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P)A[RV 2 ANSWERs 
The sets of answers which follow are responses to the 
framework of questions established in-Part I. Unless other- 
wise indicated, the method-used has been to take the con- 
tributor through the questions orally, to type out the 
answers, and to send them to him or her to be checked and 
amended. Each is prefaced by a brief biographical note, and 
by an editorial comment. 
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Biographical Note 
Lord Carrington has been Secretary-General of NATO since June 1984. Born 
in i9i9, he won the Military Cross in the Second World War, first held 
Ministerial office as Parliamentary Secretary of State at the Ministry of Agri- 
culture and Fisheries in 1951, and served as United Kingdom High Com- 
missioner in Australia from 1956 to 1959. He then served successively as: First 
4' 
Lord of the Admiralty 1959-63; Leader of the Opposition, House of Lords 
1964-70,1974-79; Secretary of State for Defence 1970-74; and Secretary of 
State for Energy 1974. He was Secretary of State for Foreign and Common- 
wealth Affairs from 1979 until his resignation in April 1982. 
Editorial Comment 
Communicated during the course of an informal interview in Brussels on 
July 14,1986, this set of answers represents the response of an influential 
international statesman, who has held office of Ministerial rank almost con- 
tinuously since the age of thirty-two. His familiarity with the working of 
national and international bureaucracies, and his wide experience in the con- 
duct of public affairs, make him impatient of what he regards as unpractical 
theorizing of all kinds. In the conversational form of this interview, his expo- 
sition of the central perception that deterrence depends upon uncertainty is 
characteristically clear, forthright and direct. The reader may, perhaps, learn 
most from answers such as those to questions A2(A)(iii) and B(iii), which, 
within this context, explicitly acknowledge the conceptual gulf separating 
those who believe in the efficacy of nuclear deterrence from those who do not, 
and explain why the latter fail to grasp the essential principle upon which 
collective security continues to depend. 
LORD CARRINGTON 
A. Global Policy 
i. The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 1945? 
You can't prove it one way or the other - it's almost impossible to say that one 
or the other is true. But is it just coincidence that, since nuclear weapons have 
existed, there has been no serious quarrel in Europe, which before was so 
quarrelsome? 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
The two sets of questions are too clever. The real reason is much more simple. 
It's to do with the horror of nuclear weapons in everybody's minds. They deter 
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from all major wars, because we are all so frightened of what might happen. 
It's as simple as that. 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
If you believe, as I do, that the answer to the second question is as I have 
said that it is, then the answer to the third question is that it is better for 
people to be frightened of nuclear war all the 'way down the scale. It has to 
do with credibility. If you didn't have these options, people might be less 
frightened. I 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
I don't hold either of these views. It seems to me that it's perfectly possible to 
have your nuclear deterrence at a much lower level than you have now. There's 
much too much, so get rid of what is not needed. We would probably all be 
happier if numbers were reduced. That is why we are currently negotiating 
for substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. 
On the other hand, I don't believe that, because you've got too much, it 
necessarily makes life more dangerous.. The capability to kill yourself eleven 
times over is superfluous, but not -necessarily dangerous. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
I don't agree with either of these alternatives. It seems to me that balance 
between the super powers has been achieved over a period of years, because 
the Russians have caught up. Beforehand you had just as good a deterrent 
from the Western point of view, because the Americans had an enormous 
superiority and were invulnerable. As they didn't intend to use their nuclear 
weapons in a first strike, but only if the Russians did anything disagreeable, 
you had a very reasonable nuclear deterrent. Now the Russians have caught 
up, so you have a nuclear balance. It's not a question of whether you want a 
nuclear balance. 
As to the question of arms control, both sides have a different idea of 
balance. The role of arms control has been to codify two different perceptions 
and two different force structures. Within these parameters, I think that, apart 
from the fact that critics can make the case that numbers in certain areas have 
increased, they have overall established a framework that has been helpful. 
C 
(vi) Has force-planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
Certainly not the latter, but not entirely the former either. It's a sort of grey 
area, isn't it? There undoubtedly are pressures from inventors and technol- 
ogists and the military, but they are held in political check in the West and 
are on the whole under political control. There has been an overall discipline 
about force requirements, and so on, in NATO. It may be that the greater 
relative strength of the military within the Soviet Union and the large sums of 
money available, mean that there the momentum is held less closely under 
political restraint -I wouldn't know. 
2. The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable 
future? 
OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
What you have to do here, I think, is separate two questions. If you are asking 
`is there a greater technical capacity to effect a first strike? ', then the arguments 
that there may be such a capacity are probably fairly convincing as far as they 
go - although that debate is full of uncertainties. But if you are asking `is it 
more likely that someone is going to try this? ', then you are in a completely 
different area, and I would have said definitely `no'. 
You cannot say that it is `inconceivable' that someone might try this, because 
you never know what political developments there may be in any country - 
Mr Gorbachev might be unexpectedly replaced by a more extreme figure, 
perhaps slightly deranged, and believing that he has a first-strike weapon that 
can give him superiority. But this remains highly improbable. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication 
and intelligence facilities likely to remain 
secure? 
OR Does the amount of information to be 
processed, pressure of time and fear of 
preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
Once again it can be argued that there are technological developments that 
could threaten the survivability of command, control and communications 
facilities. But I don't see any particular development making that happen. In 
any case, the more worried people get, the more careful they are going to be. 
And that, as I have said before, is in general a good thing. 
As to inadvertent war, it remains, or should remain, a major objective of 
the arms control process to make this less likely. It has already done quite a 
lot in that direction. 
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(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited 
nuclear exchange would it be likely to end 
hostilities swiftly? 
OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
illusion? 
I find this sort of question absolutely impossible to answer. All I can do is give 
you my view of deterrence. To begin with the Americans had an overwhelming 
superiority. First of all, they were the only people who had nuclear weapons. 
Then there was a period when they had the ability to wipe out the Soviet 
Union and they were almost invulnerable. But now that you have got a balance, 
the only thing that makes deterrence credible is uncertainty. Since you can 
never get certainty, what you actually want, is uncertainty. We are not going 
to be the aggressors; but we want to leave in the mind of the Soviet Union a 
real doubt as to what would happen if they were to attack us. That's why a 
declaration of `no first use' of nuclear weapons is a bad idea: it makes it easier 
for the Kremlin to calculate the costs of military adventure. 
So, from the point of view of nuclear deterrence, it's a good thing that there 
is doubt as to whether a nuclear exchange be limited. The difficulty with these 
sorts of things is that you are arguing on two levels. You are arguing first of 
all about deterrence, and then those represented by the questions on the right 
are arguing about what you would do if deterrence failed. And the two things 
are not the same. The aim is to make it as difficult as possible for deterrence 
to fail - to make it so difficult that deterrence doesn't fail. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
It is not the modernization of theatre nuclear weapons that lowers the nuclear 
threshold, but the weakening of conventional capabilities. If theatre nuclear 
forces are modernized as part of a response to a qualitatively new threat, 
then they reinforce deterrence. It is failure to meet that threat which would 
undermine your deterrent abilities. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in r? 
How on earth can we know this until we know what it can do? All we can do 
at this stage is to speculate about the possible implications. For example, if 
you had a system which you thought would work and you deployed it by 
agreement with the Soviet Union, and at the same time substantially reduced 
your offensive weapons, I think that everybody would say that that would be 
stabilizing. But we can also imagine possibilities that would be destabilizing. 
Both the Soviet Union and the United States are engaged in this area of 
research, but none of us can know yet what the possibilities will be, so we 
cannot answer these questions. Find out what you can do, and what the 
consequences would be, before you make your decision whether or not to 
carry on and deploy. 
B 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
proliferation best met by a continuation by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
of past policies? process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
I would rather not see further proliferation, but it is not what the great powers 
do along these lines that will be decisive. I suspect that what determines the 
attitude of, say, the Argentinians and Brazilians, or the Indians and Pakistanis, 
depends much more on Argentina/Brazil or India/Pakistan than on anything 
the great powers are doing. But the conference rhetoric is of course rather 
different. In this kind of forum, where the great powers may be trying to 
campaign against nuclear proliferation, it may be diplomatically helpful if they 
can say `look, we are cutting down our arsenals' - but it's no more than that. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
offer the best prospect for future stability? attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
I think that current bilateral and multilateral negotiations will produce worth- 
while measures of disarmament. 
The `alternative school' appear to recommend unilateral concessions in the 
hope that the Soviet Union will reciprocate, but they never explain why this 
should happen, or what we should do if it doesn't. 
Even if the Soviet Union did reciprocate, it would only be with the coin 
that they had offered in existing negotiations, and that would almost certainly 
be an unsatisfactory bargain from the Western point of view. It might well be 
that they would offer even less than this, and extremely unlikely that they 
would offer more. I 
Take the example of chemical weapons. The Americans did in effect unilat- 
erally disarm for seventeen years, when they made it plain to the Russians that 
they were not going to produce more chemical weapons. Meanwhile, the 
Russians continued to maintain enormous stocks of 350,000 tons of these 
beastly things, and saw no reason to behave differently. 
When you pin the critics down in private and say `are you a unilateral 
disarmer? ', many of them say `no'. But they are reluctant to say so in public, 
or to explain what the alternatives are. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
would war between the great powers again incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
become a rational option and therefore affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
more likely? to initiate a third world war? 
If you believe, as I do, that nuclear deterrence has played a part in preventing 
a third world war, then to remove it is to increase the danger that there will 
be one. Without nuclear deterrence, you have a very large preponderance 
of conventional weapons and superiority for the Warsaw Pact over NATO. 
Whatever they may sometimes say, advocates of unilateral nuclear disarma- 
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ment for the West are certainly not prepared to put more money into conven- 
tional weapons. Does that fill you with confidence? 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be 
likely in itself to be as terrible as a limited 
nuclear war? 
OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
preferable to nuclear war? 
A major conventional war would, indeed, be appalling. I have fought in one. 
It was very nasty. The next would probably be worse. 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented would they not be bound to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
th, 'ere be no incentive to resort to I 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
I don't know. This is all hypothetical, and it's not going to happen. 
(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only 
feasible in a world where war itself is no 
longer a possibility? 
OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
hope of a rational world-order? 
Let's be practical about this. You are not going to get `global nuclear disarma- 
ment'. What you may get is a very much lower level of weaponry, which would 
make everybody feel better, including me. 
(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen 
to be prepared for war, as failure before 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under 
likely future conditions would global 
nuclear disarmament make war, including 
nuclear war, more likely? 
OR Do the years before 1914 show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? 
Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
The suggestion on the right that there is an arms race galloping out of control 
is wrong. But the other side isn't the whole answer either, because it's all too 
compressed. 
B. Nato Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
evenly matched? 
This depends upon a number of factors. For example, which forces you count, 
which area, whether both sides mobilize at the same time and so on. Under 
the right circumstances we would hope to do reasonably well, but reinforce- 
ment would be a critical factor. However, all theorizing apart, let's just say 
that, whether you like it or not - and I don't - they have the capacity to do a 
great deal more than we can. 
to 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
which will take advantage of unilateral threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western concessions and is only restrained Western technology and likely to respond 
and forced to accept arms-control positively to unconditional offers of 
agreements by Western determination and Western restraint within a general context 
strength? of detente? 
No one can say for certain what their intentions are. A simple analogy helps 
to make the point: if there is an elephant in the next-door garden, you have a 
fence to protect your flower beds. You do, not spend a lot of time trying to 
find out what the elephant's intentions are. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
preponderance such that NATO must nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
continue to be able to threaten early use of strategically suicidal? 
nuclear weapons? 
I have really already answered this, because we are back to the question of 
uncertainty. But let me be clear, we do not threaten anything - all we say is 
that we maintain the option to use nuclear weapons if and when necessary if 
we are attacked. 
And once again we are arguing on two levels. I am arguing from the point 
of view of deterrence: making it clear to the elephant that he cannot be sure 
what we would do if he trampled down the fence, in order to deter him and 
keep him off the flower bed. Critics ask what would happen if deterrence 
failed tomorrow morning. If I were to try to reassure them in the way they 
want, I would be undermining the deterrent which is designed to prevent that 
from happening. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
What is important here is the change in composition of Soviet nuclear forces, 
not so much the growth in size. If there is a qualitative change on the other 
side, you reassure people by adjusting accordingly, so that we are seen to have 
the ability to respond. Although the SSaos in a way replaced the SS4s and 
SSSs that were already there, they seemed to be a different kind of threat and 
Europeans did find them that degree more terrifying. If the other side is 
getting qualitatively stronger and you do nothing, for long enough, you under- 
mine your deterrent abilities, so that in that sort of situation modernization 
reinforces deterrence. And at the same time, by the way, you strengthen 
Transatlantic linkage. 
As to the idea of a `freeze', I can't sec why people are so keen on it. It seems 
to me that it's much better to get reductions than to freeze the thing at the 
wrong levels; and we would do much better to concentrate on reductions. 
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(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
I fail to see how people can use the term `provocative' to describe our capabili- 
ties. It's idiotic to call it `provocative' if you hit back when the other side starts 
a war. Everything we say and do points to a defensive strategy. Forward 
defence cannot be called provocative. It's just that West German territory is 
relatively small and understandably they don't want it sacrificed. If it were 
not for forward defence, our forces might look slightly different, but neither 
posture is provocative. And `emerging technology' has nothing to do with it. 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the t}ding-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
OR Is it domination by the two super-powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super-power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
The left-hand side is right. The right-hand side is partly wrong, partly unre- 
alistic. People tend to forget that an independent Western European defence 
could have serious and potentially dangerous consequences. A European 
defence force capable of defending itself against the Soviet Union would, 
among other things, mean Western Europe building up quite a large strategic 
nuclear force; and then the Soviet Union might see itself facing two very 
powerful, potential opponents and count them together and respond accord- 
ingly. So all you would be doing would be to build up an arms race. 
If the Americans did decide to go home, you would probably find it very 
difficult to get the Europeans to take their own defence seriously. But the 
Americans have no intention of pulling out, not so much because they love 
us, but because it's in their own interest to stay. There are, of course, Amer- 
icans who question this; and others who complain about how much they do 
to defend Europe. But that's not the whole story, because it is also their own 
interests they are defending. 
As for a European nuclear weapon-free zone, it's all part of goodwill flabbi- 
ness. Whatever you might declare yourself to be, the Soviet Union would 
retain systems targeted on Western Europe. And if you are nevertheless pre- 
pared to believe Soviet assurances that they would not target you if you were 
a nuclear weapon-free zone, why not believe them when they say that they 
will never use their conventional weapons against you either? Why bother 
about defence at all? The idea of a European nuclear weapon-free zone is 
meaningless - except, of course, to those other countries who would be left 
shouldering the burden and responsibility for Western defence. 
1Z 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
Those who talk about radical Western unilateral disarmament concessions are 
not talking about defence. They are talking about giving in - whatever they 
may say. Some of these people may have ulterior political motives, but many 
are well-intentioned people, whose main aim is to avoid war, but who do not 
understand that the only way in which this can be done is through the kind 
of deterrence that we have been discussing here. 
C. British Policy 
i. The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and 
independence and protects her from nuclear 
blackmail? 
OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
`deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
encourage proliferation? 
There are so many strands to this whole question that one can't just answer 
`yes' or `no'. I think that there's a very powerful feeling in Britain in favour 
of keeping a British nuclear capability. Perhaps a greater number supportive 
of our own deterrent than of American bases. 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
Then there is the question of ensuring European defence in the longer term. 
What would happen if in ten, fifteen or twenty years' time, the Americans 
thought that we were no longer sufficiently interested in defending ourselves, 
and decided to pull out of Europe? Where would that leave us? We need to 
keep a European nuclear option open in case that eventuality is forced on us. 
Other Western Europeans are in favour of the British nuclear force, inciden- 
tally. 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent British initiatives more likely 
to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
involvement? 
This is a factor that is usually neglected. The Americans actually like having 
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the French and British nuclear deterrents, because to some extent it absolves 
them from having total responsibility for these things. Do you think that they 
are allowing us Trident because of our bright blue eyes? No. They want, to 
feel that others are prepared to share the responsibility. 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are afforded at the expense of conventional 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
It depends how much you're preriared to pay for your own national sovereign 
independence. If you are not prepared to pay, and want something else 
instead, that's your business. Although there is a lot of talk about cheaper 
alternatives, I very much doubt that there are any. Of course, it all depends 
how effective you want your deterrent to be. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament have no effect on other 
countries and only serve to weaken British 
influence and allow France unchallenged 
ascendancy in Europe? 
OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
British prestige? Would British 
disarmament within the context outlined in 
B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
British unilateral nuclear disarmament would have virtually no effect on other 
countries who might be considering taking up the nuclear option. And it 
would have no effect on the Soviet Union, either. We are told that the Soviet 
Union is willing to reduce by the number we reduce by. What does this amount 
to? I suspect that it is really double counting. Suppose that the British reduce 
by a hundred and the Russians go down by a hundred. But the Russians then 
continue to insist on parity with the Americans in their negotiations with 
them, so that the hundred that have been `sold' to us are double counted and 
are sold to the Americans as well. We would only get a real trade-off if the 
Americans and the Russians reach agreement and established parity first, and 
then the Russians were prepared to reduce by an extra hundred in response 
to a corresponding British reduction. That is not a very likely thing for the 
Russians to do. 
In addition to this, we must ask whether it would be a good thing from a 
European point of view, if we were to give up a British nucleär capability. I 
think most of our Allies are happier if we and the French both share this 
particular burden. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
continue to ensure effective British strategic all the drawbacks listed above? 
defence into the 21st century? 
We need Trident for all of the reasons I have already given. Despite the cost, 
it is still relatively cheap for the job it will do. 
14 
i. NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
Britain must indeed continue to share responsibility for her own defence. And 
this includes her involvement in manning nuclear systems in Germany, and 
so on. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain make US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affairs 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
I think that the removal of American nuclear bases from Britain would do 
more than make the defence of the West much more difficult. It would put 
the Alliance under tremendous strain. If the Americans found that one of their 
major Allies had gone unilateral, then it would really call in question the whole 
basis upon which the Americans take part in this Alliance. It would also make 
life very difficult for the Germans, and others. I think it would have very 
serious implications indeed, for our security and for that of our allies. 
Turning to the right-hand side, of course any alliance or association will 
make some difference to you, because you have to accommodate the views of 
other people. But there has certainly not been an `erosion of British sover- 
eignty'. The British Prime Minister could have said `no' to the use of bases in 
Britain for the bombing of Libya. People often forget that it is just as likely 
(or unlikely) that we would drag the Americans into something, as that they 
would drag us in. It works both ways. 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
What do you think? Of course Britain would go on being targeted. The idea 
that by going `non-nuclear' you can turn yourself into a sanctuary in these 
circumstances is illusory. I just don't believe it. 
(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
I do indeed think that if you did this you would just be taking an easy ride. I 
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agree with what is said on the left. As to the right-hand side - it's so silly, I 
have no further comment to make. 
Moral Considerations 
I am neither a theologian nor a philosopher, and I suspect that one would have 
to be both to do justice to the many questions in this section. Instead of 
addressing them one-by-one, let me try to say briefly how I look at the question 
as a whole. 
As I see it, theimain job of the Alliance is to prevent our countries from 
being attacked or effectively blackmailed by a militarily very strong and nucle- 
ar-armed power, whose own conception of morality is, to say the least, very 
different from our own. I am satisfied that this job could not be done without 
there being nuclear weapons also on the Western side. 
Those who imply that it might be all right to have nuclear weapons, pro- 
vided that we made it clear that we would never use them, are not solving the 
moral problem, but evading it: if your potential opponent were sure that you 
would never use them, they would be useless as a deterrent to aggression or 
as a counter to nuclear blackmail; if, on the other hand, you secretly hoped 
that he would remain uncertain as to whether or not you would use them, you 
would be making present allied strategy less clear - and I would say less 
effective - but morally no different. 
The points to remember are that: 
(i) The purpose of our nuclear weapons is to deter war and counter nuclear 
blackmail; 
(ii) We have succeeded in doing both; 
(iii) We shall never use any of our weapons unless we are attacked; 
(iv) If deterrence failed, and we were attacked, it would be for our political 
leaders to decide whether or not to use nuclear weapons; and the moral 
considerations would of course weigh very heavily on their, minds; 
(v) Meanwhile, we shall continue to do everything we can to reduce the 
number of nuclear weapons on both sides. 
If nuclear weapons did not exist, or could be disinvented, we wouldn't have 
these difficult moral questions to answer. But, as things are, I think that our 
policy is morally justified; and I would certainly question a morality which 
appeared to suggest that we should leave a monopoly of nuclear weapons to 
the Soviet Union. 
Recommendations 
NOTE. The unqualified `yes' and `no' answers below represent the editor's 
reading of what Lord Carrington would say, if he had to reply in one word. 
It should be understood that Lord Carrington himself would no doubt have 
wanted to expand, and perhaps qualify, some of them. 
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i No (see B(iv)). 
2 No (see A2(A)(v)). 
3 We are not at present in a position where a CTB could be signed with a 
sufficient degree of confidence in the verification regime, or of certainty 
about its implications for the credibility of our deterrent. 
4 No (see A2(A)(iii)). 
5 There should be deep, but not unconditional, cuts: this needs to be done 
by negotiation, and with effective provisions for verification (see AI(iv)). 
6 No (see B(vi)). 
7 Yes (see A2 (A)(vi)). 
8 No (see A2(B)). 
9 Does not apply. 
10 No (see A2 (A)(V)). 
tt No (see A2(A)(iii)). 
12 No (see B(vii)). 
13 No (see Ci). 
14 No (see B(vi)). 
[5 No (see B(vi)). 
[6 No (see CI). 
[7 Does not apply. 
[8 No (see C2(i)). 
[9 No (see C2(i) & (ii)). 
to Does not apply. 
lip 
(o) 
G. C. B., C. B. E., D. S. O., M. C. 
Biographical Note 
Born in 1915, Lord Carver won the D. S. O. and the Military Cross in the 
Second World War, at the end of which he was commanding the Fourth 
Armoured Brigade. Subsequently he served as Commander-in-Chief, Far 
East, between 1967 and 1969; G. O. C., Southern Command, between 1969 
and 1971; Chief of General Staff between 1971 and 1973; and Chief of the 
Defence Staff between 1973 and 1976. 
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Among his other publications is A Policy for Peace, published by Faber and 
Faber in 1982, where a fuller exposition of his thinking can be found. 
Editorial Comment 
Communicated during an interview at his home in Hampshire on February 
19th, 1986, this set of answers represents the response of an experienced man 
of action, who has held high military command for a number of years, and is 
well known for the radical nature of his thinking about military strategy. In the 
spirit of Clausewitz, Lord Carver goes back to first principles in his criticism of 
NATO `flexible response' policies as they have evolved over the past twenty 
or thirty years, and suggests ways in which this could be remedied. His aim 
is to re-establish a sound basis to military thinking, so that the threat of force 
is once again clearly related to political purpose through a coherent strategy 
for its possible use. Lord Carver's criticisms of current policy, particularly 
evident here in sections Ai, Ai(A), B, and Ci, have been widely influential 
within the peace movements. Less popular in those quarters has been his 
defence of the principle of strategic nuclear deterrence, as expounded in sec- 
tions A2(B), and C2. 
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A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 194S? 
My answer is that it has not by any means been nuclear deterrence alone that 
has kept the peace between the great powers since 1945 - although that has 
been a very important factor. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
Mutual possession of an invulnerable second-strike nuclear force is indeed 
important in preventing the use of nuclear weapons by either of the great 
nuclear powers, and also in helping to prevent major war between them, 
because of the inherent fear on both sides that a clash between their military 
forces could eventually lead to an exchange of nuclear weapons. That is why 
I do not want to see nuclear weapons abolished altogether. 
But the essential link in all this is the physical presence of the conventional 
forces of the nuclear powers in the area. If there were no US airforce or army 
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forces stationed in Europe, then, although the Soviet Union would still very 
seriously have to consider the risk of nuclear retaliation, she might nevertheless 
judge that limited action in, say, West Germany could be possible. 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
It is, as I have said, the physical presence of United States armed forces on 
the ground and in 4he air that is the important link - far more essential to my 
mind than the presence of American nuclear delivery systems in Europe. 
In response to the statement on the left, I should say `no': limited nuclear 
options at strategic and theatre levels have not enhanced deterrence since the 
time the Soviet Union has had the capacity to answer back at every level. 
As to the statement on the right - yes, I do think that it is dangerous. 
Military planners have indeed been aiming for war-fighting superiority, 
whether in terms of pure counter-force nuclear weapons strategies or more 
general war-fighting strategies which include the use of nuclear weapons. This 
is bound to be so once you try to produce military arguments to justify the 
existence of these weapons. It's probably even more applicable to the Soviet 
Union than it is to the other side. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
The answer is that it is the constant change in the size and variety of nuclear 
arsenals that has tended to be destabilizing - although as a result of what has 
been done by both sides the situation is fairly stable at the moment. But, 
turning to the question on the right-hand side - yes, this has generated a 
dangerous and strategically pointless superfluity of weapons systems. 
Undoubtedly. Particularly in the field of counter-force systems. And the prin- 
cipal threat to stability that both sides see is the fear that their static land- 
based intercontinental ballistic missiles, on which they both rely heavily, could 
be preemptively destroyed by the other. That's the principal destabilizing 
element and it's the principal element in the escalation in the numbers of 
warheads. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
If arms control is significant here - and it's something I'm beginning to doubt 
- then it is as part of the attempt to achieve the lowest possible level of strategic 
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balance of forces. At the time of SALT I Henry Kissinger saw clearly (and I was 
arguing this with General Abrahamson' only yesterday over SDI) that, if both sides 
continued in the way they were going, they would have to devote more and more 
effort to their strategic nuclear systems, and the result would not in fact enhance 
the security of either. He realized that you have got to try to find something which 
is clearly in the self-interest of both sides to follow - as when the Russians and 
Americans agreed to control nuclear testing in order to prevent proliferation. He 
wanted to bring about a situation in which both sides recognized this, and in the 
first instance stopped where they were, and then agreed to move downwards, as it 
were, almost back to the 1945-1950 state of affairs. 
Turning to the statement on the right, I wouldn't say that `arms control' 
has just been `another name for the arms race' - what I would say, though, is 
that as yet it has shown hardly any promise of limiting the numbers and variety 
of nuclear weapons. It has so far proved impossible to achieve what Kissinger 
wanted because of mutual mistrust. Some kind of balance at reduced levels 
depends on confidence on both sides that each is in fact attempting to pursue 
the target and not attempting to evade it - and that's very difficult to achieve. 
But it's not impossible. 
(vi) Has force planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
I would have said that on balance, as Solly Zuckerman' has pointed out in a 
number of different articles, it has definitely been the impetus of technology 
and vested interest on both sides of the Iron Curtain dictating policies, which 
have then been justified afterwards. 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable 
future? 
OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
The threat of an enemy first strike is obviously not inconceivable, because, as 
long as both sides maintain weapons systems which are clearly designed for 
first strike, the threat remains. All counter-force systems are by definition first 
strike weapons, because there is no point in firing at the other side's weapons 
system after it has itself been fired. Therefore you must strike first. There is 
also no doubt that a combination of MIRVs and of greater accuracy makes the 
threat of a strike against a static land-based missile system more difficult to 
counter than it was before - although of course a solid fuel powered missile in 
a deep silo is more difficult to destroy. 
t. Director of the Strategic Defence Initiative Office. 
2. Former Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government, 196o-1966. See, for example, Science 
Advisers, Scientific Advisers, and Nuclear Weapons (1980). 
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Both the Soviet Union and the United States maintain that they would never be 
the first to make a strategic nuclear strike. But both at the same time argue that they 
must nevertheless retain that capability, in case they come to the conclusion that 
the other is about to do so - and if they do come to that conclusion, then they will 
have to strike first! So each is a reflection of the other. If they would only go for 
systems that were mobile or very difficult to detect, like long-range submarine bal- 
listic missile systems, they would not have the problem. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilit? es likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
Command and control systems are, on the contrary, likely to become more 
secure in future even than they are now, I think. In the days when you had 
liquid fuelled systems to get ready to fire and almost archaic communications 
networks which were extremely vulnerable, not only to electronic but also to 
physical counter-measures, there was a much greater danger of inadvertent 
war. But now, with the astonishing advances that there have been in micro- 
electronics, seventy-five percent of your communications can be knocked out 
and the system will still work perfectly well. 
By far the most important confidence-building measure that has ever been intro- 
duced, by the way, has been mutual acquiescence by each side in the ability of the 
other to observe activity from space- and the greatest possible danger would come 
if either threatened to do away with the other's observation satellites. 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
There is absolutely no likelihood that a limited nuclear exchange would be 
likely to end hostilities swiftly. The one clear distinction that can be made in 
this whole field is that between the use and the non-use of nuclear weapons. 
Almost everybody, including people like Harold Brown' and- others, agrees 
that once you have used nuclear weapons there is no knowing where it will 
lead - you just cannot calculate what the other side's reaction is going to be. 
Indeed, you can't even calculate what your own side's reaction is going to be. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
deterrence? nuclear threshold? 
So far as concerns the question on the left, I can't see how new theatre systems 
make the slightest difference to deterrence. For example, the fact that the 
Pershing II has got a longer range than the Pershing I doesn't alter the 
characteristics of the system. The Soviet authorities are fussed because it is 
t. US Secretary of Defense under President Carter, 1977-81. 
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now possible to reach the Soviet Union from Western Europe, but submarine- 
based missiles could do this before anyway. As for the Cruise missile, it worries 
the Soviet Union because, although it would not be difficult to devise a defence 
against it, this would be very expensive. But once again it doesn't make any 
difference to deterrence. I would like the Cruise missile restricted to non- 
nuclear warheads and used for all those missions other than very short range 
ones for which NATO now thinks it wants to employ manned aircraft. Half 
the problem for NATO over the past twenty years has been to find targets for 
its nuclear weapons! 
So far as the right-hand side goes, it's things like enhanced radiation 
weapons, which everyone has almost forgotten about now, that would indeed 
lower the nuclear threshold and for that reason be very dangerous. It would 
increase the pressure from the military on the President to agree to the initial 
use of nuclear warheads. 
v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in t? 
In response to these questions you have to consider what the aim of the Stra- 
tegic Defence Initiative is and that has never been clear. 
First there is the President's vision of making nuclear weapons obsolete, or, 
a little less ambitious, of defending the whole of the United States. The critical 
target here is said to be that ninety-five per cent of all warheads launched 
should be intercepted and destroyed: that is a very stringent test. In any case 
even five per cent of the present deliverable stock of Soviet warheads would 
do untold damage. And no-one is suggesting that anything like this will apply, 
say, to Europe. 
Then we must consider whether a lower target is something worth getting 
involved in - for example, just the protection of the US delivery systems 
themselves. The sophisticated argument used here by the state department, 
the defence department, the arms control agency and everybody else who is 
involved, when they can agree among themselves, is to invoke Paul Nitze's' 
criteria: that SDI will enhance deterrence by making the system more surviv- 
able and therefore more stable, and will also make it more cost-effective than 
the alternative continuing escalation in offensive systems. This takes us right 
back to all the arguments why at the time of the ABM treaty the US, correctly 
in my opinion, decided not to go ahead with ABM systems. I challenged 
General Abrahamson with this yesterday. I asked him why he thought that 
there was going to be a totally different result from what the whole history of 
weapons development has shown, which is that the moment one side begins 
to improve its defence the other improves its offence, and so on. This is exactly 
the sort of situation that Henry Kissinger foresaw which impelled him into 
arms control talks. So I believe it's a wrong road to follow. 
t. Chief United States arms negotiator for many years. 
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(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
proliferation best met by a continuation of by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
past policies? process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
I find this a difficult question to answer because, although I can't, in theory, see 
why mutual possession of nuclear weapons by, say, Iran and Iraq shouldn't prevent 
war between them, nevertheless I think that a world in which a great many people 
had nuclear weapons would be less safe. So I am in general against proliferation. 
But although there's a lot of talk to the effect that continuing reliance on nuclear 
deterrence by the great powers encourages proliferation, I don't think that 
decisions`taken by countries like South Africa, Israel, South Korea, Argentina or 
anybody else to develop or not to develop a nuclear weapon is going to be deter- 
mined by how many the Soviet Union, the Unitet. i States, we, the French or the 
Chinese have; nor do I think that if we suddenly decided tomorrow to give up all 
our nuclear weapons it would make anybody else give them up. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
offer the best prospect for future stability? attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
I fall back here on what Michael Howard never tires of saying which is that it 
is policies which matter, not arms control negotiations. It is the policy adopted 
by the West towards the Soviet Union and vice versa which is significant. If 
policies are sensible, you might get sensible answers in other fields. In particu- 
lar it might be possible for each side to realize at last that it is in their mutual 
interest first of all to give up these wretched static land-based systems (the 
Russians will be particularly reluctant to do this), and secondly to do away 
with the battlefield systems which NATO has tended to pioneer. If we could 
get rid of these two we would be half way to solving the problem and eliminat- 
ing the main areas of proliferation. But if both sides go on feeling that arms 
control negotiations are a threat and that the only way to conduct them is by 
negotiating from strength, then we might well be better off without them. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
war between the great powers again incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
become a rational option and therefore affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
more likely? to initiate a third world war? 
I do not share the President's vision and I find it hypocritical of the British 
government to claim in successive White Papers that its aim is total and com- 
plete nuclear disarmament. My answer is, therefore, that, if nuclear arsenals 
were dismantled, war between major industrial nations would indeed appear 
to become a rational option again. 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited preferable to nuclear war? 
nuclear war? 
24. 
Depending upon a number of factors a major conventional war in Europe, if 
it lasted any length of time, would create terrible destruction, but nothing 
comparable to a limited nuclear war. 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented would they not be bound to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
there be no incentive to resort to 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
But the fact remains that even if through international agreement, nuclear 
weapons had somehow or other been eliminated, and some sort of international 
inspection had verified this (though I have no idea how), the moment hostilities 
did start it would not be long before they reappeared. Even schoolboys now 
know how to make them. 
(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only 
feasible in a world where war itself is no 
longer a possibility? 
OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
hope of a rational world-order? 
On the right hand side - in a way this is what both the Soviet Union and the 
United States are professing that they want. So what's to stop it? It would 
certainly be far cheaper than the Strategic Defence Initiative! But the fact is 
that I can't imagine a world where war itself is no longer a possibility. 
(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen 
to be prepared for war, as failure before 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under 
likely future conditions would global 
nuclear disarmament make war, including 
nuclear war, more likely? 
OR Do the years before 1914 show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? 
Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
As I have said I do think that global nuclear disarmament would make 
war, including nuclear war, more likely. But the continuing proliferation 
of nuclear weapons systems is unnecessary and dangerous. The only rational 
policy would therefore be one in which, among other things, nuclear arsenals 
were reduced to the minimum strategic force needed for effective mutual 
deterrence - preferably in the form of long range submarine ballistic missile 
systems. 
B. NATO Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
evenly matched? 
In terms of conventional arms within the European theatre the Soviet Union 
enjoys a considerable superiority in numbers of land forces and air forces but 
is inferior in naval forces. And there is no doubt that the Soviets can, as 
they did in the Second World War, develop the most enormous conventional 
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military power. But the presence of United States ground and air forces in 
Europe, together with her undoubted capacity to inflict enormous damage on 
the Soviet Union, to my mind means that there is a stable strategic balance. 
Of course, if NATO's conventional forces became so weak that the Soviet 
Union thought that it could achieve a swift result and present the other side 
with a fait accompli, particularly if it didn't involve any direct hostilities against 
United States forces, well, then that might be another matter. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
which will take advantage of unilateral threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western concessions and is only restrained Western technology and likely to respond 
and forced to accept arms-control ' positively to unconditional offers of 
agreements by Western determination and Western restraint within a general context 
strength? of detente? 
This is a very interesting question because, in territorial terms, I don't think 
that the Soviet Union's history shows it to be an expansionist power at all. 
What lies at the heart of the problem and makes the whole thing so difficult 
is that the Soviet Union believes in and propagates an ideological, cultural, 
political, social and economic theory of how society should be organized which 
is in total opposition to the capitalist democratic West. They, like us, would 
like to see as many countries as possible turn in their direction. But they have 
in many ways been more cautious than we have in setting about it - and 
extraordinarily unsuccessful too. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
preponderance such that NATO must nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
continue to be able to threaten early use of strategically suicidal? 
nuclear weapons? 
I don't think that the question of chemical weapons is so important. So far as 
redressing any conventional imbalance goes, reliance on the early use of 
nuclear weapons is simply no answer. The facts of the matter are that, if 
NATO initiated the use of nuclear weapons, it would suffer proportionately 
much more damage than the Warsaw Pact and its forces, so it would be cutting 
off its nose to spite its face. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
I don't think that the theatre balance matters at all. I don't go along with this 
constant German fear of decoupling - that if you don't have American nuclear 
delivery systems based on land in Europe then the Soviet Union might think 
that it could invade Western Europe without receiving anything nuclear in 
reply. A fraction of the present Soviet nuclear arsenal could wipe out the whole 
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of Europe tomorrow, so that adding or subtracting a few warheads doesn't 
make the slightest difference. The number of SS2os that they have is com- 
pletely irrelevant. 
I'm against freezes, because you begin to argue about what you're going to 
freeze, and then you can't give anything up because you've frozen it. I favour 
unconditional cuts. That's the better way. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
The important thing about emerging technologies in terms of warheads, deliv- 
ery systems and, above all, target acquisitioning is that it makes it much more 
possible for you to have a non-nuclear way of dealing with the other side's 
forces, particularly his threatened superiority in conventional weapons, than 
you had before - which is a very good thing. It could free you to a certain 
extent from overdependence on first use of nuclear weapons. 
Forward defence on the other hand is forced on NATO for German political 
reasons. The Federal Republic is not prepared to sacrifice great stretches of 
land in order to play for time. If it wasn't for this, we would adopt a military 
posture in greater depth for good military reasons. 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
OR Is it domination by the two super-powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super-power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
I think that this is the heart of the matter. It is absolutely essential both that 
American troops remain in Europe and that the United States should maintain 
an effective strategic nuclear deterrent. But there's a great exaggeration of the 
need for a whole series of steps in the nuclear ladder. Since NATO would 
suffer more than the other side, the question is raised whether we need theatre 
nuclear forces at all. To my mind the only valid function of theatre nuclear 
forces now is to make it absolutely clear to the Soviet Union that it could not 
itself employ nuclear weapons in Europe with impunity. It is a retaliatory and 
not a first use function. 
But it makes no sense to talk about `decoupling' Europe from the super- 
power nuclear confrontation, or to recommend a nuclear weapon-free zone, 
when the Soviet Union will retain any number of means of delivering nuclear 
weapons which don't depend upon what you call theatre nuclear systems. 
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(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament-invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of 'multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
Unilateral initiatives are not the only way to reverse the arms race, but I do 
thipk that they are probabaly the best way. If we have decided in Western 
Europe that we don't need certain systems, it is probably much better for us 
to say, as we have done in certain cases, that we are going to give them up and 
hope that the other side would do the same, but that we are not going to get 
involved in an argument about reciprocity or verifiability. Of course, this 
would not necessarily mean that the other side would give up theirs straight 
away - although it might persuade them that it wasn't worth their while 
developing successor systems. 
So far as the questions on the left-hand side go, if for example we and the 
French were to decide to give up our nuclear weapons tomorrow, it wouldn't 
make the slightest difference to what the Soviet Union did, as long as we were 
prepared to go on manning NATO delivery systems with American nuclear 
warheads. If, on the other hand, all the European members of NATO were 
to turn to the US and say that they would no longer go on manning these 
systems, that would be a shattering blow to NATO, would make it more likely 
that the Americans would wash their hands of Europe, and, in the event, 
would indeed lay Europe open to Soviet blackmail. 
C British Policy 
i The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and 
independence and protects her from nuclear 
blackmail? 
OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
`deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
encourage proliferation? 
The left-hand side represents an instinctive response that has been there from 
the start. If all else fails, we can stand on our own feet. It's what Margaret 
Thatcher and Heseltine have said and is sometimes heard running around the 
Ministry of Defence. But it doesn't make sense, and in any case is not an 
argument you can put forward in front of your allies, because it implies that 
you have let Europe be overrun without doing anything about it with your 
nuclear weapons. 
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(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
This is the theory put forward by the government in its official paper `The 
Future of the British Strategic Deterrent' when Francis Pym was Minister of 
Defence. It's exactly the opposite of the `last resort' argument, because it 
implies, absurdly, that even though the Russians might think that the Amer- 
icans would hesitate to use nuclear weapons for fear of retaliation against their 
cities, they would believe that the'. I British would be happy to sacrifice their 
cities for the sake of Europe. British independent nuclear forces are of no 
value to European allies, and this `second centre' argument implies mistrust 
of the Americans. 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent British initiatives more likely 
to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
involvement? 
British nuclear forces guarantee nothing. The only thing the American like 
about it is that there are other people besides themselves who can share the 
odium of having these weapons. They are also afraid that an anti-nuclear 
movement in this country could affect them. 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? 
OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
afforded at the expense of conventional 
strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
In answer to the left-hand side: since I don't believe that it playes a vital 
defence role at all, you don't need an `alternative'. Turning to the right-hand 
side: it's bound to be at the expense of conventional strength - as long as the 
money set aside is to be spent on defence as it should be. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament have no effect on other 
countries and only serve to weaken British 
influence and allow France unchallenged 
ascendancy in Europe? 
OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
British prestige? Would British 
disarmament within the context outlined in 
B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
I think that I have already answered this. I don't believe that whether or not 
Britain keeps an independent nuclear force makes much difference to anybody 
else. If the French want to waste their money on these things let them. 
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(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to 
continue to ensure effective British strategic 
defence into the 21st century? 
OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
all the drawbacks listed above? 
It is the cohesion, self-confidence and general strength of NATO that is essen- 
tial for British strategic defence, not an independent nuclear force. On the 
other hand, if you did think that an independent nuclear force was important, 
then there can be little doubt that Trident is the best answer. David Owen's 
recommendation of alternatives is just equivocation. My only argument 
, against 
Trident is that it's a waste of money. 
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i NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NA TO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
I would certainly say `yes' to the left-hand side. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain make US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affairs 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
What really matters is what the Germans do - they're the people who really 
matter - although of course the forced removal of American nuclear bases 
from Britain would be an extremely serious blow to NATO. If we were neutral, 
US defence of the West would still be physically possible, but politically this 
would threaten the total break-up of NATO. 
As for American interference in British affairs -I should say that as far as 
defence is concerned it's negligible, but it appears that in economic affairs it's 
quite considerable! 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
Because Soviet nuclear delivery systems are primarily targeted against Amer- 
ican nuclear delivery systems in Europe, we are less likely to be targeted if we 
don't have American nuclear delivery bases in this country. This is one of the 
arguments for having them at sea. I can't see the argument for having these 
things on land. It's a question of persuading the Germans of this. 
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(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
Ideally we would have American ground troops in Europe and then sub- 
marine-based nuclear forces. It is perfectly possible to have a valid theatre 
nuclear weapons system under the aegis of the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR) that is based at sea. All theatre systems should be totally 
detached from the land, airforce and navy organizations and held under very 
tight separate control by the Supreme Allied Commanders. This would get 
Margaret Thatcher off the hook - there would be no land-based nuclear deliv- 
ery systems and British nuclear forces would be assigned to NATO, which is 
what we have always said is their primary purpose. I would drop the indepen- 
dent strategic side to it. But in the meantime Britain must be prepared to man 
NATO nuclear delivery systems. 
Moral Considerations 
(i) Is it morally right to pursue the policy least OR Are there actions which are in themselves 
likely to cause human suffering? May this wrong no matter what the situation? Is the 
sometimes involve doing things which in alternative to excuse almost any act of 
other circumstances would be wrong? barbarism? 
(ii) In formulating policy should we weigh up 
the probability of success and the relative 
costs in terms of human suffering of 
alternative nuclear and non-nuclear 
strategies? 
OR Is the only relevant point here that a 
nuclear exchange of almost any kind 
would in itself cause unimaginable 
suffering to largely civilian populations? 
I'm not very good on morals, but taking the right-hand side first, I think that 
there are actions which are wrong in themselves - shooting a man in cold blood 
when he's helpless is a thing which is wrong no matter what the situation. 
There is no doubt that a nuclear exchange would cause terrible suffering to 
civilian populations and I think that Mgr O'Brien made an important point 
when he said to me once that, although it may in certain circumstances be 
moral to kill someone in order to prevent him from killing your wife, it is not 
moral to kill him in revenge afterwards - so a retaliatory second strike. would 
be morally wrong. But all of life is a matter of very difficult judgement - 
usually between two conflicting evils, not between right and wrong. 
(iii) So far as concerns intention, need we look 
no further than the fact that our sole aim in 
deploying nuclear weapons is to prevent 
their use? 
OR Is there no such thing as a fully deployed 
weapons system which is a bluff? Is to 
deploy nuclear weapons to intend to use 
them in certain circumstances? 
This is very difficult. Our response must be at any rate to try to reduce the 
4 "w 
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thing so that the smallest possible number are employed. But there is no doubt 
that to deploy and man these systems is to be prepared to use them in certain 
circumstances. 
(iv) Are there possible uses of nuclear weapons 
which are allowed by Just War theory, for 
example the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in order to prevent worse 
suffering? Can there be a theory of Just 
Deterrence? 
OR Is a conditional intention to cause 
indiscriminate and disproportionate 
suffering of this kind, whether admonitory, 
preemptive or retaliatory, ruled out by Just 
War theory? Was it wrong to bomb 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? 
What was wrong in the cases of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to drop the 
bombs on cities. But at the time it was greeted with relief and didn't seem to 
be so different to other things that had beeq going on. 
But the fact remains that now, particularly with the introduction of the fusion 
weapon, there is absolutely no means of ensuring what what you have started 
off is going to remain at that level. 
Question: So there are circumstances in which you could be morally justified 
in using your presumably retaliatory submarine-based nuclear force? 
Answer: I think that's frightfully difficult. 
Question: But, if you can't use it, don't you get to the stage where you ask 
what the point of it is? 
Answer: Yes you do. The whole thing begins to unravel. 
(v) Is there no relevant connection between the 
development and deployment of nuclear 
weapons and world poverty and disease?, 
OR Is it a scandal that such huge resources are 
devoted to the development and deployment 
of nuclear weapons and not to the 
alleviation of suffering? 
This has nothing to do with it. Don't tell me for one moment that the money 
being spent by any of the nations on their nuclear weapons systems would be 
used for alleviating suffering in this way - except possibly in their own country. 
(vi) Does Christian teaching allow the OR Does Christian teaching condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? deployment of nuclear weapons? 
Christian teaching condemns all killing. So that finishes that one. 
Recommendations 
i No (See B(iv)). 
2 Yes (See A2 (A) (ii) & (v)). 
3 Not `at once', because of the need to go on testing to make warheads 
safer and cleaner. But, as part of a general agreement on the reduction of 
warheads, `yes'. 
4 Yes. But, if counter-force systems are retained, this will not prevent their 
preemptive use when it is thought that the other side is about to strike (See 
A2(A)(i) & B(iii) & B(vi)). 
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5 Yes (See AI(iv) & AI(v) & A2(A)(vii)). 
6 SO far as concerns Europe - No (See B(vi)). 
7 Yes (See A2(A)(vi)). 
8 No (See AI(ii) & A2(B)). 
9 This should be a permanent arrangement (See A2(B)). 
io Yes (See A2(A)(v)). 
iI See 4. 
12 Unconditional cuts, Yes; a freeze, No (See B(iv)). 
13 Yes (See esp. CI(v) & C2(iv)). 
14 No (See B(vi)). 
15 See 6. 
16 Yes. Alternatively, assign it to NATO in its entirety, and drop the indepen- 
dent strategic side to it (See C2(iv)). 
17 Yes (See CI(iv)). 
18 No (See C2(i)). 
19 No (See C2(i) & C2(ii)). 
20 Does not apply. 
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Biographical Note 
Group Captain Cheshire is well known for two main reasons. First, because 
he was awarded the Victoria Cross for bravery after one hundred operations 
as a bomber pilot in the Second World War. Second, because of the work he 
has since done in founding homes for the sick and disabled. Beginning with 
the conversion of his own house into the first Cheshire Home soon after the 
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war, the enterprise has progressed to the point where there are now seventy- 
five Cheshire Homes in the United Kingdom and a further 147 in forty-five 
other countries throughout the world. There are also twenty Family Support 
Services in England, offering part-time help to elderly and handicapped people 
and to families with a handicapped member living in their own homes. 
As the official British observer, Leonard Cheshire witnessed the dropping 
of the atomic bomb on Nagasaki in 1945. His book, The Light of Many Suns, 
published by Methuen in 1985, describes that experience and explains the 
effect that it has had upon his own attitude to nuclear deterrence. 
Editorial Comment 
The answers recorded here were given in an interview on 24th June 1986 in 
Maunsel Street, the London headquarters of the Cheshire Foundation. They 
represent the conclusions of someone who has been concerned with the 
problems of just defence in the nuclear age for over forty years. Two features 
may strike the reader in particular. The first is the idea, proposed in the 
answers to A2(A)(vii) and B(vii), that what is needed is not so much a reduction 
in certain classes of nuclear weapons, as a drastic and, if necessary, unilateral 
reduction in conventional forces. This is an approach which has not been given 
proper emphasis elsewhere in the book. It may be seen to carry through to its 
logical conclusion the conviction that the mutual possession of flexible and 
invulnerable second-strike nuclear forces in itself deters from war. The second 
is the fearless way in which Leonard Cheshire defends the use of nuclear 
weapons in 1945, and their deployment today, on moral grounds. 
GROUP CAPTAIN LEONARD CHESHIRE 
A Global Policy 
i The History of Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 194S? 
It has mainly been nuclear deterrence. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
Mutual possession of an invulnerable second-strike nuclear force does prevent 
war. I don't agree with the right-hand side. 
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(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war-fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
I think that these limited nuclear options do enhance deterrence, because, if 
the only option that you had was a full strategic strike, this would be totally 
incredible. I don't agree with what is suggested on the right, because the really 
vital threshold is the one between no war at all and nuclear war. I suppose 
that it is true that military planners in the East and in the West have at heart 
been aiming for nuclear war-fighting superiority - it's only human to do that 
if you are a military planner. In fact, I think that this is unattainable, but 
nevertheless I do agree that there is a danger here. This way of thinking should 
be changed. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
I would like to see as minimal a deterrence as is effective and credible, and I 
think that there are types of nuclear weapons that we would be better without. 
In particular, I would like to do away with all battlefield nuclear weapons. 
There is a different logic to the battlefield nuclear weapon and to the strategic 
nuclear weapon. The battlefield nuclear weapon is aimed at striking the attack- 
er's army; the strategic nuclear weapon is aimed at destroying his country. So 
the latter deters in an absolute sense, 'but the former only in a relative sense. 
Moreover, since you also have the intermediate range between the two, which 
is partly battlefield because it is situated there, but also partly strategic because 
it is aimed at your homeland, there is a confusion of logic, which, I think, 
inhibits the arms control process. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
I think that the idea of nuclear balance is essential for stability. But I don't 
know the extent to which the arms control negotiations have helped or hin- 
dered it. That requires specialized knowledge which I do not have. 
(vi) Has force-planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
I am certainly afraid of the inevitable struggle on both sides to harness tech- 
nology to their advantage, and of the vested interests that are aroused as a 
result. Military planners are cast in a mould that they cannot escape from. But 
36 
I da think that there is also a strong effort to control force-planning by strategic 
thinking. 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable 
future? 
OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
I cannot believe that either side will think that it has got a first-strike capability. 
You would have to have a one hundred per cent certainty of eliminating all the 
enemy systems - you could not even afford a ninety per cent certainty. I just 
cannot believe it. And in any case, if this were threatened, you would know that 
the other side would resort to launch-on-warning. He would have to. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
I don't think that inadvertent war is likely, because both sides have a common 
vested interest in preventing it. But I think that there is a great need to make 
certain that command, control and communication facilities are secure. I think 
that there is a danger here - but not a danger of a degree that is likely to lead 
to war. 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
I simply do not know. I don't think that anyone can know, because it has 
never happened. On the one hand, as I think Olof Palme' put it, the dynamics 
of interaction might be so powerful that neither side could prevent escalation. 
On the other, the shock might be so great that hostilities would rapidly cease. 
I simply cannot believe that the superpowers would knowingly destroy one 
another. Above all, governments want to stay in power, and escalation would 
mean that they would not. It doesn't make sense. So I think that there is a 
strong case for believing that, even if some accident were to happen, both 
sides would do everything that they could to stop it rather than to carry on. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
I don't like new generations of battlefield systems, but I do see a need to 
update theatre systems - but only on the grounds that they are obsolete. I 
i. Chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, and Prime 
Minister of Sweden until his assassination in 1986. 
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can't make a judgement on particular systems, such as Pershing II and Cruise, 
because I do not have the knowledge. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in t? 
There are persuasive arguments on both sides here. I do not believe that it can 
offer a blanket defence. When you see what accidents there have been to what 
were supposed to be well-proved enterprises like the Challenger space shuttle 
and the Chernobyl reactor, you cannot believe that a complicated system such 
as SDI, which can never be tested, has a hope of being one hundred per cent 
reliable. It could be destabilizing, because it could cause the enemy to think 
that you were going for a first strike capability. On the other hand, I'm quite 
certain that the Russians are proceeding with one, too. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
As I have said, I see no alternative to our continuing to rely on nuclear deter- 
rence at great power level. And I think that the danger of `horizontal' prolifer- 
ation can be met. In the first place, a Gadaffi would only have short-range 
delivery systems, so that whatever he did could only be local. But, above all, 
if something like that were to happen, then I am sure that Russia and America 
would combine swiftly to stop them. So I don't think that the danger is as 
great as the public thinks that it is. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations 
offer the best prospect for future stability? 
OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
I do not think that we should lose faith in the multilateral arms control process. 
But I would propose something that is not usually recommended. First of all, 
in view of the terrible consequences that there would be were war of any kind 
to break out in Europe between the great powers, each side should say that war 
between the superpowers is a crime against humanity, whether conventional or 
nuclear. Either way, it's a crime against humanity. We totally renounce it. We 
declare before the world that we'll never even contemplate it. If that is so, 
then the present levels of armament in Europe, both nuclear and conventional, 
are excessive. They should be drastically reduced. But what form should these 
reductions take? It seems to me that, contrary to what most disarmers say, it 
is conventional forces that are least necessary and that pose the greatest risks. 
The most likely way for a nuclear war to break out is a conventional entangle- 
ment that begins to escalate. Most disarmers say that we should abolish nuclear 
deterrence and instead provide a secure conventional defence in Europe. But 
no-one has ever succeeded in doing this before. I just do not believe that you 
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can be so clever that you can thwart anything that the opposition may think 
up. So surely the correct thing to do is to do it the other way round: it is 
to dismantle, or virtually to dismantle, conventional defences in Europe - 
everything that could be aggressive at the conventional level - and merely aim 
to keep a policing force to maintain internal order (and conventional forces 
outside Europe for other security problems). And then, in the common inter- 
est of both sides, each should keep the insurance of a nuclear deterrent. Even 
Bruce Kent agrees that nuclear war between the superpowers is not a rational 
option - they will never deliberately fight each other with nuclear weapons. 
So in this way we would keep the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, while 
getting rid of all the other incentives to war. We would have a safe world 
between superpowers. 
The main argument that is invoked against this proposal is that it would 
not be credible. I will meet this objection in my answer to B(vii). 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would 
war between the great powers again 
become a rational option and therefore 
more likely? 
OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
to initiate a third world war? 
Well, global nuclear disarmament obviously would make war between the 
great powers a rational option again. It was always a rational option before, 
because you could think that you could achieve a limited objective and stop. 
Conventional weapons don't threaten the destruction of your homeland. They 
only threaten the defeat of your armies. There is a total difference between 
conventional and nuclear weapons. 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited preferable to nuclear war? 
nuclear war? 
Conventional war is, of course, preferable to nuclear war. But conventional 
war would in itself be so terrible that our goal must be the prevention of both. 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented would they not be bound to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
there be no incentive to resort to 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
Yes, I do think that, if a conventional war broke out, nuclear weapons would 
be bound to be used sooner or later. Both sides would think that the other 
was getting a nuclear capability, there would be a frantic struggle on both sides 
to regain the capability, and there would be none of the balanced restraints that 
we have at the moment. So we would be in a worse position than we are in 
now. 
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(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only 
feasible in a world where war itself is no 
longer a possibility? 
The left-hand side is correct. 
OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
hope of a rational world-order? 
(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen 
to be prepared for war, as failure before 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under 
likely future conditions would global 
nuclear disarmament make war, including 
nuclear war, more likely? 
OR Do the years before 1914 show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? 
Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
There is a difference between the situation as it was in the years before 1914, 
and the situation today. Before 1914, war was a normal option of state policy. 
Now it can no longer be. So, although the situation today is more like the 
1930's, nuclear weapons have so altered things that no historical analogy really 
applies. We have hardly yet understood the extent to which things have been 
altered. 
B NATO Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
evenly matched? 
I do think that the Soviet Union enjoys a dangerous military superiority in 
Europe. It's not just a question of comparing numbers of divisions and so on. 
All sorts of other factors come into it, particularly geographical. The Soviet 
front line has the whole weight of the Soviet Union behind it, whereas we have 
to cope with 3000 miles of Atlantic. I don't in fact believe that the Soviet 
Union wants to launch a frontal assault. But, if they were to do so with the 
determination with which they fought in World War 2, we couldn't stop them. 
Western Europe could never withstand a Soviet conventional attack. We 
might hold it up for a month or so - but I doubt even that. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power 
which will take advantage of unilateral 
Western concessions and is only restrained 
and forced to accept arms-control 
agreements by Western determination and 
strength? 
OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
threatened power trying 1o keep up with 
Western technology and likely to respond 
positively to unconditional offers of 
Western restraint within a general context 
of detente? 
I rather think that both are partly true. Nobody can deny that Marxism- 
Leninism is an expansionist ideology. It has always preached world revolution. 
We are doing the leadership a discredit if we say that it no longer believes in 
that. So the regime is expansionist. But that does not mean that they want to 
use military force openly against the West to achieve that expansion, because 
they clearly recognize the dangers involved. And the Russian people, as dis- 
tinct from the regime, have never been as imperialistic as, say, the Germans 
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or the British. Above all, historically, they have been terrified of invasion and 
obsessed by the fear of war being fought on their territory. That is. why they 
acquired those buffer states at the end of World War 2. Nothing is ever black 
or white in these cases. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional 
preponderance such that NATO must 
continue to be able to threaten early use of 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
strategically suicidal? 
Well, I think that for deterrent reasons it is necessary for NATO to keep open 
the option of the early use of nuclear weapons - although, if it came to it, it 
could well be suicidal. That is why I have suggested that we should work 
towards conventional disarmament. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
I do not think that we need to match the Soviet Union number for number, 
and no doubt some unilateral cuts could be made safely. But anything that 
threatens to impair the mutual second strike capability is destabilizing and 
dangerous. I fear that a freeze would do that, particularly as the Soviet Union 
has recently installed a new generation of missiles which the West has not 
matched. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep 
strike' strategies essential for effective 
deterrence? 
OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
`emerging technology' to explore less 
provocative alternative strategies? 
As I have already indicated, I do not like these strategies. But I don't think 
that `emerging technology' helps at all. The remedy must lie in the direction 
of my main proposal: the dismantling of conventional forces in Europe. 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forc;! s to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
OR Is it domination by the two super-powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super-power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
At the moment, if Western Europe were decoupled from the United States, 
she would have no defence at all - or practically no defence. Similarly, to make 
Europe a nuclear weapon-free zone would be to have given in. Since I do 
not believe that the superpowers are likely to become involved in a serious 
confrontation so long as nuclear deterrence is secure, I do not see that as a 
great danger. That is the situation as I see it today. 
But, if there were a major reduction in the vast NATO conventional forces, 
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as suggested in my answer to AZ(A)(vii), and the resources thus released were 
put into a second strike, flexible, nuclear capability, then I think that Western 
Europe would have the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet 
Union, and this therefore would act as a credible deterrent. In those circum- 
stances, Western Europe would no longer need to rely on the Americans. 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
I agree with the right-hand side to the extent that Gorbachev and Reagan are 
both being insincere when they say that they want complete nuclear disarma- 
ment. It is an unattainable goal, and, for the foreseeable future, an undesirable 
one. I am also sure that there are some unilateral steps that we could take 
which would not be dangerous - although I don't know whether they would 
have much effect. I'm not in the arms control business. But, on the whole, 
what is implied on the left-hand side is more realistic. I would be inclined to 
think that the Russian leadership understands force better than anything else. 
It's force that keeps the system going. From what I have seen in Poland, I'm 
inclined to think that force is the language that they understand. So, if we are 
tough but fair, we will probably get the best results. 
Now I must meet the main criticism of my proposal that conventional forces 
should be virtually dismantled in Europe. It is said that, in view of Soviet 
inertia, if not belligerence, a significant reduction in Western conventional 
capabilities would undermine the credibility of nuclear deterrence. It is not 
credible that, if the Soviet Union occupied West Berlin tomorrow, America 
would respond with a nuclear strike. There are two things to be said. First, I 
am not suggesting a return to an `all-or-nothing' policy of massive retaliation. 
I propose that we keep a graduated nuclear capability that does not include 
battlefield nuclear weapons, but does include intermediate nuclear weapons - 
preferably located under the sea, so that nobody can say `our bases are threat- 
ened'. Secondly, it will be up to us to make this graduated deterrent credible. 
We must define precisely what we mean by aggression, even if it takes us five 
years to work that definition out, and then we must say `if you put even one 
foot over the border, our response will be nuclear. It will not necessarily be 
total, but perhaps a warning shot across the bows. Enough to show you that 
we mean' ii. And you do the same on your side. ' The argument that such a 
threat would not be credible works both ways. Why would the Soviet Union 
risk its own destruction for the sake of West Berlin? 
But in order to achieve all this, we have to recognize that nuclear weapons 
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have permanently altered the situation. We have to think in a new way. When 
I came back from Nagasaki in 1945, I wrote a report in which I said that 
nuclear weapons were from now onwards the decisive weapons in war, that 
rockets would replace bombers as the main delivery vehicles, and that this 
called for revolutionary thinking that in turn called for young minds. That 
was my conclusion then, and that is my conclusion now. At the moment we 
are still incapable of thinking in these new ways. Traditional habits of thought 
are too strong. But I'm sure that this is the direction we must move in. And 
I'm determined to fight for it. 
C British Policy 1 
i The British Deierrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and 
independence and protects her from nuclear 
blackmail? 
OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
`deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
encourage proliferation? 
Obviously Britain can't `go it alone' against the Soviet Union. That would 
make no sense at all. Britain is part of NATO. So I would be happy to see the 
British deterrent go, as long as it would be replaced by an American one. 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
European allies because they provide a illusion when the weapons are dependent 
specifically European second centre of upon the US and there is no independent 
decision making? strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
I think that there is a case for saying that an independent British deterrent 
enhances deterrence in general, and that the value of a second centre of deci- 
sion-making of this kind is that it creates another area of uncertainty for the 
Soviet Union. But I do not think that this is a critical point. In the last resort 
it is only the American deterrent that deters. My fear would be that, if we got 
rid of the British deterrent, the next thing to go would be the American - and 
then we would be defenceless. 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent British initiatives more likely 
to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
involvement? 
The linkage with the United States is essential, but I do not think that indepen- 
dent British nuclear forces are necessary for this. We could accept American 
nuclear forces in their place. 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? 
OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
afforded at the expense of conventional 
strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
if 
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I don't believe that conventional forces give us proper strategic protection. 
The cost of Britain's independent nuclear force may be small compared with 
the cost of suggested replacements, but there can be no effective conventional 
replacement for a nuclear deterrent. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament have no effect on other 
countries and only serve to weaken British 
influence and allow France unchallenged 
ascendancy in Europe? 
OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
British prestige? Would British 
disarmament within the context outlined in 
B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
I don't know that our prestige matters much, and I'm not sure how much 
influence our possession of an independent nuclear force gives us with, say, 
the United States. I certainly don't mind France having a nuclear capability, 
and Britain not. The only thing that matters is the cohesion of NATO. Sch 
long as we and other Western European countries are committed to NATO 
and to its nuclear policies, then Europe is safe. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to 
continue to ensure effective British strategic 
defence into the 21st century? 
OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
all the drawbacks listed above? 
I don't know. I always refrain from making a judgement on a given weapon- 
system. 
2 NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
I totally disagree with the idea that NATO should adopt a non-nuclear policy, 
for reasons which I will give later. I think that the more we involve ourselves 
in the overall NATO nuclear policy and its systems the better. It makes the 
deterrent more credible. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain make US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affairs 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
Apart from the qualification made in my answer to B(vi), I think that the US 
nuclear bases are essential. The suggestion that the United States might be 
tempted to fight a war on European soil while herself remaining unharmed is 
nonsensical. A war on this scale would be bound to affect everyone. Nor do I 
think that'we have yielded our sovereignty by having these bases. 
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(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
Soviet warheads whether or not she carrier and targeted by the USSR 
disarms unilaterally? accordingly? Will Britain falb an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
I don't like the argument on the right. It says, if there's going to be a war, let 
someone else be hit and not us. In any case, if the disarmers are arguing that 
we should compensate by increasing our conventional forces, then this seems 
hardly likely to make us less of a target. 
(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
If it were true a non-nuclear defence could be effective against a nuclear 
aggressor, those on the right-hand side would be right. But it is not true. I 
simply cannot understand the premise of people like Bruce Kent. You may 
be able to upgrade your conventional defence to the point where you can hold 
an aggressor on the battlefield, perhaps even though he is using battlefield 
nuclear weapons. But the moment he invokes strategic missiles targeted on 
your cities, it no longer matters what is going on on the battlefield - you go 
under. I cannot understand how a rational person can think that conventional 
defences could ever be effective against the threat of a strategic nuclear attack. 
Moral Considerations 
(i) Is it morally right to pursue the policy least 
likely to cause human suffering? May this 
sometimes involve doing things which in 
other circumstances would be wrong? 
OR Are there actions which are in themselves 
wrong no matter what the situation? Is the 
alternative to excuse almost any act of 
barbarism? 
(ii) In formulating policy should we weigh up 
the probability of success and the relative 
costs in terms of human suffering of 
alternative: nuclear and non-nuclear 
strategies? 
OR Is the only relevant point here that a 
nuclear exchange of almost any kind 
would in itself cause unimaginable 
suffering to largely civilian populations? 
Although it may be true in the absolute that certain actions are wrong, when 
you come to apply them to the concrete reality of war, you may have to try to 
choose the lesser of two evils. Take World War 2, which is the only war I 
know. In that war roughly two civilians died for every military - thirty-five 
million civilians and twenty million military - something like that. Now, isn't 
that totally wrong? So the moral objections that nuclear disarmers raise against 
nuclear war, I also raise against conventional war between major powers in a 
modern context. My argument is that we have passed that threshold of history 
Group Captain Leonard Cheshire V. C., O. M., D. S. O., D. F. C. 45 
beyond which war between major powers is no longer morally permissible. 
The question which should concern moralists here is - how can we prevent 
this happening again? 
(iii) So far as concerns intention, need we look OR Is there no such thing as a fully deployed 
no further than the fact that our sole aim in weapons system which is a blufß Is to 
deploying nuclear weapons is to prevent deploy nuclear weapons to intend to use 
their use? them in certain circumstances? 
Now we come to the question of intention. And the second stage of the argu- 
ment is this: assuming that it is nuclear deterrence that prevents all forms of 
war between major powers, and this is your sole intention in deploying nuclear 
weapons, how can it be morally wrong to do so? First of all, I don't believe 
that the intention' of those who deploy the deterrent is to use it. Both the 
Russians and the Americans who deploy it are convinced that, by deploying 
it, they can make its use impossible. And, secondly, how can it be right to 
permit the horror of conventional war by removing nuclear deterrence, simply 
because of the supposed immorality of the intentions of those who are deploy- 
ing the deterrent? This seems to me to be an extraordinary position. It is this 
argument from conditional intention that carries most Christian moralists, but 
they just haven't thought it out. 
(iv) Are there possible uses of nuclear weapons 
which are allowed by, Just War theory, for 
example the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in order to prevent worse 
suffering? Can there be a theory of Just 
Deterrence? 
OR Is a conditional intention to cause 
indiscriminate and disproportionate 
suffering of this kind, whether admonitory, 
preemptive or retaliatory, ruled out by Just 
War theory? Was it wrong to bomb 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? 
I hold that it was not wrong to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And the reason 
why I say that is that the only forseeable alternative was the all-out invasion 
of Japan. Given the Japanese military mind at the time, that would have 
involved a fight to the last man, total war across the whole of Japan, in which, 
not hundreds of thousands, but millions would have died. Now, what do those 
who disapprove of the dropping of the bombs say when I challenge them with 
this? Pax Christi' tell me that a full-scale invasion would have been wrong, 
too. They say that we should have used a blockade. But a blockade inevitably 
causes terrible suffering, particularly to the innocent. As the blockade tigh- 
tens, the armed forces have to keep the food and medical supplies for those 
who can fight. In Leningrad 8oo, ooo civilians died through blockade, and 
they died worse deaths than those in Hiroshima and Nagasaki - lingering 
deaths, frozen, without food, without medical supplies. It's unimaginable. 
According to these moralists, if we had imposed such a blockade against Japan, 
we would not have been to blame for the fact that civilians were hit worst, 
because'we would not have made that choice. But this is Pharisaical. It is part 
of a rather hypocritical search for our own purity by pretending to shift the 
t. International Catholic Movement for Peace. 
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blame to the defenders. When I put that to Bruce Kent, he said that a blockade 
would also have been wrong. In other words, there was nothing that we could 
have done to the Japanese. We would have had to have given in. 
And the same thing applies to those who say that we are not allowed even 
the conditional intention to use nuclear weapons which they say is implied in 
deterrence. If the only alternative to nuclear deterrence is that there will be a 
greater likelihood of conventional war, then it is hypocritical of those who 
want to abandon nuclear deterrence to say that they would not share moral 
responsibility for that war. To say this is again to be more concerned with 
your own moral purity than with the effect of your policy. 
(v) Is there no relevant connection between the OR Is it a scandal that such huge resources are 
development and deployment of nuclear devoted to the development and deployment 
weapons and world poverty and disease? of nuclear weapons and not to the 
alleviation of suffering? 
Although there is obviously a certain truth in the argument on the right, it is 
in general dishonest. We spend as much money on alcohol as we do on defence 
- why not say `cut back on your alcohol'? And I'm sure that any money saved 
would not go to the poor. It would go on better roads, or lower taxes, or the 
Trade Unions would ask for higher wages. What is lacking is the will to help 
the poor. 
(vi) Does Christian teaching allow the OR Does Christian teaching condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? deployment of nuclear weapons? 
I would say that Christian teaching regrets that there is a need for nuclear 
deterrence, but, in the circumstances, allows it. When it was a question of the 
Just War theory, the Church longed to abolish war. But it could not do so, 
and therefore had to make the best of the sinful situation that we are in. Bruce 
Kent says that the Roman Catholic Church does not allow the continuing 
deployment of nuclear weapons. But it does. None of the bishops' conferences 
have forbidden the deployment of nuclear weapons. The American bishops, 
who have actually written the most profound document of all' on the morality 
of war, have got into a muddle over it. They seem to condemn all use of 
nuclear %veapons, but then leave an ambiguity as to whether they mean all use 
or not. If they do mean that all use is inadmissible, then they should have 
forbidden deployment, too. They try to say `you may deploy them, so long as 
you state that they will never be used'. But in that case, how do they deter? The 
answer that is given is that they will still deter, because the enemy won't know 
that you mean it. Well, that is a deliberate deception. You are living a lie. And 
how they can justify that morally I don't know. That is not Christian. It isn't 
straight dealing. How is he going to believe anything else you say? 
t. The Challenge of God's Peace, May 3,1983. 
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Recommendations 
I No (See B(iv)). 
2 Not on research programmes (See A2(A)(v)). 
3I don't know. 
4I question its usefulness, because I doubt whether it's really going to be 
believed by the other side. It sounds good, but I don't think it's significant 
(See B(iii)). 
5 Yes. And in some cases unconditional (See Ai(iv)). 
6I don't think that a European nuclear weapon-free zone would enhance 
security. I think it would do exactly the opposite. Anyway, you cannot 
guarantee that weapons won't drop on Europe just because you have 
declared it nuclear free (See B(vi)). 
71 don't know. 
8' No (See A2(B)). 
9 The idea of a `minimum' or `sufficient' nuclear deterrent is a good one. 
But not as a stage on the way to swift nuclear disarmament as CND wants. 
It should be a permanent arrangement. CND have shifted their ground 
here. 
10 I don't see why we shouldn't, as long as it's research. I like any advance 
in technology. It might be put to civilian use. 
ii No. See 4. 
12 (a) Yes. 
(b) No - keep them, especially if they are sea-based. Although then they 
are not so accurate. That's the snag. 
13 On balance, I would like to keep. them. But, as long as there are American 
replacements, I don't make too much of this. 
14 No, she certainly should not. But see the qualification in B(vi). 
15 No. See 6. 
i6 No, but this is not crucial (See CI). 
17 I am very much against this. I think that it's dangerous (See Az(A)(vii) & 
B(vii)). 
18 No (See C2(i)). 
19 No (See C2(i) & C2(ii)). 
20 Does not apply. 
.r 
`1 he GMft0 Cri)o no 
P. C., M. P. 
Biographical Note 
Born in 1938, Denzil Davies was Bacon scholar at Gray's Inn, and then a 
teaching fellow at the University of Chicago, before becoming Labour Mem- 
ber of Parliament for Llanelli in 1970. He was Minister of State at Her Majes- 
ty's Treasury between 1975 and 1979- Since then he has been Opposition 
Spokesman on Foreign Affairs, 1979-i98i, Opposition Spokesman on 
Defence, 1981-1983, and, from 1983, Chief Opposition Spokesman on 
Defence and Disarmament. 
Sb 
Editorial Comment 
I' 
These answers were communicated in an interview in the House of Commons 
on December 4,1986. Their political importance for the reader is that they 
offer the full rationale behind current Labour Party policy. As Denzil Davies 
points out at the beginning of Section C on British Policy, what the Labour 
Party proposes for Britain can only be understood against the background of 
earlier answers. Because nuclear weapons are rationally unusable (A2(B)(ii), 
B(iii)), they do not deter (Ai(ii)), but, on the contrary, are likely to convert 
political crisis into catastrophe (A i (iii), A2 (B)(v)). Continued Western depen- 
dence upon them means that proper non-nuclear defences are neglected. This 
is unnecessary (B(i) and B(ii)). Britain's renunciation of her own nuclear 
weapons will enable her to maintain effective defences which will otherwise be 
seriously weakened (Cz(iv)). The proposed move towards non-nuclear defence 
within NATO (C2(i), C2(ii)) must be seen against the background of the 
answers to questions B(iii), B(iv), B(v), and B(vi), which justify it. Finally, it 
is the important answers to questions A2(A)(vii) and B(vii) which support the 
argument in C2(iv), and provide the overall context within which the proposed 
British policy is set. 
THE RT HON DENZIL DAVIES MP 
A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 194S? 
Without going into details, I think that, whatever the situation just after the 
Second World War when the Americans had a nuclear monopoly, in recent 
years it has mainly been other factors. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
As I say, it may have been the case when only one side had an invulnerable 
and effective nuclear force that this prevented war, but it certainly cannot be 
the case when both have. For example, the main reason why President Reagan 
says that he is proposing his Strategic Defence Initiative is because he cannot 
see how he can defend America with i z, ooo warheads, when the Russians 
have got i i, ooo warheads pointing at America. And that, in particular, is why 
`extended deterrence' cannot work. There is no American `nuclear umbrella' 
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over Europe - as people like Henry Kissinger are right to point out to us. 
There can't be. No American president will authorize the use of American 
strategic nuclear forces in the defence of Europe, when the inevitable result 
would be the destruction of America. 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic OR Have most military planners from the start 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by been aiming for nuclear war fighting 
dramatically raising the threshold between superiority? Has `flexible response' 
peace and war? dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
I The suggestion on the left-hand side is entirely wrong. In fact, 'the opposite is 
the case. It is a mistake to think that the danger is of some kind of Blitzkrieg 
war, in which one side deliberately decides to launch an all-out attack on the 
other. Much the greater danger is that a period of heightened political tension 
will spill over into war, and then the fact that we have scattered battlefield and 
theatre nuclear weapons throughout Europe will make it much more likely 
that this will quickly degenerate into nuclear war. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
In general I don't think that piling strategic weapons on strategic weapons 
makes much difference. I wouldn't have thought that the danger was greater 
with i i, ooo warheads than it is with 5000. I'll concede this argument to the 
Richard Perleslof this world. The main dangers lie in the types of weapon 
deployed, and in the effect which larger numbers - particularly of battlefield 
and theatre nuclear weapons - have in making command and control more 
difficult. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control', been just 
another name for the arms race? 
The idea of balance seems reassuring, but in a situation of mutual suspicion 
and partial ignorance of what the other side has got, it breaks down. There is 
no agreement about what you count, or how you count it, or what the overall 
situation is. So, when one side reaches a point where it thinks that there is a 
balance, the other gets worried and thinks that it is behind. That is what has 
been happening repeatedly since 1962. It has gone in spurts. At the time of 
the Cuba missile crisis, the Russians had 300 missiles, and the Americans had 
5000. So the Russians then did a great spurt, and the Americans thought that 
they had been overtaken. Then the Americans did a spurt to try to catch up 
again. And so it goes on. 
t. US Assistant Secretary of Defense until March 1987. 
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Arms control has had a very limited success. It has not stopped new tech- 
nology, but has perhaps done something to limit the application of some of 
the technology already developed. One trouble is that particular systems are: 
justified as `bargaining chips' on the grounds that this will force the other side 
to negotiate. But then, when it comes to it, they are not given up, and only 
stimulate further expansion on the other side. So there are more and more 
`bargaining chips' and no bargains. But arms control negotiations do serve as 
a forum for discussion, so, to that extent, we should not be against them. 
(vi) Has force planning been controlled by OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
strategic thinking? technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
I agree very strongly with what is written on the right-hand side. Those 
ýho 
have done step-by-step analyses of the life-history of particular nuclear 
weapons systems, find that the starting point is an equation somewhere. Then, 
when the technological possibility of a new weapon has been established, 
people start to devise reasons for having it. Most of the arguing in post hoc 
rationalization. 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable 
future? 
OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
First strike is in the eye of the'beholder. For example, although the Americans 
say that Star Wars is to be a purely defensive system, the Russians are con- 
vinced that it is part of an evolving first strike strategy. There is considerable 
mutual fear that new systems of all kinds will give the other such an advantage. 
Once again, we are not talking so much of a sudden deliberate surprise attack, 
as of what is likely to happen in a time of acute political crisis. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
Of course we should be alarmed about the threat to command and control 
systems. In the kind of situation which we have been describing, they are 
likely to become increasingly vulnerable and therefore increasingly unreliable. 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
Frankly, I don't think that I can answer this question. I, certainly don't 
subscribe to the idea that it makes any sense at all to plan in terms of `limited 
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nuclear war' - whatever that's supposed to mean. I don't subscribe to NATO 
or Warsaw Pact nuclear war-fighting strategies. But whether, if there were an 
initial exchange, it would escalate to all-out nuclear war, or lead both sides to 
terminate hostilities quickly, I just don't know. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
I have answered this. I think that new generations of battlefield and theatre 
nuclear weapons, deployed as part of NATO and Warsaw Pact war-fighting 
strategies, are indeed highly dangerous. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in t? 
As nearly all commentators agree, Star Wars is very unlikely to give us a totally 
effective defence against ballistic nuclear weapons. And it is also flawed in the 
sense that the technology developed as part of it would provide us with ingeni- 
ous and dangerous offensive systems as well. The distinction between offence 
and defence here is illusory. In the meantime, it clearly is destabilizing, both 
because the Russians inevitably see it as part of a threatened first strike capa- 
bility, and because it jeopardizes past arms control agreements, such as the 
ABM treaty, and blocks future ones, as we saw at Reykjavik. 
But we must not ignore the thinking behind it. President Reagan no longer 
believes in the nuclear umbrella, which is why he is trying to substitute another 
one for it. His speech of September'23,1983, challenges the whole strategic 
assumption of the past forty years - the M. A. D. world, if you like. He is quite 
rightly groping towards an alternative. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
I don't know whether the fact that the great powers have got nuclear weapons 
makes it more likely that other countries will want to have them, or whether, 
if the great powers were to give them up, other countries would then not want 
to have them. I don't know. But I suspect that each country which has the 
technology will decide independently in terms of its own interests. But those 
who say that nuclear weapons have kept the peace for forty years in Europe, 
certainly should not argue against exporting them, say, to the Middle East. 
Both the Iraqis and the Iranians should be given them. That is the logic of it. 
They can't have it both ways. 
r, 
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(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts :" 
offer-the best prospect for future stability? attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
As we look ahead, what is important from a global perspective is what hap- 
pened at Reykjavik. I don't think that things will be the same again. In the 
past, arms control has done little more than regulate the nuclear arms race, 
because the assumption behind it has been that the two superpowers would 
continue to rely on nuclear deterrence indefinitely. But this has now changed. 
There has been a challenge to the system. And the challenge has come from 
the leaders of the two greatest powers. I think that we must recognize that 
both Mr Gorbachev and Mr Reagan are genuine in their desire to rid the world 
of nuclear weapons. Both understand that we cannot go on as we have in the 
past. They feel that, without nuclear weapons, the East and the West can live 
together and avoid war. Reagan is genuine, if misguided, about Star Wars. 
And Gorbachev is genuine in proposing that we eliminate nuclear weapons by 
the end of the century. I don't think that he is saying this just to divide Western 
Europe from America, or just because he cannot afford to take up the Star 
Wars challenge - counter-measures are likely to be far cheaper than Star Wars 
itself. No. Reykjavik has established the global context within which all of us, 
including Britain, should now be moving. It is depressing to see the way in 
which it is Western Europe which is dragging its feet. Mrs Thatcher is horri- 
fied at the prospect of Reykjavik, because it takes away the justification for 
her nuclear defence policies. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS' 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would 
war between the great powers again 
become a rational option and therefore 
more likely? 
OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
to initiate a third world war? 
Well, once again it is a question of what you believe. Those who think that 
there is no such thing as conventional deterrence, and that there is only such 
a thing as nuclear deterrence, will never be convinced. If you believe that it is 
only nuclear deterrence that prevents war, then you will'be terrified of losing 
it. But, as I have said, I do not believe this. On the contrary, I believe that 
much greater dangers lie in continuing to base defence on irrational and 
unstable nuclear strategies. 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited preferable to nuclear war? 
nuclear war? 
Yes. The implication on the left-hand side is familiar. `If you are proposing 
to get rid of nuclear forces and to increase conventional forces, what's the 
difference? ' The difference, I think, is pretty basic. Its a difference in the very 
nature of the conflict. We don't need to go as far as imagining a major 
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exchange, and the possibility of a `nuclear winter', to realize this. In a conven- 
tional war, with modern weaponry, large numbers of civilians would undoubt- 
edly be killed on both sides, and moral questions, comparable to those 
associated with the bombing of Dresden in the last war, would be raised. A 
conventional war would, of course, be terrible. But a nuclear exchange would, 
in addition, involve radiation and fallout. The accident at Chernobyl has 
brought home to us how people living hundreds of miles away from the battle 
zone would be affected. Countries which had nothing to do with the war would 
suffer. Crops would be blighted, livestock would die, and the contamination 
might last for generations. There is a clear difference in'kuality between the 
two. 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented would they not be bound to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
there be no incentive to resort to 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
This phrase sounds good, but means nothing. `Nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented'. Of course we cannot abolish science. Nothing that we do can 
affect the fact that e= mc2. But we are talking about turning the equations 
into technology, and that is something that we can and must control. We can 
make it much more difficult to do this, and we can build political systems 
which remove most of the incentive to do so. 
(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only 
feasible in a world where war itself is no 
longer a possibility? 
OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
hope of a rational world-order? 
We are really talking about bilateral nuclear disarmament, aren't we? In the 
past, people like Mrs Thatcher have said that they are in favour of `multilateral 
nuclear disarmament'. But now they have been flushed out. The moment the 
two world leaders seem to be on the verge of achieving this, Mrs Thatcher has 
to come out into the open and admit that she is not in favour of bilateral 
or multilateral nuclear disarmament after all. She wants perpetual nuclear 
deterrence. To argue as she does is, indeed, to give up all hope of a rational 
world order. 
(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen 
to be prepared for war, as failure before 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under 
likely future conditions would global 
nuclear disarmament make war, including 
nuclear war, more likely? 
OR Do the years before 1914 show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? 
Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
The trouble is that people are always trying to fight the last war. They cling 
onto wbät they are used to. In this case, the people who believe in perpetual 
nuclear deterrence are saying `We must do what we did not do in the 193os. We 
must stop the Russians from starting a Third World War by going on building up 
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more and more nuclear weapons. ' In fact, Britain and France had very powerful 
military forces in the 1930s, and, in any case, Soviet Russia today cannot 
usefully be compared to NAZI Germany then. But, if we are göing to make 
historical comparisons, a closer parallel would be with the years before 1914 
- the two armed alliances, the building up of more and more powerful arsenals, 
the elaboration of war-fighting strategies, the prospect of a confrontation being 
triggered by some incident in central Europe, or even further afield. And 
today, as we have seen, the nature and disposition of new generations of 
nuclear weapons makes it more and more likely that, in those circumstances, 
the situation would rapidly escalate to nuclear war. 
b NATO policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically evenly matched? 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
This is a crucial area. People are still being fed the idea that the Warsaw 
Pact enjoys a four to one advantage in conventional forces over NATO. In 
introducing a programme on defence on television recently, David Dimbleby 
repeated it. It was an extraordinary statement to make, and he should have 
done his research properly. It is true that the Russians have more tanks, and 
the Warsaw Pact can be said to have local superiority along certain sectors of 
the Central Front. But, if you look at the totality of forces, which is what 
matters, then both sides are probably evenly matched. It is not just a question 
of numbers either, but of an overall capacity to wage war. This includes 
industrial and technological capabilities, the reliability of your Allies, and so 
on. And an attacker needs decisive superiority if he is to be confident of success 
in a frontal assault. When everything is weighed up together, it is probably 
true to say that the two sides are relatively evenly matched. Continued talk of 
a four to one Warsaw Pact advantage must be shown up for what it is -a gross, 
and often deliberate, distortion of the facts. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power 
which will take advantage of unilateral 
Western concessions and is only restrained 
and forced to accept arms-control 
agreements by Western determination and 
strength? 
OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
threatened powertrying to keep up with 
Western technology and likely to respond 
positively to unconditional offers of 
Western restraint within a general context 
of detente? 
I think that, as they stand, both of the alternatives here are rather exaggerated. 
I do not believe that the Soviet Union is an expansionist power, which wants 
to drive West or South. But the Russians are equally paranoid about the West. 
We have no intention of attacking them, either. So mutual paranoia feeds on 
itself. The danger is that wars don't just start because one side deliberately 
decides to attack the other, but often as a result of mutual suspicion, fear, and 
misunderstanding. This is what must be dispelled. And it. can only be done 
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by restraint-on both sides, and a readiness to believe that the other's offers are 
genuinely made with a view to reducing tension and building confidence. 
A number of Mr Gorbachev's recent proposals should be welcomed in this 
spirit. We should recognize that significant changes have been taking place in 
Russia. We often forget that Russia has been through a terrible dark age. 
There was the appalling suffering of the First World War, the upheaval of the 
Revolution, the ruthlessness with which Stalin drove through industrialization 
in the 1930s, the trauma of the Second World War, the post-war period of 
Stalinist purges, the debacle of Cuba when Khruschev overreached himself 
and the military realized how far behind they were' in the arms race, the 
consequent build-up of arms unFier Brezhnev as the Russians tried to catch up. 
And now they are coming out of it. Gorbachev represents a new generation, no 
longer conditioned by the revolutionary and immediate post-revolutionary 
experience. We have a real opportunity to put the past behind us and to move 
slowly out of the Cold War era. The West should respond with flexibility and 
not react with suspicion to everything that Mr Gorbachev proposes. Funnily 
enough, a number of people within the Reagan administration, such as George 
Schultz, realize this in a way that people in our government in Britain do not. 
Mrs Thatcher, for example, refuses to let go of her habitual hostility, because 
she has a vested interest in the perpetuation of the enemy threat. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
preponderance such that NATO must nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
continue to be able to threaten early use of strategically suicidal? 
nuclear weapons? 
We have already seen why NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons is mili- 
tarily unnecessary. It is also strategically suicidal. We can't use our nuclear 
weapons without causing far more damage to our own side, and risking indis- 
criminate, if not universal, catastrophe. So what is the point of having them? 
As it is, all that they do is to make it more and more likely that a future political 
crisis will precipitate nuclear war. I am not a military historian or a military 
expert, but increasing numbers of those who are now recognize, this. Like all 
other areas of policy, military strategy must evolve and change with circum- 
stances. It is quite possible that the strategy was all right twenty years ago. It 
may or may not have been. But there is no doubt that today it is unnecessary, 
irrational and dangerous. Just as in the years leading up to 1940 the French 
generals showed themselves to be incapable of recognizing that circumstances 
had changed, so there is a great danger that we are in the process of doing the 
same now. We keep thinking that the danger that we face is of a Second World 
War Blitzkrieg, and fail to realize that an unpremeditated collapse into war, 
triggerg4 by political crisis, and precipitated by nuclear war-fighting strateg- 
ies, is a far more serious threat. The policy must he changed. 
One of the troubles here has been the traditional refusal of the Federal 
Republic of Germany even to contemplate the possibility of a war being fought 
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on her territory. As a result, she has tried to convince herself that with nuclear 
weapons this will not happen. So, paradoxically, she continues to support a 
strategy which is far more likely in the event to destroy her. It is a major 
objective of British Labour Party policy to persuade NATO allies to shift 
towards a proper non-nuclear defence strategy. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
The important point to be made here is that, even within the terms of nuclear 
deterrence theories, there is ample room for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
to begin to shift towards non-nuclear defence, without having at every stage to 
become enmeshed in intricate multilateral bargaining. This is not to advocate 
`unilateral nuclear disarmament'. It is to decide the overall strategy that is in 
our own best interest, and then to move towards it in whatever way seems 
prudent and safe at the time. 
A further point to be made here is that even Americans like Richard Perle, 
who want to keep a nuclear deterrent, agree that with modern technology 
there is no need to persist with land-based nuclear systems in Europe. Once 
again, it has been Western European governments which have foolishly 
insisted on this, largely for political reasons. Militarily these weapons are a 
liability, serving only to ensure enemy targeting. NATO is already cutting 
down her battlefield nuclear arsenal in Europe. She can also safely begin to 
remove her land-based theatre systems too. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
It is important to understand that NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons 
is part and parcel of her continuing commitment to forward defence. It is 
largely because West Germany does not want to accept the logic of in-depth 
defences, and insists on the holding of the frontier at all costs, that NATO has 
had to fall back on the nuclear deterrent threat. For the same reason, `deep 
strike', the engagement of the enemy follow-on forces, instead of being mainly 
concerned with their destruction once they have crossed the frontier, has to 
involve apparent plans for offensives deep into enemy territory. So a second 
major objective of Labour Party policy will be to persuade NATO Allies to 
accept military reality, and supplement the present inflexible response with a 
proper flexible mix of defence options. There are large numbers of possibili- 
ties, which are being widely studied by military planners at the moment. We 
don't need to commit ourselves to the fate of the Spartans at Thermopylae. 
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(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
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OR Is it domination by the two super-powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super-power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
These alternatives are too extreme. The main reason why American troops are 
in Europe is to defend the interests of the United States. This is just as it 
should be. It is in the American interest that Western Europe should not be 
dominated by the rival superpower. But that does not mean that Western 
Europeans have supinely to support every American policy. We should cer- 
tainly try to develop greater European awareness, so that there can be a more 
equal discussion of priorities within the Alliance. The Americans have always 
said that they would welcome this. Indeed, I feel rather sorry for them. First 
of all, Chancellor Schmidt says that he desperately wants American Cruise 
and Pershing missiles in Europe, because he no longer believes in the strategic 
umbrella. Then, when they are installed, the Americans are blamed for putting 
them there. Then the Americans negotiate with the Russians to get rid of 
them, and General Rogers and Mrs Thatcher rush off to Washington to per- 
suade them not to. Western European governments should be supporting any 
moves which seem likely to lead to the negotiated removal of these weapons. 
As can be seen, it is quite wrong to call this an `anti-American' policy. 
But it doesn't mean anything to say that Europe should be `decoupled' from 
the superpower confrontation. Apart from anything else, Russia is in Europe. 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
I repeat. The Labour Party does not advocate unilateral nuclear disarmament. 
That is something that opponents like to accuse us of, because then they can 
simply say that we would be exposing the West to Soviet nuclear blackmail, 
and do not have to argue out the implications of their own policies any further. 
But nuclear blackmail does not come into it. What we are working towards is 
a proper strengthening of NATO defences, so that we no longer have to rely 
on the increasingly dangerous illusion of extended nuclear deterrence. This 
would, of course, be part of a broader negotiated settlement within the terms 
already tdughly laid out by the President of the United States and the General 
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. It is essential that we set this up 
straight away as a long-term policy objective, and move towards it as far and 
as fast as we safely can. Some of this can be done independently; some will 
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require bilateral or multilateral agreement. At no point is there any question 
of laying ourselves open to Soviet nuclear blackmail. I have alreadyAxplained 
why land-based battlefield and theatre nuclear systems can be built down with 
less risk than was involved in building them up in the first place. And it is 
hypocritical of those who oppose Mr Reagan's declared desire to rid the world 
of nuclear weapons, and argue against an acceptance of Mr Gorbachev's offer 
to negotiate nuclear weapons away by the year 2000, at the same time to say 
that we cannot move towards the elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe 
because we would then be laying ourselves open to Soviet nuclear blackmail. 
The elimination of defence policies based on irresponsible nuclear war-fighting 
strategies is recognized to be an urgent mutual priority for both East and West. 
There is only one rational middle-term function for nuclear weapons, and that 
is as minimum forces to be held by both superpowers during the period of 
adjustment, in order to allay fears on both sides that the other might be 
tempted to cheat. 
By saying that the British Labour Party is irresponsible because it is advocat- 
ing unilateral nuclear disarmament, opponents like to imply that they are 
responsibly advocating multilateral nuclear disarmament. This is not the case. 
As their reaction to Reykjavik has shown, they are not nuclear disarmers at 
all, but advocates of indefinite reliance on nuclear deterrence and on defence 
based on nuclear war-fighting strategies. The British Labour Party advocates 
independent, bilateral, and multilateral moves towards long-term political 
stability and non-nuclear defence. It is those Western European governments 
which continue to cling to outmoded and increasingly dangerous nuclear 
deterrent policies, and are prepared, as a result, to jeopardize joint progress 
by the superpowers towards a non-nuclear world, which are guilty of short- 
sightedness and irresponsibility. 
C British Policy 
British policy must be seen against the background that we have just outlined. 
A lot of the misunderstanding of Labour Party policy comes from failing to 
do this. 
If you like, we could say that there are, roughly, three'interrelated areas of 
British interest and influence. First, there are those things that are within the 
sovereign competence of a British government to do, in what are thought to 
be the best interests of Britain. These are the independent actions which the 
Labour Party is proposing. But this can only be understood within the context 
of Britain's membership of the NATO Alliance. This is the second of the 
circles of influence. Here Britain is not sovereign. We have influence and can 
work towards a strategy which we think is in the best interest of the Alliance 
as a whole. But we may not be able to persuade all our Allies. Finally, there 
is the global circle, where our influence on, say, arms control negotiations 
between America and Russia is pretty limited. But at least we need not be 
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obstructive. At least the policies that we propose can be seen to contribute to 
what is in the best long-term interest of us all. At least we can push forward 
the debate that was begun at Reykjavik. It is depressing that, whereas in 
America the debate is being carried on energetically, not only by Democrats 
like Senator Nunn, but also by members of the administration, like George 
Schultz, Richard Perle, and the President himself, in this country there is 
almost no debate at all. 
i The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and 
independence and protects her from nuclear 
blackmail? 
OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
`deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
encourage proliferation? 
Britain's so-called `independent deterrent' is not a `weapon of last resort', 
because it cannot be used. And the idea that it can protect us against nuclear 
blackmail is fanciful. An imagined scenario in which we successfully stand out 
alone against the Soviet Union, is, to put it mildly, unconvincing. And to say 
that the supposed enemy is some other, as yet non-nuclear, power, is to argue 
for the indiscriminate spread of nuclear weapons. 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
What the argument on the left-hand side is really saying here is that we no 
longer believe in the American umbrella. We no longer believe in extended 
deterrence. And the proposed remedy simply compounds this. Are we to 
believe that, if the Americans with their i i, ooo warheads will be reluctant to 
use them for fear of retaliation, Britain, with 200, will not? The same is true 
of a `European nuclear force'. Apart from being a political impossibility, it 
would also heighten tension and increase instability - Anglo-French cooper- 
ation would have to be extended to include the West Germans. 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent British initiatives more likely 
to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
involvement? 
There is no overall `American view' by the nature of the way in which Amer- 
ican government works. But most Americans probably see the British deter- 
rent as apit of a nuisance, which just complicates arms talks. On the other 
hand, if we want to go on indulging this delusion of grandeur, they are pre- 
pared to let us do so. It makes no material difference to our relationship with 
America whether we do or do not. 
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(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in 
view of. the vital defence role it plays? Are 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? 
OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
afforded at the expense of convert fional 
strength and of other more impdrtant 
economic priorities? 
First of all, it does not play a `vital defence role'. But the important point here 
is that the money. for, say, Trident, comes out of money that would otherwise 
go into non-nuclear defence. Future constraints on the defence budget mean 
that conventional forces will undoubtedly suffer if we carry through the pro- 
posed `modernization' of our nuclear forces. 
Nor is it true that the economy benefits more from investment in nuclear 
than in non-nuclear programmes. With Trident, for example, we may employ 
a few whizz-kids with PhDs in physics at Aldermaston building warheads, 
but the really difficult bit ,+ the missiles - is made by the Americans. Techno- logically and industrially, investment in conventional forces would benefit us 
more. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament have no effect on other 
countries and only serve to weaken British 
influence and allow France unchallenged 
ascendancy in Europe? 
OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
British prestige? Would British 
disarmament within the context outlined in 
B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
Our so-called independent deterrent gives us virtually no influence at all, even 
with the Americans. America is a super-power and will act according to its 
own interests. 
As for the French nuclear forces, they are just as much of an illusion as 
ours. And, when you talk to them about it, you find that they are just as much 
at sixes and sevens as we are. What are they going to do with them? Bomb 
Russia? Bomb Germany? 
On the other hand, I do not subscribe to the idea that Britain's giving up 
of her nuclear weapons would influence the Soviet Union, or other as yet 
semi-nuclear or non-nuclear powers. You can't negotiate effectively with a 
superpower when you are not in that league. And why should other powers 
be particularly interested in what Britain does? It's a hang-over from empire 
to think that they will be. As I have said earlier, the reason for Britain to give 
up nuclear weapons is because it is in her own strategic interest to do so. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to 
continue to ensure effective British strategic 
defence into the 21st century? 
OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
all the drawbacks listed above? 
I have already answered this. 
2 Nato Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
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This is where we begin to enter the second circle of influence, which I was 
mentioning earlier. The fundamental point here is that, for reasons already 
explained, our security does not depend on NATO's nuclear policies. Neither 
the West Germans, nor the 55, ooo British troops in Germany, are going to be 
too happy if nuclear bombs are dropped on their heads by F-i i is. These 
weapons have no credible military use. That is why the Labour Party will 
work towards non-nuclear defence for NATO, and will substantially increase 
Britain's conventional contribution. 
But the question being asked here is, given the fact that we do not control 
overall NATO strategy, can a non-nuclear Britain continue to be a member 
of an Alliance which, wrongly in our opinion, still commits itself to a nuclear 
war-fighting strategy? And the answer is, of course, yes. There are a number 
of countries already in NATO which are non-nuclear, such as Denmark. And 
it is an insult to them to say that, if we go non-nuclear, we will be `reduced' 
to their status. As for the argument that in that case we will be shifting the 
burden to, say, West Germany, well, it will be up to the West Germans to 
decide whether they do or do not want to go on with suicidal and dangerous 
nuclear deterrent policies. We will be trying to persaude them that they do 
not. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
nuclear bases from Britain make US yielded to the US erode British 
defence of the West impossible? Is sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
American interference in British affairs more than restore a normal peacetime 
negligible? relationship? 
And the same applies to American bases. The withdrawal of American nuclear 
weapons from Britain will not affect defence very much at all. They are not 
integral to defence in the first place - even within terms of American strategic 
nuclear deterrence. America will keep her bases and all her other facilities. 
None of her ships will be barred from visiting our ports, even if they are 
nuclear capable. As I have said, American troops are in Europe, quite rightly, 
for the main purpose of defending American interests. It is also in our interest 
that they should remain here. So neither they nor we will jeopardize our 
mutual interest by making more of this than is in fact the case. 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
This is not for me a decisive issue. It is probably true that we are more of a 
target with the missiles here, because there is more of a temptation to take 
them W. But it is silly to suppose that an island twenty miles from the 
mainland will not be involved if a war started on the continent. 
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iv) Can non-nuclear de/ences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrorrjation, 
would Britain no more expec4 to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
Now we reach the third circle of influence. It is out of our power to dictate 
whether Russia or America go on with their nuclear deterrent policies. We 
hope that they will be moving away from them. If they do not, there is nothing 
that we will be able to do about it. But this cannot be called `sheltering under 
the American nuc/ear umbrella', because, as we have seen, there is no such 
thing. There may have been an umbrella when the Americans had a nuclear 
monopoly, but there certainly isn't now. Helmut Schmidt does not believe in 
it. Henry Kissinger does not believe in it. And President Reagan does not 
believe in it. 
Moral Considerations 
(i) Is it morally right to pursue the policy least OR Are there actions which are in themselves 
likely to cause human suffering? May this wrong no matter what the situation? Is the 
sometimes involve doing things which in alternative to excuse almost any act of 
other circumstances would be wrong? barbarism? 
(ii) In formulating policy should we weigh up 
the probability of success and the relative 
costs in terms of human suffering of 
alternative nuclear and non-nuclear 
strategies? 
OR Is the only relevant point here that a 
nuclear exchange of almost any kind 
would in itself cause unimaginable 
suffering to largely civilian populations? 
(iii) So far as concerns intention, need we look 
no further than the fact that our sole aim in 
deploying nuclear weapons is to prevent 
their use? 
(iv) Are there possible uses of nuclear weapons 
which are allowed by Just War theory, for 
example the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in order to prevent worse 
suffering? Can there be a theory of Just 
Deterrence? 
OR Is there no such thing as a fully deployed 
weapons system which is a bluff? Is to 
deploy nuclear weapons to intend to use 
them in certain circumstances? 
OR Is a conditional intention to cause 
indiscriminate and disproportionate 
suffering of this kind, whether admonitory, 
preemptive or retaliatory, ruled out by just 
War theory? Was it wrong to bomb 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? 
All weapons can be used immorally, and a lot has been written in an attempt 
to define this. But, as I have said, nuclear weapons are different, because I 
just do not think that there can be a moral use of them. I believe that the 
American catholic bishops came to the same conclusion. ' And, if the use is 
immoral, then the threat to use them is immoral. It is immoral to deploy them. 
I. In the pastoral letter, The Challenge c)f /'e'uc'e . 
May 1983. 
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(v) Is there no relevant connection between the OR Is it a scandal that such huge resources are 
development and deployment of nuclear devoted to the development and deployment 
weapons and world poverty and disease? of nuclear weapons and not to the 
alleviation of suffering? 
I think that, in general, it is morally wrong that we are spending so much on 
armaments, and so little on constructive economic and social programmes. 
But I do not think that this is peculiar to nuclear weapons. I can't see that 
there is a special link here which does not apply to other weapons as well. 
(vi) Does Christian teaching allow the OR Does Christian teaching condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? deployment of nuclear weapons? 
I have said that it is immoral to deploy nuclear weapons. So I suppose that, if 
Christian teaching coincides with morality here, it, too, must condemn their 
deployment. And the same might apply to other religions. I just don't know. 
Recommendations 
I Yes. 
2 Yes (See A2(A)(v)). 
3 Yes. 
4 Yes (See B(iii)). 
5 Yes (See A2(A)(vii)). 
6I don't think that this would mean much. 
7 Yes. 
8 If it were possible, yes. But it seems too optimistic. 
9 Let us say that both sides had negotiated 9o per cent reductions, then I 
would not object to their saying that they wanted to keep Io per cent in 
order to see how it went. 
10 Yes. 
II Yes (See B(iii)). 
12 Yes (See B(iv) & B(vii)). 
13 Yes (See Ci(v)). 
14 This would be part of 12, part of a NATO agreement (See B(iv) & B(vii)). 
15 See 6. 
16 Yes (See Ci). 
17 Yes (See Ci(iv)). 
i8 Yes (See C2(i)). 
19 Yes (See C2(i) & (C2(ii)). 
20 Britain will not leave NATO, even if she fails to persuade her Allies to 
adopt her preferred policies. She will simply keep on trying. 
S -ý! 
6'7 
ora oo00 o00ä0 
Biographical Note 
Born in t 94o and educated in Australia, John Finnis came to Oxford in 1962 
as a Rhodes scholar, and has been a fellow of University College and a lecturer 
and reader in law at the university since 1966-7. He has been a barrister at 
Gray's Inn since 1972, an adviser on constitutional matters to Australian state 
governments and to the UK House of Commons, and a member of English, 
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British and Irish Catholic Bishop's committees on bio-ethical and nuclear 
issues. 
Among a large number of books and articles on legal, jurisprudential, moral, 
theological and philosophical subjects, special mention should be made of 
Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism, written in collaboration with Joseph 
M. Boyle Jr. and Germain Grisez, to be published in April 1987 by the Claren- 
don Press. In it, readers will find a more detailed working out of the ideas 
which are presented in brief here. 
Editorial Comment 
These answers were communicated in an interview on October 30,1986, in 
University College, Oxford. What may impress the reader most in these pages 
is the uncompromising way in which Dr Finnis accepts both the prudential 
arguments in favour of a policy of continuing nuclear deterrence, and the 
moral arguments against. (The kernel of the moral case can be found under 
Moral Considerations in the answers to questions (iii) and (iv). ) This is very 
unusual. Although it seems that many people are drawn in these two direc- 
tions, it is rare for them both to be followed through as consistently as this. 
Usually we avoid what we see as the threat of internal inconsistency by saying 
that nuclear deterrence is either both prudentially wise and morally right, or 
both prudentially unwise and morally wrong. The remarkable results of not 
doing this, but of following the tension through to the end, can be seen in the 
two paragraphs at the beginning of the final set of Recommendations. 
DR JOHN FINNIS 
Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 1945? 
I think probably mainly nuclear deterrence. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
war? armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
Mutual possession of an invulnerable second strike nuclear force has, I think, 
been the main factor that has so far kept the peace at great power level. It has 
not, of course, prevented all wars, and it's also true that it is not altogether 
stable. But it's pretty stable. 
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(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic OR Have most military planners from the start 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by been aiming for nuclear war fighting 
dramatically raising the threshold between superiority? Has `flexible response' 
peace and war? dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
I don't think that these are really true alternatives. If you are going to have an 
effective deterrent - especially an extended deterrent - then you need limited 
nuclear options, because the threat simply to escalate from nothing to all-out 
strategic exchange is less credible than the threat to do it by stages with time 
for everyone to opt out of the battle. And in order to mount this threat, you 
must plan for war-fighting - which means in a sense planning for superiority 
in at least some aspects or phases of the potential battle. But, as I say, this 
enhances deterrence. 
The extent to which this is dangerous has, I think, not so much to do 
with lowering the threshold between conventional and nuclear war, as with 
generating a system of immense complexity, which under certain conditions 
could become unstable - especially under conditions of alert. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
Again I say `yes' to both sides. If we could somehow unravel the whole inter- 
superpower setup and start again, then clearly we would not choose to have 
so many. In that sense there is a superfluity of weapons systems. And I don't 
think that anyone, except for polemical purposes, would want to deny that 
size (which involves complexity) can be dangerous. But no one has been in 
charge of the whole `system'. Each has been faced by varying threats from the 
other side, and in these circumstances the size of the arsenals does not seem 
to be strategically pointless - especially if your aim is to defend an extended 
alliance. Almost everyone who has tried to manage Western deterrence policy 
has been tempted by the attractive idea of a much reduced, `minimum' deter- 
rent - but all of them have in the end decided that it is too dangerous. I 
think that within these terms of reference their reasoning has been essentially 
correct. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
the superpowers been essential to stability `parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
and have arms-control negotiations helped negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
to achieve it? in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
`Parity' is not a proper synonym for `balance here'. `Parity' suggests crude and 
unhelpful ideas of numerical equality, whereas `balance' - meaning that each 
sort of threat that one side can pose is properly checked by some kind of 
counter-check - is, I think, essential to deterrent stability. 
As to whether arms control negotiations have helped to achieve it - I'm 
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rather agnostic. There are quite strong arguments which suggest that arms 
control negotiations have in some cases been destabilizing in their actual, not 
intended, effects. For example, SALT I may be seen to have encouraged a 
great explosion in warhead technology. But one gets into very refined assess- 
ments when one tries to sort all this out. 
(vi) Has force planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
I think that, at the most basic level, strategic thinking has been decisive - 
elementary thoughts such as these: we need a deterrent, we need an extended 
deterrent, we need a graduated response, limited options, etc. But many of 
the details have been controlled by what you are calling `the self-reinforcing 
impetus of technology and vested interest' and so on. 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
future? 
I think that a unilaterally determined first strike, out of the blue, from `ungen- 
erated' force postures to hot war in twenty-four hours, is extremely unlikely. 
It is a very uninviting prospect for anyone to undertake. On the other hand, 
against a background of political or military confrontation, the possibility that 
one side may think that it has to `go first' under conditions of great stress 
arising out of mutually `ratcheted' alerts is far from negligible. And the 
existence of increasingly accurate offensive weapons makes that all the more 
possible. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
This is a very complicated matter, and, when you look at the literature, you 
find that there are powerful considerations on each side. The trouble is that 
you can never tell what the ultimate pay-off will be. Vulnerable command and 
control facilities may be dangerous; on the other hand they may make a first 
strike less inviting to the enemy, in so far as it is clear that their destruction 
will trigger their side's whole system. Again, under certain conditions the 
amount of information which electronic systems make available to decision- 
makers will help them to avoid error, but under conditions of alert, the flood 
of information may make error more possible. Errors are possible out of ignor- 
ance, but they are also possible out of a superfluity of information. 
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(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
Nobody knows. There would probably be tremendous pressure to end hostilit- 
ies swiftly and on almost any terms. On the other hand there would be tremen- 
dous pressure to plunge on in the hope of salvaging something from the 
wreckage. Nobody knows. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
In many cases they clearly reinforce deterrence. But they also lower the nuclear 
threshold. These ire not alternatives. As to detailed questions about whether 
Pershing and Cruise weke necessary to balance SS2os, I do not feel competent 
to make a judgement. It is not something that I have thought worthwhile to 
investigate very carefully. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in r? 
I think that the Strategic Defence Initiative is partly the product of morally 
inspired hopes that we can somehow simply levitate out of the appalling quag- 
mire, which everyone recognizes that we are in. And, indeed, if we could 
create the system which the planners envisage overnight, and share it with the 
other side, then that might well be an immense change for the better. But 
there is no prospect of this, and the process of getting there would be very 
dangerous, because it would look to the other side as if we were aiming to 
disarm him, particularly since the Reagan administration has made it clear that 
it intends to keep its offensive capability right through the process. Admiral 
Poindexter's remark the other day, that he could not see how anyone could 
object to SDI because it is purely defensive, is alarming, if he meant it seri- 
ously; it is blind to the inevitable strategic assessment the Soviets will make (or 
else supposes that his audience is blind to that). In the meantime, the threat 
of SDI may have helped to bring the Soviet Union back to the negotiating 
table. But bringing someone to the bargaining table is not the same as striking 
a bargain, and SDI may well play a major role in preventing that. Many 
influential American politicians support SDI only as a bargaining chip, but 
the administration seems to deny that it is one. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
There may be certain causal links between the size of the arsenals held by the 
established nuclear weapons powers and the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
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to other powers, but I think that they are tenuous. If the great powers were 
to give up nuclear deterrence altogether, that might make a big difference. 
But I don't think that relatively small reductions have much effect. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations 
offer the best prospect for future stability? 
OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
I have no lively anticipation that the current talks will yield anything much at all. I 
don't think that there is much prospect in general of gaining stability or disarma- 
ment measures from multilateral negotiation. Each responsible person involved in 
these processes must think how much better it would be if we could do the same 
essential job of deterring the other side with much less expenditure of resources 
and many fewer of the risks that come from huge complexity and `overkill'. The 
apparently dramatic offers made on either side are partly a genuine attempt to levi- 
tate out of the quagmire. But no one is in full command of any of these giant political 
systems, and, among other things, neither can trust the other not to cheat or take 
advantage of the opportunities that bargaining opens up. Neither is willing to take 
the chance involved in an acceptance which measures up to an offer, or an offer 
which is likely to meet acceptance. Nevertheless, a world in which people are still 
talking to one another in this sort of way seems better than one in which they simply 
turn their backs on one another. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would OR Would nuclear disannament remove the 
war between the great powers again incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
become a rational option and therefore affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
more likely? to initiate a third world war? 
I think that war would become significantly more likely. At the very least, I 
think that the kind of brinkmanship which typically generates wars would 
become much more attractive as an option - and this would be more likely to 
result in a major war. 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited preferable to nuclear war? 
nuclear war? 
If one could imagine a major conventional war that did not in fact escalate into 
a nuclear war, it would probably be as frightful as certain forms of very limited 
nuclear war; but it would not be as terrible as the sort of nuclear war that is 
currently being planned for. 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
uninvented would they not be bound to be there be no incentive to resort to 
used sooner or later once war had broken capabilities which the other side has as 
out? well? 
I am sure that nuclear weapons would reappear, given enough time to recon- 
struct them. 
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(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only 
feasible in a world where war itself is no 
longer a possibility? 
73 
OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
hope of a rational world-order? 
What the previous question has demonstrated is that global nuclear disarma- 
ment is very risky. It carries all sorts of appalling possible consequences. In 
that sense it is `undesirable'. But we should not leap from there to the con- 
clusion that therefore we must prefer the alternative; the alternative in this 
case is the present sort of nuclear confrontation, which is in itself `undesirable' 
and also carries other appalling risks. So, which is the least undesirable? This 
is the bottom line consideration and is an entirely different question. As I will 
be arguing later, it is folly to think that you can compute the probabilities 
against the values at stake, in other words the anticipated consequences, and 
arrive at a sum which will enable you to say `therefore this option is the more 
desirable'. The sum cannot be done. So all we can say here is that the antici- 
pated consequences of global nuclear disarmament are in many respects 
extremely uninviting. 
(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen 
to be prepared for war, as failure before 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under 
likely future conditions would global 
nuclear disarmament make war, including 
nuclear war, more likely? 
OR Do the years before 1914 show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? 
Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
They are both true, aren't they? That's all one can say. 
B NATO Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically evenly matched? 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
This is once again not something that I have given much attention to, but, if 
I am forced to answer, I will say - yes, the Soviet Union and her allies have a 
dangerous conventional military superiority in Europe. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
which will take advantage of unilateral threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western concessions and is only restrained Western technology and likely to respond 
and forced to accept arms-control positively to unconditional offers of 
agreements by Western determination and Western restraint within a general context 
strength? of detente? 
I think that there are two big questions being run together here. One is: given 
mutual nuclear deterrence, what are the factors that are operating on the Soviet 
Union? The other is: what would be likely to happen if we unilaterally gave 
up our nuclear deterrent, leaving them with a nuclear capability, or if both 
sides gave up their nuclear deterrents? 
In answer to the first, I would say that the Soviet Union that exists today 
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has from the start been constrained by Western strength and has in many ways 
been transformed as a result. 
In answer to the second, it seems likely that Western unilateralism might 
encourage an intrinsic expansionism, which springs from, among other things, 
Soviet ideology. Mutual nuclear disarmament would have unpredictable 
consequences. As I have said, it might lead to dangerous confrontations 
between East and West, and therefore make war more likely - although the 
situation would be so different to the one that exists today that it's very hard 
to say. Who was being expansionist might not in every case be clear. The 
Soviet Union has an ideology which authorizes and encourages unilateral 
expansionism, without excluding any means. The West has far-flung interests, 
which it is prepared to defend or attain by the use of military power, for 
example in the Middle East. It has an ideology which encourages expansion- 
ism, if not by any means, then by means which include military pressure of a 
-kind that can lead to confrontations and war. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional 
preponderance such that NATO must 
continue to be able to threaten early use of 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
strategically suicidal? 
For NATO to use her nuclear weapons might well be strategically suicidal. 
On the other hand, it would seem to me to be dangerous if she were not able 
to threaten to make early use of them. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
As I have said earlier, this is not a matter which I have tried to investigate very 
closely, and I am not prepared to conclude that NATO's policy is illegitimate 
or mistaken. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
There is much to be said for exploring less dangerous alternative strategies. 
But exploring is one thing and finding is another. 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
OR Is it domination by the two super-powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
In a sense it is possible to agree with both sides here. Given the fact that we 
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need American support, we had better keep them in the front line and tie in 
our defences to their nuclear capability. This is certainly a very substantial 
guarantee of Western European security. On the other hand, if everything 
went wrong and we were dragged into a military superpower clash, that would 
probably be the end of Europe. There is much that is attractive about the idea 
of Western European neutrality. But there would be immense costs - and we 
would be in danger of falling a prey to one of the two superpowers - the less 
attractive of the two! 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilatet`al disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
Let me take these questions one by one, starting on the left. Would Western 
unilateral disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Yes, undoubtedly. Would 
unilateral initiatives be the thin end of this wedge? Not necessarily, unless 
they were intended to be. The bottom line of nuclear deterrence is so far 
away from particular unilateral disarmament initiatives, and in the end it's the 
bottom line that matters most. Do radical disarmers serve Soviet interests? 
My reading of much of the radical disarmament literature is - yes, many of 
them do. A number are unrealistic about the nature of Soviet power and 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests. Some of them, I suspect, do so con- 
sciously. Turning to the right-hand side, I do think that unilateral initiatives 
of this kind are the only way to-reverse the arms race. They are a risky way, 
and might not succeed in reversing it. But they are probably the only way, 
and I think that we should be prepared to take some risks. Finally, I do 
not think that multilateral disarmers who reject those policies are necessarily 
insincere - although some probably are. 
C British Policy 
z The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and 
independence and protects her from nuclear 
blackmail? 
OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
`deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
encourage proliferation? 
I do think that all probable uses would be likely to be suicidal. But it does not 
follow from that this the British deterrent does not protect Britain from many 
forms of nuclear blackmail. 
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(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
I think that it is largely a rationalization to say that one of the main reasons 
why Britain retains an independent deterrent is to contribute to a second 
centre of decision-making in Europe. That is not why we have it. It may be 
the case that in fact others in Europe welcome it as a second centre and think 
that it usefully complicates Soviet calculations - but this is not in itself a 
sufficient reason for keeping it. 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent British initiatives more likely 
to trigger Soviet retaliation than US . involvement? 
Although the considerations on either side here are reasonable, I think that 
for most people they are peripheral. The deep consideration is the one in 
number (i). 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? 
OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
afforded at the expense of conventional 
strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
The saving would not be all that great. It would not buy much in the way of 
conventional strength. This again is not a decisive argument. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament have no effect on other 
countries and only serve to weaken British 
influence and allow France unchallenged 
ascendancy in Europe? 
OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
British prestige? Would British 
disarmament within the context outlined in 
B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
I think that this is also marginal. We might lose a certain amount of influence 
with the United States. I don't think that the fact that France would be left 
as the only European nuclear power makes much difference one way or the 
other - although there are refined calculations that it might encourage the 
Germans to go nuclear, which would be dangerous. On the other side, I do 
not believe that it would help to break the nuclear log-jam or influence other 
powers to go non-nuclear. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to 
continue to ensure effective British strategic 
defence into the 21st century? 
OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
all the drawbacks listed above? 
I haven't any special reason to question the political-economic-strategic calcu- 
lations made or expounded by Michael Quinlan. ' (See footnote page 229. ) 
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2 NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
All talk about working towards `an overall non-nuclear strategy' in NATO is 
just fantasy. And the belief that one somehow improves one's moral position 
by getting rid of one's own weapons, while retaining one's place within an 
alliance whose whole policy involves `flexible response' based on nuclear deter- 
rence, seems to to me largely illusory. Of course we have a moral obligation 
to get rid of our; own weapons, and therefore we should get rid of them. So 
far I agree with Labour Party policy. But we should also get out of an alliance 
whose fundamental strategy is nuclear. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain make US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affairs 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
For the same reason we should also get rid of American nuclear bases.. It is 
clearly the case that it would weaken Western defences, but we must do it on 
moral grounds. 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR' 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
If we got rid of our own nuclear weapons, got out of the Alliance and removed 
American nuclear bases - in other words, if we became effectively neutral -I 
don't see any special reason why the Soviet Union would want to target us for 
actual massive nuclear attack. I just do not believe the story that everyone is 
under direct nuclear threat, no matter what their stance in the world. 
(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
Perhaps in those circumstances, no matter what Neil Kinnock may say, we 
would still be effectively under the American umbrella. But that would be up 
to the Americans. 
i. Sir Michael Quinlan, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence 
1977-1981, now Permanent Secretary at the Department of Employment. 
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Moral Considerations 
(i) Is it morally right to pursue the policy least OR Are there actions which are in themselves 
likely to cause human suffering? May this wrong no matter what the situation? Is the 
sometimes involve doing things which in alternative to excuse almost any act of 
other circumstances would be wrong? barbarism? 
I say `yes' to the right-hand side. 
As to the left, there are two sources of confusion to be dispelled. First, it is 
an illusion to assume that we will be in a situation in which all our options are 
morally wrong, so that we are simply having to choose between moral evils. 
There has been no demonstration that we are ins such a position, nor do I 
believe that such a demonstration of a true moral dilemma is even conceivable. 
Secondly, it is a fundamental mistake to think that we can weigh up greater 
and lesser risks, and greater and lesser quantities of human suffering, measure 
them against one another, and thereby reach a morally significant conclusion. 
Goods, harms, risks, probabilities, and so on, are factors which pull in differ- 
ent directions and cannot be measured against one another. They are incom- 
mensurable. 
(ii) In formulating policy should we weigh up OR Is the only relevant point here that a 
the probability of success and the relative nuclear exchange of almost any kind 
costs in terms of human suffering of would in itself cause unimaginable 
alternative nuclear and non-nuclear suffering to largely civilian populations? 
strategies? 
Taking the statement implied on the left, we now apply this to the question 
of alternative nuclear and non-nuclear strategies. In making our moral choice, 
we must of course be aware of the probability of success and attend to the 
relative costs of alternative policies. In this sense morality has a great deal to 
do with consequences. It's better not to go in blind, and to have as full a 
picture as possible of the resulting scenarios that we will be likely to finish up 
with if we choose in different ways. But this working out of the different 
scenarios will not in itself constitute or determine our moral judgement and 
choice. As I say, the relevant factors are in the end incommensurable, so that 
we cannot just feed in the data, turn the handle, and then expect to find out 
in this consequentialist way how we should act morally. For example, here we 
are faced with an impressive case for unilateral nuclear disarmament, based 
on the fear of the holocaust and the likelihood that this will come about if we 
carry on indefinitely as we are going now. And also with an impressive case 
for continuing to rely on nuclear deterrence, based at any given time on the 
quite low risk of the holocaust and the preservation of the immense goods of 
Western civilization against the dangers of being unjustly taken over. These, 
let us say, are the two alternative scenarios that our assessments picture for 
us. But. there simply is no calculation that will show which is the more rational 
or moral of the two choices. In order to discover that, we do not rely on 
mechanical computation, but on all sorts of commitments that we have made 
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in our earlier moral lives. We go for the option that is most continuous with 
the commitments that we have made, and the vocation that we as individuals 
and as a community have responded to, provided that that option does not 
violate a moral absolute, or involve choosing (intending) something `in itself 
wrong', as you have put it. 
(iii) So far as concerns intention, need we look OR Is there no such thing as a fully deployed 
no further than the fact that our sole aim in weapons system which is a bluff? Is to 
deploying nuclear weapons is to prevent deploy nuclear weapons to intend to use 
their use? them in certain circumstances? 
Well, I think that what is suggested on the left is often advanced as a way out 
of an otherwise uncomfortable position, especially by Christian moralists. 
They want to retain the deterrent, but recognize that it would be utterly 
immoral to use it and see that it seems to be geared up for use if need be. So 
they try to turn it into a sort of bluff. But I am afraid they are mistaken. It 
isn't a bluff, nor could it be a bluff. ' Even if, as is logically possible, but 
exceedingly unlikely, all the weapons operators were bluffing, so that on the 
day when the orders went out no buttons were pressed, even so it is logically 
impossible for the policy as a whole to be a bluff, and there are many people 
who participate in the policy who cannot be bluffing. Let me take this by 
stages. The policy does not announce itself as a bluff. It declares itself to be 
the policy of having the capability of wiping out cities in tit-for-tat city swaps 
and/or in final retaliation, and of having the will to use that capability. That 
policy is reiterated every year by the United States, and occasionally by the 
United Kingdom and France. `We have the capability and the will' is the 
threat. So the policy itself is not to bluff, and cannot be to bluff. And it is that 
policy that you and I are invited to subscribe to or detach ourselves from. So 
when we vote for it, for example, in Parliament or in Congress or at the polls, 
we cannot be bluffing. We may be hoping that other people are bluffing, but 
we cannot ourselves be bluffing in the part we play as voters. Similarly, nor 
can people who build nuclear weapons or send nuclear submarines out, which 
are then out of their control. They are simply doing their bit for a policy which 
is not one of bluff; in other words, when we vote for the policy, we say 
`yes' to the announced intention to use. Our motive, of course, is to prevent 
situations arising in which we might `have to' execute our threats of use. Non- 
use is our hope; preservation of peace with freedom is our motive. But our 
intention is to have the weapons, and, so the policy says, to use them if we 
have to. Reagan's and Thatcher's innermost intentions are irrelevant to the 
moral choice that we are asked to make now. No one is asked to subscribe to 
Reagan's and Thatcher's innermost intentions. We are only asked to subscribe 
to the policy, which does not alter whenever Reagan or Thatcher secretly alter 
their innermost intentions. 
(As to the idea that we might keep our weapons, but change our announced 
policy and say that we will never use them - the policy would be almost 
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unintelligible. As announced it would have virtually no deterrent capability. 
And if, in order to give it deterrent capability, we continued to deploy and 
update our forces, our total policy could only seem to be one of keeping our 
options open, which once again is a kind or policy of use -a conditional 
intention or at least willingness to use). 
(iv) Are there possible uses of nuclear weapons 
which are allowed by just War theory, for 
example the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in order to prevent worse 
suffering? Can there be a theory of, Just 
Deterrence? 
OR Is a conditional intention to cause 
indiscriminate and disproportionate 
suffering of this kind, whether admonitory, 
preemptive or retaliatory, ruled out by Just 
War theory? Was it wrong to bomb 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? 
Those who say that if deterrence failed there are certain morally legitimate 
uses of nuclear weapons, may be imagining restricted strikes against missile 
fields or fleets at sea and so on. But this is to abstract from the necessities of 
a total military strategy. It is not sane to threaten to use nuclear weapons unless 
this is backed up by one or both of the following two threats. First, the threat 
to make tit-for-tat attacks on the other side's cities if he has made an attack 
on your cities. You must threaten to city-swap, lest your cities be simply taken 
out one by one until you are blackmailed into surrender. Secondly, and I think 
that this is probably the more basic, you must say `ifyou make an all-out nuclear 
attack on us and we are wiped out and have lost everything, you will regret it, 
because we will wipe you out'. This is the threat of final retaliation. There cannot 
be a coherent or effective nuclear deterrent strategy, within a context where 
both sides have nuclear weapons, which does not rely wholly or partly on one 
or both of these two threats. Since neither the threat of city-swapping, nor 
the threat of final retaliation, can conceivably be reconciled with `Just War 
Theory', no nuclear deterrent strategy can be, either. But I prefer not to talk 
about `Just War', let alone `Theory'. We are talking about an absolute norm 
of common and Christian morality: You must not intend to kill innocents 
(here, non-combatants). 
As to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the dropping of the two atomic bombs on 
those cities was indeed morally wrong. In fact, as one can plainly see from the 
records of those who made the decision, neither the motive nor the intention 
was to attack military targets. The intention was simply to cause maximum 
damage in largely civilian areas in order to shock the Japanese out of the war 
- which it did. Even if Leonard Cheshire is right, and this was the only way 
in which the war could have been ended short of a much more costly invasion 
of Japan, it was still clearly morally wrong and should certainly not have been 
done. 
(v) Is there no relevant connection between the OR Is it a scandal that such huge resources are 
development and deployment of nuclear devoted to the development and deployment 
weapons and world poverty and disease? of nuclear weapons and not to the 
alleviation of suffering? 
In a way both alternatives are mistaken. Nuclear weapons are one of the 
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cheapest components in our defence, so it is wrong just to point the finger at 
them. On the other hand, the enormous expense involved in the huge enter- 
prise of defending ourselves against the Soviet Union undoubtedly does con- 
tribute to the suffering of the poorest of the poor - and the costs of the Soviet's 
own efforts even more so. 
(vi) Does Christian teaching allow the OR Does Christian teaching condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? deployment of nuclear weapons? 
Because, as we have seen, the deployment of nuclear weapons is only rational 
within a strategic framework which includes the threat and capability to city- 
swap and carry out final retaliation, Christian doctrine requires us to condemn 
their deployment. If it was not for these two threats, it qoes not seem to me that 
Christian teaching would necessarily condemn either the use or deployment of 
nuclear weapons any more than it condemns the use or deployment of other 
weapons. What is mistaken is the attempt made by many of the churches in 
their official pronouncements to suggest that the systems are or can become 
purely counter-military, or that they can become a bluff. On inspection, both 
of these suggestions are clearly unrealistic. The facts have not been fully 
attended to. Quite often, of course, governments deliberately try to draw a 
veil of obscurity over these facts. (The British are more mealy-mouthed than 
the French over this. ) So people need to engage in a bit of strategic analysis 
to uncover them. Once the facts are established the application of Christian 
doctrine becomes clear enough. The minimum that the churches ought to say 
is this: `If our nuclear deterrent system involves either or both of the two threats to 
city-swap and carry out final retaliation, then it cannot be morally justified, even if 
it preserves peace and justice and lives which could not otherwise be preserved. ' 
That would be sufficient. It would then be up to Christians as men of the 
world to judge what the facts about our threats actually are. 
Recommendations 
As you can see, broadly speaking I agree on prudential grounds with those 
who defend current policies. But these policies turn out on analysis to be 
clearly and irrevocably immoral. So what should be done? I have two types of 
recommendation to make. If I had my way, we would give up our nuclear 
weapons immediately and unconditionally. We would give them up very fast, 
because we are bound to renounce the deterrent policy immediately, and 
because the process of more leisurely dismantling would be dangerous - the 
Soviets would have such an incentive to prevent us backsliding on our resolve 
to give them up. So that is my basic recommendation. 
But now I am faced with your list of possible courses of action in a world 
where my basic proposal is not going to be accepted. So what I say is this. 
Don't mix morals with strategy. If you are determined to go on being immoral 
by keeping some form of nuclear deterrent, then at least make the damn thing 
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safe. This may well involve you in updating it, complexifying it, enhancing 
it. In fact, I think that one should be prepared to take some risks in order to 
get rid of some of the more dangerous features of the present system. But 
don't let us kid ourselves that by doing this we are making it more morally 
satisfactory - except in the sense that it is always morally right to reduce risks. 
II think that there is a case for a freeze, although it is not conclusive. 
2 If we could be sure that the other side was also doing the same, this would 
be good (See A2 (A) (v)). 
3 This does not seem to me to be critical, but, given appropriate verification, 
yes. 
'A A declaration of No First Use might be quite dangerous in the European 
theatre. 
5 Up to a certain depth this would be safe and desirable. Beyond that it 
becomes actually destabilizing (See AI(iv)). 
6 That would be nice. 
7 So would this. 
8 As I have said, despite the great risks involved in universal nuclear dis- 
armament, we are clearly under an obligation to do anything that would 
get rid of our threats of city-swapping and final retaliation. But there is no 
such thing as a `process of universal nuclear disarmament' and no-one can 
bring such a process into being by his own decision. It's an illusory ques- 
tion (See A2(B)(iv)). 
9A minimum deterrent could be dangerous, particularly if one of the powers 
was at the same time committed to extended deterrence (See Av(iv)). 
10 This depends upon a number of contingencies, such as whether the Rus- 
sians are in it themselves, whether the Americans make this a prerequisite 
for their continuing to uphold the NATO Alliance, and so on. 
II See 4. 
12 I am undecided. I would not favour unconditional cuts for the sake of it, 
but certain unconditional measures might help to break the log-jam. 
13 Yes. 
14 No. The withdrawal should be immediate. 
15 See 6. 
16 Yes. 
17 I have no strong views (See Ci(iv)). 
18 This is unrealistic. Britain should immediately get out of an alliance whose 
fundamental strategy is nuclear (See C2(i)). 
19 Britain should also get rid of American nuclear bases (See C2(ii)). 
20 See 18. 
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Editorial Comment 
This set of answers was given during the course of an interview in King's 
College, London, on August 14,1986. Perhaps what may strike the reader 
most is Professor Freedman's insistence throughout that these are nearly all 
highly complex issues to which there are no clear-cut or simple answers. The 
question of nuclear weapons is only part of a much broader set of problems 
(L2(A)vii), nuclear deterrence theory itself is ' deeply ambiguous (Aliii), and 
there are no simple remedies (Biv). This applies as much to sweeping official 
claims, such as those made on behalf of the American Strategic Defence Initiat- 
ive (A2(A)v), as to the proposals of the more radical critics of current policy 
(Bvii). The result is that, seen from these polarized positions, Professor Freed- 
man's is an influential, but ambivalent, voice. 
PROFESSOR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN 
A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factor? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 1945? 
I think that, if nuclear weapons had not existed, war between the great powers 
might have been more likely - but by no means inevitable. As it is, fear of 
nuclear-war has probably been an important restraining factor at key moments 
- perhaps more important in the first twenty years after the Second World 
War, when the international system was still settling down, than recently. For 
example, in the absence of such a threat, it is possible to imagine a Soviet 
seizure of West Berlin, or the temptation for America to have intervened in 
Hungary in 1956. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
An enemy's possession of an invulnerable second strike strategic nuclear force 
means that there are profound disincentives to launching a first strike should 
a war seem imminent. In theory, mutual possession does introduce a degree 
of neutralization, which perhaps ought to invite things lower down the spec- 
trum. But this has not happened, largely, I think, because of the fear that 
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somewhere or other nuclear weapons could get used, and this might then 
escalate. 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
To begin with, flexible response does not necessarily mean limited nuclear 
options. By and large it was introduced with conventional options in mind. 
Nor were the limited nuclear options that were envisaged necessarily of a 
war-fighting sort. They were, if anything, thought of more as a signal to 
indicate the terrible things that might happen if the aggression continued. 
Having said that, there does seem to be a problem here. I think that the 
existence of such a diversity of nuclear weapons around the place, and such a 
variety of ideas about how they may be employed, does increase the possibility 
that they could be used. But this is all part of deterrence. Clearly, the paradox 
of deterrence is that it is. reinforced to the extent that you think that nuclear 
weapons can be used - but, the more that you think that you can use them, 
the lower the threshold of their use and the more dangerous the situation 
seems to be. So there is always a balance to be struck. My own view on this is 
that it is not that the use of nuclear weapons has in fact become more likely, 
but that even a very small percentage chance that they may be used is in itself 
deterring. 
I do not think that military planners have in general been aiming for war- 
fighting superiority. They do tend to believe that they need to have-things to 
do should deterrence fail, but very few think seriously in terms of the possi- 
bility of achieving a meaningful victory in a nuclear war. I don't think most 
European planners believe for a moment that you can fight a nuclear war along 
conventional lines. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
Well, again there is a tension here. There are arguments both ways. On the 
one hand, you can say that large and complicated arsenals reinforce deterrence 
by increasing apparent risk. On the other hand, when you spread the arsenals 
too wide, command and control problems may arise, which could be danger- 
ous. I do think that a lot of the systems we have at the moment are unnecessary. 
So there is superfluity. But that does not necessarily mean that they are danger- 
ous. I do not think that `overkill' is necessarily more dangerous than `kill'. In 
fact `kill' may even be more dangerous, because the calculations may then 
become rather delicate and you may get it wrong. 
I do not, by the way, think that `worse case analysis' has in general been a 
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determining factor here. It has been an element, but cannot be said to have 
driven the process. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
These are very complex relations. The idea of parity has at times seemed to 
be a suitable and generally acceptable objective for arms control negotiations, 
but has often in practise turned out to be rather elusive. There have been 
successes, such as the ABM treaty, which, I think, has been a stabilizing force. 
But you can also argue that the idea of parity in arms control negotiations has 
encouraged imitation, force-matching, and so on. It's difficult to assess this, 
because we are dealing with a complex process, and you can't prove that the 
same sorts of thing wouldn't have been happening anyway. 
Much the same applies to the idea of `Negotiation from strength'. By and 
large it is probably the case that using `bargaining chips' in order to negotiate 
from strength leaves you with the strength of the chips rather than nego- 
tiations. But this is hard to judge. For example, if, as some see as possible, we 
get an INF agreement this year, it would in part be a vindication of the 
idea that in some cases you can successfully bargain from strength. But it all 
depends. The threat of a developed ABM system by the United States has 
undoubtedly had an effect as a bargaining chip, whereas I don't think that 
other things, like MX, ' have. This is one of those arguments that is not a 
general rule, but on occasion may apply. 
(vi) Has force planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
A bit of each. For example, you can't say that SDI has been technologically 
created, because the technology is not yet there. It is a strategic idea. And 
what is written on the right-hand side here is a way of describing things which 
aren't quite as sinister and stark as that. On the other hand, there are certain 
imperatives within an organization towards continuity, towards following tra- 
ditional patterns, towards doing things the way they've always been done. 
And this had been a very powerful factor. Then, after that, I think that it is 
an interaction between technology and strategic thinking. 
i.. `Missile Experimental', now known as `Peacekeeper', the main United States ICBM develop- 
ment for the late 198os and i99os. 
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2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
future? 
I am definitely with those who believe that it's inconceivable. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent v pr more likely? 
No systems of this kind can be absolutely secure. There will always be vulner- 
abilities. And our command and control systems, like any others, would be at 
risk if there were a major crisis deteriorating towards war. There would be 
intolerable strain in an intolerable situation. As in any conflict, if the com- 
manders panic, then all sorts of things could happen. But in different circum- 
stances it could also be dangerous if they are not properly alarmed when they 
should be. You can't be dogmatic. Nevertheless, this is certainly an important 
issue that requires looking at. 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
The answer is that we cannot be sure what would happen. It might be stopped, 
or it might escalate. If it came to it, we could be grateful that we had options 
that gave us hope of limiting the conflict. But we would be very unwise to 
work on the assumption that we can control matters, because that might well 
prove to be a dangerous illusion. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
The two are not contradictory. Reinforcing deterrence often requires a lower- 
ing of the nuclear threshold. But I would distinguish between the longer-range 
and the short-range systems. Systems like Cruise and Pershing II have, by 
and large, been helpful and positive in their influence on Soviet calculations 
- in particular, by denying them the thought that they could maintain Soviet 
territory as a sanctuary in war. But I have less time for battlefield systems, 
which on the whole probably do just lower the nuclear threshold without 
significantly reinforcing deterrence. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in r? 
The answer is quite easy. No. It does not offer the prospect of a defence against 
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nuclear weapons, nor is it likely to affect deterrence. The whole thing is based 
on illusions and on faulty strategic judgement. It is little more than a cobbled 
together series of research programmes that have been going on anyway, and 
in ten years time will be seen as little more than a footnote. It will be interesting 
to talk about it in a nostalgic sort of way. That's all. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
It's hard to show that any given potential proliferator is likely to be particularly 
influenced by, siy, whether or not Britain stays in the nuclear business. And, 
so far as concerns the superpowers, a convincing case can be made the other 
way. You can say that by diminishing the superpower's nuclear guarantee to 
their allies you are creating incentives for proliferation. To some extent the 
Chinese thought that they needed nuclear weapons themselves, because they 
no longer believed in the Russian guarantee in the late 195os. The French felt 
the same about the Americans. Similar influences can be said to be operating 
today with countries like Taiwan, South Korea, or, to a certain extent, Israel. 
By and large, the incentives for proliferation are found within the security 
environment of the potential proliferators, and that is where policy has to 
operate. Overall, I do think that proliferation must be seen as a danger, and 
there are things that could be done to tighten up current policies. But the 
process has been much slower than was at one time anticipated, and this is 
not at the moment a disaster area. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
offer the best prospect for future stability? attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
It depends what you think are the main sources of instability. The trouble 
with so much of the debate is that it tends to be too narrow. There is too 
much exclusive emphasis on nuclear weapons, and not enough on the broader 
political factors, such as East-West relations in general, which are the ones that 
make the nuclear arsenals stabilizing or destabilizing, and give the stimulus. 
Nuclear weapons are important in international politics, but so are conven- 
tional weapons. They are important in East-West relations, but differences 
go well beyond that. So there may be a relationship between arms control 
negotiations and political stability, but it is a tenuous one. The best that 
arms control can do is consolidate an existing stability, not create one. The 
fundamental sources of stability and instability are political, and that is what 
needs to be worked at. 
Turning to the right-hand side, it again depends what we are talking about. 
Is it going to mean total nuclear disarmament? Is it going to be partial? If 
partial, are you sure that you will be in a safer relationship as a result? Is it 
really the case that less means safer? There are a lot of obvious questions to 
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be asked here. There is certainly plenty of waste and surplus capacity that we 
can do without. But you could have a degree of disarmament that made very 
little difference one way or the other. Or doing without it might have important 
political consequences that are difficult to foresee. Again, the idea of a `mini- 
mum deterrent' is not straight-forward either. By what criteria do we judge 
this? By numbers? By missions? Will the calculations become more delicate, 
and the situation therefore less stable, as a result? Are we to keep graded 
options? How will this affect the guarantee that the United States has been 
asked to provide for Europe? The lower the `minimum', the more questions 
will be raised in Western Europe. It may challenge the credibility of extended 
deterrence. And so on. 
So I don't see any of these measures as panaceas. The overall situation is 
extremely complicated, and the problem of nuclear weapons is only a part of 
it. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would 
war between the great powers again 
become a rational option and therefore 
more likely? 
OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
to initiate a third world war? 
Yes. Possibly. You would have removed one of the inhibitions against war. 
I'm not as convinced as are some others that, if we abandoned the nuclear 
deterrent, there would be war in Central Europe. I don't think that the conven- 
tional situation in itself provides incentives to war. But there might well be a 
greater likelihood of US-Soviet skirmishing on the peripheries. 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited 
nuclear war? 
OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
preferable to nuclear war? 
It depends how limited the nuclear war was. Obviously more people were 
killed by firebombing and so on at the end of the Second World War than in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki - which counts as a kind of limited nuclear war. 
Major conventional war would be terrible. Let's leave it at that. 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented would they not be bound to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
there be no incentive to resort to 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
I think this is probably true. If it happened, nuclear weapons would probably 
be used anyway. There would be the likelihood that, during the course of a 
prolonged land war, both sides would be getting nuclear arsenals together. 
Even the assumption in the mid-to late-1940s when the Baruch Plan` was 
being talked about, was that that's what would happen. (See footnote on page 
242. ) 
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(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
feasible in a world where war itself is no disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
longer a possibility? hope of a rational world-order? 
I think that what Reagan and Gorbachev say about wanting complete nuclear 
disarmament is an illusion. I don't think that politicians should peddle 
illusions. I don't think you will ever get rid of the thing. You will never get 
rid of war itself. All you can do is to marginalize them both, so that they 
become less and less important in international affairs. That may indeed be a 
worthwhile object, but it requires a different set of policies from the almost 
exclusive concern with reducing nuclear weapons stocks, which seems to pre- 
occupy some people. Nuclear arsenals will be with us indefinitely. We live in 
the nuclear age. 
(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen OR Do the years before 1914 show what 
to be prepared for war, as failure before happens when military planning and the 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under arms race control political choices? Do 
likely future conditions would global present strategies make nuclear war almost 
nuclear disarmament make war, including inevitable under likely future conditions? 
nuclear war, more likely? Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
I think that analogies like this are very dangerous. The situation now is differ- 
ent to the situation as it was in either 1914 or 1939. And often the analogy is 
in any case based on a misapprehension of what was going on at the time. 
There are things to be learnt from those occasions, but I don't think they are 
necessarily the simple lessons that we are sometimes told that we should learn. 
Study history, but don't draw too many simple analogies from it. 
B NATO Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
evenly matched? 
This is very important. I'm probably somewhere in between. The Soviet 
Union has taken conventional capabilities very seriously indeed and has 
impressive armed forces. They are well trained and well positioned, and they 
have thought about mobilization strategies and so on. On the other hand, I 
think that NATO could probably cope with the Warsaw Pact better than 
NATO leaders normally suggest. I am sure that Soviet Commanders do not 
feel that they have reached a point of overwhelming war-fighting superiority. 
They themselves are well aware of key weaknesses that could be readily 
exploited. But I would not say that the two sides are `evenly matched'. That 
would be putting it too strongly. Apart from anything else, they are not trying 
to do the same sort of thing. 
i. A plan presented by Bernard Baruch on behalf of the United States Government to the first 
meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946. It proposed the handing over of all potential 
nuclear war-making activities to international control and the destruction of existing stocks of 
weapons. It was rejected by the Soviet Union because it would perpetuate the advantages held 
by the United States. 
Professor Lawrence Freedman 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power 
which will -take advantage of unilateral 
Western concessions and is only restrained 
and forced to accept arms-control 
agreements by Western determination and 
strength? 
of 
OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western technology and likely to respond 
positively to unconditional offers of 
Western restraint within a general context 
of detente? 
Although there are elements of truth in it, I do not think that conventional 
Western wisdom about the Soviet Union's being a simple `expansionist power' 
is very helpful. The searing experiences of the last war should not be forgotten. 
The Soviet Union is conducting a diplomacy in which it is looking for reassur- 
ances as much as it is making threats. But the two alternatives offered here 
are not mutually exclusive. Encircled and threatened powers have often been 
expansionist in the past - that's how we got our empire! I think that the Soviet 
Union went into Afghanistan because it felt encircled and threatened. So its 
very weaknesses can make it quite dangerous. Part of the problem here is that 
one of its weaknesses is ideological, which, living in the way we do, we cannot 
help but inflame. So the West needs a tactful diplomacy, sensitive to time and 
occasion, which is realistic and flexible. It does not need grand gestures and 
ostentatious symbols, which are in any case a bad way of conducting inter- 
national relations. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional 
preponderance such that NATO must 
continue to be able to threaten early use of 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
strategically suicidal? 
If it came to it, NATO's use of nuclear weapons probably would be suicidal. 
So i would prefer it if, in force planning, there were a presumption on our 
part that we would not use nuclear weapons first. This raises quite large issues, 
given the symbolism of what has been said so often in the past. But there are 
things that we could do in this direction, such as reduce the number of battle- 
field nuclear systems and instead give more thought to equivalents on the 
conventional side. 
But I am against a declaration of No First Use, first, because I don't think 
that it would be believable. And, secondly, because of the effect on deterrence. 
If we were actually moving into a crisis, I think that a lot of the people who 
are now clamouring for such a declaration would be begging for it to be 
ignored. If Western leaders said `we will not use nuclear weapons first' and Soviet 
leaders said `nor will we, so let's have war, ' there would be widespread alarm. 
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(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
I don't think that the balance is particularly delicate. One of the problems 
here is that we are dealing with elements of political perception, which in some 
cases can make the situation seem potentially unstable. But, by and large, we 
probably have enough options already not to have to match everything that 
the Soviets are doing. Turning to the right-hand side, it's true that the West 
has initiated many of the phases of the nuclear arms race, but this is by no 
means. overwhelmingly true. The first ABM system was Soviet deployed, the 
first anti-satellite system was Soviet deployed, the first ICBM tests were Soviet. 
It's not true in all areas. 
I think that the trouble with the freeze is that it would freeze the bad along 
with the good. It's a bit indiscriminate. It's a simple idea, but not easy to do 
- there are enormous negotiating problems. I don't 'think that it would be 
disastrous if there were a freeze, though. As with many of these suggestions, 
I'm relatively indifferent to them, because I think that they are oversold. 
I feel much the same about the idea of unconditional Western cuts. There 
have been unconditional Western cuts, for example to certain battlefield sys- 
tems, but they do not"seem to have made much of an impression. It was just 
sensible from our own point of view - we didn't need them. Once again, this 
is an instrument that we might consider using in certain circumstances. At the 
right time it can sometimes work. But you have to know what you are doing. 
It's not a cure-all. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
`Forward defence' simply means defending the inner German border. This 
may not be sound militarily, because it is a very difficult thing to do, but it 
has to be done in order to satisfy the West Germans. It can hardly be said to 
be destabilizing. As for `deep strike', in essence it hardly counts as a new 
strategy (although FoFAI partly does, I suppose). We have had it for years in 
terms just of interdiction capabilities. ' If you don't interdict, then basically 
what you are saying is that the Warsaw Pact forces' logistical problems are 
eased dramatically. In any case, interdiction of this kind is not the same as an 
offensive capability. To create a full invasion force you need, not just aircraft 
to reach Soviet territory, etc., but masses of troops, a huge logistical back-up, 
and so on. 
i. Follow-on Forces Attack. The strategy of countering an enemy assault by attacking his 
follow-on forces. 
2. The ability to deny an enemy immunity in his build-up of attacking forces. 
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Some alternative strategies are quite interesting and are worth looking at. Greater 
use of militias, greater use of fortifications, and soon, seem to me to be admirable 
in many ways. But only as supplements to, not replacements of, current defences. 
You would still have to have an effective airforce, for example. `Emerging technolo- 
gy' works in all sorts of ways, not just in favour of defence. 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line OR Is it domination by the two super-powers 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear that poses the greatest threat to European 
forces to the American strategic deterrent integrity? Would Europe be safer 
that guarantees W. European security? decoupled from the super power nuclear 
Should American policies therefore be confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
supported? nuclear weapon free zone? 
I think that Western Europe could move further in the direction of becoming 
more self-reliant and independent, but our security still basically depends 
upon our links with the Americans. Some people may not like American policy 
in Libya or the Middle East or Central America, but this should not cloud 
their judgement of what we need in Europe. We should remember why we 
were desperate for the Americans to come and help us twice this century. And 
how, before Russian and American power sobered us up, we were not exactly 
one big happy family. Although political conditions seem to be improving 
now, we will need our close links with America for the forseeable future. It is 
possible to imagine an effective alliance with the United States without the 
presence of large numbers of American troops in Europe. But they have been 
here for a long time now and have become symbols. The political consequences 
of trying to do something different could be very destabilizing. It could be 
seen as a comment on the durability of the Alliance. 
A European nuclear weapon-free zone is little more than a slogan. It doesn't 
mean much. If the Soviet Union is not included, there is no such weapon-free 
zone. If the Soviet Union is included, then so must the United States be, and 
we are no longer just talking about Europe. The idea collapses. 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
The trouble with a number of those who argue as on the right is that they see 
an arms race which needs to be reversed. Unfortunately, it's not as simple as 
this. I don't think that there is an arms race involved here in the first place. 
There is competition in certain areas, but arms decisions are not just deter- 
mined by what the other side is doing. There are all sorts of factors at work. 
That's why it's so difficult to reverse the process by unilateral, bilateral or 
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multilateral measures - there isn't any simple thing to reverse. It's not like 
making two runners turn round and run in the opposite direction, or playing 
a film backwards. Too much emphasis is placed on unilateral initiatives. We 
have all taken unilateral initiatives of one sort or another - we have cut our 
navies unilaterally, for example. The results have not been spectacular. 
But, turning to the left, I don't think that it is useful to characterize unilater- 
alists as serving Soviet interests. The Soviet Union often does not like them 
any more than NATO does. Members of END (European Nuclear Disarma- 
ment), for example, want to dismantle the Warsaw Pact as well as NATO, 
together with the Soviet system in Eastern Europe, a thought which the Soviet 
Union finds very alarming indeed. 
There are no simple remedies. Some people, members of CND but not just 
them, do not like to talk in terms of complexities, and get very irritated when 
someone comes along who does not agree with them and does not just repeat 
word-for-word the latest government White Paper or Daily Telegraph leader. 
Unilateral measures may at times be helpful, but at others they may have little 
effect or even be counter-productive. It depends upon the circumstances. 
C British Policy 
i The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and 
independence and protects her from nuclear 
blackmail? 
OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
`deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
encourage proliferation? 
Any use of Britain's deterrent against, say, the Soviet Union would be likely 
to be suicidal. But that is the problem with nuclear deterrence theory in 
general. The question is: are there possible circumstances in which our pos- 
session of nuclear weapons would mean that the Soviet Union was more likely 
to lay off us? The answer is probably `yes'. But the circumstances are unlikely 
and it's a marginal argument. And I wouldn't say that Britain's deterrent 
guarantees anything - certainly not sovereignty and independence, which can 
be eroded by things like economic weakness. 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
For a variety of political reasons, not necessarily to do with deterrence, a 
number of Europeans are surprisingly enthusiastic about us as a nuclear 
power. I think that some European governments see it as a means of providing 
a European input into Alliance nuclear decision-making - and to some extent 
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as a balance to the French. So far as concerns deterrence, the argument about 
Soviet perceptions is largely a rationalization of an underlying uncertainty 
about the long-term reliability of the American nuclear guarantee. If it came 
to it, I am not convinced that an Anglo-French or European nuclear force 
would be an effective alternative. In any case, at the moment, within the 
context of NATO strategy, this is only marginal as an argument for the reten- 
tion of a British nuclear force. 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee independent British initiatives more likely 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
recognition of it? I involvement? 
I think that this is once again marginal. I find the Americans rather muddled 
as to why we should keep our deterrent. If they think hard about it, they tend 
to conclude that in itself it is a bit of a waste of time and money. But they think 
that, because it's psychologically important to us, it's politically significant to 
them. They fear that, if we relinquish the nuclear option, we will no longer 
take ourselves seriously as a military power. 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are afforded at the expense of conventional 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
I think that too much has been made of the question whether we can `afford' 
our independent nuclear force. As an opportunity-cost the price is not outrage- 
ous, if you think that we need it. If you don't think that we need it, then even 
five million pounds is too much. As it stands, alternatives are now likely to be 
as expensive, or even more expensive - depending again, of course, on what 
you think is necessary. And getting out of the nuclear business is unlikely to 
ease the pressure on other defence areas for more than a year or two. This is 
a relevant factor, but not a decisive one. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament have no effect on other 
countries and only serve to weaken British 
influence and allow France unchallenged 
ascendancy in Europe? 
OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
British prestige? Would British 
disarmament within the context outlined in 
B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
Britain's nuclear capabilities do give her influence in certain areas. We must 
not exaggerate this, but there is more to it than is recognized by the people 
who say that it's all just delusions of grandeur. But there are many other forms 
of influence -a number of which we have not got! 
If we were to decide to give up our nuclear deterrent, we should certainly 
try to gain as much from it as we could. We might be able to do good work 
along Ghandian lines in some quarters. But again it would be unwise to expect 
too much. 
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(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to 
continue to ensure effective British strategic 
defence into the 21st century? 
OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
all the drawbacks listed above? 
In terms of hardware, I do think that investment in Trident is the best way to 
continue current policies. To the extent that the deterrent is partly seen as an 
insurance against American withdrawal, there might have been a case for 
looking at more national ways of doing it, but they would have been more 
expensive. And now, assuming that you are committed to having a deterrent, 
it's hard to think that there is a more cost-effective way of doing it. David 
Owen's alternatives might have made a lot of sense when he was Foreign 
Secretary, or in the early 198os but, by the time the next election is over, 
billions will already have been spent. We might as well go on with it. 
2 NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
All my inclinations are against dual-capable and battlefield systems. I would 
have fewer of them. Britain could work towards this within a NATO context 
without major disruption, so long as she did not make a great song and dance 
about it. But I don't see what would be gained by Britain's making great 
gestures here. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain make US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affairs 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
Yes I think that it would be absolutely disastrous. It would be the most disas- 
trous thing that a British government could do in this whole area. The effect 
on the Americans would be electric. The arguments that would be used to 
defend such a policy would be extremely offensive to the US Administration 
and to Congress. I just don't think that you can expel the Americans and then 
expect them to defend us. It is our own security that would suffer. 
Do these bases erode British sovereignty? No more than, say, our member- 
ship of the EEC. It's a cost you pay. We always have the option of getting rid 
of them - which is not one that, for example, the Czechs have in their relation- 
ship with the Soviet Union. 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
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If you asked the Norwegians or the Danes or the Dutch whether they thought 
that Soviet weapons were targeted on them, they would tell you that they did. 
When you live in a strategically awkward part of the world, as we do, you are 
a creature of your geographical position. 
(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
If the American nuclear umbrella were removed suddenly and dramatically, 
I do not think that many of us would feel particularly secure. A great many 
questions would be asked, most notably in West Q: rmany. I don't think that 
we would like the alternatives. I certainly would not feel more secure in those 
circumstances. 
Moral considerations 
(i) Is it morally right to pursue the policy least OR Are there actions which are in themselves 
likely to cause human suffering? May this wrong no matter what the situation? Is the 
sometimes involve doing things which in alternative to excuse almost any act of 
other circumstances would be wrong? barbarism? 
I tend towards the left-hand side. Not being a clever philosopher, there are 
some actions for which I can barely imagine a possible moral justification. But, 
by and large, I am a consequentialist, I suppose. 
(ii) In formulating policy should we weigh up 
the probability of success and the relative 
costs in terms of human suffering of 
alternative nuclear and non-nuclear 
strategies? 
OR Is the only relevant point here that a 
nuclear exchange of almost any kind 
would in itself cause unimaginable 
suffering to largely civilian populations? 
We are living in the nuclear age. We cannot escape having to work out our 
policies in terms of the possibility of nuclear war. There is often a jump in the 
argument of those on the right-hand side in your analysis. They seem to 
assume that there is somehow a policy readily at hand, which will free us from 
the obligation of having to think about the possible deaths of large numbers 
of civilians. There isn't. If their main preoccupation is with the fact that, as 
long as they themselves don't have nuclear weapons, they will not personally 
be responsible for using them, then I do not find this particularly uplifting. 
(iii) So far as concerns intention, need we look 
no further than the fact that our sole aim in 
deploying nuclear weapons is to prevent 
their use? 
OR Is there no such thing as a fully deployed 
weapons system which is a bluff ? Is to 
deploy nuclear weapons to intend to use 
them in certain circumstances? 
This is very difficult. It's unfortunate that the choice is so often presented in 
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these terms, because I don't think that either answer is entirely satisfactory. 
To take the left-hand side first, it is true that one can become insensitive to 
the implications of what one is doing. And, if you leave certain tools lying 
around, then you have to accept that someone may pick them up and use 
them. But deterrence in a way depends upon that possibility. Turning to the 
right-hand side, it would possibly have been better had nuclear weapons never 
been invented. But here we are with them; historically they have become an 
integral part of international relations. So we have to think what the conse- 
quences of abandoning them would be. It is irresponsible not to do so. We 
cannot just concern ourselves with our own conditional intentions. And as to 
those intentions themselves - well, no one is actually dying at the moment, 'and 
that must make a difference. The disincentives against using these weapons are 
substantial, and we can do a lot to make sure that decisions to use them would 
not be taken frivolously. And those disincentives themselves are in the end 
based on the possibility of use. There is no escape from this. 
So it is a moral dilemma. I can't see it as anything other than that. But it is 
one that is not of my creation. 
(iv) Are there possible uses of nuclear weapons 
which are allowed by just War theory, for 
example the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in order to prevent worse 
suffering? Can there be a theory of Just 
Deterrence? 
OR Is a conditional intention to cause 
indiscriminate and disproportionate 
suffering of this kind, whether admonitory, 
preemptive or retaliatory, ruled out by just 
War theory? Was it wrong to bomb 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 194S? 
You can only judge the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the context of 
its time. As horrible things had been happening, moral restraints had already 
been reduced. It wasn't worse than other things that had been going on. I 
think that it's true that those taking the decision believed in all good faith that 
they were preventing something worse from happening. There are even a 
number of Japanese who will accept this now. Historical evidence is not so 
conclusive here. But that is not the point. At the time they had reason to 
believe that the alternative was going to be a full-scale invasion of Japan. It 
may not have been the right decision, but I don't think we can say that it was 
irretrievably immoral. 
Although I am myself not very happy with Just War theory - people adopt 
various criteria rather uncritically and do not ask themselves about their rela- 
tive weighting and so on -I think that there can be a sort of theory of just 
Deterrence. 
(v) Is there no relevant connection between the OR Is it a scandal that such huge resources are 
development and deployment of nuclear devoted to the development and deployment 
weapons and world poverty and disease? of nuclear weapons and not to the 
alleviation of suffering? 
There are a number of answers to the implied claim on the right. First, money 
is not just being spent on weapons. Second, nuclear weapons. cost a fraction 
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of what is spent on conventional weapons. It is possible that cutting back on 
the former may mean spending more on the latter. Third, we cannot *assume 
that any money saved would in fact be spent in the ways suggested. Finally, 
one of the main causes of Third World misery is, not weapons spending 
as such, but war. That's what you must work to prevent. And sometimes 
expenditure on weapons prevents war. 
(vi) Does Christian teaching allow the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? 
I am not a Christian. Pass. 
OR Does Christian teaching condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? 
Recommendations 
The simple `yes' and `no' answers below are on their own misleading. They 
should be understood to be qualified by the references that accompany them. 
i No (See B(iv)). 
2 As already explained, I dislike the Strategic Defence Initiative (See 
A2(A)(v)). It is based on illusions. But I have no objection to current 
research programmes being continued. And I don't believe that a mora- 
torium on either anti-satellite or strategic defence programmes would be 
either verifiable or useful - how do you distinguish this research from 
other, legitimate, areas? Questions of testing and deployment are much 
more important. 
3A comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is, in general, a laudable objective. But 
I think that it is a good idea whose time is past. It would have been very 
influential two-and-a-half decades ago, when it was first mooted. It would 
not make a lot of difference now. It might have certain beneficial effects, 
but not, I think, the decisive influence that some people claim. 
4 No (See B(iii)). 
5 In certain areas cuts would be beneficial, and in general there is an 
unnecessary superfluity of weapons systems. But there are important 
caveats (See Ai(iv), A2(A)(iv) & A2(A)(vii) ). 
6 So far as concerns Europe, no (See B(vi)). 
7 Yes, but not too much should be expected of it (See A2(A)(vi)). 
8 No (See A2(B)). 
9 Does not apply. For minimum deterrence see A2(A)(vii). 
10 There are problems with participating in SDI which I don't think need to 
be elevated to matters of principle. The question is whether it is possible 
to maintain an honest and consistent long-term perspective on the issues 
raised by SDI. It would be a shame if the Allies allowed themselves to be 
dragged into breaking the ABM Treaty simply in order to get American 
contracts. 
II No (see B(iii)). 
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12 Too much emphasis is placed on the significance of unilateral initiatives 
(See B(iv) & B(vii)). In general, at the moment a is desirable as an 
objective for the West, but b is not (See A2(A)(iv)). 
13 No (See 16). 
14 No. 
15 No (See B(vi). 
16 No. I have always found the arguments for and against an independent 
nuclear force marginal. I suppose that when forced to the crunch, I would 
be reluctant to see us completely out of the nuclear business, partly as it 
is a question of continuity, partly because I do think that there are argu- 
ments for a European capability of some sort to avoid excessive dependence: 
on the United States. 
17 Does not apply (See CI(iv)). 
18 No (See C2(i)). 
t9 No (See C2(i) & C2(ii)). 
20 Does not apply. 
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Signals between 1955 and 1958, and was then ordained as a priest in the 
Church of England. After some years in a curacy in Hampshire, he moved on 
to become the vicar of All Saints, Fulham, between 1972 and 198 1. Since then 
he has been Dean of King's College, London, and has just been appointed 
Bishop of Oxford. Richard Harries is well-known as a broadcaster, and has 
written and contributed to a number of books on Christian prayer, and on the 
ways in which Christian teaching relates to contemporary life. Of particular 
1O2 
relevance here is Christianity and War in a Nuclear Age, published in 1986 by 
A. R. Mowbray & Co., where a fuller exposition of Dr Harries' ideas can be 
found. 
Editorial Comment 
These answers were given in an interview in Dr Harries' rooms in King's 
College, London, on December i t, 1986. They represent the thinking of an 
influential Christian commentator. Of special interest here are the answers 
under Moral Considerations, in which Dr Harries offers a carefully reasoned 
defence of the morality of continued nuclear weapon deployment, summed 
up in the answer to question (iv). Prudential considerations reached earlier 
about the high probability that nuclear deterrence will succeed, and that 
nuclear disarmament will not (AZ(A) and A2(B)), are seen to have a critical 
bearing on the moral outcome. But Dr Harries takes the question of intention 
equally seriously, and only allows that continued deployment is morally justi- 
fied, because an effective deterrent threat can be made which does not involve 
a conditional intention to inflict unacceptable direct damage on non-combatant 
populations. 
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Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 1945? 
Yes, I do think that it has been nuclear deterrence that has kept the peace. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
I think that mutual possession of such a force does prevent major war between 
the superpowers. But I also agree with the right-hand side that it invites what 
you nicely call `sub-deterrent encroachment'. Under the nuclear umbrella all 
sorts of things have gone on in other parts of the world. And in Europe the 
crushing of resistance in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for example, was 
accepted by the West for fear of nuclear retaliation. But it has certainly pre- 
vented a major war. 
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(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
in 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
To make deterrence credible, you must have some kind of flexible response. 
You cannot go straight from the failure of conventional forces to the threat of 
a full strategic exchange. There must be a range of options. So I would-agree 
with the left-hand side here. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
To. the extent that they are needed for flexible response, the size and variety 
of nuclear arsenals stabilizes deterrence. But at the moment they are clearly 
unnecessarily large, and should be cut. I would like to see a reduction to a 
minimum deterrent on both sides. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
I do believe in the theory of balance. That is what mutual nuclear deterrence 
is based on. But there has been a great deal of propaganda on both sides about 
who has been `ahead' in the so-called `arms race'. A agree with Laurence 
Martin= that there has been loose talk about an `arms race', when all that has 
been happening has been legitimate modernization in a number of cases. 
(vi) Has force planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
I do take the threat of the `military-industrial complex' seriously. There has 
been a momentum behind a number of undesirable weapons developments, 
which strict strategic thinking should have kept under tighter control. Many 
people would say now that MIRVing weapons was a mistake. And the enor- 
mous investment in Star Wars technology carries similar dangers. But, overall, 
there has been more strategic purpose behind the main developments than is 
suggested on the right-hand side. 
i. Professor of War Studies, King's College, London, 1968-1977. Now Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Newcastle. 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
14 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
future? 
The fact that both sides have an invulnerable strategic nuclear second-strike 
force is fundamental for me. So long as second-strike forces are secure, deter- 
rence is stable. We have got that at the moment, and I do not see that anything 
seriously threatens it. Apart from anything else, submarines are virtually 
invulnerable, and are likely to remain so. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
But I think that there are real worries in this area. Too much attention has 
been paid to a comparison between force structures, and not enough to what 
I would call `crisis management'. We must take much more care to ensure 
that wars do not break out by accident, or by a misreading of signals and so 
on, and to make provision for bringing hostilities to an end as rapidly as 
possible should deterrence fail. I do not have the impression that at the 
moment command, control, communications and intelligence facilities are 
adequate in these respects. 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
If deterrence failed, the risk of escalation would, of course, be great. It must 
be taken with the utmost seriousness. But I would reject the idea on the right- 
hand side that escalation would be automatic. There is an alternative scenario. 
We must hope that leaders on both sides would act in the common interest 
and prevent it. It is dangerous for people to think that there are only two 
alternatives: successful deterrence or all-out nuclear war. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
It depends which system we are talking about here. In this country the fuss 
has mainly been about Cruise, but it seems to me that it is Pershing II which 
is seen by the Soviet Union to pose the serious first-strike threat. The missiles 
are so accurate and the flight-time is so short that this must make the other 
side nervous and tempt them to act first. So it would have been better had 
Pershing II not been deployed. 
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(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
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OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in t? 
I do not favour the Strategic Defence Initiative. First of all it will not work. 
But in itself it is also destabilizing. The side that thought that it was behind 
on strategic defence would have to develop enormous numbers of offensive 
weapons in order to penetrate the system. This could lead to another round 
of the arms race. The impetus behind Strategic Defence is destabilizing. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely?? 
Here again there is a perfectly proper and serious worry. But proliferation has 
been much slower than people at one time predicted. The fact that so many 
countries that could have developed nuclear weapons have not done so, shows 
that it is generally recognized that they only have a very limited usefulness. 
Although major arms reductions by the superpowers would reinforce the will 
not to develop systems in other countries, I think that this is marginal. The 
power of example on the international stage is only limited. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations 
offer the best prospect for future stability? 
OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
First of all, I am a supporter of arms control, even if the achievements are 
limited. It does help to keep the balance stable. But I would distinguish arms 
control from arms reduction, and, in the wake of Reykjavik, I think that we 
can now look for real reductions, not just control. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would 
war between the great powers again 
become a rational option and therefore 
more likely? 
OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
to initiate a third world war? 
Here I agree with the left-hand side. 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited 
nuclear war? 
OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
preferable to nuclear war? 
It is a mistake to become so obsessed with the idea of eliminating nuclear 
weapons that we forgot how terrible a conventional war would be. The reason 
for keeping nuclear weapons is to prevent all war between the major powers. 
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(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
-uninvented would they not be bound to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
there be no incentive to resort to 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
I agree with the left-hand side. 
(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only 
feasible in a world where war itself is no 
longer a possibility? 
OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
hope of a rational world-order? 
So long as there is a danger of war, we need nuclear weapons. I would have 
welcomed an agreement of the kind proposed at Reykjavik, in which minimum 
forces were kept on both sides as a continuing deterrent. And, in order to 
make extended deterrence effective, a wide range of targeting possibilities is 
needed. I do not myself believe that it must include tactical nuclear weapons, 
nor indeed land-based INF weapons - although others disagree. But we must 
never get to the stage where people can think that it would be in their interest 
to go to war. 
(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen 
to be prepared for war, as failure before 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under 
likely future conditions would global 
nuclear disarmament make war, including 
nuclear war, more likely? 
OR Do the years before 1914 show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? 
Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
I agree with historians like Michael Howard who say that the 1914-18 War 
was not just caused by an arms race. Other factors were much more crucial. 
And today what matters is mutual recognition of proper spheres of influence, 
and stable alliances. The comparison with the years before 1914 is a false one. 
B NATO Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
evenly matched? 
The Soviet Union does enjoy conventional military superiority at the moment, 
although I believe that it is not as great a superiority as a number of people 
think. I also believe that modern precision-guided weaponry could redress the 
balance still further. I am not an expert on all this, but that would be my 
reading of it. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power 
which will take advantage of unilateral 
Western concessions and is only restrained 
and forced to accept arms-control 
agreements by Western determination and 
strength? 
OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western technology and likely to respond 
positively to unconditional offers of 
Western restraint within a general context 
of detente? 
All medium-to-large powers are potentially expansionist. This need not be 
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because they are particularly malevolent, but because they feel vulnerable and 
want to keep their borders secure. In order to do this, they are as likely as not 
to be inching those borders out. This is especially the case with the Soviet 
Union, which has long and often ill-defined frontiers, and feels that it needs 
buffer states to be secure. It is determined that past history should not repeat 
itself. It also still officially subscribes to Marxist-Leninist ideology, which is 
indeed expansionist, but this has been tempered over the years, so that now 
the Soviet Union is a rather conservative and cautious power. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
preponderance such that NATO must nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
continue to be able to threaten early use of strategically suicidal? 
nuclear weapons? 11 
In view of Soviet non-nuclear strength, it is right that for the time being 
NATO keeps open the early use of nuclear weapons as a possibility. It may 
be true that the weapons could not in fact be used - apart from anything else, 
the Soviet Union lets it be known that there could be no limited use, and that 
early use by the West would bring massive retaliation. But the threat of that 
use is important in order to underpin deterrence. It is a stalemate. And 
NATO's nuclear weapons help to keep it that way. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
I do not think that deterrence is `delicate', in the sense that each side has to 
match the other side's nuclear forces in detail. All that is needed is the generally 
recognized ability to inflict unacceptable damage if attacked first. Deterrence 
is robust enough to allow the West to make unconditional reductions in some 
areas without risk. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
I am very much in favour of the development of Emerging Technology in 
order to scale down the relative advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union in non- 
nuclear force strength, and to enable NATO to reduce reliance on the likely 
early use of nuclear weapons. But i do not see it as an alternative to FoFA 
(Follow-on Forces Attack). The two go together. FoFA needs to be argued 
on its own merits, as the most effective defensive strategy, or not, as the case 
may be. 
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(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
OR Is it domination by the two super-powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
I agree with what is written on the left-hand side. Obviously there will eventu- 
ally come a time when these American troops are no longer stationed in 
Europe. But that probably lies many decades ahead, when the world will be 
very different to what it is now. A rapid decoupling at the present stage would 
be very destabilizing. 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are general programme of nuclear disarmament 
suggestions that the West should take the the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do in the mouths of those who reject all 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
threaten to undermine Western defences? Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
Well, as I say, I think that there are certain steps that can be taken unilaterally 
by either side without fundamentally destabilizing the system. But what is 
needed is overall bilateral or multilateral agreement, such as seemed to be 
within reach at Reykjavik. As it is, I just reaffirm my view that deterrence is 
fundamentally stable. Many of those in the Peace Movement play on people's 
fears that it is unstable. I think that this is quite untrue. 
C British Policy 
i The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and 
independence and protects her from nuclear 
blackmail? 
OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
`deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
encourage proliferation? 
I agree with those who say that, if Britain did not already have an independent 
deterrent, she would not now be acquiring one. But, in a world of notorious 
uncertainty, where we do not know what power configurations there may be 
in future, since we already have a deterrent, I think that on balance we should 
keep it. But I do not feel nearly as strongly about this as I do about the 
importance of nuclear deterrence as a whole, and about Britain's role in sup- 
porting it. 
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(ii) Arc British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
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OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
This seems to me to be one of the main reasons for Britain to retain a nuclear 
capability. If the Americans did begin to pull out of Europe, Europe would 
need to have an independent deterrent to which Britain would need to 
contribute. 
Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent 
. 
'British initiatives more likely 
to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
involvement? 
There is also something in this - that the Americans welcome shared responsi- 
bility, and fear that British nuclear disarmament would be part of a general 
weakening of commitment to defence. 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? 
OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
afforded at the expense of conventional 
strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
Here I would agree with the left-hand side. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament have no effect on other 
countries and only serve to weaken British 
influence and allow France unchallenged 
ascendancy in Europe? 
OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
British prestige? Would British 
disarmament within the context outlined in 
B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
I would not lay very much stress on this. I do not really think that Britain's 
possession of independent nuclear forces significantly increases her influence, 
even with the Americans. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to 
continue to ensure effective British strategic 
defence into the 21st century? 
OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
all the drawbacks listed above? 
I am not a conservative, but I would support Trident on the grounds that, if 
we are to retain an independent deterrent, then it should be the best available. 
I have been largely persuaded of this by Neil Cameron, the former principal 
of King's College, who was a keen advocate of Trident. 
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2 NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
I am entirely in agreement with what is written on the left-hand side. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain make US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affairs 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their rejnoval do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
Here I would certainly say that, if we are to have a nuclear deterrent system, 
largely operated by the Americans, then we must support them. Not to do so 
would undoubtedly seriously weaken NATO. As I say, I feel more strongly 
about this than I do about the need for an independent British force. 
I do not think that the existence of American nuclear bases in this country 
significantly erodes our sovereignty. 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
Given our geographical position and importance within the Western Alliance, 
there is no prospect of our being able to turn ourselves into a nuclear-free 
sanctuary. 
(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
It means nothing to say that we do not want to shelter under the American 
umbrella. The umbrella is there and it continues to protect us. We are shelter- 
ing under it, and therefore we should help to hold the handle. 
Moral Considerations 
(i) Is it morally right to pursue the policy least OR Are there actions which are in themselves 
likely to cause human suffering? May this wrong no matter what the situation? Is the 
sometimes involve doing things which in alternative to excuse almost any act of 
other circumstances would be wrong? barbarism? 
My own view is that there are certain actions which are morally wrong under 
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all conceivable circumstances. For example, it can never be right to launch a 
deliberate and direct attack against millions of non-combatants. But in public 
life the choices that face us are not usually as clear-cut as this. We normally 
have to decide between evils. If we are fighting a war, whatever we do will 
result in the loss of civilian life. Even an attack on purely military targets will 
cause some civilian deaths. So, in these circumstances, other things being 
equal, it must be morally right to pursue the policy which we think will cause 
least human suffering. The important distinction here is between directly 
intending non-combatant casualties, and acting in such a way that non-comba- 
tant casualties are an unintended (but foreseen) consequence of our action. 
The former is morally illegitimate; the latter may be morally allowed, if it 
really is the lesser of two evils. 
(ii) In formulating policy should we weigh up OR Is the only relevant point here that a 
the probability of success and the relative nuclear exchange of almost any kind 
costs in terms of human suffering of would in itself cause unimaginable 
alternative nuclear and non-nuclear suffering to largely civilian populations? 
strategies? 
When we turn to the question of nuclear weapons, the same applies. If the 
statement on the right were true, if the only use of nuclear weapons was a 
general exchange in which hundreds of millions died, then this could never 
be morally justified. But this is not the only scenario that we can envisage. 
Although the use of any nuclear weapon would almost certainly cause terrible 
collateral suffering, and would also carry the risk of escalation, there can well 
be a restricted employment of nuclear weapons against military targets, which 
would not cause more overall damage than conventional weapons in the war 
taken as a whole. So the statement on the right-hand side is misleading. 
Given the caveat against directly attacking non-combatant populations 
already made, I tend to agree with the statement on the left. Particularly 
important here is the point about the probability of success. Again, if I did 
not think that nuclear deterrence is fundamentally stable, I might take a very 
different view. But, as things are, I think that it is stable, so it is unlikely that 
nuclear or conventional weapons will be used by the great powers against one 
another at all. Insofar as that is so, the question of relative costs does not arise. 
(iii) So far as concerns intention, need we look OR Is there no such thing as a fully deployed 
no further than the fact that our sole aim in weapons system which is a bluff? Is to 
deploying nuclear weapons is to prevent deploy nuclear weapons to intend to use 
their use? them in certain circumstances? 
But here I agree with the statement on the right. Although it is true that our 
overall purpose or intention is to make sure that these weapons are never used, 
in order that this might be so we have to deploy them, and to retain the option 
of using them. The targeting policy necessary to make deterrence effective is 
not a bluff. Nor will it do to suggest, as does Anthony Kenny, for example, 
that we could deploy our nuclear weapons, but publicly declare that we will 
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never use them. This would put servicemen into an impossible situation. They 
are trained to use these weapons, and have to assume that they might be called 
upon to fire them. If they were at the same time told that there were no 
circumstances in which it would be moral to do so, their position would 
become untenable. The statement on the left-hand side is correct so far as 
concerns our overall intention, but, as pointed out on the right, we must also 
face the moral implications of the fact that deterrence involves a conditional 
intention to use our weapons should it fail. 
(iv) Are there possible uses of nuclear weapons 
which are allowed by Just War theory, for 
example the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in order to prevent worse 
suffering? Can there be a theory of Just 
Deterrence? 
OR Is a conditional intention to cause 
indiscriminate and disproportionate 
suffering of this kind, whether admonitory, 
preemptive or retaliatory, ruled out by, Just 
War theory? Was it wrong to bomb 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? 
To sum up, two considerations in particular lead me to think that there can 
be a Theory of Just Deterrence. First, the probability of success seems to be 
so high, that it is very unlikely that it will ever come to use in the first place. 
But, second, we are nevertheless right to take seriously the question: what if 
deterrence were to fail? Here it is important that there are possible morally 
justifiable uses of nuclear weapons, the threat of which is sufficient to make 
deterrence effective. These two, largely non-moral considerations - the prob- 
ability of success and the possibility of restricted use - underlie my conclusion. 
If I thought that either or both were not true, then I might well conclude that 
it is immoral to deploy nuclear weapons. To that extent, although the moral 
principles themselves are not affected, particular moral judgements are depen- 
dent upon prudential considerations. 
The question of whether the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki was morally justified depends upon whether they were seen as 
military targets. A case can be made out on grounds of proportionality, if, as 
Leonard Cheshire argues, the alternative was an invasion of Japan with the 
likelihood of over twelve million deaths. But, on grounds of discrimination, 
it depends upon whether a direct attack was made on non-combatants. So far 
as I understand it, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not intended as military 
targets, but the aim was to deliver as great a psychological shock as possible 
to the Japanese war leaders. In that case, these actions cannot be encompassed 
within Just War theory, and must be judged to have been immoral. 
(v) Is there no relevant connection between the 
development and deployment of nuclear 
weapons and world poverty and disease? 
OR Is it a scandal that such huge resources are 
devoted to the development and deployment 
of nuclear weapons and not to the 
alleviation of suffering? 
In terms of the world in which we live, I do not accept the connection made 
on the right-hand side. It is not only, or even mainly, nuclear weapons which 
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tie up all these resources. Nor is it an `either/or'. If nuclear weapons prevent 
world war, then the poor will suffer along with the rich if we get rid of them. 
But, judged by the absolute standards of the Kingdom of God, it certainly 
is a scandal. It is part of the whole scandal of human existence. Although in 
worldly terms it is essential for even the most underdeveloped societies to 
maintain armed forces, and they would suffer if they did not, in heavenly 
terms it is quite wrong. Nuclear weapons carry the same ambivalence, as do 
so many other features of our life on earth. 
(vi) Does Christian teaching allow the OR Does Christian teaching condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? deployment of nuclear weapons? 
For the reasons already given, Christian teaching does allow the continued 
development and deployment of nuclear weapons. It allows this in the same 
way- that it allows many other things necessary for the right ordering of our 
society. We live in a fallen world, and, in those circumstances, the churches 
have always taught that force or constraint are needed to protect the innocent 
from the criminal elements within society, and malevolent enemies without. 
The whole of society depends to a greater or lesser measure on the use of 
constraint, and it's just illusion to pretend that it does not. Indeed, Christian 
authorities have a positive duty to perform these functions, and proper defence 
against external enemies is one of them. But they must be performed in a spirit 
of Christian love. We must never lose sight of the deeper purpose behind our 
actions. This has always been central to the Christian tradition of the Just 
War. 
But, of course, in the Augustinian City of God, none of these things would 
be so. 
Recommendations 
i No. This is a meaningless concept. 
2 Yes (See A2(A)(v)). 
3I know the arguments against a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but I 
would support it, at any rate for a period, as an important sign of sincerity. 
I am, in fact, more worried about French tests in the Pacific than I am 
about the underground tests. 
4 No (See B(iii)). 
5 Yes (See Ai(iv) & A2(A)(vii)). 
6 They do not mean much. 
7 Yes (See A2(A)(vi)) 
8 No (See A2(B)). 
9 Yes (See Ax(iv) & B(iv)). 
10 Yes. 
I1 No (See B(iii)). 
12 Not a unilateral freeze. There is room for cutting down dual-capable, 
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battlefield and land-based INF systems, but not right down unless the 
Soviets reciprocate (See B(iv)). 
13 No. 
14 No. 
15 No. See 6. 
16 No (See Ci). 
17 Does not apply. 
18 No (See C2(i)). 
19 No (See C2(i) & C2(ii)). 
20 Does not apply. 
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Biographical Note 
Sir Michael Howard is Regius Professor of Modern History in the University 
of Oxford. Born in 1922, he served with the British Army in Italy between 
1943 and 1945 and was awarded the Military Cross. He was Professor of 
War Studies at London University between 1963 and 1968, Fellow in Higher 
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Defence Studies at All Soul's, Oxford, between 1968 and 1977, and held the 
Chichele Chair of the History of War at Oxford between 1977 and X980. 
Sir Michael was for many years Vice-Chairman of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, and is Vice-President of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, on whose Council he has served since its foundation in 
1958. He is also a Vice-President of the Royal United Services Institute, the 
Historical Association, and the Council on Christian Approaches to Defence 
and Disarmament. He is a member of the Foreign Secretary's Advisory Panel 
on Disarmament and Arms Control. 
Among his many books and articles, special mention may be made of War 
in European History (1976), and The Causes of Wars (1983). 
Editorial Comment 
These answers were communicated in Sir Michael's rooms in Oriel College, 
Oxford, on May 28 and November io, 1986. Apart from the careful moral 
justification of continued nuclear weapon deployment at the end, perhaps of 
special interest here is Sir Michael's refusal, as an historian, to accept either 
of the analogies offered in question A2(B)(v); his defence of the principles 
behind current NATO strategy, but criticism of the unnecessary degree of 
dependence upon the likely early use of nuclear weapons, in the answers to 
questions B(i), B(iii) and B(v); and his review of policy options for Britain and 
recommendation of `burden-sharing' in the answer to question C2(iv). The 
answer to question A2(B)(iv) offers a cautiously optimistic assessment of the 
direction in which we seem to be heading. 
SIR MICHAEL HOWARD 
A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 194S? 
I would say that nuclear deterrence has been one factor among many, and that 
it is impossible to give it weight as against the other factors. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
I would say that it is a powerful disincentive to anybody initiating a war, either 
conventional or nuclear. It does pose a terrifying risk, which, so far, no major 
power has been inclined to take. I don't think that it lacks credibility - if it 
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did, then it is probable that by this time somebody would have started a major 
war, which they have not. The question of whether it invites sub-deterrent 
encroachment is really a different question altogether. Indeed, if it has credi- 
bility, then it is likely to do so. 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
I think that one has to answer this in terms of different time-frames. Initially, 
Western military planners assumed war-fighting superiority, and deployed 
theatre nuclear weapons on that assumption. With the creation of nuclear 
parity at theatre level, the original assumptions cease to be valid, and the 
question then does arise as to how far the purposes for which they were 
originally deployed still apply. What they are now meant to do is to make it 
clear that a war, which begins conventionally, might well end in a nuclear 
fashion, and thereby increase the deterrent to conventional attack. In my view 
they still do that. The fact that there is now parity of nuclear weapons at every 
level does not, in itself, erode the credibility of a nuclear response. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
deterrence? and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
Well, frankly, I think that both are true. I think that to some extent a spectrum 
of nuclear weapons does stabilize deterrence, but I think that, nonetheless, 
the worst-case analysis and the logic of the thing have created a ludicous 
superfluity of weapons systems. One could undertake a rigorous degree of 
pruning, without destabilizing the situation. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control -negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
The alternate answer on the right contains so many issues, which are not 
necessarily directly related to one another, that it is very difficult to give a 
succinct response to it. I think that the whole concept of balance is an illusory 
one. It is the wrong concept to have in mind. The concept that one has to 
think about is stability. And stability is not provided by equivalent numbers 
of weapons, which is what `balance' suggests. It is provided by the assurance 
that, however many weapons the other side has, one is still going to be able 
effectively to deter him from their use by the credibility of one's own nuclear 
response. And that is not a function of the number of weapons which one has. 
I think that it is an illusion on the part of hard-line strategists, as well as arms- 
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controllers and disarmers, to think that there is such a relationship. I think 
that the concept of each power being able to preserve an effective nuclear 
response is essential to stability. I wouldn't say that arms control negotiations 
have helped to achieve it. But, insofar as arms control negotiations do aim at 
ensuring that stability, they are not utterly fruitless. 
(vi) Has force planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
Much more the latter than the former. Strategic thinking has not been com- 
pletely irrelevant to force planning. But I do think that bureaucratic interests 
and inertia have, as historically they always have, played a far larger part in 
determining what force structures will be. All too often strategic justification 
is devised post hoc - or simply produced out of files in order to justify some- 
thing which has been decided upon for other reasons. 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable 
future? 
OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
When someone says that something is inconceivable, he is talking about our 
capacity to conceive things, not about the subject under discussion. What we 
are talking about here is the degree of probability. In my view, the threat of 
an enemy first strike remains highly improbable. It has to be admitted that 
the greater accuracy of new weapons-systems may marginally increase the 
probability, by placing the survivability of land-based missiles that much more 
in doubt. This does, unfortunately, mean that there is likely to be more safety 
in redundancy than in reduction - which I wish was not the case. But, even 
so, the probability of the Soviet Union's being able effectively to eliminate the 
whole of the American land-based nuclear retaliatory force is so remote, that 
I really think that it's foolish to postulate it as a basis for planning. And, in 
addition, so long as the sea-launch ballistic missiles are there, they will still 
constitute an extremely effective second-strike force and a credible deterrent. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
Here, on the other hand, I would plump for the latter answer without any 
hesitation at all. Everything that I have read confirms my worries about the 
capacity of either side to be able to function effectively in these respects under 
crisis. 
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If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
I think that this is an unanswerable question. In a sense, the whole concept 
of flexible response does assume the possibility of a limited nuclear exchange. 
And this cannot be dismissed as impossible. But the whole thing is a question 
of unassessable probabilities. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
I don't think that the deployment of recent theatre nuclear systems has made 
much difference. It has neither enhanced, nor eroded deterrence. There were 
ample resources for immediate retaliation anyway, quite sufficient to deter the 
Soviet Union from using her SS2os in a nuclear first strike against NATO 
command and control systems. What is far more significant than this, although 
rarely stressed, is a capacity for an effective first strike with purely conven- 
tional warheads. That would, indeed, made conventional defence that much 
more difficult. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in r? 
The Strategic Defence Initiative means one of two things. It either means the 
maximalist objective, as outlined by President Reagan, of rendering nuclear 
weapons impotent and obsolete, by making it impossible for them to get 
through; or the minimalist objective, which is for developing more effective 
point-defence systems for retaliatory forces. Insofar as it does the latter, I 
don't think that it is necessarily destabilizing, because it probably provides 
a rather necessary technological counter to the increasing penetrability and 
accuracy of missiles. Insofar as it promises to do the former, however, aiming 
at an absolutely secure blanket defence, then I'm afraid that I think that it 
would be destabilizing. In fact, nothing that I have seen indicates to me that 
this is likely to be achieved. But what is worrying is the way in which the 
President and the Administration of the United States seem to think that it is 
achievable. This in itself is highly destabilizing. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
`Horizontal' and `vertical' proliferation are linked, but not in the way that is 
generally understood. I don't subscribe to the `Swedish' doctrine, that the 
example of the great powers affects what the potential nuclear powers decide 
to do. The latter will determine their policy in accordance with what they 
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perceive their neighbours and rivals doing within their own regional sub- 
systems. They will calculate the cost-benefit of diverting the very considerable 
resources necessary for developing any kind of credible nuclear system away 
from the other things they may want to do. Where there is a link is in the 
technical development of nuclear weapons, which occurs as an inevitable result 
of the armament process engaged in by the great powers. But I don't have the 
technological knowledge to know whether this is likely to make the develop- 
ment of nuclear weapons easier and cheaper. If it does, then that will in itself 
make `horizontal' proliferation more likely. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations 
pffer the best prospect for future stability? 
I 
OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
I am not particularly optimistic about current arms control talks achieving 
anything more than a stabilization of the status quo. But I do not see that there 
is a better alternative. I do not distinguish between arms control and nuclear 
disarmament, as suggested on the right. I have yet to be convinced that unilat- 
eral disarmament initiatives would be any way of `breaking the log-jam'. Like 
democracy, arms control is the worst system - except for all the others! 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
war between the great powers again incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
become a rational option and therefore affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
more likely? to initiate a third world war? 
Major war did not first become a possibility when nuclear weapons were 
invented, and therefore the suggestion that the abolition of nuclear weapons 
would eliminate the causes of war is, if I may say so, a very irrational and 
ignorant one. So conventional war would then again become an option. 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited preferable to nuclear war? 
nuclear war? 
I think that the answer is that a major conventional war would be less terrible 
than a limited nuclear war, but would lead to the possibility of a nuclear war 
nonetheless. You would get the worst of both worlds. 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented would they not be bound to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
there be no incentive to resort to 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
Although you may have abolished your nuclear weapons, you have not abol- 
ished your capacity to make them, so, once conventional war has broken out, 
both sides are likely to race in order to produce them. The abolition of nuclear 
weapons would in this way only lead to their reintroduction. 
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Div) Is global nuclear 
disarmament only OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
feasible in a world where war itself is no disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
longer a possibility? hope of a rational world-order? 
By a `rational world order' some people mean a kind of world government in 
which war has simply become civil war. But we are likely to go on with a 
framework of nation-states for the foreseeable future. This means, I'm afraid, 
a framework of armaments. No doubt this is very inadequate as a way of 
ordering the world, but there is reason to believe that we are going to be able 
to go on incrementally improving it. I think that we are. In the end, I would 
optimistically and ideally see an incremental change-over from a system which 
depends upon national armaments, to one which relies on mutual agreement. 
Armaments would become purely symbolic - rather like the palace guard. 
But, in the meantime, during the whole of this (presumably long) process, it 
will- be necessary to maintain nuclear deterrent forces. 
(v) is peace only preserved when we are seen 
to be prepared for war, as failure before 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under 
likely future conditions would global 
nuclear disarmament make war, including 
nuclear war, more likely? 
OR Do the years before 1914 show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? 
Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
I'm not happy with either of these analogies. It's totally illusory to do what 
A. J. P. Taylor does, and say that the great armaments before 1914 were seen 
as deterrents, and they failed. They weren't seen as deterrents. They were 
seen as means of fighting a war to which many people looked forward, and 
which many people thought that they could win. The view that 1914 was 
simply a terrible accident is one which I, and a great many other historians, 
simply do not believe in at all. The analogy falls down. 
And the same is true of the 1939 analogy, I think. That happened, basically, 
because Hitler saw conventional war as an effective instrument of policy, 
which was going to enable him to gain his objectives at minimal cost. He 
miscalculated. The great thing about the existence of nuclear weapons is that 
it is very unlikely that anybody is going to believe that war is an effective 
instrument of policy in the same kind of way. 
B N,, 1 TO Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
evenly matched? 
Well, the way I would put it is that I would far rather be commanding the 
Soviet armed forces than commanding NATO armed forces. It's not so much 
a question of trading tank against tank, or aircraft against aircraft. To do a 
bean-count in this way is to overlook what is far more important - the struc- 
tural weaknesses in NATO. It is the fact that the Soviet armed forces are 
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under one single command, speak one single language, and conform to one 
single strategy, that is significant. And it's the sheer lack of coordination of 
NATO forces, the different degrees of training, the failures of communication 
between them, which worry me in the event of a war. All of this could be 
improved dramatically without any substantial increase in the actual number 
of armaments. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
which will take advantage of unilateral. threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western concessions and is only restrained Western technology and likely to respond 
and forced to accept arms-control positively to unconditional offers of 
agreements by Western determination and Western restraint within a general context 
strength? cif detente? 
I think that it is true that the Soviet Union is essentially a defensively-oriented 
power. It certainly does see itself threatened by Western technology, and by 
Western ideology. Even if the technological conflict and the conflict over 
Eastern Europe were eroded, there will still remain a fundamental ideological 
hostility and lack of understanding, which is going to keep the Soviet Union 
profoundly suspicious. 
But the Soviet Union sees its best security in extending its perimeter when 
it can. It is not a naive power, and is quite capable of exploiting naivety in the 
West. It will exploit divisions between allies, and weaken us in every way that 
it possibly can. So, should we make unconditional offers? Should we allow 
ourselves to be weakened? Will it in fact lead to a greater degree of mutual 
understanding? I'm afraid that I still believe that it's better to try to preserve 
coherence and firmness in the Western Alliance, when dealing with the Soviet 
Union. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
preponderance such that NATO must nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
continue to be able to threaten early use of strategically suicidal? 
nuclear weapons? 
I believe that we should have a force structure that enables us to fight success- 
fully with conventional weapons for the longest possible time, and in this way 
delay the introduction of nuclear weapons to the last possible moment. The 
Soviet Union needs to perceive that, even if we don't use our nuclear weapons, 
she will still suffer very heavy losses. But to abandon the possibility of the use 
of nuclear weapons is virtually to hand the game to the Soviet union, who 
might then be prepared to accept heavy conventional losses in the belief that 
she would eventually prevail. So I would wish to retain the nuclear option in 
Western strategy, but to make it an option for late use, rather than for early 
use. 
It is true that, if it ever came to a major theatre nuclear exchange, then - 
finis Europa, East and West. So the use of nuclear weapons would be intended 
only to show that one had reached a point of such despair, that one was 
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prepared to gamble on the possibility of a limited nuclear war, rather than 
admit total defeat. It is not a decision that I would wish to have to take. 
ýiv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
I think that the balance is not delicate at all. I also think that it's true that the 
West initiates nearly all phases of the nuclear arms race. On the other hand, 
the Soviet Union is very good at' catching up and overhauling us, and I do? not 
think that it's true that the West `enjoys a substantial lead in most areas'. In 
those areas in which we do enjoy a lead the Soviet Union is hot on our heels. 
The problem with a `freeze' is choosing the moment when you can have a 
freeze, when neither side feels that it is at a disadvantage. So far nobody has 
found the precise point to do that. 
As for `unconditional cuts', we come up against the problem of what might 
be called the `arms control game', in which there are protests that we should 
not give anything away without a quid pro quo. This is an argument that I 
simply don't buy. If you don't need the weapons, why have them? We are 
beginning, very reluctantly, to say that we have got far more theatre nuclear 
weapons than we need - and have, in fact, unconditionally abolished 2000 of 
the 6ooo or so that we had. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
There are two points to be made here. The first is that, if we stand purely on the 
defensive, the war will be fought on our territory - or, rather, West Germany 
territory. The second is rather more axiomatic. As Clausewitz has said, all 
defence must involve the concept of some kind of counter-strike. Just to sit 
there and allow oneself to be subjected to enemy blows is not defence at all. I 
have yet to see a convincing `alternative strategy', which would hold out the 
prospect of eventually being able to destroy the weight of attack, which Soviet 
forces can bring against us - including their command of the air. Relatively 
untrained reservists, manning local point-defences, for example, simply would 
not be able to stand up to the sustained intensity of Soviet pressure. And the 
idea that `emerging technology' will necessarily favour defence over attack is 
illusory. 
So the military concept that the way to stop a Soviet attack is to absorb as 
much of it as you can in your front line, and then launch attacks against their 
lines of communication to prevent the follow-on forces from coming on, seems 
to me to be sound strategy and sound deterrence. Nor does it seem to me to 
be particularly provocative. So I don't have a problem about that. 
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(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
OR Is it domination by the two super powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super-power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
About this I say two things. First, neutrality. It takes three to make a neutral. 
To declare that you are neutral or nuclear-free means nothing, unless the two 
belligerents are prepared to agree that you are. Neutrality is the privilege of 
certain geographically favoured areas. But an area like Western Europe, which 
is on the direct line between the two main belligerents, cannot possibly be 
regarded as neutral by them if thej, balloon were to go up. In these circum- 
stances, the Soviet Union would either occupy Western Europe, or demand 
such guarantees as virtually to erode our sovereignty. And we could not pre- 
vent the use of nuclear weapons against us, or the seizure of parts of our 
territory as bases for nuclear weapons. 
Secondly, I think that the idea that there can be a safe `no-man's land' of 
this kind would in any case by a recipe for disaster. A large `neutral' zone 
would be a constant prey for subversion by both sides, as each tried to support 
those within the area who they thought were inclined in their direction. There 
would be the perpetual danger of conflict and instability within every Euro- 
pean country. It is the clarity of the distinction of the frontier, where there 
can be no doubt whatever where the border lies, that is the best security for 
peace in Europe and for peace in the world. 
The presence of American front-line troops, and the tying-in of Western 
defences to the American stratetic nuclear deterrent, are fundamental in mak- 
ing it quite clear to the Soviet Union that their frontier stops at the Iron 
Curtain, and that there is a powerful alliance, which is going to make any use 
of military force as a means of attaining political objectives highly counter- 
productive. 
(vii) Would Western unilateral. nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
In response to the questions on the left, I do not myself believe that radical 
nuclear disarmers consciously serve Soviet interest. But the divisiveness of 
their proposals, sincere as they are, does provide for a kind of incoherence in 
Western policy, which the Soviet Union naturally exploits. That is, I'm afraid, 
what happens in pluralistic democracies, and one has got to put up with it. 
Turning to the questions on the right, I agree that, when Gorbachev or 
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Reagan say-that their aim is to abolish nuclear weapons, they are being insin- 
cere. Both, fundamentally, wish to preserve their nuclear deterrents. And it's 
high time they came out and said so. It's also true that, if the United States were 
prepared to make certain unilateral initiatives, of a kind that could generally be 
seen not to erode her own security, but might be reassuring to the Soviet 
Union (and I believe that this might be possible), then this would be all to the 
good. But it is the United States, not Western Europe, which is significant 
here. And the rejection of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a Nuclear 
Freeze, a European Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, a Declaration of No First 
Use, and so on, is made on the perfectly practical grounds that they could be 
counter-productive. 
C British Policy 
i The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and `deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
independence and protects her from nuclear encourage proliferation? 
blackmail? 
Within the context of a conflict with the Soviet Union, in which we were not 
members of an alliance, I cannot see our deterrent being credible. But in the 
world as it may develop in the eist century, the Soviet Union may not be the 
only nuclear power with which we may be in conflict. I do find the argument, 
that, if the Argentines had had nuclear weapons, we might have had major 
problems in the recent war, quite persuasive. For that reason I think that there 
is a lot to be said for remaining in the nuclear game without necessarily think- 
ing of maintaining credibility against the Soviet Union. 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
In the past the `second centre of decision-making' argument has not been very 
convincing, and our European allies, and in particular the West Germans, 
have not been enthusiastic about our possession of our nuclear weapons. But, 
as there comes to be increasing fear of decoupling from the United States, 
then the value of there being nuclear decision-makers on this side of the 
Atlantic does, I think, become more apparent to our continental allies. I also 
think that it is arguable that one does not so much need a second centre for 
decision-making if the United States is the first centre, but that, if the alterna- 
tive is for Paris to be the only centre, then many of us would feel safer if there 
were another one as well. 
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(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent British initiatives more likely 
to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
involvement? 
I do think that the United States forces are committed anyway. The reason 
why they are prepared to help us to produce Trident is not because they think 
that this will in itself significantly strengthen the Western alliance, but because 
they fear that our giving up of our independent nuclear forces would be seen 
to be a weakening of our will to defend ourselves and our allies. But, in general, 
their defence decision-makers regard the British independent deterrent as 
more of an embarrassment than anything else. 
(iv) Is the cost of 
the 
British deterrent small in 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? 
OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
afforded at the expense of conventional 
strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
All I would say here is that nuclear weapons are still very cheap compared 
with conventional forces. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament have no effect on other 
countries and only serve to weaken British 
influence and allow France unchallenged 
ascendancy in Europe? 
OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
British prestige? Would British 
disarmament within the context outlined in 
B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
The idea that British unilateral nuclear disarmament would have any effect on 
other powers seems to me to be a sort of colonialist attitude - an assumption 
that Britain still provides moral leadership in the world. I do not believe that 
the Indians, or the Israelis, or the Pakistanis, or any of the other near nuclear 
powers, would be in the least interested in what Britain does or does not do. 
What I think that it would do would be to weaken British influence on 
decision-makers in the United States. Unless it was accompanied by a really 
spectacular increase in our conventional capabilities, it would simply be taken 
as evidence that our will to defend ourselves was being eroded. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to 
continue to ensure effective British strategic 
defence into the 21st century? 
OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
all the drawbacks listed above? 
I don't agree with the implication behind the question on the right. I don't 
think that commitment to Trident makes any difference in those respects. But 
nor do I accept that it is the only or best way to continue to ensure effective 
strategic defence. A capacity to explode a very small number of warheads on 
Soviet soil is a very effective deterrent, as the recent events at Chernobyl 
indicate. It is certainly not necessary for us to be able to penetrate the defences 
of Moscow and destroy Soviet headquarters, or to eliminate sixty Soviet cities. 
This is grotesque overkill. Arguments in favour of Trident along these lines 
are not valid. 
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2 NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
I think that, if we accept the overall NATO strategy, then we have got an 
obligation to do whatever is considered necessary within the alliance to play 
our part in upholding it. There are understandable reasons why neither Nor- 
way nor Denmark wish to have nuclear weapons on their soil, because they 
are part of a sort of Baltic balance, whose nuances have got tq be taken into 
account. We have no excuses of that kind. Either we are full members of the 
Alliance, playing a full part in it by whatever is regarded as effective burden- 
sharing, or we are not. I really don't see a sort of half-way house. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain make US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affairs 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
The withdrawal of US bases from Britain would, clearly, not make the defence 
of the West impossible. But they are there for a strategic purpose, and their 
removal would therefore create difficulties. What it would do, it seems to me, 
is unnecessarily to create major complications within the Western Alliance, 
and to that extent destabilize what I think is still a relatively stable relationship 
between the East and the West. The presence of these bases on our soil is to 
some extent an erosion of sovereignty, but it is arguable that this is a price 
which one has to pay for being part of any larger kind of community, whether 
it is the EEC or NATO or anything else. 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
In a conflict between the Alliance, as it is at present, and the Soviet Union, 
there are a large number of legitimate military targets for the Soviet Union in 
Britain, apart from any nuclear bases and facilities - for example, places like 
Portsmouth, or Harwich, from which our reinforcements could sail or on 
which our Fleet is based. If we tried to remove ourselves from the Alliance, 
or to declare some sort of neutrality, then both the United States and the 
Soviet Union might feel that they would have to occupy us or deny occupation 
to the other. 
So I see no safety whatever in trying to subtract ourselves from the equation. 
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(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
-afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
There are a number of different possibilities here. We have already rejected 
the possibility of a totally non-nuclear and neutral Europe. Then there is the 
possibility that Britain could opt out of the alliance, irrespective of what else 
is done in Europe. Britain would lose all capacity to influence the policy of 
those still in the Alliance, the Alliance would be severely weakened, and this 
would be likely to produce a very much more unstable situation than the one 
we have at present. 
A third possibility we have also already dealt with - that we remain a mem- 
ber of the Alliance, but tell the United States to remove their nuclear bases 
from our soil. So we are left with a fourth possibility, which in many ways I 
favour. It is one of burden-sharing, in which we leave strategic nuclear forces 
to the United States, and ourselves concentrate on non-nuclear forces on a 
simple cost-effective bases. We would continue to provide nuclear facilities 
for the United States and to be members of an alliance, whose strategy is based 
fundamentally on American strategic nuclear retaliatory capability. 
Moral Considerations 
(i) Is it morally right to pursue the policy least OR Are there actions which are in themselves 
likely to cause human suffering? May this wrong no matter what the situation? Is the 
sometimes involve doing things which in alternative to excuse almost any act of 
other circumstances would be wrong? barbarism? 
I think that there is a false apposition in the statement on the right. An action 
is `in itself' morally neutral. What makes it moral or immoral is motive and 
consequence. The infliction of pain as an at of sadism is morally wrong; the 
same action carried out as a judicious punishment is not morally wrong, and 
may be morally desirable. Then there are notorious grey areas. Is it morally 
wrong to inflict pain in order to eliminate injustice? This will depend upon 
the circumstances. If you have an IRA prisoner, and know that he has set a 
time-bomb to go off in Oxford Street, is it not right to inflict great pain on 
him in order to find out where it is before it is too late? But in these cases you 
have to be certain. The more difficult it is to see the moral justification for an 
action, the more certain you need to be that there is a good moral reason for 
doing it. You could probably work out some sort of matrix for this. So, in 
these general terms, I would agree that, if your intention is to maximize human 
welfare and minimize human suffering, you will sometimes be morally right 
to do things which in other circumstances would be morally wrong. 
Professor Sir Michael Howard, C. B. E., M. C. 
(jj) In formulating policy should we'weigh up 
the probability of success and the relative 
costs in terms of human suffering of 
alternative nuclear and non-nuclear 
strategies? 
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OR Is the only relevant point here that a 
nuclear exchange of almost any kind 
would in itself cause unimaginable 
suffering to largely civilian populations? 
Now we apply this to nuclear weapons deployment and use. There are, in 
fact, two separate, but related, issues here. There is, first of all, the question 
of whether there are particular limited uses of nuclear weapons that could in 
certain circumstances be morally justified. Second, there is the question of 
how great the risk would be that the limited action would escalate towards an 
all-out nuclear exchange. When the only nuclear weapons were very large and 
very dirty, the situ--; tion was simpler. But now, thanks to the confounded 
scientists, one does have a very wide range of nuclear weapons, some of which 
do no more damage than so-called `conventional' weapons. I think that it is 
very necessary to keep these two issues separated out, because it is all too often 
said that the use of nuclear weapons is automatically an annihilating strategy. 
It is not. The statement on the right is incorrect, and, if I may say so, patently 
incorrect. 
(iii) So far as concerns intention, need we look 
no further than the fact that our sole aim in 
deploying nuclear weapons is to prevent 
their use? 
OR Is there no such thing as a fully deployed 
weapons system which is a bluff? Is to 
deploy nuclear weapons to intend to use 
them in certain circumstances? 
This is a central issue. As far as I remember, the American Catholic bishops' 
say that it is morally all right to deploy nuclear weapons, as long as you don't 
intend to use them. This seems to me to be the weak point in their letter. To 
deploy nuclear weapons without intending to use them is self-contradictory. 
You do not develop Polaris submarines and train people to man them, if you 
know that, when it comes to the point, you are not going to use them. There 
may be a reasonable doubt as to whether you will. There will always be a 
chance that you will not. But the effectiveness of deterrence cannot be separ- 
ated from the possibility that you will use your weapons. Deterrent forces 
cannot be a bluff. To that extent, the statement on the right is correct. And 
there is another weakness in the statement on the left. Given NATO strategy 
at the moment, the function of nuclear weapons is not simply to prevent the 
use of nuclear weapons by the other side. We do retain the option of first use 
- unfortunately. 
(iv) Are there possible uses of nuclear weapons 
which are allowed by, Just War theory, for 
example the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in order to prevent worse 
suffering? Can there be a theory of Just 
Deterrence? 
OR Is a conditional intention to cause 
indiscriminate and disproportionate 
suffering of this kind, whether admonitory, 
preemptive or retaliatory, ruled out by Just 
War theory? Was it wrong to bomb 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? 
The right-hand side has already been dismantled. There are possible uses of 
i. In the Pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace (1983). 
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nuclear weapons, which in certain circumstances could be moral justified in 
the same way that the use of conventional weapons would be. For example, 
the destruction of a comparatively isolated military target in, say, the Kola 
peninsula, which would be likely to pre-empt a Soviet attack and prevent 
worse damage, while not carrying with it a high risk of escalation. And, if 
there are possible uses of nuclear weapons which do fit in with the principle 
of proportionality of Just War theory, then Just Deterrence is possible, too. 
As to the question of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there are two issues here. 
Given the perceptions and the state of knowledge of the time, was it a reason- 
able, and not immoral, decision to take? And, secondly, with hindsight, know- 
ing what we do now, would we have done the same? Let us set the second 
question on one side. We now think that it would not have been necessary to 
invade Japan, because they were in any cast! on the verge of economic collapse. 
So for that reason we may say that the dropping of the bombs was unnecessary. 
But at the time this was not known. It was genuinely thought that, if the 
bombs were not dropped, the Japanese would go on fighting. Moreover, we 
must remember the ethics of the period. The destruction of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki by single bombs was surely no more morally reprehensible than the 
destruction of Tokyo with rather higher casualties by fire-raids carried out by 
larger numbers of planes. It is the difference between being killed by a single 
bullet and a shot-gun. The question of radiation after-effects was not thought 
through as fully as it should have been, although the whole thing is still an 
open issue. So the question of the morality of the destruction of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki is part of a wider question of the morality of area bombing in 
general. Would it have been better had Strategic Air Command used fire- 
bombs to burn every Japenese city, one after the other, with comparable 
casualties? 
(v) Is there no relevant connection between the OR Is it a scandal that such huge resources are 
development and deployment of nuclear devoted to the development and deployment 
weapons and world poverty and disease? of nuclear weapons and not to the 
alleviation of suffering? 
If we could be sure that a peaceful order would be preserved without the 
deployment of nuclear weapons, then we should dismantle them and devote 
the proceeds to the alleviation of suffering. But I have argued that this is not the 
case. We must continue with the search for a way of preserving the structure of 
order at far less cost, but must on no account put that structure at risk in the 
process. More relevant to this is the question of armaments in general, both 
the sale of arms to the Third World, and the over-investment by Third World 
states in military affairs and resources which they ought to be devoting to the 
welfare of their people and the infrastructure of their economiies. If there is 
any scandal about the failure to relieve suffering, it is about the general self- 
indulgence of the rich North and West. We could help to relieve suffering by 
paying rather more income tax, and by drinking and smoking less. 
Professor Sir Michael Howard, C. B. E., M. C. 
(vi) Does Christian teaching allow the OR Does Christian teaching condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? deployment of nuclear weapons? 
17® 
If what I have said is valid, then Christian teaching does not condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons. But it does rather depend upon what you 
mean by `Christian teaching'. I find that Roman Catholics tend to see Christian 
teaching as being an area of discourse which has been going on ever since the 
time of the early fathers. It is an attempt to define these issues in the light of 
what we know, or think we know, about God's providence, as applied to the 
development of humanity and human kind. And there is no single Christian 
dogma here. Christian teaching provides parameters, a framework, within 
which one takes; decisions. Then there is the Protestant ethic, which does tend 
to try to draw clear and specific conclusions from Gospel teaching about what 
we should or should not do. It is Protestents, on the whole, who press for 
black-and-white judgements. I am more of a Catholic by temperament, and, 
I suppose, by upbringing. I look to the church for a framework of guidance, 
within which I and other people can decide what is the best thing to do 
under the circumstances. Official teaching does not rule out nuclear weapon 
deployment. It is not happy with it. But there is a great deal in a sinful world 
about which one is not happy. 
Recommendations 
i No (see B(iv)). 
2I favour a moratorium on anti-satellite programmes. A general moratorium 
of Strategic Defence Programmes would be nice, but, since it would be 
impossible to monitor and there would be constant reciprocal accusations 
that it was being breached, I think that this would create far more tensions 
than it would resolve (see A2(A)(v)). 
3 No. I see no point in it. I don't think that it would make the world any 
safer. 
4 No (see B(iii)). 
5I would like to feel that each side would scrutinize its nuclear arsenals and 
decide what it could dispose of. But cuts do not necessarily produce greater 
stability, and could produce greater instability (see Ai(i), and 9 below). 
6 Not in Europe (see B(vi)). 
7 It would be nice if those powers, which have not yet signed, would do 
so. But tell that to the Indians. I don't see much point in this sort of 
declaration. 
8 No, not in a context where we are still likely to have endemic war (see 
A2(B)). 
9 By definition, a `sufficient' force would be stable, because each side would 
decide what was `sufficient'. I suspect that for this reason it would not do 
much to change the situation. On the other hand, if nuclear arsenals were 
reduced to the level where a first strike again began to look like a feasible 
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possibility, this would produce greater instability. To that extent, a degree 
of redundancy enhances stability. 
10 No. I think that we have done the right thing. We have used our influence 
with the Americans to persuade them to give a satisfactory definition of 
what is involved. First, that the objective is to enhance deterrence, not get 
away from it; second, that this is at present just a research programme in 
order to keep us abreast of the Soviet Union; third, that there will be 
careful consultation within the Alliance and with the Soviet Union, if and 
when the question of deployment is raised. This is a good example of 
Britain, as a member of the Alliance and a nuclear power, being able to 
influence policy. 
It No. See 4. 
12 No. (See B(iv)). 
13 No. (See Ci(ii)). 
14 No. 
15 No. (See B(vi)). 
16 No. (See Ci). 
17 Does not apply. 
18 Britain should remain in NATO, but not press for a non-nuclear strategy. 
Perhaps there could be more cost-effective burden-sharing, in which 
strategic nuclear defence was left to the United States and we concentrated 
on strengthening non-nuclear forces (See C2(iv)). 
i9 No. (See C2(i) & C2(ii)). 
20 Does not apply. 
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Biographical Note 
Rebecca Johnson has lived and worked at the Greenham Common Women's 
Peace Camp since August 9,1982. She has been imprisoned many times for 
her non-violent resistance to male violence, bases, bunkers, and nuclear war 
preparations. Prison has increased her determination to use her life working 
for peace, freedom and justice, with love. 
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Editorial Comment 
This set of answers was recorded at an interview in Marlborough on November 
i t, 1986. Rebecca Johnson is the only woman whose views are included in 
this book. For her this is a highly significant fact, as can be seen from the 
wording of the biographical note, and, above all, from the penultimate para- 
graph of her response to the Moral Considerations at the end. Equally import- 
ant, and linked to it, is her rejection of the rational and dispassionate terms 
within which this issue is usually debated, and her insistence that, both from 
the point of view of those responsible for the implementation of public policy, 
arnd from the point of view of those who may be affected by it, this is a matter 
that can only be properly responded to in a directly personal and emotional 
way. In her answers to the questions in section A2(B), and in Moral Consider- 
ations, she may be speaking for a considerable number of people not rep- 
resented elsewhere in this book. 
REBECCA JOHNSON 
A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factor? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 1945? 
There has not really been peace between the great powers in the last forty 
years. They have been trying to increase their spheres of influence and fight 
out their ideological conflicts by supporting and equipping other groupings. 
To say that it is nuclear weapons that have kept the peace is as ludicrous to 
say that it was mustard gas that kept the peace in the years after 1918. We 
could see the conditions that were leading to the Second World War then, and 
we can see them now - mutual mistrust, constructed paranoia about the 
enemy, weapons build-up. The problem is that today we have nuclear 
weapons, so we cannot allow the naivety that was possible between 1919 and 
1939 to prevail now. The Second World War followed from the conflicts 
unresolved and created at the end of the First World War. If we continue with 
the naive view of a balance of terror in the world, then the Third World War, 
the nuclear war, is going to follow on from the military conflicts that we are 
seeing now. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
Nuclear deterrence theory is strategically incoherent. Mutual Assured 
Destruction just displaces the fighting for a time in the way that I have 
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described. But the scientists and military strategists are not satisfied with this, 
and in the i96os they started to refine nuclear weapons so that they could be 
used to fight a war. The trouble is that there are all sorts of factors involved 
in wars. War is not just about military power- it's about political and economic 
competition. And these tensions and rivalries have not been resolved. So the 
incentive to war remains, and, the military mind being what it is, strategists 
could not be satisfied with stasis. 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war: ' 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
The result of this has been the introduction of tactical battlefield nuclear 
weapons and so on, which have narrowed the gap between conventional and 
nuclear war, and changed our perceptions, so that now we are planning for 
limited nuclear war. All of this, of course, increases the likelihood that there 
will be such a war, and it won't be limited. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
The size and variety of nuclear arsenals is part of the military perception that 
war can be fought with nuclear weapons. It is also very dangerous, because 
this vast number of weapons all have to be tested, stored, based, modernized 
- and this increases the possibility of accidental use or misuse, as well as 
radioactive pollution and contamination in places like the Pacific, where the 
Islanders have been victims of our `Nuclear Peace' for forty years. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
The right-hand side is correct. I think that each side does aim for superiority. 
But, even if the planners in the Pentagon or the Kremlin are aware of exactly 
what the weapons levels are on each side, it is usually in their interest in terms 
of domestic political control to put out different stories to their people. If their 
aim is to build up military arsenals, they say that the other side has more; if 
their aim is to reassure their own people, they say that their own defences are 
strong. But I get impatient with having to go through all the arguments about 
balance and deterrence, when that is not where the important changes have 
to happen. 
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(vi) Has force-planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
I agree with the right-hand side. I think we have seen this very clearly with 
Star Wars. Reagan is clinging to Star Wars, because he has already sold a 
number of the contracts for research and development, and because he knows 
that Republican party votes are going to depend in certain key areas on the 
industry that is now already gearing up to investment in the programme. It 
doesn't matter that'the concept of Star Wars is a military nonsense, as long as 
somebody is making money out of it. With things like Cruise and Pershing, 
though, it was rather different. The military planners wanted a system that 
'was difficult to detect, could fly below the level of radar, and be launched 
from various platforms, which Cruise can do; and be swift and accurate, like 
Pershing. Military planning and industrial enterprise are hand-in-glove. Huge 
profits are made from keeping us in fear. So much money and power become 
vested in the arms industry and trade, the spiralling replacement of each new 
technology and system. It would take a brave government to expose the waste, 
risk the wrath of the warmongers, and try to rechannel the research and 
resources into socially useful areas. 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat. of an enemy first strike OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
future? 
The left-hand side is nonsense. The United States has always refused to give 
an undertaking of `no first use', and now France has reversed her earlier policy 
and is wanting to develop a military arsenal which will make first- and second- 
strike feasible. The dangers are, first, of accidental firing, because wrong 
signals are sent through the computer, or there is a wrong interpretation of 
them on the ground. And, second, the new first-strike weapons increase the 
strain of bluff. In a situation of tension, with both sides jockeying for position, 
throwing out propaganda both to the other side and to their own public, 
watching one another, both afraid that the other will strike first and take out 
command centres and weapons in their silos, in these circumstances the stakes 
have become very high. All it needs is a failure of nerve in the game of bluff. 
This is a very real and likely scenario with the weapons now being deployed. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
Yes. The right-hand side follows on from this. I just do not think that the 
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information is secure. I have lived at Greenham for four years, and I have been 
appalled at how stupid, naive, misinformed, disinformed, and confused these 
military officers, these people who are supposed to be defending us, really are. 
Their security is inadequate, it is very easy to get highly sensitive top secret 
information from them, and some of them do not seem to be able to interpret 
their own sources of information. I am terrified that peace is in the hands both 
of fallible communication systems and of badly-educated and ill-informed 
military personnel. 
If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
I just do' not think that we can risk it. My own impression, having seen the 
way in which the officers in charge of the Cruise convoy panic when faced 
with a few women standing in the road, is that if there was any kind of exchange 
it would very quickly escalate. They would try to get all their weapons out 
as quickly as possible, and probably not even programme them correctly. But 
any nuclear exchange would be so unimaginably horrifying that we cannot 
risk it. We have to prevent the possibility. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
They lower the threshold. Any honest military strategist will admit that. Their 
purpose is to take us out of Mutually Assured Destruction, and to make 
nuclear war thinkable and plannable. Take Cruise. It is supposed to be taken 
out on dispersal and hidden among the civilian population, and then fired 
secretly. But we know quite well that Soviet satellites can pick this up, so at 
a time of tension we will be depending on Soviet military planners to get the 
equation right and act with restraint. First we are told that the Soviet Union 
is evil, vicious and untrustworthy; then we place the lives of everyone living 
within a hundred-mile radius of Greenham at the mercy of the humanity and 
good sense of Soviet commanders. In April of this year, for example, Cruise 
went on an unscheduled exercise a few days before the Libyan bombing. In 
fact, it is stated in the Geneva and Hague Conventions that, just as you should 
not make civilians the indiscriminate object of your bombing, so you should 
not hide your weapons systems among the civilian populations. In order to 
neutralize Cruise, the Soviet Union would have to obliterate a large part of 
southern Britain. Of course they lower the threshold. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in i? 
The Strategic Defence Initiative is very destabilizing. And it's dishonest. If 
the scientists, technologists and many of the military are doubtful if it can 
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work, why are they telling us that it will? They tell us that it will prevent 
missiles leaving the Soviet Union; that it will be a shield over the United 
States; Thatcher tries to pretend that it will be a shield over the West as a 
whole. This is all nonsense. If it were possible to give ninety-five percent 
protection to, say, Washington or New York, that would just mean that a 
rational attack would swamp the shield so that even five percent would be 
enough to annihilate the city. And behind all this is a more sinister implication. 
Once Congress has been conned into funding-all the advanced electronic and 
laser research, at a certain point the Pentagon may be able to say `we have 
done even better. We can now use this technology to control and immobilize whole 
populations without having to launch a nuclear attack'. And, of course, they will 
be able to do this to their own domestic population, policing urban unrest 
brought about by the distortion of the economy and diversion of resources 
into the whole arms programme and away from education, jobs, social pro- 
grammes to alleviate poverty, overcrowding and other social evils. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
If nuclear deterrence works, then we should be spreading it to as many coun- 
tries as possible. Then we would all be safe! But, of course, the superpowers 
and Britain know that this is nonsense, and that there is no such thing as 
deterrence. That's why they are all terrified of proliferation. But there is also 
the desire to keep these weapons in the hands of the rich, predominantly 
white, north, because this perpetuates their dominance. It is a form of racial 
superiority. 
Proliferation is indeed encouraged by the dependence of the great powers 
on nuclear deterrence. That is one of the main reasons why Britain should 
give up her independent deterrent. And she must do it quickly to have an 
effect. Once some of these other countries have them - tempted by the idea 
that their possession will bring them power, recognition and respect - it will 
be too late. We will have a whole other set of problems and instabilities. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations 
offer the best prospect for future stability? 
OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
I would agree with the right-hand side. Anyone with a sense of history, looking 
back at the so-called forty years of multilateral arms control negotiations, has 
to be blind or stupid to argue that this is an effective way to reduce tension or 
cut back on arms. Although I welcome any attempt to reduce the vast nuclear 
arsenals, I am not hopeful about the present talks, because I don't think that 
this is where the problems lie. It is a mistake to separate defence and arms 
policies from broader foreign policies. They put all their arguing into haggling 
over numbers and quantities of explosive power, instead of getting to grips 
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with the 'fundamental disagreements and conflicts of ideology, of spheres of 
influence, of resources. 
(g) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
I would like to approach all this in a different way. I do not want to be pushed 
into the alternatives that the questions in the left-hand column assume. The 
question that I would like to ask is this: Can the Earth and the nations on it 
survive a nuclear war of any kind? And my answer would be `no'. As the 
Thatcherites are always so keen to tell us, we cannot disinvent nuclear 
weapons. So war of any kind is no longer a rational option available to anyone. 
Since we cannot disinvent these weapons of mass destruction, we have to start 
working out other kinds of policies and means of resolving the problems that 
war has traditionally been used to resolve - conflicts of belief, territory, 
resource. In the past, each war has created the next. But with nuclear weapons 
we cannot afford the next. When wars were fought between small armies and 
were localized, most of the people who fought and died were soldiers. But in 
the Second World War forty-five percent of the people who died were civilian, 
and a lot of those were women and children. It makes me very angry when we 
have Armistice Day and they lay wreaths at the foot of monuments commem- 
orating the heroic soldiers, and forget that those soldiers were at the same time 
killing millions of civilians. In any future war that number will be greatly 
increased. 
We can no longer fight wars to protect homes and families. The rational 
objectives of human life are survival, an increase in the quality and health of 
life, the creation of a future for our children and grandchildren. In planning 
for the possibility of war of any kind, we are not making use of the qualities 
that made human beings fit to survive, our qualities of thought and mind and 
intelligence. We have to start creating the moral and political structures which 
will enable our species to survive. War of any kind in a nuclear age will not 
enable our species to survive. So we have got to discount that as a rational 
option for all time. We must not allow the evolutionary suicidals to destroy 
and poison the Earth, the waters, the very air we breath for all time. 
So I have my eyes firmly fixed on the only possibility for the future - 
although there's a part of me that does not hold out much hope for it, because 
too many peoply are moral cowards, or are short-sighted and won't make the 
radical changes that are an urgent necessity. 
But my feet are, of course, in the quicksand of the present. Multilateral 
nuclear disarmament is a little island, a tussock of grass, and conventional 
disarmament is a tussock a bit further on. We have to take those first very 
difficult, very sticky, very courageous steps of unilateral nuclear disarmament 
in order to get ourselves out of the quicksand to the first tussock. That first 
step of unilateralism could make the programme of multilateral disarmament 
possible. Then we have to manage our lives and our personal, political and 
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international relations so as to recognize the pointlessness of all the conven- 
tional hardware that clogs the seas and land. That will take time and courage, 
but, if we hesitate now to reach for the first tussock, the quicksand will suck 
us deeper down and we will die. 
B NATO Policy 
The West's policies threaten our own peace and security, and that of many 
countries, far more than Soviet activities. 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically evenly matched? 
dangerous militaty superiority in Europe? 
There's a huge part of me that doesn't care too much who thinks they're 
superior. It's all the numbers game. But there probably is a rough parity in 
conventional forces. As we said before, when it suits their purposes to make 
us feel that we don't have as much as the other side, then they argue that way. 
When they are trying to reassure us, then, almost in the same breath, they 
argue the other way. Governments are liars. And, in any case, I don't think 
that this is where the problem lies. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
which will take advantage of unilateral threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western concessions and is only restrained Western technology and likely to respond 
and forced to accept arms-control " positively to unconditional offers of 
agreements by Western determination and Western restraint within a general context 
strength? of detente? 
The present situation has been created out of the aftermath of the Second 
World War. The twenty-two million deaths that the Soviet Union suffered in 
that war made her determined to reassure her people that this would never 
happen again. So Europe was divided up into two `spheres of influence' - 
Russian and American. To criticize the Soviet Union for going into Hungary 
or Afghanistan, while ignoring the much greater expansionism of the United 
States in the same period, is rank hypocrisy. I would tend to agree with the 
right-hand side here. The Soviet Union is an encircled power, standing at bay, 
surrounded by forces which are hostile and are putting out increasingly violent 
rhetoric about how evil the Soviet system is. The West deliberately aims to 
destabilize the Soviet Union, forcing the diversion of resources away from 
autonomous national consolidation, and towards military build-up, so that in 
the end internal discontent boils over. This is the kind of paranoia and projec- 
tion which has always created the emotional climate for war. It carries with it 
very great dangers, because, like an animal at bay, an encircled country can 
attack out of fear. So the essential task is to get rid of these buffer zones and 
spheres of influence, to emancipate ourselves from virulent propaganda which 
depicts the other side in dehumanized terms, and finally to break the mould 
set at the end of the Second World War. 
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Is Soviet chemical and conventional OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
preponderance such that NATO must nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
continue to be able to threaten early use of strategically suicidal? 
nuclear weapons? 
Any use of nuclear weapons would be suicidal. So the threat of early use is 
not credible. The same applies to all modern weapons of mass destruction - 
biological and chemical, as well as nuclear. (The US claims not to store chemi- 
cal weapons - but they do in the Welford bomb base, where I have seen the 
storage facilities. ) There cannot be such a thing as `deterrence'. NATO's 
dependence upon the early use of nuclear weapons is irrational and inexcusably 
irresponsible. Chemical and biological weapons are as dangerous and uncon- 
trollable as nuclear weapons in that they could get out of hand and spread, to 
cause death and injury far beyond the battlefield or blinkered intentions of the 
military users. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
The right-hand side is probably true. But the very way in which these ques- 
tions are framed one again brings out the incoherence of the so-called strategy 
of nuclear deterrence. To invoke the Soviet threat and then say `the Soviets 
are increasing their forces and therefore so must we' is exactly the fallacy that 
creates the arms race. It is each side saying this that is carrying us to the 
precipice. There is such overwhelming overkill that either side could freeze 
without risk. They won't, because then they would have to admit the stupidity 
of this expensive exercise in macho sizing, and also because decades of the 
arms race means that industry is dependent upon the development of ever- 
newer weapons-systems with built-in obsolence and spiralling demand. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her, lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
This is entirely irrelevant. The problem is artificial in the first place - the 
Soviet threat has been created in order to legitimize arms programmes and 
justify the control of domestic populations in the West - so the search for 
`alternative strategies' is a diversion from what we should really be concerned 
with. 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
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OR Is it domination by the two super powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super-power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
I am not anti-American. I was brought up there when I was young and I love 
many things about America and American people. But I would agree that the 
major threat which faces us, both as a nation, and as members of the human 
race in general, is the continuing escalation of the superpower confrontation, 
fuelled principally by United States' sabre-rattling. 
And the danger does not just lie in the outbreak of war, but in the steady 
and surreptitious erosion of democracy that the increasing militarization of 
Europe is bringing about. It allows governments to implement policies which 
take away our freedoms - the Public Order Act, the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Bill. This turns legitimate dissent and protest, which is what democ- 
racy should be about, into what is described as a treacherous disruption of 
public life. Health and social service programmes are being dismantled 
because so many resources are being poured into the bottomless pit of arms- 
spending. Europe should indeed be a nuclear weapon-free zone, and the 
NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances should be dissolved. Western European 
countries should contribute towards this by moving towards a policy of non- 
alignment. True defence in the nuclear age can only lie in the mutual respect 
and interaction of non-aligned countries. 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
This is like the people who say, `I would love to see the view from the top of that 
mountain, but I am certainly not going to put one foot in front of the other in order 
to get there. ' Or it's like the twins, who never emerged from the womb, because 
each was saying `afteryou'. I see unilateral initiatives as part of that first crucial 
step. They certainly don't stand on their own. It would be ludicrous to think 
that they did. They are the first step in a broader programme. As we have 
seen, the only alternative is increasing escalation and the baying hounds of the 
military-industrial complex wanting more and more arms to be built up. 
The trouble with the left-hand side is self-fulfilling expectations. If you 
expect that the Soviet Union will not reciprocate genuinely, then you create 
the conditions in which they cannot. They have, in fact, taken some significant 
first steps - making a pledge of no first use, declaring a unilateral test mora- 
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torium, offering bold initiatives at Reykjavik. But in each case we turn round 
and say, `What are they doing that for? I don't trust them. They must have ulterior 
motives. ' So we have created the conditions in which that whole system of 
negotiations cannot succeed. 
C British Policy 
i The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and `deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
independence and protects her from nuclear encourage proliferation? 
blackmail? 
I welcome the Labour Party's recognition of the fallacy at the heart of Britain's 
possession of nuclear weapons. Our `nuclear deterrent' can never be used. It 
does not protect us. We do not have a realistic defence strategy if it is based 
upon nuclear weapons. These illusory arguments need to be shown up for 
what they are. 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
The argument on the left-hand side is simply another rationalization. It is 
empty and entirely lacks credibility. 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee independent British initiatives more likely 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
recognition of it? involvement? 
I have already answered this. I do not want the United States `fully committed 
to the defence of Europe' when the cost is our liberty and independence. They 
tie us into attacks and alliances which are not necessarily in Europe's best 
interest. They consider that `defending Europe' from threats, that they have 
helped to create, gives them the right to interfere with domestic internal poli- 
tics. I wish they'd spend more time seeing to the interests and needs of the 
disadvantaged millions in their own country. I fear that the `special relation- 
ship' means that our big American cousin covers his fist with a soft velvet 
glove. But, if we show too much independence and initiative in determining 
our own best defence policies, the glove will be thrown aside, and we'll feel 
the brutal iron fist experienced by Chileans, Nicaraguans and others. Many 
Americans are also deeply distressed by their Administration's warmongering. 
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(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? 
OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
afforded at the expense of conventional 
strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
Nuclear weapons do not play a `vital defence role'. They simply help to per- 
petuate the militarization of Europe and the progressive erosion of our democ- 
racy. I want to see the resources now being spent on armaments in this country 
instead being spent on constructive long-term public programmes such as 
education and health. The effort should go, not into more nuclear or conven- 
tional arms, but into investment in combatting racism, in understanding and 
respecting other cultures, in building mutual concern among our populations. 
That will be our strongest and most effective long-term defence policy. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament have no effect on other 
countries and only serve to weaken British 
influence and allow France unchallenged 
ascendancy in Europe? 
OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
British prestige? Would British 
disarmament within the context outlined in 
B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
Britain's nuclear weapons have brought her no prestige or influence. This 
whole idea is inappropriate and completely out of place. If Britain wants to be 
more significant internationally, she would do well to detach herself from a 
lame dependence upon the United States and to achieve it through a policy of 
non-alignment. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to 
continue to ensure effective British strategic 
defence into the 21st century? 
OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
all the drawbacks listed above? 
The Trident programme is ludicrous. But, unfortunately, like many ludicrous 
things, it is also very dangerous and expensive. 
2 NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary. within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
We have already seen why the argument in the left-hand column is spurious. 
Britain's long-term security does not depend upon NATO, still less upon 
NATO nuclear systems. I want to see NATO and the Warsaw Pact dis- 
mantled. I can understand why the Labour Party argues as on the right-hand 
side. Conventional forces do not need to be strengthened for defence purposes. 
But, after years of propaganda to the contrary, by both Labour and Tory 
governments, this is too difficult to get across quickly. They'd have a hard task 
explaining how they've conned us and wasted our resources not for defence 
but to appease our masters in the Alliance. So I understand why political 
considerations mean that the Labour Party has to approach the question of 
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NATO and conventional weapons build-up rather delicately. That's the 
problem with acquiescing in expenditure on successive falsehoods - it comes 
back and haunts you! 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
nuclear bases from Britain make US yielded to the US erode British 
defence of the West impossible? Is sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
American interference in British affairs more than restore a normal peacetime 
negligible? relationship? 
The response of the American administration to the decisions taken during 
the recent Labour Party conference clearly showed up what the real situation 
is. Listening to the American Secretary of Defense gave me a surreal feeling 
that our apparent ally was all at once a potential enemy, threatening the with- 
drawal of economic favours and the deliberate destabilization of this country, 
if we dare to try to escape from its sphere of influence. Will America do 
everything it can to undermine a democratically elected government, which 
wants a very sane and rational defence policy that is not in accordance with 
American interests? I think that Labour Party policy will force the Americans 
out into the open about what really is the underpinning of the NATO Alliance 
- American economic and security interests. This will show what has been 
going on for the past forty years in Europe. 
And our own governments have up until now been prepared to play along 
with this. With Cruise missiles, which are said to be protecting our freedom, 
they are prepared to deny people living in our towns and villages freedom of 
movement on our own roads when there is a Cruise convoy moving through, 
freedom of protest, freedom of access to common land and the sacred land of 
Salisbury Plain. So what price our sovereignty and independence? 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
I think that the right-hand side is true. The mobility of Cruise missiles means 
the blanket targeting of most of southern England. If Britain gets rid of nuclear 
weapons, the Soviet Union has explicitly said that it will take Britain out of 
its primary list of targets. Obviously, if there were a general nuclear war, we 
would be killed eventually, by fallout or by nuclear winter, if by nothing else. 
But, without US bases or weapons targeted threateningly on the Soviet Union 
or other countries, we would be protected from first or second strikes. 
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(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
It cannot be called an umbrella. On the contrary, we are all implicated in the 
terrible risks of American first-strike planning, without having any influence 
over it. We are endangered, not protected. 
Moral Considerations 
I would rather respond to all of these questions at once. 
I feel very strongly that there is a rational aim to human life. It is survival. 
And not just survival on any terms, but survival with an increasing quality 
of life. I believe that the conditions for that survival are our recognition of 
the degree to which we are mutually dependent upon one another, and 
upon the birds, the animals, the fish, the plants, the foodstuffs, the resources 
of the earth. And that is why I believe that to poison the possibility of our 
future by the indiscriminate build-up of industry and weapons manufacture 
in the present is a fundamentally irrational course of action for the human race 
to be undertaking. It is irrational for us to be building up weaponry that 
deliberately threatens the immediate annihilation, or slow desecration, of all 
the earth's natural living systems. Any act which tends in that direction is, if 
you like, irrational in evolutionary terms. And that is also to say that it is 
immoral. I get very irritated with people who try to separate rationality and 
emotion, and tell us at Greenham that we are being emotional and should be 
more rational. On the contrary, we should all be more emotional about the 
death of a child, our own child or someone else's, about the death of a friend, 
about the death of a soldier. Only in that way can we begin to understand the 
significance of what it means to threaten the deaths of millions of people. The 
two cannot be separated, and it is very dangerous to try to do so. We know at 
a very gut level that to kill another person is wrong, and that to plan to kill 
another person is wrong. So to plan to kill on a large scale by making and 
deploying nuclear weapons is that much more wrong. We know that all of 
these things are wrong. We are not prepared, either to do this ourselves, or to 
have it done in our names. And simply saying `no' is not enough, because it 
is assumed in our political system that our silence, and our acquiescence, and 
our vote every five years, is a sort of blank cheque to our governments to 
perpetrate these acts of atrocity. If we know that this is wrong, then we must 
take those kinds of action that will prevent governments from doing it in our 
name, otherwise we are hypocrites. That is what we are trying to do at Green- 
ham by taking nonviolent direct action. We are trying to bring home the 
implications of what they are doing to the workers who are producing the 
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weapons of mass destruction - the research workers at Aldermaston, the mili- 
tary workers at bases like Greenham, Welford, or Upper Heyford, those who 
drive the. launchers for Cruise missiles, each convoy of which carries about 
20o times the destructive power of the Hiroshima bomb. What I do is to place 
my own body in front of them and say, `No. Stop. Are you prepared to follow 
through the logic of what you are doing, and run me down and kill me? Are you 
yourself prepared to do this act of bestiality and barbarism? ' And, if they did run 
me down, they would at least be consistent and show that they thought that 
it was all right to kill those they disagree with. But most, in fact, stop. And 
then we ask them, `If you are not prepared, consciously, and in front of your own 
eyes, to murder another human being, what on earth are you doing playing your 
part in a system designed to destroy large numbers of human beings far away? ' We 
are trying to bring the morality of what they are doing close to them. That is 
one of thr main troubles with nuclear weapons. In the First World War every- 
one was aware of the shattered, disfigured men who came back from the Front. 
Even the commanding officers were sickened. That was why it was to be `the 
war to end all wars'. But now those who plan, prepare, and build for war are 
psychologically distanced from it. The destruction will take place a long way 
away and they expect to be safe in their bunkers. Those who suffer will be the 
women, the children, the civilians, those in the cities, those trying to live off 
the land, the animals, the birds, the fish. The innocents. There is this huge 
gap between the military's targeting and strategic thinking, and the actual act 
of killing. It is a very dangerous gap for the survival of the world. By taking 
nonviolent direct action we are trying to close that gap. We say `Are you 
prepared to kill me? Because I am telling you that you cannot kill someone else in 
my name'. So for me that is the starting point of my morality. 
And that is why Greenham is women only. This whole desire to control, to 
dominate, to repress, and eventually to destroy, those who are different from 
you, is a male response. It is the view that `might is right', that the person 
with the loudest voice, or the biggest bomb, has a right to impose his will on 
other cultures, other needs, other ways of looking at the world. It is no accident 
that the only women who are allowed to gain power in this very male system, 
are women, like Thatcher, who play the game in the ways that the most right- 
wing men want the game to be played. And women who approach things in a 
different way, who do not want to discuss these questions in the purely rational 
ways that men recognize, but think that to separate reason and emotion is to 
have lost touch with part of what makes human beings human, are just not 
listened to. Their views and needs simply don't get a hearing. Then the women 
lose confidence in themselves and do not recognize the validity of their own 
instinctive responses, because they have been so conditioned to being shouted 
down or ignored. For example, I see that I am the only woman you are 
interviewing. This happens again and again. If the peace camp had been 
mixed, it would have been a man who would have been listened to as a spokes- 
person, because you would have regarded his views as more important. So the 
148 
decision to make Greenham women-only is not a decision to exclude men, but 
a decision to include women, all women. In Greenham, women's views can be 
heard, and in this way what was at first ridiculed has now come to be adopted 
in other parts of the peace movement. Women's understanding of peace is not 
just an absence of weapons or war, but is something that has to be created 
positively through nonviolence, imaginative risk, commitment, and a readi- 
ness to change ones own ways of working and inter-relating. It requires much 
more courage and hard work than any war-fighting would require. War-fight- 
ing is a passive response to conflict, which simply perpetuates the whole thing. 
Peace means struggling towards a completely different way of living and look- 
ing at the world, in which the language and political categories which make 
war possible are transcended. Peace cannot be separated from justice, freedom 
and independence. There are no short cuts. We all have to take responsibility 
for making the changes and refusing to benefit from abuse of our own power. 
But the future is so precious that it is worth going to prison if that jolts one 
more person out of the lethargy of hopelessness. 
We are often told that we must be realistic and begin from where we are. I 
agree. But, in order to know what the first steps are, we need to know where 
we want to go. So let's begin by imagining what the world would have to be 
like if we are to survive, and are to be able to look forward to healthy, fulfilled 
lives for ourselves, and for our children and grandchildren. Imagine that we 
have succeeded in getting there. Then turn round, and retrace the path, step 
by step, until we reach where we are now - our starting point, this huge, 
paralysing mass of problems, which so many people feel so utterly powerless 
to change. And now we know what the first step is that we have to take, 
because there is no alternative if we are to reach the goal of survival. It is the 
step we have to take, not the easiest or the one that looks most convenient or 
most politically plausible. And it is the step that women, not only at Green- 
ham, but all over the world, are taking. 
Recommendations 
I Yes. 
2 Yes (See A2(A)(v)). 
3 Yes. 
4 Yes (See B(iii)). 
5 Yes. 
6 Yes (See B(vi)). 
7 Yes. 
8 Yes (See A2(B)). 
9 And start the whole thing off again? No. 
I0 Yes. 
I Yes (See B(iii)). 
12 Yes (See B(iv)). 
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13 Yes. 
14 Yes (See B(vi)). 
15 Yes (See B(vi)). 
16 Yes (See Ci). 
17 No (See Ci(iv)). 
i8 No. Britain should leave NATO (See C2(i)). 
19 Yes. And the American military presence should be removed entirely (See 
B(vi) & C2(ii)). 
20 See 18. 
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Biographical Note 
Born in 1931, Anthony Kenny was ordained as a Roman Catholic priest in 
1955, but returned to lay state eight years later. Between 1963 and 1978 he 
was a lecturer in Philosophy at Oxford University and since 1978 has been 
Master of Balliol College. He has also been a Visiting Professor at a number 
of American universities. 
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Among his many publications on philosophy and public affairs, particular 
mention should be made here of The Logic of Deterrence, published in 198 5 by 
the Firethorn Press. 
Editorial Comment 
These answers were communicated in an interview at Balliol College on June 
3,1986. They represent the thinking of a philosopher who, among other 
things, has for over twenty-five years been concerned, both with questions 9f 
human intention and purpose in general, and with how this bears on tI e 
morality of nuclear weapon deployment in particular. Dr Kenny does not see 
professional philosophy as an enterprise which is divorced from the practicalit- 
ies of public life, but has consistently emphasized the importance of its role 
in clarifying the concepts used by decision-makers and others when they for- 
mulate, justify, and criticize, official policy. Perhaps of particular interest here 
is the strictness of the conditions upon which he is prepared to allow that the 
continued deployment of nuclear weapons is morally justified. This can be 
found in his answers to questions (iv) and (vi) under Moral Considerations, and 
in his response to Recommendation 9. 
DR ANTHONY KENNY 
A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 1945? 
I think that nuclear deterrence has been one of the factors that have kept 
the peace, but there have been other factors, too. If you like, it has been 
overdetermined, so that these alternatives are not mutually exclusive. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
Mutual possession of an invulnerable second strike nuclear strategic force 
does, I think, make full-scale war between the great powers less likely. But it 
means that smaller powers, like Libya or Vietnam, are more difficult for the 
great powers to deal with, because they are inhibited from using their full 
military potential against them, for fear of being drawn into a nuclear confron- 
tation with one another. To this extent I think that it does invite sub-deterrent 
encroachment. 
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Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
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OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war-fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
The limited options introduced in order to enhance strategic deterrence are 
dangerous. Flexible response has, indeed, dangerously lowered the threshold 
between conventional and nuclear war. But I do not agree with the opening 
statement on the right: I don't think that, on the whole, military planners 
have been aiming for nuclear war-fighting superiority, if that means actually 
intending to plan seriously for a nuclear war. At least, ' not during the years 
when Mutual Assured Destruction was official doctrine. Although there has 
been a definite change of policy with the advint to power of those in favour 
of the recommendations of the Committee on the Present Danger. ' They do 
seem to be talking about the possibility of nuclear war-fighting. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
I would certainly agree with the right-hand side here. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
I agree with the statement implied in the first question on the right. The 
idea of `parity' is illusory, and `multilateral negotiation from strength' self- 
contradictory. As a result, although there have been perfectly genuine people 
working for arms-control, the constraints within which they have had to move, 
have meant that arms-control has never slowed down the arms race, and has 
in some cases even speeded it up. 
(vi) Has force planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
I agree with the right-hand side here - mainly as a result of having read 
Lawrence Freedman's book, `The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy'. 
i. Formed in 1976 to warn Americans of the danger of the Soviet military build-up. A number 
of Committee members subsequently joined President Reagan's administration. 
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2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable 
future? 
OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
Yes, I think that new generations of nuclear weapons do significantly increase' 
the threat of a first strike. Weapons such as Cruise or Pershing II may not 
have been intended as first strike, weapons by the West, but I am sure that 
they are seen as such by the East: 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
I agree with the implication on the right-hand side here. 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear 
exchange would it be likely to end 
hostilities swiftly? 
OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
illusion? 
Here, we really don't know, do we? I doubt that anyone would deliberately 
intend to fight a limited nuclear war, because of the enormous risk of escal- 
ation. But, if it came to it, escalation is not inevitable - both sides might draw 
back as a result of the initial shock. In their Pastoral Letter" the American 
bishops had rather a good qualified phrase on this: `To cross this divide (ie from 
the conventional to the nuclear arena) is to enter a world in which we have no 
experience of control, much testimony against its possibility and therefore no moral 
justification for submitting the human community to this risk. ' 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
Yes, I do think that new generations of battlefield and intermediate nuclear 
weapons dangerously lower the nuclear threshold. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in i? 
I think that, if SDI began to look at all plausible, if it seemed to offer an 
effective defence of centres of population against nuclear attack, as President 
Reagan still argues, then it would be extremely destabilizing. One of the 
regular defence correspondents in the American Harper's magazine has 
pointed out how extraordinary it is that nobody seems to have noticed that, if 
it worked, it would be a most effective offensive weapon. 
i. The Challenge of Peace, May 1983. 
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But, since it is unlikely to do more than provide some defence for a limited 
number of nuclear weapons, it is probably more of a red herring than a serious 
threat. A surprisingly large number of American scientists say that they do 
not believe in it, and for this reason refuse to take money for it - which is a 
most unusual thing for university faculties to do! 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
I don't really think that there is a close link between the continued build-up 
of nuclear weapons systems by the established powers, and the spread of 
nuclear weapons to potential nuclear powers. They are, I think, separate 
dangers. Of course, the fact that the major nuclear powers are continuing to 
build up their arsenals, makes it seem pretty hypocritical when they call for 
others to sign Non-Proliferation treaties, and so on. But the risk of nuclear 
war between, say, India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, or Israel and Syria, is 
influenced by local factors, which would not be much altered by even quite 
sweeping changes in superpower policies. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations 
offer the best prospect for future stability? 
OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
I do not hold out much hope for the current arms control and disarmament 
talks. The way ahead is, as implied on the right, by unilateral disarmament 
initiatives offered as part of a general process of nuclear disarmament. But it 
is not true to say that this is the `only safe policy'. No policy is safe in these 
circumstances. We are talking about relative risk, about the probability of 
various evils happening, and the size of those evils. On prudential grounds I 
subscribe to the Pascalian calculation here: we should prefer nuclear disarma- 
ment to continued nuclear deployment, because the worst case with the latter 
is so much worse than the worst case with the former. 
But it's principally for moral, rather than for prudential, reasons that I 
prefer nuclear disarmament. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
war between the great powers again incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
become a rational option and therefore affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
more likely? to initiate a third world war? 
I have to admit that global nuclear disarmament might make a major conven- 
tional war slightly more likely. 
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(ii) Would a major- conventional war be likely 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited 
nuclear war? 
OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
preferable to nuclear war? 
A major conventional war might well be as destructive as a nuclear war, which 
was limited to a restricted number of exchanges (after all, the last war was in 
a sense a limited nuclear war). But I do think that, in general, a conventional 
war, however terrible, would be preferable to a nuclear war, because of the 
risk of the latter becoming an all-out nuclear war. 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented would they not be bound, 'to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
there be no incentive to resort to 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
As I have said, there is no safe policy. There is no way that we'll ensure that 
there will never be war. It might well be that, if a major war broke out between 
the superpowers after there had been apparent nuclear disarmament, each 
side would take steps to redevelop nuclear weapons before the other. But the 
essential strategic planning on both sides would have been for conventional 
war, so I think that even in that case the risks would be lower than they would 
be if war broke out now. 
(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only 
feasible in a world where war itself is no 
longer a possibility? 
OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
hope of a rational world-order? 
The terrible risks involved in the continuing deployment of nuclear weapons 
by the great powers, means that we should certainly move in the direction of 
global nuclear disarmament as fast as we can safely do so. 
(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen 
to be prepared for war, as failure before 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under 
likely future conditions would global 
nuclear disarmament make war, including 
nuclear war, more likely? 
OR Do the years before 1914 show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? 
Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
Global nuclear disarmament might make a major cönventional war slightly 
more likely, but it would make nuclear war less likely. A continuation of 
current policies does not make nuclear war almost inevitable, although it is 
potentially very dangerous. I see the present situation as relatively stable, but 
highly vulnerable. We are not so much sliding down a slope towards a preci- 
pice, as standing near the edge of a cliff. As long as we stand where we are, 
we will be all right. But something which pushes us a little in the wrong 
direction, like an unexpected political crisis, could make us fall very fast. This 
is not a state of affairs that we would be wise to live with. 
But argument from histcrical analogy is seldom reliable. Examples can often 
be used to support opposite conclusions. The Munich crisis can be said to 
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show that it's very important to stand up to dictators, but it can also be said 
to show the danger of being obsessed by the threat from world Bolshevism. 
In any case, analogies drawn from the pre-nuclear era are quite unreliable 
when applied to the post-nuclear age, because the kind of decisions, which it 
was then rational to take, no longer are. 
B NATO Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
evenly matched? 
I do think that the Soviet Union and her allies enjoy quite a large military 
superiority. I don't think that the two sides are in this sense evenly matched. 
But, since it seems that you need a three-to-one advantage in order to be able 
to take the offensive confidently, the West is not too badly placed defensively. 
I would not myself be against a strengthening of Western conventional forces, 
if this was needed, so long as it was done in a non-provocative way. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power 
which will take advantage of unilateral 
Western concessions and is only restrained 
and forced to accept arms-control 
agreements by Western determination and 
strength? 
OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western technology and likely to respond 
positively to unconditional offers of 
Western restraint within a general context 
of detente? 
I tend to agree with the right-hand side here. I do not think that the Soviet 
Union is at the moment anxious for territorial expansion. But that is not to 
say that, if there were a rush to disarm by the West, she would not take 
advantage of it, and perhaps as a result again become more expansionist. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional 
preponderance such that NATO must 
continue to be able to threaten early use of 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
strategically suicidal? 
I am firmly on the right-hand side here. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
The idea on the left, that the balance is delicate, and that the West has to 
match every Soviet system, is quite wrong. If deterrence works at all, it is very 
crude, and depends upon uncertainty, not the kind of intricate numerical 
balancing that is characteristic of war-games. It is also true, I think, that the 
West has initiated most phases of the arms-race, and that the overkill is such 
that a freeze could be offered or cuts made without risk. 
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(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
The question of whether to persist with `forward defence' and `deep strike' 
strategies would remain, even if the nuclear components were removed. They 
are conventional, as well as nuclear, strategies. I do think that they are 
unnecessarily provocative, and my response is to agree with the implication 
on the right. I don't think that we should put too much trust in `emerging 
technology'. 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic de, lerrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
OR Is it domination by the two super powers 
that poses thergreatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super-power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
I would say `no' to what is implied on the left. The fact that, at the moment, 
American troops are essential to European security, does not reflect much 
credit on Europe. I have come round to the view of Hedley Bull, who used to 
be Head of International Relations here and died last year. In one of his last 
articles he argued that, although it was appropriate that immediately after the 
war the shattered and separated states of Western Europe should become 
clients of America, now that they are comparatively united, and, in terms of 
population and economic power, comparable to either of the two superpowers, 
they should take on responsibility for their own defence. It might be objected 
that Russia would not like two great power blocs ranged against her, but, if 
China were brought into the equation as well, we could move towards some 
rough kind of balance between the four, with no one power dominant, and no 
two in alliance with one another. In a commencement address I was giving in 
Ohio the other day, I said that this should be a prospect which might please 
the Americans, many of whom resent the way they feel that they contribute 
disproportionately to the defence of an ungrateful Europe. I think that the 
Libyan raid may prove to have been a turning-point in the relations between 
America and her Allies. Even in the middle of the Vietnam war, I do not 
remember such a divergence of views. Every European government, except 
our own, and the majority of the population in every country, including our 
own, disowned the American action. I would like to see Western Europe take 
on more of her own defence. 
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(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
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OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
I would imagine that some multilateralists are sincere, and some are not. But 
it has always struck me as remarkable, that, for some reason, everybody claims 
to be a multilateral disarmer - including even those who actually want to 
increase our armaments. Nobody admits to being an `armer'! 
. 
As for the accusations on the left, I have openly said in my book that I 
would like us to go much further than a freeze. I also explained that clearly 
to those who are organizing the `Freeze! ' campaign, when I was asked to 
be a spokesman for it. They said that this would not embarrass them at 
all. The campaign deliberately embraces unilateralists and anti-unilateralists, 
who can combine together to work for the intermediate goal of a nuclear 
weapons freeze. This happens all the time in politics. There is nothing 
insincere in collaborating with people on a particular shorter term goal, 
even though, having achieved that goal, you may then have to walk your 
separate ways. 
C British Policy 
i The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and 
independence and protects her from nuclear 
blackmail? 
OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
`deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
encourage proliferation? 
I take the right-hand alternative here. 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
I suppose that, whether we like it or not, we are a `second centre of 
decision-making'. It is possible, for example, that Mrs Thatcher left open 
the option of using nuclear weapons during the Falklands war. But I 
don't think that this has any significance, so far as the global superpower 
confrontation goes. 
As to the question, whether, following on from my answer to B(vi), a more 
independent Western Europe, responsible for its own defence, would need a 
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strategic nuclear deterrent, held on the strictly conditional terms laid out in 
my book - I'm not sure. When I wrote my book, I was thinking within a 
NATO context, and there European nuclear weapons don't serve a helpful 
purpose at all. Since the Libyan adventure, I have come to favour the idea of 
detaching Western Europe from American interests, but I haven't thought 
through the implications for nuclear weapons policy. I would like to think 
more about that. 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent British initiatives more likely 
to triggerýSoviet retaliation than US 
involvement? 
I am inclined to agree with the implication on the right. 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? 
OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
afforded at the expense of conventional 
strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
I think that the past costs of the British deterrent have been comparatively 
small. But, if we move on to Trident, this will eat more and more into the 
budget. I must say that I would prefer an overall reduction in the defence 
budget - but, if the only two alternatives were, either to remain nuclear, or to 
increase the defence budget slightly, I would favour the latter. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament have no effect on other 
countries and only serve to weaken British 
influence and allow France unchallenged 
ascendancy in Europe? 
OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
British prestige? Would British 
disarmament within the context outlined in 
B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
Too much importance is attached to prestige. I would prefer it if France, like 
other countries, gave up her nuclear weapons capabilities, but I have no fear 
of France gaining prestige at Britain's expense, if she did not. 
On the other hand, I do not attach much credence to the idea that British 
nuclear disarmament would be a `good example' to others, who would then 
want to emulate her altruism. As recent talks in Moscow suggest, a unilateral 
British disarmament gesture could on its own achieve quite a substantial Rus- 
sian reduction. But this would be the result of concrete bargaining. It is poss- 
ible that this might initiate a general process of nuclear disarmament. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to 
continue to ensure effective British strategic 
defence into the 21st century? 
OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
all the drawbacks listed above? 
The implication on the right is correct here. 
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2 NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
I agree with what is implied on the right, with the single qualification, that, 
for reasons that I have already given, I am no longer conviced that membership 
of NATO serves our interests best. So I would rephrase that as `British obli= 
gations to the defence of Europe and the West .. . ', instead of `British obli- 
gations to NATO ... ' 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain make US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affairs 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
The presence of American bases does erode British sovereignty, although 
probably less so than her membership of the European Economic Community. 
And, if a major war broke out or was in prospect, I don't think that the 
putative British `veto' would deter the American President from using those 
bases. It would be better were they withdrawn. 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
I agree with what is said on the right, although I do not think that the Soviet 
Union would lose all interest in Britain, if she were unilaterally to disarm and 
American facilities were removed. 
(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear -ftee Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
I don't want to be sheltered by anyone's nuclear weapons, American or British. 
But I certainly think that, if we tell the Americans to leave, we will have to 
depend upon ourselves much more. 
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Moral Considerations 
(i) Is it morally right to pursue the policy least OR Are there actions which are in themselves 
likely to cause human suffering? May this wrong no matter what the situation? Is the 
sometimes involve doing things which in alternative to excuse almost any act of 
other circumstances would be wrong? barbarism? 
I endorse what is implied by the questions on the right. 
(ii) In formulating policy should we weigh up 
the probability of success and the relative 
costs in terms of human suffering of 
alternative nuclear and non-nuclear 
strategies? 
OR Is the only relevant point here that a 
nuclear exchange of almost any kind 
would in itself cause unimaginable 
suffering to largely civilian populations.? 
Here again, I would agree with what is on the right, depending to some extent 
upon what goes into that `almost'. 
(iii) So far as concerns intention, need we look 
no further than the fact that our sole aim in 
deploying nuclear weapons is to prevent 
their use? 
OR Is there no such thing as a fully deployed 
weapons system which is a bluff? Is to 
deploy nuclear weapons to intend to use 
them in certain circumstances? 
I think that to deploy nuclear weapons is to be willing to use them, rather than 
to intend to use them. It implies a conditional willingness that they should be 
used. In other words, it is an option that you have not ruled out. With that 
qualification, what is written on the right is correct. 
(iv) Are there possible uses of nuclear weapons 
which are allowed by, Just War theory, for 
example the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in order to prevent worse 
suffering? Can there be a theory of Just 
Deterrence? 
OR Is a conditional intention to cause 
indiscriminate and disproportionate 
suffering of this kind, whether admonitory, 
preemptive or retaliatory, ruled out by just 
War theory? Was it wrong to bomb 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? 
So here, if we change `intention' to `willingness', I would accept the argument 
on the right. The continuing development and deployment of nuclear weapon 
systems is immoral in so far as it does involve such conditional willingness. 
(v) Is there no relevant connection between the 
development and deployment of nuclear 
weapons and world poverty and disease? 
OR Is it a scandal that such huge resources are 
devoted to the development and deployment 
of nuclear weapons and not to the 
alleviation of suffering? 
It is wrong to give the idea that nuclear weaponry is the most expensive part 
of the arms race. In some ways nuclear weapons are comparatively cheap. But, 
with that qualification, I agree with the implied statement on the right. 
(vi) Does Christian teaching allow the OR Does Christian teaching condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? deployment of nuclear weapons? 
If by `Christian teaching' we mean only what is in the Gospels, then this is 
very hard to answer, because so little is said about war, one way or the other. 
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But, if we take Just War theory to be an integral part of traditional Christian 
teaching, then I do indeed think that the use of nuclear weapons is condemned. 
So far as concerns their deployment, I would say that Christian teaching in 
the broader sense would only allow it on the terms outlined in my book. That 
is to say, temporarily, while the process of nuclear disarmament is being 
accomplished, and accompanied by a strict and explicit declaration that they 
will never be used under any circumstances, together with practical measures 
taken to ensure that this will be so. 
Recommendations 
I Yes (See B(vii)). 
2 Certainly on Anti-Satellite programmes. Not, perhaps, on all components 
of the Strategic Defence Initiative, because some are harmless and are 
likely to go ahead whether or not they are incorporated in SDI (See A2(A) 
(v)). 
3 Yes. 
4 (See B(iii)). 
S Yes. Although they do not all have to be immediate. They have to be 
seriously planned, seriously announced, and credibly put in train, so that 
the other side's intelligence knows that you really mean it. 
6I do not feel strongly either way about a European Nuclear Weapon-Free 
Zone. 
7I think that the powers who have not yet signed should do so. But I don't 
think that it makes a great deal of difference. 
8 Yes, although I think that it is optimistic to expect anything like this earlier 
than well on into the next century. I would be happy if it was down to 
what I call a `transitional deterrent' before the end of the century. 
9I accept the idea of a minimum nuclear deterrent on two conditions. First, 
that it is transitional to complete global nuclear disarmament. Second, that 
people really would have to mean that they would not use it, if the worst 
came to the worst. 
io Yes. 
ii Yes (See B(iii)). 
12 Yes (See B(iv)). 
13 Yes, but see No. 16 below. 
14 Yes. 
15 See No. 6 above. 
6 Yes, if we are talking about our continuing to be a member of the NATO 
Alliance. If we had an effective Western European alliance, then, if it was 
considered to be necessary, I would hope that Britain and France would 
hand over their nuclear capability to a European commmand (See Ci(ii)). 
17 Ideally, no. But, if the alternative was to keep nuclear weapons, yes (See 
CI(iv)). 
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18 I am coming round to thinking that Britain should not remain inside 
NATO (See C2(i)). 
t9 Yes to all of this (See C2(ii)). 
20 Britain should be prepared to leave NATO if all else failed. 
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Biographical Note 
Born in 1929, Bruce Kent served as a Second Lieutenant with the 6th Royal 
Tank Regiment between 1947 and 1949, and then took a Law degree at Oxford 
University. He was ordained in 1958, served as a curate in Kensington and 
Notting Hill, and, between 1964 and 1974, was chaplain at London Univer- 
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sity. Since then, as well as being at the Church of St John the Evangelist, 
Islington, until 1987, he has been Chairperson of War on Want 0974-6), 
and, first Chairperson, then General Secretary, of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (1977-1985). He is now Vice Chairperson of CND and Presi- 
dent of the International Peace Bureau. 
Editorial Comment 
These answers were given in an interview in Islington on March 6,1986. They 
represent the response of someone who has been actively campaigning for 
peace for over twenty years, and has become widely influential as a spokesper- 
son for CND and related organizations. The emphasis throughout is on the 
unusability of nuclear weapons, and on the consequent dangers inherent in 
defence policies based upon them. The answer to question A2(B)(iv) provides 
the wider conceptual setting for this. In addition, the central moral objection 
to nuclear weapon deployment is summed up in the answer to question (iii) 
under Moral Considerations. Of particular interest to the reader may be the 
answer to question B(vii), in which Bruce Kent explains CND's central 
approach, and corrects a popular misunderstanding of it. 
Mgr BRUCE KENT 
A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factor? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 1945? 
Neither I nor anybody else can answer the main question conclusively here, 
because you cannot change individual factors and re-run history in order to 
find out. But, by the way, I will not call what has happened since 1945 `peace': 
the superpowers have worked out their wars in other people's countries at a 
cost of something like twenty million lives. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
I believe that, if nuclear weapons are possessed by two rational groups in 
opposition to one another, then the very possession of them, together with the 
threat to use them in retaliation, will actually prevent either side from initiating 
a nuclear attack. Each will know what the consequences would be. But I do 
not think that this has any effect on what you call `sub-deterrent encroach- 
ment'. Since the nuclear option is so irrational, I think that both sides, through 
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their satellites, and even by direct conflict, can risk sub-nuclear attack on one 
another. 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
I think that the attempt to get out of the irrationality of this mutual suicide posi- 
tion has actually created its own irrationalities. By lowering the threshold, by 
producing tactical nuclear weapons and so on, the milita, ty planners, particu- 
larly in the West, have made the boundary between nuclear and non-nuclear 
war much easier to cross. Since I do not believe that it makes sense for either 
side to attack the other, I think that war, if it occurs, will come about by some 
miscalculation. And, in that situation, we will be the first to use nuclear 
weapons, because we have relied on them as if we could win. I think that the 
logical nonsense of this policy of `flexible response' is that there must be an 
assumption that you can have a limited nuclear war, that you can fire nuclear 
weapons and stop at a certain level. I can see no support for that at all, and there- 
fore I think that the whole system of `flexible response' is flawed in its very foun- 
dations. (I must say, though, that I am not sure that it's true that military 
planners have been deliberately aiming for nuclear `war-fighting superiority'. 
Some have, like Weinberger, but in general it's worst-case analysis that leads 
planners always to want a bit more, in order to be able to negotiate from strength. 
But I don't think that this could fairly be called a `war fighting' mentality. ) 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
There is no sense in having a profusion of weapons unless you happen to 
believe that limited nuclear war has got some sense. For deterrence against 
nuclear attack, all you need is a very small number of invulnerable submarines 
facing one another. You don't need anything else, because every submarine is 
capable of delivering the most appalling second-strike retaliatory punishment, 
and, if people are not deterred by losing fifty of their cities, they they'll be 
deterred by nothing. So you certainly don't need additional nuclear weapons. 
The build-up of nuclear arsenals has been very dangerous, because, together 
with improvements in technology, this has inevitably been seen as a move 
towards first use, and even first strike, policies. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradia on 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
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I think that `parity' or `balance' is the petrol of the arms race, because each 
side inevitably sees the other as ahead, and this impels both to try endlessly 
to `catch up'. It is also plain that, although arms control has had a certain 
effect - for example the Partial Test Ban Treaty or SALT II could be said to 
be agreements in arms control, it has certainly not brought about a reduction 
in arsenals. -The idea that there must be parity in numbers is part of a classic 
military approach, but is quite unnecessary if the aim is genuine nuclear deter- 
rence. 
So the idea of parity in numbers should be abandoned, and arms control 
measures should be pursued as steps on the way towards genuine disarma- 
ment, not as some kind of alternative to it. 
(vi) Has force planning been controlled by OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
strategic thinking? technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
Somebody described the situation as two giants in a cellar fighting in the dark. 
Neither side has much idea of what the other is doing, so each pursues its 
research projects in the laboratories, pressing forward with whatever new 
scheme has become a possibility for fear that the other is doing the same. For 
example, the Cruise missile again became feasible as a warhead carrier in about 
1971 or 1972, and was then developed under its own impetus, not as a response 
to Soviet SS2os. It was only when it came to deployment that the SS20 was 
used as an excuse to hang it on. Both sides do that constantly. It is the tech- 
nology that is dictating the policy rather than the other way round. 
z The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable 
future? 
OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
In any rational world a first strike remains inconceivable even for those who 
may think they have the capacity to attempt it, because they know that, if 
they did, atmospheric and other effects would cause incredible damage to 
themselves. 
But the increasing threat to stability comes from the perception of the side 
which fears that it is at a disadvantage, and that the other side is gaining a 
superiority in first-strike capability. Greater accuracy and therefore counter- 
force capability, improved submarine detection, Star Wars (cloaking yourself 
in a lead jacket so you won't be vulnerable to the other side's attack) - put all 
those things together, and, if they follow a worst-cast analysis as they have to, 
then I think that a first-strike perception is bound to develop on the other 
side. They will have to say to themselves at some stage `are we going to let them 
get into a first strike position or not? ' So it's the perception of the side that sees 
itself at a disadvantage that is, I think, the danger here. 
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(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
Well, even now studies such as those by Desmond Ball' show that command 
and control systems are much more archaic than I think people realize, and 
much more dependent upon human error. As we move forward and produce 
faster weapons with shorter flight-times, we are constantly making command, 
control and communications more difficult with less time to respond. So I 
would say that we are moving towards a position cif intolerable strain, where 
war by miscalculation does become more likely. 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
I don't know who supports the idea that a nuclear exchange could be limited 
now. And yet those who defend current policy have to argue that way. Carring- 
ton's speech in January was very interesting in this respect. He said that, as 
well as having the function of deterring an enemy from using nuclear or other 
weapons, nuclear weapons also have the operational function of bringing the 
war to an end should deterrence fail. He has acknowledged the possibility of 
the failure of deterrence as very few people do, and he thinks that nuclear 
weapons can be used intelligently in that situation. I don't. 
(iv) Do new generations-of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
This has already been answered in AI(iii). Any weapons system that has behind 
it a strategy of first use lowers the threshold. It implies what is not possible. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in i? 
Well, it must be as on the right-hand side. Deterrence rests on the vulnerability 
of the opponent. Once his vulnerability is removed, deterrence is brought to 
an end, and that is very destabilizing. So there can be no argument but that 
SDI is destabilizing. 
Beyond that, of course, it's not going to work, apart perhaps from providing 
some sort of protection for land-based missiles - which is destabilizing in a 
different way, because it suggests progress towards first strike capability. 
If the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, or defence against them, 
were genuinely the aim, then a far easier, cheaper and safer way of doing this 
would be by starting to remove them! 
I. For example, Can Nuclear War be Controlled? (International Institute for Strategic Studies 
19äD. 
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(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
If nuclear weapons are said to be essential for the defence of some countries, 
so must they be for the defence of others. It seems to me that logically prolifer- 
ation is inevitable once the process has begun. It is true that it is remarkable 
that there are still only five countries that openly acknowledge possessing 
nuclear weapons, and perhaps two more that have them, and that proliferation 
is not moving faster than that. But, if we go on as we are, it will come. And 
the proliferation that no one is thinking about is the proliferation to sub- 
national groups -I see no reason why the PLO shouldn't acquire nuclear 
weapons of some sort or other. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations 
offer the best prospect for future stability? 
OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
I repeat what I said in answer to AI(V). A search for `parity', a gentlemen's 
agreement to keep present high levels of nuclear weapons in a certain pattern, 
is not what I mean by `arms control'. I see arms control as part of the process 
of nuclear disarmament. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would 
war between the great powers again 
become a rational option and therefore 
more likely? 
OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
to initiate a third world war? 
Well, I don't think that even with conventional weapons only, war between 
the great powers is a rational option, because the level of destructive power is 
so vast that both sides would suffer enormously. But I would agree that we 
can't just be leaving the world as it is, and simply remove the nuclear weapons 
from it. We have got at the same time to do a number of other things which 
will help to build confidence, interlock countries economically, and so on. 
But, even if present levels of distrust and hostility remain, I don't think that, 
with nuclear weapons out of the way, there would be an incentive to war. 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited 
nuclear war? 
OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
preferable to nuclear war? 
The assumption on the left-hand side is that there can be such a thing as a 
limited nuclear war, which, as I have said, I do not believe. But would a major 
conventional war be as terrible as, say, the accidental release of a flight of 
Cruise missiles? I don't know. I don't think that you can balance it. I don't 
think that there is any way in which you can answer that question. 
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(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented would they not be bound to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
there be no incentive to resort to 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
This takes me into a strange world, because it assumes that hostilities continue 
in the absence of nuclear weapons, and that is not what we are working for. 
But I suppose it's true that you cannot `uninvent' anything - things like the 
rack could be reintroduced, for example. If a third world war of a conventional 
sort started, I* am sure that both sides would think of manufacturing nuclear 
weapons. But, if each side realized that the other had the capability as well, 
then they would, as it were, cancel each other out. 
But the main point is that you cannot altogether remove risk from the world. 
At the moment the biggest possible risk is incurred by doing nothing about 
ongoing technology, and letting the present situation continue. A policy of 
proper nuclear disarmament would involve real, but much smaller, risks. If 
the house is on fire, whatever way you escape, you'll face risks. 
(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only 
feasible in a world where war itself is no 
longer a possibility? 
OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
hope of a rational world-order? 
To abandon even a programme of multilateral nuclear disarmament is to give up 
hope of the future, which I think a lot of people are doing. Now we see people like 
Michael Heseltine suggesting that nuclear weapons in their country are going to 
be around as long as anyone else has got nuclear weapons. And I think that is 
giving up hope of multilateral disarmament. It's a great pessimism. The assump- 
tion is that we have always got to do the worst in life. Human beings have always 
got to behave in the most dreadful way. I don't think that's actually true in his- 
tory. People do behave in other ways, and, once the general understanding has 
been reached that nuclear weapons cannot produce any intelligent military 
results, then we have a different sort of motivation for giving them up. We are 
not talking about giving up rifles or anything that would traditionally be called 
`weapons'. We have got something for which there isn't a word. That's why 
Oliver Postage= used the word `geddon' for them (from `Armageddon')-he says 
we shouldn't use the word `weapon' at all. Vocabularies preserve ways of think- 
ing. Once you use `weapon' you've lost the argument. Even Reagan has now 
acknowledged in his `Star Wars' speeches that indefinite reliance on nuclear 
`weapons' is irrational and a policy of despair. 
(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen to 
be prepared for war, as failure before 1939 
and success since 1945 show? Under likely 
future conditions would global nuclear 
disarmament make war, including nuclear 
war, more likely? 
OR Do the years before 1914 show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? Is 
global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
j. The Writing in the Sky' Trenard Press, 1983. 
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The assumption on the left-hand side is that there is a rational person who wants 
war, and, in the absence of nuclear weapons, would not be deterred from having 
a war. I don't think that's the situation. No rational person could want war, but, 
because of our current policies and our technology, we are moving towards war. 
So I think that we are in much more of a 1914 than a 1939 situation. 
But I do think that there is a great deal of quite disgraceful propaganda about 
that run up to the 1939 war, that is widely believed. Our predecessors in the 
peace movements were actually supporting the League of Nations vigorously, 
whilst a number of Establishment figures were opposing the League and appeas- 
ing Hitler. 
B NATO Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically evenly matched? 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
I'm not an expert, I just read the books. It's very difficult to know what you 
count and what weight you give to what you count. I would suggest that, if you 
put all the relevant factors into the soup bowl- such as, for example, the political 
unreliability of Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which is a major 
issue, then the situation is that the two sides are probably evenly matched. But 
it's not the kind of question that can be easily answered. You can say that they 
have got more of one thing-tanks, for instance-and we have got more of another 
- say, anti-tank weapons. But it is not an equation that on its own makes much 
sense, because, even if they do have more of this, that, or the other, it does not 
follow that they have got a dangerous superiority. Strategically significant super- 
iority means that there would be hope of something called `victory'. And there 
would not be. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power 
which will take advantage of unilateral 
Western concessions and is only restrained 
and forced to accept arms-control 
agreements by Western determination and 
strength? 
OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western technology and likely to respond 
positively to unconditional offers of Western 
restraint within a general context of detente? 
My inclination is to choose the right-hand side of the page. That's not to say that 
the Soviet Union cannot behave disgracefully, which it clearly can, as can be 
seen in Afghanistan, or in the appalling purges of its own people. But to me the 
overall picture is clearly one of an encircled power, which has from the beginning 
been deeply conscious of the Western aim to `strangle the baby of Bolshevism' in 
its cradle. If the Soviet Union is an expansionist power, then it is doing extremely 
badly. It has been thrown out of far more countries than it has occupied. With 
the single exception of Afghanistan it has maintained its Yalta boundaries. 
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(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional 
preponderance such that NATO must 
continue to be able to threaten early use of 
nuclear weapons? 
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OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
strategically suicidal? 
I don't believe that any of the Institutes of Strategic Studies, or their equivalents, 
would claim that there was an overwhelming conventional preponderance of 
this kind. But, even if this were true, the early use of nuclear weapons is no 
cöunter to the threat, because it rests on the false assumption that there can be a 
limited nuclear war. It always comes back to that. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and 
strategic balance? Would Western failure to 
match Soviet systems be destabilizing? 
OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional cuts 
without risk? 
Well, indeed, both sides could offer unconditional cuts without risk. When 
you consider the number of nuclear weapons that there are - 5o, ooo or so 
- you can see that there is no `delicate balance' at all. The numbers game 
just does not make sense. Both sides could make independent major cuts 
now. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep 
strike' strategies essential for effective 
deterrence? 
OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
`emerging technology' to explore less 
provocative alternative strategies? 
If deep strike and forward defence strategies include a nuclear component, as 
they do, then I can only repeat what I said about the idea of limited nuclear 
war. If we're talking about conventional weapons only, then I would have 
thought that it would be much better to get away from the provocative nature 
of deep strike strategies, and concentrate on holding your own territory, not 
striking at other peoples'. 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
OR Is it domination by the two super-powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super-power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
If you want Europe to be `coupled' in this way, you don't need European- 
based nuclear weapons to do it. The Americans have got something like 
300,000 troops and dependants in Western Europe, and, if that doesn't couple 
them, nothing will. 
But I do not think that the threat is that one side will attack the other - 
what could either gain from direct assault on the other? The reality of the 
situation is that it is the superpowers who present the greatest possible danger 
to Europe, because their confrontation feeds and increases the technology of 
174. 
nuclear weaponry. I want a nuclear-free zone in Europe. I want American 
troops out of Western Europe and Russian troops out of Eastern Europe. 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
The right-hand side is my position. It is what CND is urging - unilateral 
disarmament initiatives by both sides as part of a general process of nuclear 
disarmament. We are not advocating immediate Western unilateral disarma- 
ment. You may ask why, if nuclear weapons are illegal, immoral, and suicidal, 
we are not advocating this. The answer is that for political reasons we have to 
compromise. In order to make some political gains, you have to accept the 
reality that you are not going to achieve these things straight away. In fact, it 
does not follow that, if one country has nuclear weapons and another does 
not, then the latter is likely to be open to nuclear blackmail - for example, the 
Americans did not try it in Vietnam. There is an inherent madness in threaten- 
ing to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power - although the popular 
psyche wouldn't accept this. But CND does not urge immediate and complete 
Western or Eastern nuclear disarmament. It urges unilateral initiatives where 
necessary, without which there is no hope of making any progress at all. The 
level of weaponry is such that we can all offer these initiatives without being 
unreasonable or putting stability at risk. 
Opponents of CND deliberately foster the idea that we are in favour of 
immediate and complete unilateral Western disarmament - for example, 
Carrington and Howe have said as much in major speeches within the last 12 
months. It is a fundamental point for CND to get across that this is quite 
untrue. 
C British Policy 
i The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and 
independence and protects her from nuclear 
blackmail? 
OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
`deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
encourage proliferation? 
I can think of no possible use that would not be suicidal. The single thing to 
be said in favour of British independent nuclear weapons is that they might 
deter the use of nuclear weapons by somebody else. That's all. They do not 
even deter an enemy from invading this country with conventional forces. 
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There are also all sorts of other disadvantages with them, such as that they 
make disarmament negotiations more difficult. 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
I don't think that we have heard from our European allies what they think of 
an independent British nuclear weapon. They seem just to leave us alone to 
do our own thing. If it meant that we had to cut down on our conventional 
contribution, that might be another issue - but at the moment we're also 
spending quite heavily on that, too. 
But there's certainly no `second centre of decision making' unless there is a 
prospect of doing what the capability is meant to suggest. Since that is not the 
case, there is no second centre. 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent British initiatives more likely 
to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
involvement? 
Again, there is little evidence of serious American opinion about British inde- 
pendent nuclear weapons. As far as I can see, there is just a reluctant acquiesc- 
ence that Britain wants to have them. 
I don't see a link between an independent British nuclear force and Amer- 
ican commitment to Europe, since I can find no function for an independent 
nuclear force. The Americans are here, and are substantially linked to Europe 
anyway. I think that it is just a nuisance in terms of disarmament negotiations. 
It's a joker in the pack. I don't think that it guarantees anything. 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? 
OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
afforded at the expense of conventional 
strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
It is certainly, as on the right-hand side, at the cost of more important priorit- 
ies. The questions are slanted in the direction of assuming that security is only 
purchased by spending money on weapons, be they nuclear or non-nuclear, 
and I think that this is only a small part of the real security picture. But, on 
the left-hand side, the very word `alternative' is one that I do not accept, 
because you cannot have an alternative to something that is not there. Money 
spent on Britain's independent nuclear weapons is money down the drain - 
it's not defence at all. 
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(v) Would unilateral British nuclear OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
disarmament have no effect on other proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
countries and only serve to weaken British British prestige? Would British 
influence and allow France unchallenged disarmament within the context outlined in. 
ascendancy in Europe? B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
At least British nuclear disarmament initiatives can't make proliferation more, 
likely, and can only encourage those in other countries who are anxious to 
take similar steps themselves. I agree that we must not make too much of this, 
but example can help, as we have seen in New Zealand. 
In any case, I don't think that genuine influence depends upon weapons. 
Some countries of very small size have more influence than we have here - the 
Five Continents Peace Proposal" is very important and has come from mili- 
tarily small countries. Conversely, France may want to be the biggest arms- 
trader and nuclear dump in Europe. Fine. But that does not give her significant 
influence. There is nothing that France can do with all these things. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
continue to ensure effective British strategic all the drawbacks listed above? 
defence into the 21st century? 
I deny the assumption behind the left-hand side. I think that Trident is not 
just a continuance of existing `deterrent' forces, but has first-strike potential;. 
violates the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and so on. There are many arguments, 
against Trident, and, even for those like David Owen who want an indepen- 
dent nuclear weapon, it is not a good idea. 
2 NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear met by strengthening conventional forces 
systems upon which her security depends? where necessary within an overall non- 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
alliance? 
Since all NATO nuclear systems in Europe are first use systems, deployed 
according to military strategy, which, as we have seen, would be suicidal I 
think that we should not continue to man such systems. This will no doubt ; be seen as a betrayal of NATO by the Carvers. of this world, in a way that the ., 
abandonment of our independent deterrent will not. But it is not treachery to 
the Alliance to object to policies that threaten to destroy it. While we are in 
NATO and are genuinely concerned about security, let us talk cooperatively -; 
about meeting whatever the threat is that we are supposed to be meeting. But 
not with nuclear weapons of first use. 
I. An initiative launched in May 1984 by the Presidents of Argentina and Mexico, the Prime 
Ministers of Greece, India and Sweden and the First President of Tanzania. 
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(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain male US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affair 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
American interference in British affairs is not negligible. There is legal inter- 
ference, polilitical interference, and so on. Our sovereignty is certainly being 
reduced. Southern Ireland has got more sovereignty in these matters than we 
have. 
And, since many of the bases are first use bases, I don't think that they 
contribute to the defence of the West. When they were set up, they were for 
planes like the B-29 which did not have the range to reach the USSR from the 
US, but now, with Trident submarines and so on, the original justification no 
longer exists. 
(W) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
So long as Britain remains in a nuclear alliance, we are going to be targeted. 
Since the accuracy of these weapons is so uncertain, even Sweden and Switzer- 
land may be struck by nuclear warheads in a confrontation. Nobody is going 
to be safe. But I think that the removal of first use bases will make preemption 
much less likely, and will be a step in the right direction. 
(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
The problems with the wording on both sides here is that the word `umbrella' 
has been used. Once you use the word, you have won the argument. If, 
instead, you were to say `Shall we shelter under the American lightning conduc- 
tor?, then the whole argument changes. American nuclear weapons endanger 
us rather than give us security. 
In going non-nuclear ourselves we would be recognizing that politically we 
can't get the superpowers to get rid of all their weapons immediately, and so 
we are doing what we can to take steps in that direction. But we are not saying 
that we want the Americans to remain nuclear indefinitely. 
1 
179 
Moral Considerations 
(i) Is it morally right to pursue the policy least OR Are there actions which are in themselves 
likely to cause human suffering? May this wrong no matter what the situation? Is the 
sometimes involve doing things which in alternative to excuse almost any act of 
other circumstances would be wrong? barbarism? 
I am obviously a `right-hand side' person. There are some acts that are so 
abominable that no prudential arguments advanced in their favour can justify 
them. But, in addition to that, all such prudential reasons depend upon sup- 
posing things which have not, or have not yet, happened - for example: `If 
you do or don't do this, then that will or will not happen'. I don't think that 
this kind of speculation ever justifies the massacring of hundreds of tl.:, 'ousands 
of people. 
(ii) In formulating policy should we weigh up 
the probability of success and the relative 
costs in terms of human suffering of 
alternative nuclear and non-nuclear 
strategies? 
OR Is the only relevant point here that a 
nuclear exchange of almost any kind 
would in itself cause unimaginable 
suffering to largely civilian populations? 
I have already answered this. 
(iii) So far as concerns intention, need we look 
no further than the fact that our sole aim in 
deploying nuclear weapons is to prevent 
their use? 
OR Is there no such thing as a fully deployed 
weapons system which is a bluff? Is to 
deploy nuclear weapons to intend to use 
them in certain circumstances? 
The right-hand side is correct. There is such an obvious gap in the argument 
on the left. What are the means being employed? It's as if a burglar said `My 
sole aim is to feed my family' - but what is he proposing to do in order to feed 
his family? He is preparing to rob the bank. In the case of nuclear deterrence, 
it may be your pious intention, as you formulate the terrible intention to do 
these things in certain circumstances in your mind, to hope that it will not 
come to this. But the fact remains that you have already constructed a grossly 
immoral capability, over those implementation you have no control. Outside 
circumstances may require you to do it one day, and you have already acqui- 
esced in this. That is the key argument about the morality of deterrence. 
(iv) Are there possible uses of nuclear weapons 
which are allowed by Just War theory, for 
example the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in order to prevent worse 
suffering? Can there be a theory of Just 
Deterrence? 
OR Is a conditional intention to cause 
indiscriminate and disproportionate 
suffering of this kind, whether admonitory, 
preemptive or retaliatory, ruled out by just 
War theory? Was it wrong to bomb 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 
As far as the left-hand side goes, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was 
quite unjustified and wrong. Actually, if people wanted to make things diffi- 
cult for me, they would use a different example - say, the elimination of an 
enemy nuclear submarine base with a low-yield Pershing II warhead. Here we 
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have a discriminate weapon aimed at a military target. What is wrong with 
that? I think that there is something wrong with it, because all nuclear 
weapons, I'm told, produce radio-active material that is likely to go on damag- 
ing people for generations to come, so that, even in highly limited use like 
that, it is still an indiscriminate weapon. But this is playing around with the 
thing. There can be no Just War theory that justifies the use of nuclear 
weapons, so there can be no Just Deterrent theory, either. 
(v) Is there no relevant connection between the OR Is it a scandal that such huge resources are 
development and deployment of nuclear devoted to the development and deployment 
weapons and world poverty and disease? of nuclear weapons and not to the 
alleviation of suffering? 
There is obviously a connection here, although, of course, it's not just nuclear 
weapons that are at fault, but all armaments in general. 
It would undoubtedly be of far greater benefit to mankind if the resources 
now being squandered on the development, manufacture and deployment of 
nuclear weapons were instead to be channelled into a concerted assault on the 
causes of world poverty and disease. 
vi) Does Christian teaching allow the OR Does Christian teaching condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? deployment of nuclear weapons? 
Christian teaching undoubtedly condemns the use of nuclear weapons. It 
therefore also condemns the conditional intention to use them, which is insep- 
arable from their deployment. 
Papal and other pronouncements make it clear that we must move vigor- 
ously towards the goal of nuclear disarmament, and that the continuing 
deployment of existing weapons is only tolerated temporarily, and under strict 
conditions, while that process is being swiftly accomplished. 
Recommendations 
I Yes. 
2 Yes (See A2(A)(v)). 
3 Yes. And the West should undoubtedly have stopped testing at once and 
unconditionally in response to the Soviet testing moratorium. 
4 Yes (See B(iii)). 
5 Yes (See AI(iv)). 
6 Yes (See B(vi)). 
7 Yes (See A2(A)(vi)). 
8 Yes (See A2(B)). 
9 Yes. But not because either superpower is entitled to these `weapons', but 
because, given the political realities of the world, there is no way that either 
side is going to get rid of theirs while the other still has some. To call, 
therefore, for what would amount to unilateral superpower nuclear dis- 
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armament is to my mind counter-productive, since it will stop people 
taking the steps which they could take here and now. 
10 Yes. 
II Yes (See B(iii)). 
12 Yes (See B(iv)). 
13 Yes (See CI(v)). 
14 Yes (See B(vi)). 
15 Yes (See B(vi)). 
16 Yes (See CI). 
17 No (See CI(iv)). 
18 Yes. But once again, as with No. 9, only because of the realities of the 
situation. We are going to stay in NATO, so let us by all means press for 
a non-nuclear strategy. Getting rid of American nuclear bases is going to 
be hard enough (See C2(i)). 
19 Yes (See C2(i) & C2(ii)). 
20 No. 
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Biographical Note 
Major-General Yuri Lebedev is Deputy Departmental Chief of the General 
Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Born in 1925, he has been in military 
service since 1944, having graduated from military college and military-engin- 
eering academy. He subsequently served both in the field and in the central 
apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Defence. He is a specialist in the sphere 
of strategic arms, and took part in Soviet-American talks on the limitation and 
reduction of nuclear weapons. 
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Editorial Comment 
This essay, entitled The Arms Race and International Security, has been written 
especially for this book, and translated by Natalia Mazitova. It represents the 
response of an experienced Soviet commentator to the questions sent. In order 
to help the reader to compare Major-General Lebedev's analysis with that of 
other contributors, the editor has taken the liberty of adding the appropriate 
sub-headings and lettering necessary to coordinate it with the questions under 
Global Policy in Section A. 
Major-General Lebedev sees the nuclear arms race as having been created 
and sustained by the United States, as part of a bid for global dominance. The 
US nuclear arsenal is intended, either for direct use in a disarming first strike, 
or, by threatening it, as an instrument of nuclear blackmail during times of 
political crisis. The deterrent role of nuclear weapons is discounted by the 
author, and the stress throughout is on the increasing instability and danger 
which inevitably results from the continued US drive for permanent military 
superiority, and the Soviet refusal to permit it. Military solutions can no longer 
be found for problems which are largely political. Major-General Lebedev's 
central proposal is that this should now be recognized by both sides, so that 
political solutions can be found for political problems, and swift progress can 
be made towards the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. 
MAJOR-GENERAL YURI LEBEDEV 
Mankind is entering the threshold of the twenty-first century with both con- 
cerns and hopes. The continued race for weapons, nuclear weapons above all, 
may lead to the incineration of our civilization in the nuclear flames. 
A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
Having acquired nuclear weapons at the close of World War II, the United 
States military and political leaders thought that they could be used as the 
decisive instrument of foreign policy. This view appeared to dominate United 
States political philosophy and military strategy in the postwar history. The 
Americans initiated and continue to initiate every advance in the arms race. 
The development of nuclear weapons in the United States was followed by 
the production of thousands of nuclear warheads with which ever more sophis- 
ticated ground-, sea-, and air-based delivery vehicles were equipped for 
decades. Sophistication and build-up of other types of weapons - both mass 
destruction and conventional - were carried out in parallel without any inter- 
ruption. 
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Let's analyse in retrospect the arms race unleashed by the Americans in the 
postwar period. 
Stage One: Massive production of nuclear warheads and their delivery 
vehicles 
The US had a nuclear monopoly from 1945 to 1949. By 1949 (when the 
Soviet Union staged its first nuclear test) the United States already had from 
100 to 20o atomic bombs, and their carriers - B-29 bombers. 
By 1957 - the time of United States rapid nuclear arms build-up - it had 
produced more than 2,000 nuclear bombs as compared with several hundred 
which the Soviet Union had. 
At the same time the United States was steppink; up the build-up of delivery 
vehicles - thousands of B-29, B-36, B-47, and B-52 bombers. 
Stage Two: The race for nuclear missiles 
In the period 1957-1962, America enhanced her nuclear arsenals from 2,000 
to 4,000 nuclear warheads, and gave a powerful impetus to the development 
of fundamentally new delivery vehicles - intercontinental ballistic missiles of 
all basing modes. American scientists admit that as a result of this massive 
effort, United States supremacy in the nuclear field continued to be over- 
whelming in the early 196os. The ratio between Soviet and American strategic 
weapons by 1963 was as follows: 
Delivery vehicles US USSR 
ICBM launchers 229 44 
SLBM launchers 144 97 
Ballistic missile Launchers 105 (2o-4o) 
of medium and 
intermediate range 
Strategic bombers 1,300 155 
So the American fostered myth about the `Soviet missile threat' had no 
grounds whatsoever. Yet, it was used to impart an even more powerful impetus 
to the arms race in the US - hundreds of ICBMs and SLBMs were developed 
and deployed, and their sophistication continued. 
Each time the Soviet Union had to react to the American escalation. 
Importantly, the countermeasures taken by the Soviet Union were not 
aimed at gaining military superiority, but were strictly determined by the need 
to offset the threat. 
Rough strategic parity was established in the early 1970s. But it did not suit 
Washington which resolutely pushed the arms race into a new channel by 
deciding to equip its missiles with MIRVs. 
By the time Richard Nixon came to the White House, the United States 
had already carried out the programme for the deployment of offensive stra- 
tegic arms, and tested MIRVed Minutemen-3 and Poseidons in 1968. From 
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1970, the United States began to MIRV its strategic missiles on a massive 
scale. 
Stage Three: MIRVing of missiles 
In 1970, the first ten MIRVed missiles were deployed in American ICBM 
silos. Somewhat later, Poseidon Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles 
(SLBMs) were test-launched from a submerged submarine. Several months 
later, in the spring of 1971, the first atomic missile submarine, with new 
missiles, was placed on combat duty. The United States had launched a new 
round of the nuclear arms race, once again trying to gain military superiority 
over the Soviet Union. 
In the estimate of American experts, the United States had thereby more 
than doubled its nuclear warhead total from 4,000 units in 1970 to 8,500 in 
1977. 
But even this did not seem enough to Washington. In the late 1970s the 
Americans continued to escalate the nuclear arms race. They modernized the 
Minuteman-2 and Minuteman-3 ICBMs, stepped up the development of anti- 
satellite (ASAT) weapons, and began to prepare for the re-equipment of twin 
atomic missile submarines with Trident-i SLBMs. On June 30,1977 the 
American Administration adopted a decision to deploy air-launched Cruise 
missiles. This new hard-to-control and dangerous type of weapon created 
serious difficulties for the conclusion of the SALT-2 Treaty. 
And, finally, in the autumn of 1981 . the new 
American President, Ronald 
Reagan, announced a programme of `America's strategic rearmament' aimed at 
placing the arms race on an entirely new foundation. 
In this context it would be logical to ask: what effect did the Washington- 
launched nuclear arms race produce on United States security? 
In brief it was as follows. As a result of the nuclear arms race which went 
on for decades, United States security was seriously jeopardized rather than 
strengthened. Indeed, American territory is no longer immune to enemy mili- 
tary operations as it was at the dawn of the nuclear age. 
As a result of the nuclear arms race, the world has accumulated tens of 
thousands of nuclear warheads which can destroy all life on the planet. Wash- 
ington has itself become hostage to nuclear weapons and its myopic postwar 
policy. Weapons themselves have become a politically senseless and militarily 
reckless instrument of foreign policy. 
And, finally, the accumulation of huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and 
their delivery vehicles has created such a dangerous factor for international 
security as a risk of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The price of techni- 
cal error, or even the slightest inaccuracy in dealing with nuclear weapons has 
grown immeasurably. This has multiplied the threat to the security of the US 
and the rest of the world. 
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Stage Four: Giving a new dimension to the arms race 
The current, fourth stage of the arms race which the US began in the late 
1970s-early 198os covers not only nuclear weapons, but all other types and 
systems of weapons and material, all forms of military activities. The race for 
offensive weapons - noth nuclear and space-strike weapons - is becoming 
especially dangerous. 
Sometimes it is claimed that in the last decades the threat of mutual assured 
destruction was a factor which prevented an all-out war.. Nothing is more 
dangerous than this illusion. It is not owing to, but despite, nuclear weapons 
that mankind has avoided a thermonuclear disaster so far. 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The appearance of new types and systems of weapons and means of their 
control is bound to make the strategic situation even more precarious. An 
analysis of the peculiarities and potential consequences of the current stage of 
the arms race bears this out. 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
future? 
To begin with, the United States is rapidly building a new strategic potential in 
addition to the existing one. It is planning to deploy new MX and Midgetman 
ICBMs, two new types of strategic bombers - the B-IB and Stealth ATB, an 
entirely new Trident system, and new-generation Cruise missiles of all basing 
modes with enhanced range, accuracy and speed. As a result of this massive 
development, Washington intends to have sited several thousand delivery 
vehicles and about 20, ooo nuclear warheads by the early 199os. 
It should be stressed that all these nuclear weapons systems are much more 
effective than the existing ones and are designed for use in a first, `disarming' 
strike against the Soviet Union and its allies. The military-strategic conse- 
quences of the United States effort to build such a potential may be extremely 
dangerous - it may upset the world's strategic stability and eventually trigger 
off a nuclear conflict. In other words, implementation of the American- 
planned programmes may precipitate a nuclear conflict which is bound to kill 
not only human civilization, but all life on earth. Now let's analyse the situation 
in more detail. 
To begin with, trying to build a first-strike potential, Washington may 
develope an illusion that it will be in a position to use it. But this will be only 
an illusion, because the Soviet Union will never allow it to gain this potential 
for obvious reasons. 
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(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
Secondly, a fundamentally new military-strategic situation is being created. 
The time for political decision-making is being reduced to the minimum, and 
weapons are being increasingly controlled by computers and other systems. 
At the same time, as the experience of the last few years has shown, even the 
most perfect technology is not guaranteed against mishaps which may spell 
disaster for all mankind. 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
Thirdly, the United States has carried beyond any reasonable limits the sophis- 
tication of combat control, communication and intelligence systems. In effect, 
it wants to create an effective mechanism for controlling nuclear warfare. 
Nothing is more dangerous than such calculations which encourage the 
development of adventurist plans for waging `controlled', `limited', `sustained' 
and other nuclear wars. Under these plans a nuclear conflict can be `controlled' 
and even `won' if the corresponding weapons and combat control systems are 
developed. But nuclear war does not recognize any plans, scenarios and the 
like. Its consequences cannot be predicted, even with the latest computers. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
deterrence? nuclear threshold? 
Fourthly, deployment of first-strike weapons near Soviet borders (Pershing Its 
and Cruise missiles have already been sited in Western Europe) inevitably 
enhances the risk of nuclear war, because missile travel time to targets is 
drastically reduced, as well as the time for decision-making on retaliation. 
Needless to say, in this case the USSR will increasingly mistrust the intentions 
of the United States ruling circles. 
Apparently, the importance of this factor in the future will be growing, if 
the nuclear arms race is not curbed, and, all the more so, if the Americans 
deploy Trident II SLBMs capable of dealing high-accuracy strikes from a 
much closer range than the existing ICBMs. Understandably, such develop- 
ments are extremely dangerous for international security because they can act 
as a catalyst of nuclear conflict, including an unsanctioned one. 
The US-planned deployment of new types of strategic bombers and Cruise 
missiles inevitably leads to the lowering of the nuclear threshold, and can 
directly provoke it. Indeed, what is the Soviet Union supposed to do if it 
detects the launching of Cruise missiles or bombers which can carry both 
nuclear and conventional weapons? 
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Development of such weapons systems is a very destabilizing factor directly 
threatening international security, all the more so since the United States 
bluntly says that these systems are dual-purpose. The Americans want to turn 
these systems into an- instrument of nuclear blackmail, using them whenever 
the world tensions are escalated to a very dangerous level. 
Even a cursory glance at the prospects of the world with nuclear weapons 
makes it clear that the continuation of the nuclear arms race will lead in the 
near future to the elimination of a number of deterrence factors, and nuclear 
weapons will turn from deterrents into weapons of aggression. In this situation 
even military-strategic parity will not be a guarantee against nuclear war. 
The military-strategic situation in the world may become even worse under 
the influence of other factors which are not directly related to the nuclear arms 
race and the future of strategic East-West relations. The influence of these 
factors is so great that it is simply pointless to speak about the prospects of 
military-strategic relations without considering them. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in i? 
One of the most dangerous factors for international security is the United 
States programme for the development of space strike weapons in . the SDI 
framework. Deployment of these weapons, and even their development are 
the most dangerous catalysts of a potential nuclear conflict. This is so because 
the latest strategic weapons developed under SDI exactly meet the American 
requirements for first-strike weapons - an ability to deal strikes at a wide 
range of strategically important targets almost instantly. It is clear that their 
development, not to mention deployment, has nothing to do with mutual 
deterrence. It is also obvious that their deployment will rapidly escalate the 
race for nuclear and other weapons in a whole number of directions. The 
Soviet Union can clearly perceive the dangerous potential consequences of 
space strike weapons. This is exactly why it favours an overall ban on their 
development and deployment. 
The American President's brainchild has one more dangerous trait. If space 
strike weapons are used, the other side will have practically no time left for 
retaliation. But, as the Soviet Union has repeatedly stated, it will not allow 
the United States to build military superiority over it and will be compelled 
to take effective countermeasures even under the pressure of time limitations. 
As a result of these developments, strategic stability, about which the West is 
talking today with such enthusiasm, will be reduced to strategic chaos in which 
cause-and-effect relations will be extremely confused, and in which it will be 
highly difficult to make reasonable political decisions. 
Deployment of a large number of satellites, combat and auxiliary stations, 
communication means, and potential Anti-Satellite (ASAT) systems may lead 
to serious complications because the breakdown of a militarily important satel- 
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lite may be interpreted as an attack. In many cases, it is very difficult to tell 
whether a satellite simply went out of action or was deliberately destroyed. 
Deployment of a large-scale Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) system with space- 
based elements also spells a whole number of negative consequences. To begin 
with, unilateral deployment of these systems leads to a sharp destabilization 
of the entire military-strategic situation. The side which deploys it will have 
a potential capability of launching a `disarming' nuclear strike in the hope that 
anti-missile weapons will intercept what remains of the other side's retaliatory 
potential. But the other side is not likely to sit idly by and watch the deploy- 
ment of an ABM system. It is bound to take countermeasures which may 
further aggravate the military-strategic situation. 
But even if both states deploy their ABM systems in parallel, strategic 
stability won't be enhanced because even a small lead in the deployment of 
such a system implies a marked destabilization of the global strategic situation. 
Meanwhile, one side will inevitably gain the lead because the development of 
ABM systems cannot be an even process. 
SDI implementation will exacerbate the global military-strategic situation 
also because the very opportunity of limiting the arms race will be called into 
question. And this is perfectly obvious since, for a number of years, the Soviet 
Union and the USA were trying to reach agreement on limiting offensive 
strategic weapons but to no avail, although the problem of nuclear balance 
was not yet complicated by the `space factor'. 
Another set of negative military-strategic consequences stemming from SDI 
implementation is linked with a sharp acceleration of the arms race, which 
may eventually go out of control. SDI implies not only a large-scale ABM 
system, but also a new round in the arms race. So its implementation will spell 
a broad range of hard-to-predict consequences of this race in both technologi- 
cal and military-strategic aspects. 
It is obvious that SDI implementation will give a powerful impetus to the 
use of the latest advances in science and technology for military purposes. The 
United States Administration does not conceal that this is its aim. Weapons 
based on fundamentally new technologies, both nuclear and conventional, will 
be many times superior to the existing armaments. In these conditions it will 
be even more difficult to preserve military-strategic parity, mistrust between 
states will grow, and military-strategic stability will increasingly depend on 
how quickly this, that, or the other state will manage to use the latest scientific 
and technical gains for military purposes. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
Military competition is growing more expensive all the time, arms spending 
is skyrocketing, and the priceless resources, which are rather limited, are 
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being increasingly squandered on the arms race. This process will trigger off 
serious economic, commercial and financial difficulties which are bound to 
exert a negative effect on the political and military-strategic situation in the 
world. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
offer the best prospect for future stability? attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
To sum up, SDI implementation will seriously prejudice international secur- 
ity, and sharply destabilize the political and military-strategic situation in the 
world. On the other hand, renunciation of the Star Wars programme will not 
aggravate the existing security problems in any way, but will create favourable 
conditions for arms limitation and disarmament. A graphic example is offered 
by Reykjavik. Its results were actually torpedoed by Washington's reluctance 
to abandon its plans for space militarization, making it clear that the present 
Administration does not want to curb the arms race and rid the world of 
nuclear weapons. 
The arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, has entered a fundamentally 
new stage of its escalation. If it is not curbed today, tomorrow may be too late. 
Military confrontation will grow markedly, strategic stability will be done 
away with, and the very possibility of ensuring international security will be 
called into question. Military and technical processes will create a situation in 
which nuclear weapons will no longer be able to act as deterrents. They will 
be turned into weapons of suicide. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Investing in the arms race, and staking the future on military-technical 
supremacy, are becoming not only absurd but suicidal. The Soviet leaders 
realize the danger full well. This is why they insist that military-technical 
methods of ensuring security should be renounced. These methods have been 
discredited once and for all. They may cost the world's nations not only their 
security, but even life itself. 
The Soviet Union suggests settling the problem of security politically, above 
all, by reaching equitable and mutually acceptable agreements which would 
curb the nuclear arms race and lead to the complete destruction of nuclear 
arsenals. 
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Biographical Note 
Born in i 916, Robert McNamara was Assistant Professor in Business Admin- 
istration at Harvard between 1940 and 1943, served in the US army and air- 
force between 1943 and 1946, and was, first an executive, then President of 
the Ford Motor Company between 1946 and 1961. From 1961 to 1968 he was 
US Secretary of Defense. He moved on to become President of the World 
Bank between 1968 and 1981. 
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In The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Lawrence Freedman writes: 
No single public figure has influenced the way we think about nuclear weapons quite as much as 
Robert S. McNamara ... While he was in office many new concepts were 
introduced, of which 
the most important were assured destruction, damage limitation and flexible response, which remain 
central to this day to strategic debate. 
An expanded version of the two lectures quoted from in these answers will be 
published by the Pantheon Books division of Random House, Inc., New York, 
under the title Blundering into Disaster. 
Editorial Comment 
I 
The answers recorded here are in part taken from an interview in London on 
November 18,1986, but the bulk of the communication has been drawn from 
the two Sanford Lectures, delivered on November 8 and November 9,1986, 
at Duke University, and arranged as was thought appropriate by the editor. 
They provide a detailed critique of the situation in which we now find ourselves 
by one of the principal architects of Western deterrent strategy. The answer 
to question Aliv describes the ad hoc nature of much of the decision-making, 
while answers to questions such as AI(ii), AI(iii), Az(A)(i), A2(A)(ii), and 
B(iii), outline the disastrous consequences which result from continuing to 
rely for defence upon a deterrent threat which it can never be in the interest 
of either side to carry out. Four suggested alternative directions ahead are 
rejected or qualified in the answers to questions A2(A)(v), A2(B), and B(ii), 
while Robert McNamara's own recommendation is explained in his answers 
to questions Az(A)(vii) and B(vii). 
ROBERT S. McNAMARA 
A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 1945? 
Although four decades have passed without the use of nuclear weapons, this 
is no guide to the future. We must differentiate clearly here between the period 
just after World War II (when the US had, first a nuclear monopoly, then an 
overwhelming nuclear superiority), and the situation as it is today. Nuclear 
weapons may have helped to keep the peace during times of crisis in the earlier 
period, but they can no longer be seen to be doing so now. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
war? armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
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From the moment we in the United States lost our nuclear superiority, nuclear 
deterrence has been clearly and fatally weakened. Mutual possession of nuclear 
weapons on these terms means that it can never be in the interest of either side 
to initiate their use. That was why, as Secretary of Defense, in long private 
conversations with successive Presidents - Kennedy and Johnson -I recom- 
mended, without qualification, that they never initiate, under any circum- 
stances, the use of nuclear weapons. I believe they accepted my 
recommendations. That is also why in Brussels in 1979 Henry Kissinger said, 
in effect, that Europe should not expect us to launch strategic nuclear weapons 
against the Soviet Union in defence of Europe. 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
This is where the most dangerous illusions lie. First of all, there are no `limited 
nuclear options'. No human mind has conceived of how to initiate the use of 
nuclear weapons with a high probability of limiting the subsequent exchange. 
Realistic plans for doing that simply do not exist - as political and military 
leaders will tell you, if they are honest. So this cannot possibly `enhance 
deterrence'. One cannot build a credible deterrent on an incredible action. 
And yet, for nearly twenty years, American strategists have attempted to 
formulate plans for the use of nuclear weapons that could move our strategy 
away from the targeting of Soviet cities and toward targeting of military forces. 
This trend has persisted to the present day, culminating in the view of Sec- 
retary of Defense, Weinberger, that the United States could actually achieve 
victory in such a war. According to Weinberger's 1984-88 defence guidance 
document: `Should deterrence fail and strategic nuclear war with the USSR occur, 
the United States must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest 
termination of hostilities on terms favourable to the United States. ' Similarly, in 
accordance with NATO strategy, 25,000 nuclear warheads have been 
deployed at sea and on land. They are supported by war-fighting strategies. 
Detailed war plans for their use are in the hands of field commanders. And 
the troops of each side routinely undertake exercises specifically designed to 
prepare for that use. General Bernard Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander 
of NATO forces in Europe, has said it is likely that in the early hours of a 
military conflict in Western Europe, NATO commanders would in fact ask 
for the authority to initiate such use. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
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In the first half century of the nuclear age the world's *inventory of nuclear 
weapons has increased from zero to 50, ooo. On average, each of them has a 
destructive power thirty times that of the Hiroshima bomb. A few hundred 
of the fifty thousand could destroy not only the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and their allies, but, through atmospheric effects, a major part of the 
rest of the world as well. This situation has evolved over the years through a 
series of incremental decisions. I myself participated in many of them. Each 
of the decisions, taken by itself, appeared rational and inescapable. But the 
fact is that they were made without reference to any overall master plan or 
long-term objective. They have led to nuclear arsenals and nuclear war plans 
that few of the participants either anticipated or would, in retrospect, wish to 
support. Because we lack a long-run plan for the nuclear age, the number of 
weapons continues to multiply. And now we appear on the verge of an escal- 
ation of the arms race that will not only place weapons in space, but will 
seriously increase the risk that one or the other of the adversaries will be 
tempted in a period of tension to initiate a preemptive nuclear strike before 
the opponent can get in the first blow. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
As I have said, I do not think that mutual deployment of nuclear weapons, as 
part of a strategy which threatens their use should deterrence fail, can ever be 
stable. Within this context, the idea of `balance' lacks application, and there- 
fore sense. During the past forty years, arms control has been a positive rather 
than a negative factor. But we cannot be surprised that it has not secured crisis 
stability, when that has not, unfortunately, been the main priority for the 
negotiators. 
(vi) Has force planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
Looking back over the first fifty years of the nuclear age, we see that we have 
reached our present position by way of a long series of unplanned, piecemeal, 
ad hoc, decisions, taken by military and civilian leaders of East and West. 
There has been no clear grasp of the longer-term implications of these actions, 
nor general agreement on the goals towards which they should be directed. 
As a result, overall objectives have been poorly framed, and rarely adhered to 
in relation to particular weapon developments. New technologies have been 
allowed to develop almost unchecked, however threatening, and force-plan- 
ning has not been properly controlled by strategic thinking. It is a process 
which has led to a world in which the two great power blocs, not yet able to 
avoid continuing political conflict and potential military confrontation, face 
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each other with nuclear war-fighting strategies and nuclear arsenals capable of 
destroying civilization several times over. 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable 
future? 
OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
But it is when we look ahead to the deployment of the next generations of 
nuclear weapons that the greatest dangers threaten. Miniaturization is increas- 
ing the mobility, accuracy, and destructive power pf weapons. In advanced 
stages of development are mobile land-based missiltis; anti-satellite weapons; 
space-based systems; and land-, sea- and air-based Cruise missiles that are 
increasingly difficult to detect and hence increasingly difficult to limit by 
verifiable arms control agreements. Our current nuclear weapons-building 
programme, which is producing 2000 warheads annually, is the biggest in 
twenty years. And steps are underway to expand substantially, for the 199os, 
both the production of the key nuclear materials - tritium, uranium, and 
plutonium - and the production of the warheads themselves. At the same 
time, our weapons laboratories are forecasting large increases in the number 
of underground tests required for the development of new types of nuclear 
arms. Above all, unconstrained weapons development and deployment over 
the next fifty years will lead, not only to increased numbers of weapons, but 
to greater danger of their use in time of tension - in other words, to greater 
`crisis instability'. 
There are two fundamental points to be made here. 
First, the danger is not so much of a sudden attack `out of the blue', when 
political conditions are in any case stable, but of the likely effect of new 
generations of nuclear weapons, deployed, as they are at the moment, as part 
of a war-fighting strategy, in times of tension and acute political crisis. Today 
we face a future in which for decades we must contemplate continuing confron- 
tation between East and West. Any one of these confrontations can escalate, 
through miscalculation, into military conflict. In these circumstances, nuclear 
war-fighting strategies, integrally built into defence planning, will severely 
constrain political decision-making. In the tense atmosphere of a crisis, each 
side will feel pressure to delegate authority to fire nuclear weapons to battle- 
field commanders. As the likelihood of attack increases, these commanders 
will face a desperate dilemma: use them or lose them. And, because the stra- 
tegic nuclear forces and the complex systems designed to command and con- 
trol them are perceived by many to be vulnerable to a preemptive attack, they 
will argue the advantage of a preemptive strike. 
The second point is that we are dealing in the first instance, not with actual 
plans for a first strike, but with each side's perception that there may be such 
19( 
. plans on the 
'other side. Americans often say that they find it incredible that 
the Soviets could suspect us of planning for a first strike. For example, Reagan 
has said, `In 1946, when the United States was the only country in the world 
possessing these awesome nuclear weapons, we did not blackmail others with threats 
to use them. Doesn't our record alone refute the charge that we seek superiority, that 
we represent a threat to peace? ' But the Soviets recall, not only Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, but subsequent threats to use nuclear weapons by, among others, 
Harry Truman (Korea), Dwight Eisenhower (also Korea), Richard Nixon 
(Vietnam); and Jimmy Carter (Persian Gulf). The danger is that, at a time of 
crisis, each side will fear that the other is planning a first strike, and that it 
will be this fear which will mutually increase the pressure to preempt. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
This has already been substantially answered. The weapons are becoming 
more accurate, so to that extent command, control, communication and intelli- 
gence facilities are becoming more vulnerable. Clearly, not enough attention 
is being paid to this. It is correct to say that no well-informed, coolly rational, 
political or military leader is likely to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. But 
political and military leaders in moments of severe crisis are likely to be neither 
well-informed, nor coolly rational. During the seven years I served as Sec- 
retary of Defense, confrontations carrying a serious risk of military conflict 
developed on three separate occasions: over Berlin in August of 1961, over the 
introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba in October of 1962, and in the Middle 
East in June of 1967. In no one of the three incidents did either side intend to 
act in a way which would lead to military conflict, but on each of the occasions 
lack of information, misinformation, and misjudgements, led to confron- 
tation. And in each of them, as the crisis evolved, tensions heightened, 
emotions rose, and the danger of irrational decisions increased. In none of 
these cases did either side want war. In each of them we came perilously close 
to it. 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
As I say, no human mind has conceived of how to initiate the use of nuclear 
weapons with a high probability of limiting the subsequent exchanges. There 
are no such realistic plans. Even someone like Al Haig, ' who is convinced of 
the effectiveness of deterrence and opposed to a declared policy of `no first 
use', has said that it is highly unlikely that nuclear war, once started, can be 
i. Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1974-79. Unites States Secretary of State, i98t-82. 
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limited. Any decision to use nuclear weapons would imply a high probability 
of the same cataclysmic consequences as a total nuclear exchange. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
It is definitely not as implied on the left-hand side. New generations of battle- 
field and theatre nuclear systems are destabilizing. They do not enhance deter- 
rence, for reasons already given. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the hope of an effective defence against the most recent and destabilizing example 
nuclear weapons? of the process outlined in r? 
Here we come to a very complicated subject. For the sake of clarity, I will 
distinguish between President Reagan's original proposal for the SDI, 
announced on March 23,1983, which I will call Star Wars I, and subsequent 
alternative interpretations, which I will label Star Wars II. 
Star Wars I is an attempt to reduce the long-term risks of nuclear war by 
substituting defensive for offensive forces. The aim is to create an impen- 
etrable shield to protect the entire nation against a missile attack and therefore 
remove the need to threaten nuclear retaliation in order to deter attack. 
Indeed, with the shield in place, the President argued, we would be able to 
discard, not just nuclear deterrence, but nuclear weapons themselves. But, as 
Harold Brown, who succeeded Edward Teller as director of the Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory, says, `Technology does not offer even a reasonable prospect 
of a successful population defense. Both the United States and the Soviet Union 
will be able to undertake successful countermeasures against any system intended to 
defend urban-industrial centers and their populations, however many the layers of 
defense. ' In other words, until there are inventions that have not yet even been 
imagined, a defence robust and cheap enough to replace deterrence will remain 
a pipe dream. 
What is -common to the many versions of Star Wars II is that they would 
all require that we continue to maintain offensive forces, but add the 
defensive systems to them. The aim is to enhance deterrence. Former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has written, `Even granting - as I do - 
that a perfect defense of our population is almost certainly unattainable, the 
existence of some defense means that the attacker must plan on saturating it. 
This massively complicates the attacker's calculations. Anything that magnifies 
doubt inspires hesitation and adds to deterrence. The case grows stronger if one 
considers the defense of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile launchers. The incentive 
for a first strike would be sharply, perhaps decisively, reduced if an aggressor 
knew that half of the opponent's ICBMs would survive any foreseeable attack. ' 
But there is a fatal flaw in this. The Soviets are bound to interpret Star 
Wars II as being designed to support a first-strike strategy. Why? Because 
a leaky umbrella offers no protection in a downpour, but is quite useful in 
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a. drizzle. That is, such a defence would collapse under a full-scale Soviet 
first strike, but might cope adequately with the depleted Soviet forces that 
had survived a United States first strike. Nor are the Soviets likely to accept 
Reagan's pledge to share SDI technology with the Soviet Union in order 
to ensure that the programme will not lead to an American unilateral 
advantage. It was only two years ago that we refused to licence the sale to 
the Soviet Union of relatively simple personal computers. Are we likely to 
provide the Soviets with the technology that will help them to more 
effectively prosecute wars, whether they be with conventional or nuclear 
forces, in Afghanistan or Europe, or to undermine our competitive position 
in the commercial markets of the world? So, how will they react? Their 
promise to respond with a large offensive build-up is no empty threat. Each 
superpower's highest priority has been a nuclear arsenal that can assuredly 
penetrate to its opponent's vital assets. Such a capability, each side believes, 
is needed to deter the other side from launching a nuclear attack or using 
a nuclear advantage for political gain. We can safely conclude, therefore, 
from both the United States and Soviet statements, that any attempt to 
strengthen deterrence by adding strategic defences to strategic offensive 
forces will lead to a rapid escalation of the arms race. We cannot have both 
Star Wars and arms control. In sum, I can see no way by which American 
deployment of an antiballistic missile defence will strengthen deterrence. 
(It is sometimes argued that the threat of the SDI can be used as a 
bargaining chip. The claim is that it has already brought the Soviets to the 
negotiating table. If this is the case, then so much the better. But, by 
definition, bargaining chips are used to achieve a bargain, and so far there 
is no sign of this. ) 
Finally, there is the matter of cost. A full protective shield has been esti- 
mated at $i trillion, with perpetual expenditure in the region of $100 to $200 
billion a year thereafter to upgrade and modernize it. Thus, to deploy Star 
Wars would force us to divert massive amounts of money from conventional 
defence and from domestic programmes over a period of years extending well 
beyond the end of this century. The possibility of a cheaper alternative to Star 
Wars II will be considered in B(iii). 
So none of these rationales offer a satisfactory approach to reducing the 
risk of nuclear war in the decades that lie ahead. They combine unattainable 
technical goals with a policy rooted in concepts whose validity died at Hirosh- 
ima. And they carry the certainty of high cost and a dangerous escalation of 
the arms race. 
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(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
proliferation best met by a continuation of by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
past policies? process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
Let me just say this: If the United States and the Soviet Union were to move 
as far as Reagan and Gorbachev discussed moving at Reykjavik - in other 
words, the elimination of all nuclear weapons, except whatever was needed to 
prevent cheating - then I think that this would have a very positive effect on 
other powers and would reduce the danger of proliferation. It clearly could 
not be done - and Reagan and Gorbachev indicated that it would not be done 
- without the participation of Britain, France and China in the agreement. 
But if all five powers iWere to agree that they would move toward elimination 
of all nuclear weapons, then I think that this would increase the ability of 
those five powers to put pressure on other states to avoid nuclear weapons 
development. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations 
offer the best prospect for future stability? 
OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
So today we face a future in which for decades we must contemplate continuing 
confrontation between East and West. Any one of these confrontations can 
escalate, through miscalculation, into military conflict. And that conflict will 
be between blocs that possess 5o, ooo nuclear warheads - warheads that are 
deployed on the battlefields and integrated into the war-plans. A single 
nuclear-armed submarine of either side could unleash more firepower than 
man has shot against man throughout history. If the superpowers continue to 
weaken the arms control regime, as they have over the past six or seven years, 
the risk of the world ultimately facing a nuclear conflagration will continue to 
grow. We are on the verge of a dramatic escalation of the arms race - an 
escalation to levels that will be more and more difficult, if not impossible, to 
control. The risk that military conflict will quickly evolve into nuclear war, 
leading to certain destruction of our civilization, is far greater than I am willing 
to accept on military, political, or moral grounds. It is far greater than I am 
prepared to pass on to my children or grandchildren. This is the unplanned, 
and to me unacceptable, result of the long series of incremental decisions taken 
by military and civilian leaders of East and West during the first half century 
of the nuclear age. Can we work ourselves out of this position during the next 
fifty years? 
The conviction that we must change course is shared by groups and indivi- 
duals as diverse as the Freeze movement, the President, the Catholic and 
Methodist bishops, the majority of the nation's top scientists, Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev, and such leaders of Third World and independent nations 
as Rajiv Gandhi and the late Olof Palme. All agree that we need to plan to 
reduce the long-term risk of nuclear war, but there is no consensus on what 
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course to take. The changes of direction being advocated follow from very 
different diagnoses of our predicament. There have been perhaps four main 
courses of action proposed recently, to which I want to add a fifth. Two of 
these, Star Wars I (the replacing of `deterrence' with `defence') and Star Wars 
II (the strengthening of deterrence by adding defensive forces to the offence), 
I have rejected. A third, the proposal of General Secretary Gorbachev to 
eliminate all nuclear weapons through negotiations, I will discuss in A2(B). A 
fourth, the idea of achieving a broad political reconciliation between East and 
West, I will pursue further in B(ii). Clearly, it is desirable and is the coritext 
within which responsible arms control negotiation should be conducted. But 
it cannot be stressed enough that this process will require time, patience and 
consistency of purpose. And there are limits to the results. It cannot be 
expected to eliminate the periods of tension and confrontation which have 
characterized East-West relations over the past four decades. It is not, there- 
fore, a substitute for other actions designed to reduce the risk that military 
conflict, rising out of such confrontation, will lead to the use of nuclear 
weapons. Steps to control directly and reverse the arms race must go forward 
in parallel with efforts to reduce political tension. 
We are left, then, to turn to our final option: a re-examination of the military 
role of nuclear weapons. We need a vision of long-term goals for nuclear force 
levels, military strategy, and arms control agreements, that will have as their 
main objective the minimizing of the risk of nuclear war. In the past we have 
failed to achieve crisis stability through negotiation, because nuclear weapons 
have been treated as if they could be deployed as part of traditional war- 
fighting strategies. What I suggest is that we acknowledge once and for all that 
this can no longer be the case. I propose that we accept that nuclear warheads 
are not weapons - they have no military use whatsoever, except to deter one's 
opponent from their use - and that we base all our military plans, our defence 
budgets, our weapons development and deployment programmes, and our 
arms control negotiations on that proposition. The ultimate goal should be 
that of mutual deterrence at the lowest force levels consistent with stability. 
If the Soviet Union and the United States were to agree, in principle, that each 
side's nuclear force would be no larger than was needed to deter a nuclear 
attack by the other, how might the size and composition of such a limited 
force be determined? The number required for a force sufficiently large to 
deter cheating should not need to exceed a few hundred warheads on each side 
- say, at most Soo. Very possibly it would be far less. Two considerations 
would determine the ultimate size and composition of the deterrent force: that 
it deter attack with confidence, and that any undetected or sudden violation 
of arms control treaties would not imperil this deterrence. The policing of an 
arms agreement that restricted each side to a small number of warheads is 
quite feasible with present verification technology. With tactical nuclear forces 
to be eliminated entirely and the strategic forces having 500 or fewer warheads, 
the present inventory of 5o, 000 weapons could be cut to no more than iooo. 
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(Before such limited-force goals could be reached, other nuclear powers - 
China, France, Great Britain and possibly others - will have to be involved in 
the process of reducing nuclear arsenals lest their weapons disturb the strategic 
equilibrium. ) 
Several themes should govern our attitudes and policies as we move through 
these negotiations towards our long-term objectives. Each side must recognize 
that neither will permit the other to achieve a meaningful superiority. 
Attempts to gain such an advantage are not only futile, but dangerous. The 
forces pushing each side in the direction of a first-strike posture - whether real 
or perceived - must be reversed. A stable balance at the lowest possible level 
should be the goal. We must allay legitimate fears on both sides: Soviet fear 
of our technology, and our fear of their obsessive secrecy. These apprehensions 
provide an opportunity for a bargain: Soviet acceptance of more intrusive 
verification, in return for American constraints on applications of its techno- 
logical innovation. Our technological edge should be exploited vigorously to 
enhance our security, but in a manner that does not threaten the stability of 
deterrence. Penetration of Soviet secrecy is to our mutual advantage, even if 
the Kremlin does not yet understand that. So is technological restraint, even 
though it runs against the American grain. We have reached the present 
dangerous and absurd confrontation by a long series of steps, many of which 
seemed rational at the time. Step-by-step, we can undo much of the damage. 
The arms negotiations now underway, and in particular the discussions 
begun at Reykjavik, represent an historic opportunity to change course and 
to take the first steps towards the long-term goals which I have proposed. We 
can lay the foundations for entering the twenty-first century with a totally 
different nuclear strategy, one of mutual security instead of war-fighting; with 
vastly smaller nuclear forces; and with a dramatically lower risk that our 
civilization will be destroyed. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
I will take the first four questions together. Here we are dealing with the 
proposal of Mikhail Gorbachev that the United States and the- Soviet Union 
should begin a phased transition aimed at achieving the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons by the year 2000. 
Many -I would say most - United States military and civilian officials, as 
well as European leaders, hold the view that nuclear weapons are a necessary 
deterrent to Soviet aggression with conventional forces. Thus these individuals 
do not favour a world without nuclear weapons. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Presi- 
dent Carter's national security advisor, said of Gorbachev's proposal, `It is a 
plan for making the world safe for conventional warfare. I am therefore not enthusi- 
astic about it. ' Other Western officials have responded to Gorbachev by 
suggesting that nuclear disarmament would not be desirable without dramatic 
changes in the superpower relationship, including the correction of the con- 
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ventional force imbalances, full compliance with existing and future treaty 
obligations, peaceful resolution of regional conflicts in ways that allow free 
choice without outside interference, and a demonstrated commitment by the 
Soviet Union to peaceful competition throughout the world. 
My criticism of Gorbachev's vision, however, is not that it is undesirable, 
but that it is infeasible under foreseeable circumstances. Although we might 
be able to verify the dismantling of Soviet nuclear weapons, we could not 
cleanse the minds of American and Soviet scientists of the knowledge of how 
to build them. Warheads might be eliminated, but the potential for recreating 
them would remain. And in a `nuclear-free world' a single nuclear weapon, 
the production and storage of which would be impossible to detect, could alter 
the military balance. We would live with the fear of waking up one day to find 
Mr Gorbachev brandishing the world's only nuclear warhead, threatening to 
blackmail us into accepting his political demands. Thus we would have a 
strong incentive to stockpile secretly some nuclear bombs to protect ourselves 
against such a threat. The Soviets would harbour the same fears and would 
take the same kind of actions. 
Unless we can develop technologies and procedures to ensure detection of 
any steps towards building a single nuclear bomb by any nation or terrorist 
group, an agreement for total nuclear disarmament will almost certainly 
degenerate into an unstable rearmament race. Thus, despite the desirability 
of a world without nuclear weapons, an agreement to that end does not appear 
feasible either today or for the foreseeable future. 
(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen 
to be prepared for war, as failure before 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under 
likely future conditions would global 
nuclear disarmament make war, including 
nuclear war, more likely? 
OR Do the years before X914 show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? 
Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
The parallel with 1914 is compelling. In 1962 President Kennedy insisted that 
each member of the National Security Council read Barbara Tuchman's The 
Guns of August. The book is the story of how the nations of Europe inadver- 
tently blundered into World War I. President Kennedy reminded us of the 
1914 conversation between two German chancellors on the origins of that war. 
One asked, `How did it happen? ' and his successor replied, `Ah, if we only 
knew. ' It was Kennedy's way of stressing the constant danger of miscalcu- 
lation. Three recent events - the Soviet shoot-down of Korean Air-Lines 
Flight 007, leading to the death of 269 civilians; the explosion of the US space 
shuttle, Challenger; and the nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl - serve 
to remind us all how often we are the victims of misinformation, mistaken 
judgements and human fallibility. 
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B NATO Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically evenly matched? 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
During the twenty-five years I have been watching the scene, I think that we 
in the West, and particularly the United States, have over and over again 
overestimated the Soviet conventional force strength, underestimated the 
NATO conventional force strength, and thereby exaggerated the imbalance 
of forces between them. Secondly, when judging the strategic impact of an 
existing imbalance of forces, we fail to recognize that an attacker requires 
something of the order of a three-to-one advantage in conventional forces to 
have a high confidence of success in an attack. And, finally, we frequently do 
not understand that the Soviet Union feels that a portion of its force may be 
unreliable, and/or be required to maintain order in the East. If we put all these 
points together, the imbalance of force today is far less than it is perceived to 
be by many in the West. And it is certainly within our power to correct it 
within realistic political and financial constraints. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
which will take advantage of unilateral threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western concessions and is only restrained Western technology and likely to respond 
and forced to accept arms-control positively to unconditional offers of 
agreements by Western determination and Western restraint within a general context 
strength? of detente? 
I do not know what Soviet intentions are, but I am sure that Western objectives 
can best be served through a process of `sustained engagement' that will 
increase markedly all areas of contact with the East. Our agenda should be far 
more comprehensive than hitherto attempted. Narrow approaches focusing 
primarily on one or another functional aspect of the relationship - for example, 
arms control - are not enough. The dialogue needs to be broad-based, multi- 
faceted, and continuous. The relationship must rest on the twin pillars of 
firmness and flexibility. It is abundantly clear that both of these elements are 
essential if our policies are to command public support and have a chance of 
succeeding. There is not a contradiction here: detente without defence would 
amount to surrender on the instalment plan; defence without detente would 
increase tensions and the risk of conflict. The two are mutually reinforcing. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
preponderance such that NATO must nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
continue to be able to threaten early use of strategically suicidal? 
nuclear weapons? 
Most Americans are simply unaware that NATO strategy calls for early 
initiation of the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Soviets. Eighty 
percent of them believe we would not use such weapons unless the Soviets 
used them first. They would be shocked to learn they are mistaken. And they 
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would be horrified to be told that senior military commanders themselves 
believe that to carry out our present strategy would lead to the destruction of 
our society. But those are the facts. 
If there is a case for NATO retaining its present strategy, that case must 
rest on the strategy's contribution to the deterrence of Soviet aggression being 
worth the risk of nuclear war in the event of deterrence failing. But there are 
two problems which stand in the way here. First, since the assumption is made 
that NATO will be responding to a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe, 
and since the artillery has short range, the nuclear explosions would occur on 
NATO's own territory. Second, there is no reason to believe that the Warsaw 
Pact, now possessing tactical and intermediate-range nuclear forces at least 
comparable to those of NATO, would not respond to NATO's initiation of 
nuclear war with major nuclear attacks of its own. These attacks would prob- 
ably seek most importantly to reduce NATO's ability to fight nuclear war by 
destroying command and control facilities; nuclear weapons storage sites; and 
the aircraft, missiles, and artillery that would deliver NATO's nuclear 
weapons. Thus the war would escalate from the battlefield to the rest of 
Western Europe (and probably to Eastern Europe as well, as NATO retali- 
ated). So, as more and more Western political and military leaders recognize 
and publicly avow that the use of nuclear weapons would bring greater destruc- 
tion to NATO than any conceivable contribution they might make to NATO's 
defence, there is less and less likelihood that NATO would authorize the use 
of any nuclear weapons except in response to a Soviet nuclear attack. As this 
diminishing prospect becomes more and more widely perceived - and it will 
- whatever deterrent value still resides in NATO's nuclear strategy will dimin- 
ish still further. One cannot build a credible deterrent on an incredible action. 
And there are additional factors to be considered. Whether it contributes to 
deterrence or not, NATO's threat of first use is not without its costs. It is a 
most contentious policy, leading to divisive debates both within individual 
nations and between members of the Alliance, it reduces NATO's prepared- 
ness for conventional war, and, as I have indicated, it increases the risk of 
nuclear war. 
So the costs of whatever deterrent value remains in NATO's nuclear strategy 
are substantial. Could not equivalent deterrence be achieved at lesser `cost'? 
I believe the answer is yes. Compared to the huge risks which the Alliance 
now runs by relying on increasingly less credible nuclear threats, recent studies 
have pointed to ways by which the conventional forces may be strengthened 
at modest military, political, and economic cost. This would be in line with 
what was envisaged when flexible response first became NATO's official 
doctrine, while I was Secretary of Defense, nearly twenty years ago. The 
potential of any one of several proposals for increasing the strength of conven- 
tional forces, within reasonable financial constraints, is great. Unfortunately, 
not one of them has yet been accepted by any NATO nation for incorporation 
in its force structure and defence budget. NATO has not done so, because 
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there is today no consensus among its military and civilian leaders on the 
military role of nuclear weapons. Once the bankruptcy of a nuclear war-fight- 
ing strategy is generally recognized and acknowledged, we can then set about 
substituting realistic and effective alternatives. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
It is the asymmetry of forces that makes arms control agreements designed to 
increase the stability of deterrence so difficult. But we should recognize, first, 
that there is rough overall parity today, and, secondly, that the width of the 
band of parity is sufficiently great to accommodate existing asymmetries and 
allow agreements which can bring about crisis stability. In 1962, for example, 
when we had roughly 5000 strategic nuclear warheads and the Soviet Union 
had 300, we were neverthless deterred from using our weapons in a first strike, 
because we feared the damage that surviving Soviet warheads would do. It did 
not matter to us at the time whether we had an advantage of 17 to t, 5 to t, 
or 2 to i- or even if they had an advantage of 2 to i. That tells you that the 
width of the band of parity is very great. And that points to the great flexibility 
that there is in terms of arms control agreements. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
This has been answered under (iii). We should consider the types of conven- 
tional forces recommended by General Rogers, Professor William Kaufmann, " 
The European Security Study, " and others. 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
OR Is it domination by the two super powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super-power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
What is critical to Western Europe's security is the recognition by the Soviet 
Union that the US is committed to its defence. So the participation of US 
troops within NATO on the soil of Europe seems to me to be a major element 
in deterrence. On the other hand, as I have said, I do not think that tactical or 
intermediate nuclear forces contribute to European security, nor that Western 
Europe would want US strategic nuclear forces to be used in her defence. 
i. Author of The McNamara Strategy. Harper 1964. 
2. A study paper prepared in 1982 by Western defence experts, aiming, amongst other things, 
to assess the scope for harnessing new technology to NATO strategy. 
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(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are general programme of nuclear disarmament 
suggestions that the West should take the the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do in the mouths of those who reject all 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
threaten to undermine Western defences? Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
Having identified our goal, how can we move towards it? Some of our new 
policies would depend solely on the United States and its Allies; others would 
require Soviet cooperation. Within this context there is, therefore, room for 
particular unilateral nuclear initiatives, such as a further unilateral reduction 
in the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons deployed by NATO. But unilateral 
nuclear disarmament would be disastrous, and the main objective must be to 
secure multilateral agreement for policies which are clearly in the long-term 
interest of all parties. We should move quickly to refocus the arms control 
negotiations to accomplish what we cannot do by unilateral action alone. We 
can begin that process through the arms negotiations now underway. 
In sum, to reduce the risk of blundering into disaster, I propose we adopt 
the view that the military role of nuclear weapons is limited to deterrence of 
one's opponent's use of such weapons, and that we move as rapidly as an 
Alliance consensus can be formed - it is likely to evolve gradually over the 
next five or ten years - to base all our military plans, our defence budgets, our 
weapons development and deployment programmes, and our arms nego- 
tiations, on that proposition. I realize that I am proposing a radical change in 
attitude towards NATO's present nuclear strategy. And I realize, too, that 
attitudes will not change quickly. They are based both on deep-seated feelings 
of mistrust of the Soviet Union and on misperceptions of how nuclear weapons 
can protect us against Soviet aggression. But through public debate, a debate 
in which citizens throughout the NATO countries - the potential victims of 
nuclear war - have both the capability and the responsibility to participate, 
we can reduce the risk of catastrophe by establishing long-term objectives that 
will underlie and shape all aspects of our nuclear programmes. That must be 
our goal. ' 
C British Policy 
This is a matter for the British people to decide. I want to make no comment. 
Moral Considerations 
It is a mistake to think that we can initiate the use of nuclear weapons without 
the process ending in the destruction of our societies. And therefore I believe 
that it is morally wrong ever to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. I say that 
without any qualification. 
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But it is also a mistake to think that we can eliminate the possibility of 
nuclear weapons. So, for the foreseeable future, minimum nuclear forces are 
necessary to deter any power or group from thinking that they can gain advan- 
tage by using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons. I do not consider the 
deployment of such forces to be immoral, because there could be no deterrence 
without the intent to respond shown by deployment. Nor do I think that this 
is an un-Christian policy. 
Selected Recommendations 
iI am not opposed to a freeze, if it contributes to rather than stands in the 
way of the kind of programme I have outlined. 
2 No. Research programmes should continue. 
3I am not opposed to it. But nor would I be opposed to continuing tests, if 
this were part of a programme directed towards long-term stability. The 
important thing is the strategic objective. 
4 What is crucial is not a declaration of no first use, but a radical shift of 
strategy away from dependence upon the use of nuclear weapons (see 
B(iii)). 
5 Yes, if these are steps in the build-down of nuclear arsenals as described 
in A2(A)(vii). 
6A European nuclear weapon-free zone does not mean very much, although 
I am not opposed to it. 
7 Yes- 
8 No (see A2(B)). 
9 Minimum forces should be retained indefinitely as outlined in A2(A)(vii). 
10 See No. 2. 
11 See No. 4. 
12 See my answer to B(vii). 
13 No comment. 
14 No. Such action should not be undertaken other than in agreement with 
our Allies and the Soviet Union. 
15 See No. 6. 
i6-2o No comment. 
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Biographical Note 
Born in 1925, James O'Connell has been Professor and Head of the Depart- 
ment of Government at Ahmadu Bello University, and Associate Professor of 
Politics at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Between 1976 and 1978 he was 
Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Arts at Ulster College, Northern Ireland 
Polytechnic. He has been Visiting Professor of Politics at Warwick University, 
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and Visiting Professor at Columbia University, New York. Since 1978 he has 
been the Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University. 
Editorial Comment 
The answers recorded here were communicated in an interview in Bradford 
on July 21,1986. Professor O'Connell is able to draw, not only upon his own 
work, but upon that of the other members of his department, and of the 
students whose research he supervises. This response, therefore, represents 
the thinking within the only university department in the country to be funded 
specifically for Peace Studies, that is to say for the study of all the ways in 
which just and peaceful relationsliips can be created and preserved between 
groups and nations. The reader may be interested in such conclusions as those 
that are drawn about the present conventional and nuclear balance between 
East and West (B(i) and B(iv)), about the scope for alternative strategies for 
NATO (B(v)), and about the impact of Britain's nuclear weapons programme 
on the defence budget (CI(iv) and CI(vi)). A central critique of current nuclear 
deterrent policies can be found in such answers as those under A2(A)(i) and 
A2(A)(ii), and a suggested remedy under A2(A)(vii) and B(vii). 
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A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 1945? 
It is not possible to be categorical on this issue. It is probable that nuclear deter- 
rence has been one of the restraining factors, but there have been others. For 
one thing, the countries of Western Europe have grown together politically and 
economically since 1945. This new-formed unity has removed a major source of 
instability from an area that has fought two major civil wars in this century. 
The creation of the European Economic Community owed little or nothing to 
nuclear deterrence. An indication of this fact is that Britain, which both pos- 
sessed nuclear weapons and was more sensitive than most countries to a policy 
of deterrence, refused to join the Community in 1958 when it was formed. Fur- 
thermore, there has been no issue that would have led the great powers to accept 
anything like the costs of war, even as those costs were in 1939-45 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
war? armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
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It has manifestly been the case that the two superpowers have fought one 
another in a series of proxy engagements, notably in Indo-China, Africa and 
Afghanistan. Mutual possession of nuclear weapons has not prevented war. It 
may have restrained the superpowers from fighting one another directly, but 
their confrontation has helped to inflame rather than resolve regional conflicts. 
Moreover, the political immobilisation of the superpowers in their obsession 
with preventing one another from gaining political advantage has impeded 
their co-operating where they might have worked together to end regional 
conflicts. Finally, it seems worth saying . that, 
in a world that is essentially 
multi-polar, the East-West divide has created an artificial bi-polarity. 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war-fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
I think that at tactical, intermediate, and strategic, levels there has been a 
trend within the military establishment to plan for nuclear war-fighting - and 
therefore for military superiority - even though the declaratory policy is one 
of deterrence through Mutual Assured Destruction. Indeed, the purpose of 
flexible response itself, when it was first thought out in the late 195os and 
i96os, was in a sense to restore the military superiority that the United States 
had grown used to and was reluctant to lose. Limited nuclear options may by 
and large increase the risk of nuclear conflict rather than decrease it. But I 
would not say that this is so much the result of a `lowering of the nuclear 
threshold' (few now believe that a limited nuclear war could be contained) as 
of increasing the risk of inadvertent war. The danger is that fragile command 
and control structures will break down in the course of a mishandled crisis, 
in which, rather as in 1914, one power is impelled to strike first for fear that 
it will lose most if the other instead strikes first. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
There is undoubtedly a great superfluity of nuclear weapons systems. The 
main reasons why this is dangerous are, first, that it increases the possibility 
of accidental warfare. Second, it is part of a process in which each side is 
perceived as moving towards a first strike position. Third, it creates a political 
climate which is dangerous because it increases tension and mistrust. For 
example, the debate in the 1970S in the United States about the `window of 
vulnerability' influenced American political perceptions about the Soviet 
Union in ways which helped to create the dangerous mutual antagonism of 
the 198os. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
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OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
Insofar as there has been a measure of stability, it has not been a result of 
quantitative, or even of qualitative balance, in the sense of an equating of 
nuclear forces, but simply of the fact that each side has been able to damage 
the other beyond any acceptable level. `Arms control', in the sense of a search 
for an agreement on parity, has not limited the growth of nuclear arsenals. 
Also, arms control negotiations have at times been little more than political 
gestures aimed to placate domestic opposition to nuclear weapons pro- 
grammes. At the most, arms control agreements have edged arms growth in 
certain directions, but only within the constraints of the technology that was 
foreseen at the time. In any case, it seems to me that far too much is usually 
made of arms control negotiations. They cannot possibly carry the weight of 
public hopes for nuclear disarmament that is often placed on them. They are 
simply a narrow interface between the superpowers. What is important is 
the general political relationship between the superpowers from which arms 
control negotiations will emanate. 
(vi) Has force-planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
I think that there has been a dialectical relationship between the technology, 
and strategic thinking and politics. On the one hand, I think that the basic 
decisions are still political. But, on the other hand, given that a weapons- 
system will take something like fifteen to twenty years to produce, if an Amer- 
ican President or a Soviet Head of Government has it put to him by his military 
experts that the other is preparing a new weapons-system, then it is very 
difficult for him not to invest in similar preparations. The implication is that 
one must look a generation ahead in national security. To that extent there is 
a sense in which strategic thinking is technology-driven. But, in the last resort, 
there is still political control. Problems of political control over the weapons 
could, however, become problematic in a crisis, or in a limited nuclear conflict, 
because command-and-control capacities are fragile and inadequate on each 
side. 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
future? 
The whole trend in the evolution of nuclear arsenals is now clearly towards 
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counterforce first-strike weapons - highly accurate ballistic and cruise systems. 
It still remains irrational for either side to launch a first strike from cold. But 
that is not so much where the risks lie. The great danger is that, in a situation 
of deep crisis, political leaders will be told by their military advisers that they 
must go first, because, if they do not, the other almost certainly will. It is 
unlikely that a nuclear power will deliberately strike first in the near future. 
But such action - to answer your question literally - is sadly riot inconceivable. 
Existing command-and-control systems are exceedingly fragile and vulner- 
able. I also worry about the efficiency of Soviet computers in the event of a 
move towards `launch-on-warning' policies as well as about the human factor 
on both sides. Let me add one further observation here: I think that as you 
go around with your questionnaire you will find two differing emphases in the 
replies that you will get. Those who favour nuclear weapons will insist on the 
stability that they bring. Those who are more uneasy about -them or who are 
frankly hostile to them will emphasize the danger of the present complicated 
balance of terror. It seems to me that a curcial unifying theme should be that 
we had best use existing stability to move on towards greater political and 
military stability, which reduces present nuclear weapons to much smaller 
numbers, and to exercise control over the present unregulated arms race, in 
which the superpowers mirror one another in their distrust and in their profli- 
gate use of resources. In other words, we need to remain exceedingly sensitive 
to the existing danger. And, if we accept that there is a certain stability, we 
need to set out to build on it and to transform it and not just permit ourselves 
to hope that it will endure indefinitely. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
In a politically stable situation there is probably relatively little danger. More- 
over, there is, I think, a tacit agreement on both sides to respect each other's 
command, control and communications facilities. But, once again, it is in 
times of crisis that the problems are likely to multiply. As increasingly sophisti- 
cated time-urgent weapons with short flight times - like Trident and Pershing II- become available, this puts greater strain on command and control systems 
which are in any case themselves becoming more and more elaborate. We need 
only imagine a situation in which nuclear forces, or even just conventional 
forces, are put on the alert, to realize how fragile and vulnerable command 
and control facilities are. This situation may get worse. As Sir Geoffrey Howe 
Pointed out in his speech of last March, we could well end up with automated 
dccision-making by both sides, because there will be no other way of dealing 
with the information processing problem. 
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(iii) If ievertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
Our hope may be that, if there were a limited nuclear exchange, the immediate 
destruction and the panic among the civilian population would be such that 
the exchange would be halted short of general conflagration. It is certainly 
possible that there could be a limited nuclear war. But the pressures in the 
other direction would also be very great, and we just cannot tell what would 
be likely to happen. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclea) systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold 
Here we reach the central difficulty in nuclear deterrent strategy. New gener- 
ations of nuclear weapons are an attempt to convince your opponent that you 
would be mad enough to use them if they ignored your threat, and your own 
public that you are still sane. It is hard to see how this could be said to enhance 
deterrence. It is rather like Denis Healey's `law of holes' - if you are in a hole, 
the wise thing to do is to stop digging. As it is, I think that the situation is 
certainly more dangerous now than it was before, say, Pershing II was 
deployed - because of the combination of its accuracy and short flight time. 
The tendency of intermediate and tactical nuclear weapons towards greater 
accuracy and lower collateral damage - in other words, towards greater 
usability - contributes to lowering the nuclear threshold and to increasing the 
risk that it will be crossed. One of the further problems with Cruise is that, 
since it is a mobile weapon, you tend to put it out in the field in a crisis, and 
that sends a signal to your opponent which makes him think that you are likely 
to use it. It is the same with the SS20. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in i? 
There are so many strands to this. First of all, few people believe that the 
more extravagant claims being made for SDI are technologically feasible. 
Apart from anything else, both the Soviet Union and the United States are at 
the same time developing the penetration aids and other devices to counter 
any defensive system that may be deployed. In addition, defence stimulates 
offence, so Strategic Defence is likely to trigger an acceleration in the arms 
race. But, even if it were to prove even partially effective, it is likely to be seen 
by the other side as part of a deliberate move towards a counter-force first 
strike capability- there is clearly much more chance of warding off an enemy's 
attempt at retaliation with the remnant of his nuclear force than of coping with 
his entire arsenal. For this reason the threat of an effective or partially effective 
defence might encourage preemption before it is fully operational. A shield is 
as much a battle weapon as a sword. One of the most alarming aspects of the 
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whole thing is the way in which it is planned to be activated. There will no 
longer be any question of satellite information of a Soviet launch being checked 
by a second set of sensors, such as radar. Defences have to be triggered within, 
say forty seconds. There is simply no time for human decision-making. If it 
is ever invented in its presently proposed form, it will be a system which 
commits a nation to war automatically. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
To be logical, supporters of nuclear deterrence should argue that `horizontal' 
proliferation is a good thing. If nuclear weapons deter from war, then the 
more countries which have them the better. In fact, few do argue like 
this. There is an obvious connection between `horizontal' and `vertical' 
proliferation. The immobility of the two superpowers vis-a-vis one another 
has meant that they have taken less interest in policing proliferation than 
they should have. Moreover, they have certain commercial and industrial 
interests in facilitating the spread of technology which makes it possible for 
proliferation to be underpinned. This probably applies more especially to 
the Americans. I think that it is utterly crucial that both powers take the 
problem of proliferation seriously, especially as the technology simplifies. I 
cannot see the problems of proliferation being brought under control unless 
the global climate favours nuclear disarmament - and the lead has to come 
from the superpowers. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
offer the best prospect for future stability? attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
I think that the current bilateral and multilateral talks need to be kept up. 
But, judging by the lack of success of the past forty years, there seems 
little hope that they will bear fruit. The only way in which multilateral 
agreement to phase down nuclear arsenals can be reached is by individual 
countries being prepared to make significant unilateral concessions. Multilat- 
eralism only works when unilateral initiatives by either alliances or indivi- 
dual countries are made. What we need from several countries is a 
continuing endeavour to reduce tensions and to build confidence between 
governments and between peoples. We need at a minimum to be driven 
by the thought that deterrence in its existing shape cannot hope to last 
indefinitely. More positively, we need to appreciate our common humanity, 
our new and marvellous productive technologies, and our longer term 
converging interests. 
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(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would 
war between the great powers again 
become a rational option and therefore 
more likely? 
OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
to initiate a third world war? 
I do not think that war between the great powers could again become a rational 
option. Even conventional technology is now so dangerous, and the advantages 
that can be gained from war are obviously so few, that the abolition of nuclear 
weapons would not make war more likely. 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited 
nuclea} war? 
OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
preferable to nuclear war? 
It is unlikely that a conventional war, even between industrialized countries, 
would be nearly as disastrous as a nuclear war. But it would still be unaccept- 
ably damaging. 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented would they not be bound to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
there be no incentive to resort to 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
Did war break out, states would almost certainly consider a nuclear option. 
But it would still be as irrational and counter-productive as it is at present. 
What I think people must do is to live with the knowledge that these 
weapons can be put together again; and that they must so arrange disputes 
between nuclear-potential powers as to make it extremely unlikely that they 
would ever be tempted to put them together and use them. 
(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only 
feasible in a world where war itself is no 
longer a possibility? 
OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
hope of a rational world-order? 
I think that we have to accept the fact that some level of arms will always 
be necessary to maintain order. But what we do want to reach is a situation 
in the world in which relations between countries on a global scale will be 
like, if not those between the United States and Canada, then at least like 
those between the states of the European Economic Community. Under 
those circumstances there would be disputes, but it would be most unlikely 
that the countries would ever go to war. Effectively the whole world is as 
small in technological terms today as Europe was in 1939 - and we have 
to make political and other arrangements accordingly. 
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(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen 
to be prepared for war, as failure before 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under 
likely future conditions would global 
nuclear disarmament make war, including 
nuclear war, more likely? 
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OR Do the years before 1914 show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? 
Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
It seems to me that 1939 was only the second phase of a conflict that started 
in 1914, and that the two phases should not be separated. Today's situation is 
much more like 1914 than 1939. However, technological conditions are so 
different now from either 1914 or 1939 that people have to think in greatly 
different ways. As Einstein said - with the invention of atomic weapons, 
everything had changed except our ways of thinking. 
2 NATO Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically evenly matched? 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
There have been a number of major contributions in the literature recently, 
which show quite clearly that the Soviet Union does not have overwhelming 
conventional superiority. The two sides are relatively evenly matched. In fact, 
if you take account of the unreliability of some of the non-Soviet members of 
the Warsaw Pact, then, if anything, the advantage lies with NATO. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
which will take advantage of unilateral threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western concessions and is only restrained Western technology and likely to respond 
and forced to accept arms-control positively to unconditional offers of 
agreements by Western determination and Western restraint within a general context 
strength? of detente? 
By and large the Soviet Union sees itself as encircled and threatened, while 
the West sees it as expansionist. The problem is one of mutual perception. 
The acquisition of an Eastern European empire was partly an attempt to 
prevent another attack from Germany, partly a reflection of where armies 
ended up in 1945, partly a revival of old Tsarist ambitions, and 'partly the 
Soviet leaders' instincts for conquest and expansion. At the moment, while 
still hanging on to the the shreds of ideological legitimacy, the USSR has lost 
its universalist confidence and feels somewhat under seige. It is the poorer of 
the two superpowers economically, and the more backward technologically. 
There is a good chance that under the present leadership it will reciprocate 
Western initiatives. It has already taken initiatives of its own, notably its curb 
on testing. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional 
preponderance such that NATO must 
continue to be able to threaten early use of 
nuclear weapons? 
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OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
strategically suicidal? 
NATO dependence on the early use of nuclear weapons is militarily unnecess- 
ary and strategically suicidal in that it might lead to a `limited' nuclear war, 
which for Europe would be total. Psychologically it also undermines NATO 
conventional defences by encouraging a combination of defeatism and trust in 
early and compensatory nuclear expedients. Finally, both sides need to take 
more' seriously negotiations on mutual and balanced reductions in conven- 
tional forces. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
As I have said, I do not think that nuclear deterrence is stable. But there 
is a degree of overkill such that either side could make very generous 
concessions without affecting the level of risk. In terms of general military 
technology, the most recent Pentagon assessment says that the United States 
leads the Soviet Union in fourteen areas; they are equal in six; and the 
Soviet Union does not lead in any. It is also true that the United States 
has initiated most (but not all) of the phases of the nuclear arms race. 
There are certain areas where Soviet build-up has been disproportionate - 
particularly in certain classes of land-based ballistic missiles. But this is 
matched by American advantage in the other two arms of the strategic 
`triad'. By and large there is a rough balance in capacity and a significant 
Western lead in technology. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
Current offensive strategies - whether Soviet operational manoeuvres or 
Western deep strike postures - are both unnecessary and likely to be danger- 
ously destablizing in crisis. In addition, for political reasons, if confidence- 
building measures are to be undertaken, the arrangement of forces needs to 
be less provocative than it has traditionally been. In view of the present balance 
of forces, the West has the wealth, technology and reserve manpower to enable 
its forces confidently to explore alternative strategies. We should not, how- 
ever, be tempted to place too much reliance on the technological `fix' of Emerg- 
ing Technologies. We should also be sceptical about the more extravagant 
claims of arms manufacturers. 
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(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
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OR Is it domination by the two super-powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
In the immediate future, whether Europe is nuclear-free or not, it makes 
sense to keep American troops here because the NATO Alliance is not one 
that should be lightly unscrambled. Having said that, the crucial problem 
at the present moment is that Western Europe has not had an independent 
role but has simply lined up completely with one of the superpowers. What 
is important in the longer run is to make Europe nuclear-free; to re-work 
the Alliance in its present fbrm; and to let European powers work out an 
independent common policy which stresses their friendship with the United 
States and their European kinship with the Soviet Union. I think that it 
would be unfortunate if Western Europe constituted itself a separate power 
bloc - as it were a third superpower alongside the other two. That would 
only continue the present set of strategies, while complicating them. I would 
certainly not see a reconstituted Western Europe arming itself with a nuclear 
capability. 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in-the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
There can be no doubt that the way ahead is for the West to be prepared 
to take significant initiatives - and to reciprocate those offered by the Soviet 
Union. In other words, to proceed by way of a series of carefully planned 
unilateral initiatives on both sides which are then consolidated by bilateral 
and multilateral treaties. Unilateralism of this kind is simply part of genuine 
multilateral disarmament. We now have plenty of evidence that the Soviet 
Union is ready to take part in such a process. What is the alternative? The 
question that people need to ask themselves is: `Are we happy for the present 
situation to continue indefinitely? ' Those who say `yes' are genuine believers 
in indefinite nuclear deterrence. In which case they should be honest about 
it, and not, as so often happens, pose as `multilateral disarmers'. 
C British Policy 
i The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and 
independence and protects her from nuclear 
blackmail? 
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OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
`deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
encourage proliferation? 
It seems to me that Britain has nuclear weapons because she was once an 
imperial power. They serve no military or strategic function. They cannot be 
used against a superpower - except possibly in the form of a final act of 
retaliation by some lonely submarine commander after Britain had already 
been destroyed. All that they do is encourage proliferation. Nobody, further- 
more, has been able to sketch a plausible scenario of nuclear blackmail. 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
The second centre argument suggests that Britian would be likely to use her 
nuclear weapons in defence of Germany when the Americans were not pre- 
pared to use theirs. This seems inconceivable. If the Americans pulled out, so 
would the British. The argument is an unconvincing rationalization. In any 
case, multiple centres of decision-making imply greater uncertainty; and 
uncertainty implies greater crisis instability, not stability. That argument 
needs to be met head on. 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent British initiatives more likely 
to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
involvement? 
My impression is that, if the British were in any way to threaten the Soviet 
Union, the Americans would very quickly extricate themselves from the 
resulting situation. They might well even move against British submarines 
and weapons did they come to believe that a British strike against a third 
power contained danger to American security. The funny thing about this 
kind of justification for British nuclear weapons is that, on the one hand, 
British governments argue that they must have them as part of solidarity with 
the United States, but they also argue that they need to have them when the 
United States no longer shows solidarity with them. And they have an in- 
between position, which I think is not even compatible with either, which is 
that they could threaten to use the weapons in such a way as to involve the 
Americans in the action. I think that the entire rationale is quite confused. 
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(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are afforded at the expense of conventional 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
Recent studies show that, if in the next ten years Britain retains nuclear 
weapons, the cost will make severe inroads into British conventional weapons 
and will weaken British conventional defence. Moreover, this will happen all 
the more quickly as Britain runs into balance of payments crises with the 
failure of its manufacturing industry and the decline of the petroleum indus- 
try. I would prefer it if nuclear spending was cut out of the defence budget 
altogether and the rest of the defence budget did not go up. The trouble at 
" the moment is that defence priorities have not been properly- worked out. 
There is defence of the island, defence of the North-East Atlantic, out-of-area 
operations, the Falklands, the army on the Rhine, and nuclear strategy. These 
six undertakings have not been prioritized against one another nor properly 
costed. It seems to me that one could work out a realistic set of defence 
propositions that were much less expensive, even in conventional terms, than 
the present ones. So the saving made by abandoning Britain's nuclear forces 
would go to strategic economic investment, as well as into the health service 
and the educational system. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
disarmament have no effect on other proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
countries and only serve to weaken British British prestige? Would British 
influence and allow France unchallenged disarmament within the context outlined in 
ascendancy in Europe? B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
Neither British nor French possession of nuclear weapons has given either a 
role of strategic counsel or a place `at the top table'. If anything, West Germany 
has an ascendancy in Europe because of her economic strength. If British 
unilateral disarmament were part of the process described in B(vii), it would 
be a significant contribution. But this depends upon the nature of the Soviet 
response and what follows from it. British disarmament could have a signifi- 
cant restraining effect elsewhere, too. It would certainly not diminish British 
influence, and could well enhance it. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
continue to ensure effective British strategic all the drawbacks listed äbove? 
defence into the 21st century? 
Trident has no strategic function for this country and is just a continuing form 
of proliferation. Its cost has helped to bring the public debate about British 
" nuclear 
forces in general to a head. If Britain goes ahead with Trident, it will 
cut expenditure on new conventional equipment by at least thirty per cent 
during the late t 98os and severely damage army, air force and naval capabili- 
ties. 
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2 NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
It seems to me that it is time that Britian distanced herself from nuclear 
weapons in Europe, and worked out new political relations with the other 
European powers and with the United States. She should be thinking in terms 
of conventional strategies, working particularly with the Germans on alterna- 
tive ways of strengthening non-provocative defences. The introduction of anti- 
tank barriers, thip mobilisation of reserve manpower - there are any number 
of possibilities tc' be explored. For the time being we should stay in NATO. 
There is a case for reworking the Alliance rather than breaking it up. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain make US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affairs 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
The Libyan raid has highlighted the question of sovereignty. Although the 
Prime Minister's permission was given in that case, there can be no doubt that 
a British veto would be brushed aside in the event of a nuclear war which 
involved vital American interests. Apart from anything else, American law 
does not allow the US president to give control of American nuclear weapons 
to any non-national. The removal of American nuclear bases would in no way 
alter the strategic balance between the superpowers, or, even in terms of 
nuclear deterrent theory, make the `defence of the West impossible'. The 
bases play more of a political than a strategic military role. 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases ate removed? 
Even if Britain ceased to be a nuclear power or to have American nuclear 
weapons here, the island would still no doubt be targeted. Both the Soviet 
Union and the United States almost certainly target neutral countries at the 
moment. But it would no longer be so certain that, when it came to it, the 
weapons would be used. What no country will escape will be the effects of a 
nuclear winter or radiation fall out. Moreover, Chernobyl must at least warn 
all of us what may happen once civil power stations are caught in the most 
limited nuclear exchange. 
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(jv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
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OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
As I have said, I do not think that nuclear weapons have brought stability or 
protection in the first place. It has been political arrangements that have been 
the main basis for stability. There is obviously nothing that a middle-ranking 
power like Britain can do to prevent the superpowers from continuing to 
deploy their nuclear arsenals. In any case, `nuclear umbrella' is only a mislead- 
ing metaphor for a policy that suggests that the US would start; a nuclear war 
to protect its allies. One needs to remember Dr Kissinger's warning that no 
country can be expected to commit suicide on behalf of another. The only 
truth in the `nuclear umbrella' theory is that both superpowers are not likely 
to use nuclear weapons incautiously against any power belonging to its 
opponent's alliance. However, as Palmerston said, countries do not have per- 
manent allies but only permanent interests. 
Moral Considerations 
(i) Is it morally right to pursue the policy least OR Are there actions which are in themselves 
likely to cause human suffering? May this wrong no matter what the situation? Is the 
sometimes involve doing things which in alternative to excuse almost any act of 
other circumstances would be wrong? barbarism? 
Under certain circumstances, which are usually difficult to spell out before- 
hand in any particular case, the most moral option may be to choose the lesser 
evil. Where one or the other of the evils is unavoidable, there may even be a 
moral obligation to choose the lesser. In this sense one may have to pursue a 
course of action that, in other circumstances, would be morally wrong. For 
example, I could conceive a moral use of tactical nuclear weapons against 
terrorists who had secured such weapons and were holding a population hos- 
tage. But one must retain a different sense of proportion in formulating policies 
that involve the destruction of entire populations by deliberate action. 
(ii) In formulating policy should we weigh up 
the probability of success and the relative 
costs in terms of human suffering of 
alternative nuclear and non-nuclear 
strategies? 
OR Is the only relevant point here that a 
nuclear exchange of almost any kind 
would in itself cause unimaginable 
suffering to largely civilian populations? 
There is a prudential dimension in Just War decisions. The crucial factor in 
this connection is the principle of proportionality, in which a government 
weighs the probable success and relative cost of war against alternative costs 
in, for example, threats to security, justice and freedom. It is, consequently, 
reasonable to weigh the implications of nuclear and non-nuclear policies. It is 
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ndt easy, however, to envisage a proportion between the evils of a nuclear war 
fought with strategic weapons, and other costs in lives and suffering. There is 
also the principle of discrimination in Just War theory. This principle is based 
on the acceptance of a common humanity, and argues that those not directly 
involved in combat should be spared destruction. Just War moralists accept 
that some collateral damage is inevitable in war. But any predictable form of 
strategic exchange between superpowers would involve destroying a large part 
of each other's population. It is difficult to accept the morality of decisions 
that involve the destruction of more than a hundred million persons with no 
practical involvement in governmental decisions or war effort; or with no 
effective animosity towards supposed enemies. At most one might conceivably 
accept the destruction of a limited number of persons in actions that saved 
many more from being destroyed. But the latter choice seems implausible in 
the present state of weaponry and strategy. I do not envy political leaders those 
war decisions that might confront them. But I do not think that any decision 
to destroy millions of people could be moral under any circumstances that I 
have heard any strategist describe, or any circumstances that I can conceive 
of. For my own part - and to state a personal choice rather than put an option 
to government -I would rather have myself, my family and my people perish 
than have, in the name of their survival, our government decide the destruc- 
tion of millions of persons with whom I share a God-given humanity and 
against whom I have no grievance. 
(iii) So far as concerns intention, need we look OR Is there no such thing as a fully deployed 
no further than the fact that our sole aim in weapons system which is a bluff? Is to 
deploying nuclear weapons is io prevent deploy nuclear weapons to intend to use 
their use? them in certain circumstances? 
I think that, once one undertakes the strategic and technical devices needed 
for nuclear deterrence, then there is implicit in this the intention to use them, 
if only because the operatives are so conditioned. While in theory one may 
separate deployment from use, effectively one cannot separate them. If one 
deploys them, one thereby accepts the possibility of using them. 
(iv) Are there possible uses of nuclear weapons 
which are allowed by just War theory, for 
example the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in order to prevent worse 
suffering? Can there be a theory of Just 
Deterrence? 
OR Is a conditional intention to cause 
indiscriminate and disproportionate 
suffering of this kind, whether admonitory, 
preemptive or retaliatory, ruled out by just 
War theory? Was it wrong to bomb 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 194S? 
Yet on the issue of deploying weapons in a theory of just Deterrence I hesitate 
to be categorical. For one thing, the situation of fear and distrust between the 
superpowers is such that they may justly - if in the context of a distorted world 
- retain their weapons. Yet on any but a most limited scale I do not think that 
they could rationally or morally prepare to use their already deployed weapons. 
Professor James O'Connell 4 t` 
It is in their interest as well as in the interest of the rest of us to move out of 
the present impasse. 
(v) Is there no relevant connection between the OR Is it a scandal that such huge resources are 
development and deployment of nuclear devoted to the development and deployment 
weapons and world poverty and disease? of nuclear weapons and not to the 
alleviation of suffering? 
I think that there is a moral link between the development of nuclear weapons 
and world poverty, because, first of all, resources are being deployed in respect 
of these weapons that could go elsewhere. And, secondly, the confrontation 
diverts attention from the plight of the poorer nations of the world. The will 
to use nuclear weapons in a strategic exchange, and the existence of extensive 
and profound poverty in the world, seem to me two great scandals of our time. 
(vi) Does Christian teaching allow the I OR Does Christian teaching condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? deployment of nuclear weapons? 
It seems to me that practically all the authoritative Christian groups that have 
looked at this problem have up to now accepted the deployment of nuclear 
weapons. To take a most comprehensive review by the American Catholic 
bishops, The Challenge of Peace, I think that there is an ambiguity at the heart 
of its teaching. It accepts the deployment of the weapons, but it effectively 
condemns their use. The ambivalence lies in the acceptance of a deployment 
that is inseparable from the intention to use. The bishops seek a way out of 
their moral dilemma - which they do not seem sufficiently to recognize - by 
insisting on a moral obligation to work for arms control and relative disarma- 
ment. Yet there is evidence to suggest that they and their followers - and the 
same is true of other Christian bodies - have not accepted this moral imperative 
in practical life and politics. 
Recommendations 
I Broadly speaking, Yes. 
2 Ideally, yes (see A2(A)(v)). 
3 Yes. 
4 Yes (see B(iii)). 
5 Yes (see Az(iv)). 
6 Yes (see B(vi)). 
7 Yes (see A2(A)(vi)). 
8 Not necessarily (see A2(B)). 
9 Yes. 
Io Yes. 
II Yes (see B(iii)). 
12 Yes (see A2(A)(vii) & V(vii)). 
13 Yes. 
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14 Yes. 
15' Yes (see B(vi)). 
i6 Yes (see CI). 
17 No (see Cz(iv)). 
18 Yes (see C2(i)). 
19 Yes (see C2(i) & C2(ii)). 
20 No. 
ýýZ) 
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Born in 1938, David Owen qualified as a doctor at St Thomas' Hospital, where 
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been Member of Parliament for Plymouth (Sutton) between 1966 and 1974, 
and for Plymouth (Devonport) since 1974. For fifteen years he was a Labour 
238 
Member of Parliament serving as Secretary of State for Foreign and Common- 
wealth Affairs between 1977 and 1979. In 1981 he became a founder-member 
of the Social Democratic Party, and has been its leader since 1983. 
Editorial Comment 
Although Dr Owen was willing to contribute to this book, he was not able to 
give an interview, so, with his permission, the responses which follow have 
been selected and arranged by the editor from the sources cited at the begin- 
ning. Page references are provided throughout. 
Readers will find a criticism of current nuclear deterrent policies in the East 
and in the West in Section A, and an equally tranchant criticism of unilateralist 
counter-proposals in Section H. (see especially the answers to Questions (iii) 
and (vii)). His own proposals, as interpreted by the editor, are summarized in 
the Recommendations at the end. So far as concerns British policy, the broad 
emphasis is on the importance of creating a powerful independent Western 
European defence (see in particular the answer to question CI(ii), against the 
background of the answer to question B(vi)). Dr. Owen is critical, both of 
Conservative Party plans to press ahead with the Trident option (Ci(iv) and 
CI(vi)), and with Labour Party proposals for a unilateral withdrawal from 
NATO's nuclear deterrent strategy (C2(i) and C2(ii)). 
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A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 194S? 
OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
Although a number of other factors have also contributed, there can be little 
doubt that, for forty years, nuclear deterrence has played a major role in 
helping to maintain an uneasy peace in Europe, and in preventing direct 
conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States world wide (4.2,4.4). 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
It has mainly been the mutual fear of nuclear devastation that has prevented 
war between the major powers (4.2). Peace has in the end rested on the deter- 
rent value of a mutually assured second strike capability (3.11). This is what 
needs to be preserved (3.23). 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war-fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
We must distinguish here between deterrence and defence. Deterrence is to 
convince an enemy that the burdens and risks of any attack far outweigh any 
possible gains. Defence is to reduce the likely burdens and risks if an enemy 
attacks, deterrence having failed. Deterrence aims at changing the intentions 
of the enemy, making it less likely they will decide to act. Defence aims at 
reducing the effectiveness of the enemy if they decide to act. Defensive and 
deterrent strategies must therefore interlink. In the early days of nuclear 
arsenals, the weapons were so devastating, the consequences, of their use so 
appalling, that it was possible to envisage a purely deterrent force. The concept 
was one of mutually assured destruction. Then, as the technology of nuclear 
warfare developed, with miniaturization of the warheads, multiple indepen- 
dently-targeted re-entry vehicles and pinpoint accuracy from 4000 miles, with 
nuclear mines, nuclear depth-charges and short-range battlefield nuclear 
weapons, some saw nuclear deterrence as being merged with conventional 
deterrence. Nuclear weapons began to be part of the arsenal of war (1.37-8). 
It is a fact that military strategists in both the Warsaw Pact and NATO believe 
that nuclear weapons would be used in any war in Europe and that both sides 
expect to win such a war (1.42). This has been a very dangerous development. 
To set nuclear weapons within a seamless robe of defence decision-making in 
this way is to increase massively the risk that nuclear weapons will be used 
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again (1.46). The battlefield nuclear war-fighting strategies of both East and 
West should be abandoned. Fortunately, a strong body of opinion on both 
sides, scientific, military and political, now recognizes this. And the main 
strategic argument for the original deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons 
no longer applies. The accuracy of new generations of longer-range weapons 
means that they could if necessary be used in a tactical role. So the abandon- 
ment of battlefield nuclear weapons does not mean that the option of a tactical 
battlefield response is foreclosed (1.43). 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
Effective deterrence between the superpowers depends, not upon war-fighting 
superiority, nor upon the acquisition of an all-embracing defensive capability 
against nuclear war, but upon an absolute confidence on both sides in the 
invulnerability of powerful second strike forces. This defines the minimum 
level of nuclear weapons that are needed as a deterrent. China, France, and 
the UK can live with a more limited degree of confidence in the invulnerability 
of their deterrent, nor do they need as much power to give them the ultimate 
protection they need against nuclear blackmail. The overall levels of nuclear 
megatonnage and warheads that such a minimum capability represents is mini- 
scule in comparison to the present absurd levels (3.23). We will not prevent 
the disaster of a nuclear exchange if we allow the nuclear arms race to continue 
to spiral sharply upwards. To go on proliferating and expanding nuclear stock- 
piles is to head towards doomsday. Present policies of increasing megatonnage 
and warheads carry a far greater risk than the calculated risks of decreasing 
nuclear megatonnage and warheads (3.1,3.24)" 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
The idea of a stable overall nuclear balance has been an important one. But it 
is not a purely mechanistic matter, nor just an arithmetical missile count; it 
should be a rounded assessment of overall capability that embraces conven- 
tional weapons and even involves general economic and political factors (1.43). 
Within this context, arms control negotiations have been significant, but can 
hardly be said to have been successful. In order to control and reverse the 
arms race, it is necessary first to understand the mechanisms that drive it. The 
psychology and the politics of arms control are every bit as important as the 
technology and science (3.5). 
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(vi) Has force-planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
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The political, social and economic decisions that drive the arms race need to 
be understood in terms of human behaviour, of how political leaders and 
nations see each other, their motives, jealousies and pride. Above all, how 
feelings of national insecurity fed by military, scientific and industrial lobbying 
in democratic and communist systems, constantly undermine international 
security (3. S). Force planning has in the past been influenced too often by the 
military's wish always to have a comprehensive range of weaponry (1.43), 
while, for example, a Com, prehensive Test Ban Treaty has been opposed by 
US and UK scientists working in cahoots because they sensed their jobs were 
threatened (3.14). 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
future? 
The prospect of a deliberate all-out first strike by either side remains a very 
remote one so long as each continues to believe that it has a potent and invul- 
nerable second strike capability (3.11). 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
There are areas for concern here. The battlefield nuclear war-fighting strateg- 
ies of both East and West, for example, are associated with acute command 
and control problems (1.43), while SDI could bring forward highly automated 
systems, even with a launch-on-warning response (4.21). 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
There are two dangerous misconceptions, which have done much to stimulate 
concern about nuclear deterrence. Firstly, the folly of stressing the significance 
of measures to protect civilian populations against thermo-nuclear war. 
Governments must do something to protect their citizens, but to pretend that 
civil defence can add to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is an absurdity; 
and to pretend that it is anything more than a palliative for the population is 
a cruel deception. Secondly, the folly of planning for a nuclear war-fighting 
strategy. Governments must plan for limiting nuclear war if, by inadvertence 
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or design, nuclear weapons are even used, but loose talk of limited nuclear 
war has always been a contradiction in terms (4.2). 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
The predominant European motivation behind the 1979 theatre moderniz- 
ation decision was to lock the United States into deploying a new generation 
of ground launched nuclear missiles in Europe. President Carter's Adminis- 
tration did not think it was necessary to deploy a new generation of theatre 
nuclear weapons and were content to rely on strategic missiles, although in 
the end the Americans went along with the dominant wish of the Europeans 
(4.13). The effectiveness of the NATO deterrent, as of the Warsaw Pact deter- 
rent, depends critically on its conventional component first, and secondly on 
its having an invulnerable second strike nuclear offensive component. If both 
these components can be assured, then the whole range of intermediate nuclear 
weapons could be negotiated away (I. 4S). In the meantime, the danger of 
the forward deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons, with its `lose or use' 
dilemma, is now generally conceded (4.16). 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in t? 
President Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) was announced by 
the United States Administration with no warning or prior consultation. Out 
of the blue, President Reagan decided to call in question, not just the value of 
deterrence, but its very morality. No wonder that a stunned Europe responded 
with widespread scepticism and not a little disguised anger. Whatever happens 
over deployment, SDI is triggering off a highly expensive new arms race, 
without providing invulnerable defence, nor obviously enhancing deterrence. 
It has so far damaged arms control prospects, and, as we have seen, could 
bring forward highly automated systems, even with a `launch-on-warning' 
response (4.19-2I ). The philosophical case for the ABM Treaty, accepted by 
PresidentNixon and all his successors was that to attempt defensive invulner- 
ability for all one's territory, as distinct from one's second strike installations 
or command and control centres, was to dangerously feed the arms race. The 
Strategic Defence Initiative opens up the same philosophical issue. If one 
attempts a comprehensive defence in space against all intercontinental nuclear 
missiles, most of which are part of a second strike system, it will just produce 
another twist in the arms race, this time in space, not just on earth (3.13). 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
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Sceptics say that concern over proliferation is exaggerated. Contrary to many 
pessimistic predictions, there are still only five declared nuclear weapon states. 
But all is not as it seems. Israel and probably South Africa are to all intents 
and purposes already nuclear weapon states. India's explosion of a nuclear 
device in 1974 puts pressure on Pakistan, which would in turn stimulate 
Iraq and Libya. In Latin America, Brazil and Argentina have modest nuclear 
weapons programmes underway. Article VI of the Non Proliferation Treaty, 
signed in 1968 and entering into force in 1970, put an obligation on nuclear 
weapon states to enter into good faith negotiations on effective arms control 
and disarmament. The only conceivable way of stopping clandestine prolifer- 
ation is within the context of a changed international climate, with obvious 
moves from the nuclear weapon states to stop testing and to curb the arms 
race (3.6-io). 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
offer the best prospect for future stability? attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
The Reykjavik summit marks, not the end of serious arms control nego- 
tiations, but the beginning. I cannot understand why there is so much pessi- 
mism from sensible people about the outcome. All the ingredients are now 
present for a major arms deal, and I am confident it will happen. In Iceland, 
Mr Reagan and Mr Gorbachev took the sort of risks that distinguish the 
bureaucrat from the political leader (7). If the remaining three years of the 
i98os repeat the first seven years of the decade, there will be no substantial 
agreement to control or reduce arms - but accelerating deployments of new 
and more dangerous weapons. Yet a basis has been laid for extraordinary 
progress. An opportunity exists for the i98os to witness what only recently 
seemed to be a dream, but which now can become real: concrete accomplish- 
ments in disarmament, stability and peace. (9.8). 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
war between the great powers again incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
become a rational option and therefore affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
more likely? to initiate a third world war? 
If there were global nuclear disarmament while current conventional forces 
remain intact, Western Europe would be exposed to the undoubted Soviet 
conventional superiority (i. ¢1). This would clearly be dangerous. Global 
nuclear disarmament can only be realistically discussed against a background 
of political-military detente of the kind recommended by the Palme Com- 
mission (2. xv). 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited preferable to nuclear war? 
nuclear war? 
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We should not forget Field Marshal Lord Carver's warning about believing 
that conventional warfare is a comparatively harmless affair - one reason why 
some West German strategists accept even the risks of NATO's current tactical 
nuclear weapon strategy for their territory (1.40). As we recoil from the horror 
of nuclear war and the moral ambivalence surrounding nuclear deterrence, 
we should not let fading memories of the Second World War allow younger 
generations to forget that fifteen million in the Armed Services and between 
twenty-six and thirty-four million civilians, including six million Jews, lost 
their lives during that war. A new conventional war would be even more 
devastating to life and limb. Modern weapons have far greater destructive 
power, as experience in Vietnam and in the various Arab-Israeli were demon- 
strated (4.2). 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented would they not be bound to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
there be no incentive to resort to 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
We should remember the fate of the Baruch Plan' in 1946. In seeking a world 
without nuclear weapons the plan was never able to overcome the fatal flaw 
which was the penalty of the Hiroshima explosion. Even if the US destroyed 
their atomic weapons everyone knew they would still retain knowledge of how 
to construct a bomb. The Soviet Union not unreasonably feared that the US 
could quickly reconstruct a bomb if political or military relations deteriorated 
(3.3). . 
(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only 
feasible in a world where war itself is no 
longer a possibility? 
OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
hope of a rational world-order? 
We share the urgent wish for greater progress towards the ultimate aim of 
general and complete disarmament (2. xv). But this can only be achieved as 
part of a much wider reordering of the world community along the lines 
recommended in the Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament 
and Security Issues, chaired by Olof Palme. 
B NATO Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
OR Are NATO and lVTO forces relatively 
evenly matched? 
The Soviet Union has had conventional superiority in Europe since 1945. 
Although, somewhat surprisingly, both the US and Canada have continued 
to base forward forces in Europe, it has not been in such numbers that they 
can be described as anything more than a crucial contribution to a conventional 
delaying force, not by any stretch of the imagination a conventional holding 
i. Sec Notc on p. 242 
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force-The Warsaw Pact forces, on the other hand, are cl rly strong enough 
to sustain a NATO conventional attack (1.40). - 
If you talk to the NATO military commanders, the number one anxiety is 
ammunition stocks and the capacity to reinforce (6.18). 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
which will take advantage of unilateral threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western concessions and is only restrained Western technology and likely to respond 
and forced to accept arms-control positively to unconditional offers of 
agreements by Western determination and Western restraint within a general context 
strength? of detente? 
Some non-nuclear strategists sidestep arguments over Western conventional 
forces by saying that the Soviet Union has no intention of crossing the by now 
agreed East/West frontier in Europe; that Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia 
in 1968, and the threat of invasion to Poland in 1980-81 was within their own 
direct sphere of influence; that even Afghanistan was in the grey area of Soviet 
influence and not comparable in any way to an attack on Western Europe. 
Honest unilateralists find such rationalizations no substitute for a strong con- 
ventional defence strategy (1.41). We must not forget the crunching of 
freedom on the other side of the East-West divide since the end of the war. 
The memory of the Berlin airlift, the unrest in East Germany, and the Berlin 
wall must not be erased by time. Nor can we grow deaf to the cries for help 
that we could only listen to impotently from Hungary in 1956, and from 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and, more recently, from Solidarity in Poland. Recent 
history reminds us that we cannot take our present stability for granted. As 
Europeans, we know all too well the potential power and influence of the 
Soviet Union. Though the USSR is a European country in part, as it has grown 
to be a superpower, so has it become an alien force in a Europe of medium- 
sized and small countries (4.4-5). 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
preponderance such that NATO must nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
continue to be able to threaten early use of strategically suicidal? 
nuclear weapons? 
It is the acknowledged inbalance of conventional forces which has meant that 
the United States, France and Britain have never been prepared to sign a `no 
first use' nuclear weapons agreement. We are not confident that our conven- 
tional defence can stop a Warsaw Pact attack and we have felt it necessary to 
say that, if attacked in overwhelming numbers, we reserve the right to threaten 
the first use of nuclear weapons against a Warsaw Pact which has nuclear 
weapons (1.40). NATO countries also believe that, despite the Soviets' public 
position that they would not use nuclear weapons first, the Soviet Union 
nevertheless plans and exercises on the basis of the first use of nuclear weapons 
(2. xvi). It is an awesome reality that, as a result, Britain is one of many countr- 
ies committed to the illusion of a limited battlefield nuclear war-fighting strat- 
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egy. There should be an urgent reassessment of that strategy in both NATO 
and Warsaw Pact countries (2. xvi). But this can only be achieved if the central 
problem of the conventional imbalance is tackled at the same time, by negotiat- 
ing a reduction in Warsaw Pact conventional forces, and a strengthening where 
necessary of Western conventional capabilities. This is something that few 
non-nuclear strategists are prepared to face up to, and, until they do, their 
non-nuclear strategy lacks all credibility (1.40). 
More significant than a premature declaration of `no first use' of nuclear 
weapons would be the creation, step by step, of a functional battlefield nuclear 
weapon-free corridor, eventually reaching 15o, kilometres either side of the 
East-West frontier. The significance of this proposal is that it tackles, at the 
root, the very doctrine of limited nuclear war. By removing the weapons, it 
reduces substantially the chance of the early use of nuclear weapons and the 
likelihood of a conventional attack immediately triggering the first use of 
nuclear weapons. No longer could nuclear weapon installations twenty kilo- 
metres from the border be overrun within hours of a conventional attack. It 
deliberately makes it harder to progress from conventional war to nuclear war. 
In this sense it demands a radical change in the conventional military wisdom 
that sees a seamless robe of escalation running across conventional and nuclear 
strategies (2. xvit). 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
What is essential to effective deterrence is mutual confidence in the invulner- 
ability of powerful second strike nuclear forces. We should not believe that 
there has to be a matching, at every level and in every area, of every Soviet 
weapon system or strategy (4.3). In particular, a specifically Euro-strategic 
balance has never been necessary if there is a stable overall nuclear balance 
(1.43). To recognize this means adopting a political judgement about military 
sufficiency and rejecting the military wish for superiority. It means recognizing 
that such a wider judgement of the national and international good is bound 
to be easier with a democratic government than a totalitarian government and 
that is why the United States must not match every Soviet folly. It is a sign of 
immaturity, not virility, every time the Soviet military impose a new twist in 
the arms race for the Americans to respond. The military are part of the Soviet 
government's political decision-making. We should not be surprised in the 
West if the dynamics for the arms race appear stronger in the USSR at times. 
It should be the strength of our democracies that we do not feel bound to 
follow them blindly. We must be sufficiently skilled to de-escalate the arms 
race while preserving our security (3.12). 
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(v) Are NATO 'forward defence' and 'deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective 'emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
If dependence on the early use of nuclear weapons could be removed, and a 
reasonable conventional balance achieved, we should be able to agree a US- 
European conventional fighting strategy on the Central Front fairly easily 
(4.14). 
If we go for the so-called `smart' bombs and new technology, there is no 
doubt that we will be beginning to develop the conventional capacity to stop 
the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces massing, which at the moment is said to 
require tactical nuclear weapons. But there is a considerable price-tag on this 
(6. rg). 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
OR Is it domination by the two super-powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super-power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
The security of the West will continue to depend upon the presence of US 
troops in Europe, and on the potency of the US retaliatory nuclear second 
strike capability. But American perceptions have to be married with the differ- 
ing perceptions of their European partners. The Alliance no longer gives the 
United States automatic authority; something President Carter understood 
and President Reagan initially did not understand (1.44). Nor can we assume 
in perpetuity that senators and congressmen will still be able to persuade 
United States voters and taxpayers to fund 300,000 members of the United 
States Armed Forces on the mainland of Europe (S. 73S). So, to help check 
the influence and pressure of the Soviet superpower, it has always been inevi- 
table that a force would emerge from under the shadow of the United States 
that was fundamentally European in outlook and in interest. As nuclear 
weapons became more controversial within European politics, so the need to 
develop an inner European core within NATO to influence US nuclear strat- 
egy became urgent. What has been crucial for European security in the past 
is that at least two of three countries - Germany, France and the UK - have 
been bound together by relations of trust and intimacy. What cannot be gain- 
said is that if there could be a tripod of Franco-German-Anglo understanding 
instead of a mere bipod, the so-called European pillar within NATO would 
be immensely strengthened. This must include a nuclear component, because 
the present imbalance in NATO is essentially because of the United States 
dominance over nuclear strategy (4. S-7). Would this not be a more effective 
way of standing up to the United States when we dislike their strategy on 
nuclear arms control? Would not Europe be in a much firmer and clearer 
position when arguing for maintaining SALT 2 limits if it also had its own 
worked-out view on NATO's nuclear strategy? Would not the partnership be 
23W 
more equal if, instead of the United States speaking separately to the French, 
Germans, Italians and British, it could feel that there was an underlying 
cohesion on nuclear strategic matters among the main European partners? 
That is the logical development (5.740). 
But I am not postulating a European deterrent on the basis of replacing or 
excluding the United States, and the United States should certainly not be 
encouraged to withdraw. I would do everything in my power to hold the 
United States to the concept of the Atlantic Alliance for as long as humanly 
possible. If, as I hope, its forces remain for twenty, thirty or forty years, 
history will show that one of the reasons why they did stay was because there 
was a more equitable balance in the defence commitment to NATO by thflý 
European partners and the United States (5.737). 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western de, 'ences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
For Western unilateralists to give up the ability to threaten a second strike 
nuclear response in the face of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union is a decision of 
quite awesome dimensions. It goes against all past experience of how political 
leaders or nations actually act (1.41). The first nuclear arms race, it is worth 
recalling, was not between the Soviet Union and the United States, but was 
between Nazi Germany and the Allies. Those who in the Western democracies 
now challenge our possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent, while the 
Soviet Union has theirs, should ask themselves what would have happened if 
Hitler's scientists had been able to test a nuclear bomb before Hitler had taken 
his life on 3o April 1945? Can anyone doubt it would have been a very different 
world? (3.1). No sane person can be content to live in a world where peace 
between the great powers is preserved mainly through the mutual fear of 
nuclear devastation. Yet no sane person can allow their emotions to suspend 
their reason. We may instinctively want to stop our nuclear world and get off, 
but we know we cannot. Nuclear weapons exist. They cannot disappear or be 
wished away. The task is, painstakingly, to negotiate them away (4.2). 
C British Policy 
i The British Deterrent 
We are one of the world's five nuclear-weapon states. Our membership of 
NATO means we have our own conventional and nuclear forces on the East- 
West frontier in Germany, and as a permanent member of the Security Council 
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and a member of the Commonwealth we have many global responsibilities. No 
longer a superpower, we nevertheless hold a pivotal position and are capable of 
playing a constructive role over disarmament (2. xv-xvi). 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and `deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
independence and protects her from nuclear encourage proliferation? 
blackmail? 
Although the British deterrent can be said to provide ultimate protection 
against the possibility of nuclear blackmail (3.23), this does not make the 
suggestion that Britain should give up her independent deterrent intellectually 
untenable, so long as we accept that NATO should still retain nuclear and 
conventional deterrents, and provided also that we are content to rely upon 
the United States nuclear guarantee (5.734). 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
Many of us who believe in the need for nuclear deterrence for NATO find the 
case for Britain remaining a nuclear weapon state and contributing to NATO's 
nuclear deterrent strategy has been substantially enhanced by political events 
and US attitudes over the last twenty-five years. Few, if any, for instance, 
would argue against replacing Polaris on the grounds that were deployed in 
1962 against the purchase of Polaris, that the capability was unnecessary, 
because we could rely totally on the US nuclear guarantee. There is too much 
concern about successive responses by the President of the United States to 
the Soviet Union and to Europe across the UK political spectrum for that to 
carry conviction (4.10). We must consider the changes that are taking place 
in the United States. At one time, one in four of the United States population 
had their origins in Europe. Now it is one in ten. There has been a massive 
shift of population towards the western and southern states. Nobody who 
knows and loves the United States can fail to appreciate that the Pacific orien- 
tation is much stronger than it was ten, let alone twenty years ago (S. 73S). In 
these circumstances, as we have seen, the European defence pillar must be 
strengthened. But it is impossible to see how this can be confined to conven- 
tional deterrence and deliberately exclude strengthening nuclear deterrence. 
A United Kingdom decision to abandon or phase out our own nuclear weapons 
would not, to put it mildly, be the most convincing way of starting to 
strengthen the European pillar within NATO (4. II). 
For all these reasons, greater Anglo-French cooperation makes the utmost sense, 
not as an exclusive realtionship, but as an inclusive European relationship. The core 
of such an arrangement would be to build on existing Franco-German cooperation 
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over nuclear strategy on the continent. At the moment, those who scoff at the con- 
cept of a European minimum deterrent are trying to have it both ways. They are 
arguing for British independence while tying themselves in for the next thirty years 
to American hardware. Yet they would only ever use that American hardware inde- 
pendently if the American nuclear guarantee did not exist. When one considers the 
potential for the Americans to interfere with that Trident missile hardware, in a 
situation where their guarantee had been withdrawn, one must question how inde- 
pendent such a system really is. Certainly it is a question, with Britain a member of 
the European Community and arguing for strengthening political cooperation, that 
is far more relevant in the latter part of the t98os than it ever was in the early part of 
the i 96os (8.6-7). In future, the UK must moor permanently alongside continental 
Europe, instead of merely swinging at anchor in the Channel (4.7-8). 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee independent British initiatives more likely 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
recognition of it? involvement? 
If Europe is more self-sufficient in its defence, the United States will not pull 
out of the NATO alliance. It will strengthen those in the United States who 
wish to remain in NATO if they feel that Europe is making a strong conven- 
tional and nuclear commitment. That view is held by many Americans, and 
many Americans stationed in Europe who are responsible for defence decisions 
in NATO also hold that view. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe is 
only one example arguing that a stronger European defence commitment 
makes it easier for senators and congressmen to retain the American commit- 
ment to Europe (S. 737). 
I passionately believe that strengthening the European pillar is the mechan- 
ism whereby the United States nuclear guarantee will actually be upheld. It is 
the mechanism whereby we will see a continued United States' presence in 
Europe and a significant one. Everything I heard in Europe confirmed this 
belief. For do not believe that in five years' time there will be 325,000 US 
troops in Europe. Congress will reduce that upper limit. within that period. Far 
better for such a change to be done by agreement, and for it to be introduced in 
a way that is coherent and planned, than for it to be done as a result of unilateral 
decision by the US Congress out of frustration. We know this is likely to 
happen, and it is obvious common sense to anticipate it happening (6.2). 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are afforded at the expense of conventional 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
This is a time for rethinking the budget. During the next three years there will be a 
reduction in real terms in defence spending of more than four and a half per cent. 
All of us should be prepared to reconsider past positions and to think long and hard 
about the future of our armed services, and, in particular, about how we strengthen 
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the European pillar of NATO (5.732,743). We have seen why it is essential that 
there is an effective nuclear component in Europe defences. But if on no other 
grounds, we should reconsider the Trident programme on grounds of expense. 
Despite the money already allocated, I still believe that it is possible to cancel Tri- 
dent. If we do not do so, it will cut savagely into our defence capacity (5.736). The 
`Towpath Papers" puncture the Government's repeated claims that they are plan- 
ning for a fifty-strong surface fleet, and show that provision will not be made for 
building Hunter Killer submarines during the Trident submarine construction 
programme. So Trident not only eats into the surface fleet and endangers new 
amphibious provision, but it will reduce the Hunter Killer submarine fleet, which 
is the equivalent in firepower and effev . tiveness to the battleships of the past (8.4). For that reason, I am prepared to look at less powerful, but nevertheless effective, 
Alternatives (5-737). 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
disarmament have no effect on other proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
countries and only serve to weaken British British prestige? Would British 
influence and allow France unchallenged disarmament within the context outlined in 
ascendancy in Europe? B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
If Britain were ever to give up nuclear weapons, it should only be as part of a 
consensus calculated decision really contributing to the end of ridding the 
whole world of nuclear weapons. (4.23). In present circumstances it would 
have little effect in that direction: for example, the decision of France or 
Britain or both to give up their nuclear weapons. would not affect the Soviet 
or US arsenals (i. ¢S). 
As it is, one of the arguments for Britain remaining a nuclear weapons state 
is that it is thereby able to use its influence in some areas to achieve arms 
control - for example, our relationship with the US is sufficiently robust for 
Britain to maintain an independent position on a test ban (3.22). But the 
critical factor is European. What is vital to Europe is that France should 
not be left as the only European nuclear weapon state. For the European 
Community, particularly in political cooperation, depends on a balance 
between the member states - large and small, nuclear and non nuclear. Apart 
from developing new missiles, there is no good reason why France and the 
UK should not discuss the theory behind their existing strategic weapons, and 
to widen those discussions to include the Federal Republic. Discussions would 
not compromise the independent control of forces. But it would mean that 
slowly, through the habit of working together, Britain and France would build 
up a similar perception about nuclear strategy. This would give a solidity to 
the way Europe approaches the United States. It would reinforce the vital 
hinge which must link Europe to North America (4.1 r-12, r8). 
i. Naval documents dropped by mistake on a towpath in Sonning, Berkshire, and found by a 
freelance journalist. 
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(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
continue to ensure effective British strategic all the drawbacks listed above? 
defence into the 21st century? 
We have already mentioned cost. In addition, Trident represents a very sub- 
stantial increase in nuclear capability over and above Polaris. It is a very good 
system, and I am pleased that the United States has it, because the Soviet 
Union has the same capabilities as those that are contained in the Trident 
system. But it represents a dramatic Boo per cent increase in the number of 
warheads - from 64 to 512, and a 1,200 per cent increase in the operational 
availability of warheads - from 32 to 384. The question for Britain is whether 
we can afford it, and whether, in arms control terms, it makes any sense for 
a country that has always believed in a minimum deterrent. It is whither we 
can get a reasonable nuclear minimum deterrent that will make a contribution 
to Europe's minimum deterrent for less money than we would have to spend 
on Trident. There are a number of options and we should look seriously at 
them. There are existing systems like the American Tomahawk missiles, or 
the possibility of building similar French or British cruise missiles. And there 
are other alternatives. (5.736-7). 
My own view is that the submarine option is still the best, and Tomahawk 
cruise missiles the cheapest. Nothing has done more harm than those people 
who have tried to argue that it is Trident or nothing. Some of the most senior 
military figures in this country now worry that we are getting ourselves into a 
situation where, if we go on insisting that it is Trident or nothing, then it may 
be that `nothing' is the answer (6.12, i6). 
2 NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear met by strengthening conventional forces 
systems upon which her security depends? where necessary within an overall non- 
Would refusal to do so fat^tly weaken the nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
alliance? 
There is a logical inconsistency and moral weakness in the Labour Party's 
case. The logic of disowning nuclear weapons - not just our own but our 
allies - leads progressively to the justification of neutralism and to a lesser 
commitment to NATO, and it leads eventually through a grave impact upon 
the cohesion of NATO, to its dismemberment as we know it (5.735). 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain make US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affairs 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
It should be matter of concern to us all, irrespective of our political position, 
that Northern European Socialist International parties have developed such a 
hostile attitude to nuclear weapons. France can change governments from 
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Right to Left and back to the Right with a barely perceptible shift in nuclear 
strategy. The advent of the SPD to government in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, or the Dutch Labour Party in Holland would, however, lead to a 
perceptible tremor in the NATO Alliance. Whereas, the advent of the British 
Labour Party into government would, in marked contrast, trigger an earth- 
quake within NATO. The creation of the SDP in the UK owed much to the 
dangerous defence policy progressively adopted by Labour since 1980. That 
policy is, in 1986, even more irresponsible and damaging to the collective 
strength of NATO. Now Labour is challenging the basic NATO strategy of 
nuclear deterrence. They are pledged to throw the United States out of all 
nuclear bases in the UnitediKingdom, as well as cancelling Trident and decom- 
missioning Polaris. The effect of such a decision on opinion in the United 
States would be devastating (4.15-16). We should consider what has happened 
to the ANZUS treaty', which has been effectively set aside because the United 
States was not prepared to be a member of a treaty organization when one 
member of it had said that ships carrying nuclear weapons could not go 
through its ports (5.728). Hopefully, Labour will never be allowed to put such 
a policy into practice (4.16). 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
The decision of France or Britain- to give up their nuclear weapons would 
not ensure that either country avoided nuclear weapons being used on their 
territories. France has always been an extension of the European battlefield, 
Britain a strategic military island that would have to be towed away into the 
Southern Atlantic before it would be inviolate. A non-nuclear Britain would 
be just as subject to nuclear blackmail, and possibly to nuclear attack (1.45). 
(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
It is the deterrent value of the mutually assured second strike capability held 
by the superpowers that underpins peace in Europe (3.11). So it is dishonest 
of the Labour Party to claim that it will not depend on the American guarantee. 
It knows perfectly well that it is only because of the American nuclear guaran- 
tee that is can even pretend to indulge in the luxury of unilateralism. How can 
it justify throwing the United States out of its nuclear bases here, while still 
i. The ANZUS Treaty of 195 t between the US, Australia and New Zealand, set aside because 
of the anti-nuclear policy adopted by New Zealand in 1984. 
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relying on membership of a NATO Alliance whose strategy is firmly based on 
conventional and nuclear deterrence? (S. 728). 
Moral Considerations 
Some allege that the consequences of nuclear weapons are so morally outrage- 
ous that it is immoral even to threaten their use, when the threat, to be 
credible, must carry a readiness to act and risk an uncontrolled escalation. 
Some argue that there is no morality to killing of any kind and therefore none 
in war. In this sense the arguments of the pacifist have an absoluteness that 
no argument can easily confound, and deserve respect. Religious thought has 
through the ages tried to wrestle with the moral dilemma of war, Fand many 
compromises have evolved over time, some even to be blessed. But there has 
always been a sense that there is some undefined limit to the extent of the 
compromise. To many, nuclear weapons cross that threshold, and they rightly 
demand verifiable reductions by multilateral negotiations. 
But those who advocate a non-nuclear defence strategy in terms of morality 
or practicality must rebut the argument that nuclear deterrence is the only 
way of preventing war between the great powers, including nuclear war. If it 
is possible to show that there is any other way of doing this, while potential 
enemies still possess a nuclear capability and a dangerous conventional super- 
iority, then there is no possible justification for their retention (1.39). But at 
the moment there is no other way. The horror of nuclear war and the moral 
ambivalence surrounding nuclear deterrence should not blind us to the appal- 
ling devastation of conventional war, or to the fact that precipitate unilateral 
nuclear disarmament on moral grounds might make nuclear war itself more 
likely. The main problem of a unilateralist strategy is that it does not try to 
understand war, and by its impatience can provoke war (4.2,1.42). Nuclear 
disarmament can only safely be achieved by painstaking multilateral nego- 
tiation. It cannot be achieved by moralizing (3.5). 
Recommendations 
NOTE. These recommendations are deduced by the editor from the sources already 
cited. In each case references are given. 
In Britain, those who argue for multilateral negotiations and those who advo- 
cate unilateral disarmament measures, those who wish to remain fully commit- 
ted to NATO and those who espouse neutrality, have more in common than 
they often realize. The `Programme of Action' detailed in the Palme Com- 
mission Report is a coherent package of measures around which all can rally 
to reverse the present deeply disturbing trends (a. xv). 
r Yes - if current negotiations for deep cuts fail (to. rr-i2). 
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2 Yes, there should be an immediate moratorium on weapons testing in 
space (3.13). The ABM Treaty should be clarified and reinforced (9.2-4). 
3 Yes. There should be a complete ban over a three- or preferably five- 
year period on all testing, and an immediate moratorium on all tests once 
agreement is reached and prior to the treaty being ratified (2. xix). Argu- 
ments against this do not hold up. 
(a) Can a test ban be verified to give a sufficiently credible guarantee that there 
will be no cheating? This is a complex technical subject, but most of. 
the problems that seemed insurmountable in the i96o's have now 
been overcome. There is widespread agreement that this is no longer 
a reason for not pressing ahead C3.16-22). 
(b) Would a ban damage the safety and reliability of the existing nuclear stock- 
pile? The `stockpile' or `shelf-life' argument only surfaced within the 
context of a CTB as a major issue in 1977-8, when coincidentally for 
the first time it looked as if the breakthrough in verification was such 
that a CTB might actually be signed. Up until i98o, not a single 
American or British nuclear test had been undertaken on stockpiled 
weapons. The self-life argument was a deliberate diversion, the pro- 
tection of a vested interest by the nuclear testing laboratories at Los 
Alamos, Livermore and Aldermaston (3. z4). 
(c) Would a ban prevent new weapon development as part of assuring an 
invulnerable second strike capability? The US and the Soviet Union 
have such a vast backlog of detailed and wide ranging knowledge of 
all likely new warhead designs that a CTB would impose few inhi- 
bitions to their continuing to develop new weapons systems. In any 
case, computer simmulation techniques are now available in compen- 
sation (3. IS-16). 
A comprehensive Test Ban Treaty could be a crucial stage in preventing 
further proliferation and moving towards minimum deterrence. 
4 For reasons explained in B(iii) this is not critical. What is important is 
a shift of NATO strategy away from reliance on the early use of nuclear 
weapons. 
S Yes, within the context proposed in AI(iii) and (iv). There should be a 
fifty per cent cut in strategic systems. INF systems should be, first reduced, 
then removed from Europe west of the Urals (9.4,6. r9). 
6A functional battlefield nuclear weapon-free corridor should be established 
along the East-West frontier in Europe (see B(iii)). 
7 Yes (See A2(A)(vi)). 
8 This should be part of a move towards minimum deterrence (see AI(iv)). 
The eventual goal of complete nuclear disarmanent depends upon other, wider 
factors (see A. (B)(iv)). 
9 See 8. 
to Yes (see A2(A)(v)). 
II See 4. 
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12 Yes, within the context of Ai(iii) A2(A)(iv) & B(iv). 
13 No (Sec B(vi) & Ci(ii)). 
14 No (See B(vi) & C2(ii)). 
15 See 6. 
16 No. But Britain should be prepared to give up her independent forces as 
part of a general settlement aimed at global nuclear disarmament (see CI(v)). 
17 So far as concerns any money saved by abandoning the Trident pro- 
gramme, yes (Cr(iv)). 
18 Yes, as part of a general settlement with the Warsaw Pact (see Ai(iii) & 
B(iii)). 
19 No (See C2(ii)). 
20 Yes (See C2(i)). 
'It? 
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Biographical Note 
Born in 1929, James Schlesinger was a professor at the University of Virginia 
between 1955 and 1963. First a senior staff member, he was then Director of 
Strategic Studies at the RAND Corporation between 1963 and 1967. Between 
1971 and 1973 he was chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission. He 
served as Secretary of Defense between 1973 and 1975, and as Secretary for 
Energy between 1977 and 1979. Since then, among other things, he has been 
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. 
As Secretary of Defense under President Nixon, James Schlesinger is asseci- 
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ated with a move away from explicit reliance upon the threat of direct attack 
on enemy centres of population, often referred to in shorthand as `Mutual 
Assured Destruction', and towards the elaboration of a varied range of selec- 
tive options aimed principally against enemy military forces. 
Editorial Comment 
This set of answers was given in an interview in London on November 14, 
1986. It is full of interest for readers who want to understand something of 
the thinking of a distinguished strategist and statesman, who has helped to 
shape current American nuclear policy, but is at the same time critical of a 
number of aspects of it. He has been involved with questions of nuclear strat- 
egy since the 1950s, and, as his answers under Moral Considerations show, 
with its morality. The moral dimension to the move away from a policy of 
assured destruction is stressed. James Schlesinger's response is informed by 
the experience of having been responsible for the conduct of public policy at 
a time when many Americans felt that the Soviet Union took advantage of a 
period of notable United States restraint (for example, see the answer to ques- 
tion B(ii)). But he is as impatient with what he regards as the alarmism of 
critics on the political right in the United States, as he is with what he describes 
as the fantasies indulged in by critics on the political left in Britain. 
The answers to questions such as B(vi) and Cz(ii) give British readers an 
American perspective on European defence, while the answers to Ci(iii), C2(i) 
and C2(ii), show how much room there is or is not seen to be for proposals to 
abandon an independent British deterrent, and to withdraw unilaterally from 
NATO's nuclear dispositions. 
JAMES SCHLESINGER 
A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 194S? 
Without nuclear deterrence we might have had far greater instability in the 
world. Particularly in the years immediately after World War II, the American 
strategic nuclear advantage provided stability for Western Europe in the face 
of what was believed to be overwhelming Soviet conventional military super- 
iority. Nuclear weapons were seen as the great equalizer. To be sure, there 
are always other factors involved in such complex historical processes, and, 
even without nuclear deterrence, we might not have come to blows. But 
nuclear weapons have been the principal element in the post-war military 
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scene, and, as such, have reinforced the condition of peace. Without them, 
the maintenance of peace might have been bought, if at all, then only at the 
cost of greater Soviet influence, if not domination, over much of continental 
Western Europe. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
The critics of current policy on the right-hand side in your analysis (who are 
on the political left) have here taken over a position that has long been of 
concern to prudent military planners in the West. Before there was mutual 
possession of invulnerable second-strike forces, that is for the first twenty-five 
or thirty years after World War II, American nuclear superiority offset Soviet 
military advantage elsewhere, so that the Soviets had no desire to test Amer- 
ican resolve. And the Americans, given the nature of the American democracy, 
had no ambitions to expand by pressing the Soviet Union into territorial con- 
cessions. But the establishment of an invulnerable second-strike force on the 
part of the Soviet Union has removed that security, and there has, it seems to 
me, been appropriate concern that the Soviets might take advantage of what 
could be seen to be a stalemated condition to encroach at lower levels. It is, 
indeed, a serious problem. But it is, perhaps, ironical that this issue has been 
raised by some of those on the political left over here, because it suggests a 
malevolent intent on the part of the Soviet Union, which in other areas they 
are loath to concede. 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
The possession of an invulnerable second-strike force remains for the West a 
necessary condition for deterrence, but, as we have just seen, not a sufficient 
condition. We need something in addition to that second strike force, prefer- 
ably conventional, but in view of Soviet conventional strength, also a strategy 
of selective nuclear strikes, in order to maintain the credibility of the deterrent. 
This is particularly important for the effectiveness of extended deterrence - 
especially for the protection of those parts of Western Europe which are con- 
tiguous to the Soviet Union and therefore lie most open to Soviet military 
pressure. 
By broadening the concept of how theatre or strategic nuclear weapons may 
be deployed in this way, we have dramatically enhanced deterrence for the 
West, and thereby raised the threshold which represents the barrier between 
peace and war. The critics represented in the right-hand column are right 
when they say that a strategy of selective strikes lowers the threshold between 
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the same. Arms control has been a visible success, albeit a partial success. One 
has only to think of what the expansion of offensive weapons would have been 
on both sides if we had not had the ABM treaty of 1972. We in the United 
States had planned to respond to the Soviet Moscow defence system by 
expanding our number of strategic warheads if necessary to 50,000. Surely 
those on the political left in the UK can understand the difference between 
io, ooo and 50,000 warheads, just as their counterparts on the political right 
in the United States should be able to. 
(vi) Has force-planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified' post hoc? 
As in so much of this there are no black-and-white answers. There are only 
shadings. In this case the critics represented in the right-hand column have a 
point. It is only a half-truth, to be sure, but it is a point. Technological 
developments have at times had an impact on strategic force structure that was 
not clearly perceived in advance. We have not always controlled deployment as 
well as we should have done in this respect. Incidentally, in the West this 
problem comes in part from the nature of democracy, which is something that 
we value for other reasons. The rapid turnover of governments in the West, 
the rapid turnover of senior officials in defence and foreign policy, means that 
the continuity is provided elsewhere, and the preservation of a strategic vision 
which dominates deployment is difficult to achieve. But critics should not 
forget the power of the Soviet military-industrial complex here. It varies from 
time to time, shrinking when there is a long-established leader like Stalin or 
Brezhnev, but sometimes playing a critical role in periods of transition. So 
there is some truth in what the critics say. But it is only a half-truth. In the 
United States the role of these so-called `vested interests' is much less than it 
is in the Soviet Union. They can influence judgements at the margin, but they 
do not create and remove governments, and do not determine overall policy. 
And critics should reflect more carefully on the role of technology. Those who 
say that, once we have achieved an invulnerable second strike force, we can 
relax and stop competing in arms, should recall how we acquired such a force 
and how hard we have to work to maintain it. If they would think back to the 
1950s, when we were dependent upon bombers, all soft and all located on a 
very small number of bases in the United States, and when we were frightened 
to death at the thought of a Soviet surprise attack, they will know that it was 
the technology of the ICBM and the SLBM that provided the invulnerability 
that they now so rightly praise. And this would never have come into existence 
if their views about the impetus of technology and the power of vested interests 
had prevailed. 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
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(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
future? 
It seems to be intriguing that the political left in Britain, which, so far as I 
know, has not had the deepest admiration for Mr Reagan, should here be 
campaigning under his slogan from 1980 - the `window of vulnerability'. In 
the United States it has been the right wing that has talked about the increasing 
threat from time-urgent first-strike weapons. Some might think that we have 
a `Pearl Harbor complex' - that suddenly, one bright morning, there will be 
a nuclear Pearl Harbor. I regard all of this as much exaggerated, whether it 
comes from the British left or the American right. This would be a decision 
taken only by irrational people. There will be no such nuclear bolt from the 
blue, either from the East or from the West. But I share the desire of the 
critics to improve the stability of the balance, and to avoid anything that 
increases, however modestly, the capability and therefore the temptation to 
initiation. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
To those who argue as in the right-hand column here I answer with an English 
phrase - balderdash! Command and control systems will never be perfect, but 
they will probably be good enough, even under wartime conditions, and even 
though they may be damaged, to transmit the necessary minimum of orders. 
But, more important that this, each side knows that the command and control 
system on the other will be capable of this, and therefore both will refrain 
from those actions that would inevitably put their own societies at risk. 
Whether they be here or in the Soviet Union, and whatever their public 
professions, the political leaders that I have observed tend to be extraordinarily 
prudent men. They will not recklessly get themselves involved in nuclear war. 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
I always appreciate clairvoyance. There is no guarantee that a nuclear exchange 
would be limited. But it is clear that it is in the interest of both sides that such 
an exchange be terminated without major damage to either society. An initial, 
very limited, employment of nuclear weapons will make the leaders on both 
sides very sober people. I find it odd that those who parade under the banner 
of the rationality of man should come to such negative conclusions regarding 
the rationality of the leaders. 
25L, 
conventional and nuclear war. It is this that enhances deterrence. Where they 
are wrong is to imply that this is more dangerous than the alternative. They 
do not seem to understand that it is the lowered threshold between conven- 
tional and nuclear war that, by offsetting the lack of credibility of an exclus- 
ively second strike force, thereby at the same time offsets the invitation to sub- 
deterrent encroachment. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, as the 
English might say, and the reality is that the strategy of flexible response has 
been sufficient to deter the Soviet Union. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the stlperpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
On the whole, the variety of nuclear weapons systems has stabilized deter- 
rence. One would not want to be dependent on a single type of system that 
could, for example, only go after Moscow. That would lack credibility. It is 
the richness of the Western deterrent, provided primarily by the United 
States, that provides its credibility. The notion of having a very simplistic 
strategy -a minimum deterrent - which afflicts those who argue as in the 
right-hand column, would be dangerous. The critics do have a point about 
numerical redundancy. I think that the sizes of the two forces could be cut. 
That is why we are engaged in arms control discussions. But the numerical 
redundancy is relatively trivial when set against the overall picture. Insofar as 
the Soviet Union has aggressive intentions, it is the richness of the Western 
deterrent that restrains those ambitions. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
Let me state very clear that we would not prefer rough equivalence. We would 
prefer to have an edge. But the Soviet Union is unlikely to be generous enough 
to provide us with that edge, so we must settle for rough equivalence. And 
that rough equivalence could be achieved by unilateral appreciation of mutual 
dependence. But it is much more likely to be achieved through arms control 
negotiations. That is why we pursue arms control negotiations. Let me address 
myself to the issues raised in the column on the right, because I find myself 
bemused by the fact that the attack on arms control, which in Britain tends 
to come from the political left, happens to be precisely the attack on arms 
control that in the United States comes from the political right. 
In the United States arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union have 
been under attack, because it is said that arms control has never worked and 
that it has simply been a way of adjusting to the arms race. My response to 
both the political left in the UK and the political right in the United States is 
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(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
deterrence? nuclear threshold? 
Here I must pay tribute to the admonition of the critics in the right-hand 
column. We must always try to make sure that there is a clearly marked 
boundary line between conventional and nuclear war. There have been those 
in the atomic energy laboratories in the United States, and in the military 
establishments, who have tried to erode that boundary. In the 195os, happily 
once for a brief period, it was American and NATO policy that nuclear 
weapons were to be treated like conventional weapons. We should not allow 
the advances in the technology of nuclear weapons to erode what is a very 
important political line of distinction. I am delighted to be able to pay some 
tribute to the critics here. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in r? 
This is an immensely complicated subject in which one must deal with nuances 
of meaning. Both sides represented here have taken too black-and-white an 
attitude to it. The President of the United States, to my mind regrettably, 
jumped the traces and turned the whole strategic defence issue on its head. 
Normally, in research and development programmes, we try to resolve the 
technical questions before we draw conclusions about strategy and force struc- 
ture. In this case, radical conclusions were drawn, even though there are 
innumerable technical problems that have not been resolved. That is very 
imprudent. And it is ironical that such imprudence comes under the banner 
of Conservation. On the other hand, the critics represented in the right-hand 
column have rejected clearly required research and development activities. 
Why clearly required? Because, whatever the claims of the Americans, the 
initiative happens to come from the Soviet Union. The Soviets have been 
vigorously working in this area for some time. It is indispensable that we at 
least match what they are doing. Does the SDI offer the hope of an effective 
defence against nuclear weapons? The answer is simply, no. This is an illusion 
which may have captivated American society, but the fact that an illusion 
captivates American society does not transform it into reality. It remains an 
illusion. 
Can Strategic Defence enhance deterrence? Possibly. If it could be used to 
protect second-strike forces and were guided by arms control, it might have 
such a result. But, until we know what we are doing, the burden of proof rests 
upon anyone who wants to upset the ABM treaty. 
But the most important benefit of Strategic Defence is that it provides 
enormous impetus to the Arms Control process. The Soviets are deeply 
concerned about the SDI, and this is very useful in eliciting a response for 
them, particularly with regard to offensive weapons. Of course, for those 
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on the political left in Britain and on the political right in the United States, 
who curiously enough reject arms control for the same reasons, the role of 
the SDI in arms control negotiations is not, as I would see it, beneficial, 
but pernicious. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
The first point to be made is that the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent by 
the two major powers is essential for the preservation of the civilization that 
they represent. So, even if there is a link between the threat of proliferation 
and continuing dependence by the great powers on nuclear deterrence, this 
does not have any policy implications. There is no way that we are going to 
give up the deterrent in order to ease whatever indignities the non-nuclear 
powers may feel have been heaped upon them. 
The second point is that the link is much more complex than critics are 
inclined to suggest. The nuclear capable signatories to the Non Proliferation 
Treaty have agreed to come to the aid of any non-nuclear state threatened by 
nuclear attack. So a well-protected nuclear deterrent of the kind we have now 
is what provides deterrence against nuclear attack against the non-nuclear 
states. In the emotional diatribes on these issues, this kind of underlying 
reality is sometimes forgotten. 
No doubt for those who have refrained from acquiring nuclear capabilities 
it is somewhat psychologically disturbing to see the superpowers steadily 
expanding their nuclear arsenals. But this is a state of affairs with which they 
simply have to live - and it is one with which they have so far been prepared 
to live. There is no inevitability about the pace of nuclear proliferation. It is 
a serious problem. But it is a problem that is not adequately dealt with by 
hand-wringing. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations 
offer the best prospect for future stability? 
OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
The notion that arms control is an illusion is one shared by the political left in 
Britain and the political right in the United States. But they come to con- 
clusions which are diametrically opposed. For the former, the conclusion 
points towards nuclear disarmament; for the latter, it points towards a techno- 
logically perfect strategic defence which will make the United States invulner- 
able. Both sides operate on the basis of a rejection of reality. 
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effectively executed that provides us with a protection against the instabilities 
of 1914, to which the critics quite rightly point. 
B Nato Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically evenly matched? 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
It is maintained in some circles in Britain that the two sides are relatively 
evenly matched in non-nuclear capabilities? That is touching. The eye of faith 
can discern things that an observer of reality cannot discern, I wish that these 
people, who can equate 200 Pact divisions with forty NATO divisions, 
together with all the problemsbf deployment, organization and reinforcement,! 
would in addition look at some of the regional disparities. On the north flank 
of NATO, along the Norwegian-Soviet border, the Norwegians have a couple 
of companies forward and a brigade some hundreds of miles back at Bodo, up 
against six Soviet divisions, which can be rapidly reinforced. Only the eye of 
faith can discern equality in such circumstances. There is some truth in the 
claim that at times we have exaggerated Soviet advantages. But this notion of 
equality is a much greater exaggeration the other way. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
which will take advantage of unilateral threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western concessions and is only restrained Western technology and likely to respond 
and forced to accept arms-control positively to unconditional offers of 
agreements by Western determination and Western restraint within a general context 
strength? of detente? 
Reality is more complex than any simple formulations of this kind. The critics 
are right, insofar as the Soviets feel themselves to be encircled and threatened. 
But the conclusion is wrong. The whole of history since 1945 shows that the 
Soviets do not respond positively to unconditional offers, but take them to be 
a sign of disunity and weakness in the West. They are an opportunistic power 
and take advantage of such opportunities. Indeed, it is because the Soviet 
Union feels itself to be threatened that it responds in this way, rather than 
striking a final accommodation. Afghanistan can be seen in this light - and 
the whole protective cordon in Eastern Europe is such an insulation. A true 
detente would of course be desirable. But, when the Soviets had it all rolling 
their way with regard to the climate of detente in the 1970s, they took gross 
advantage of it. These first-strike weapons, which those whose views are 
recorded in the right-hand column criticize, were deployed by the Soviet 
Union during the 1970s, when the United States was standing fast. The Soviets 
are only likely to be induced to accept balance and detente by an appreication 
of Western strength. 
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(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
preponderance such that NATO must nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
continue to be able to threaten early use of strategically suicidal? 
nuclear weapons? 
NATO's dependency upon nuclear weapons has been excessive. NATO has 
used nuclear weapons as a kind of crutch. It is to be regretted. In my judge- 
ment it should be lessened. We should move further and further away from 
the early use of nuclear weapons, as circumstances and the build-up of conven- 
tional capabilities permit. It would be delightful if those, particularly in 
Western Europe, who have been most vigorous in their criticism of NATO's 
dependency on nuclear weapons, would also be the foremost proponents of a 
major build-up c; f non-nuclear forces. That is the obvious logical conclusion. 
Do we discern that here in the United Kingdom or on the Continent? Regret- 
tably, no. These countries in Western Europe are spending three per cent, 
four per cent of their GNP on defence: to have a conventional balance they 
would have to spend eight or nine per cent. That is not where those on the 
political left want to spend their money, so they indulge in these fantasies of 
a pre-existing conventional balance. They are right about the desirability of 
moving away from dependency upon nuclear weapons, but they fail altogether 
to see and advocate those measures that are necessary in order to do so. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
The critics in the right-hand column here stress the robustness of the nuclear 
balance which they earlier saw as unstable. In order to form a judgement on 
the real world, one needs to eliminate inconsistencies. Generally speaking, we 
need to match the Soviet Union in the gross - not in each and every component. 
The fact that the West has initiated most of the innovations in the nuclear area 
once again reflects Western weakness in non-nuclear forces. We have seen 
what the remedy for that is. 
As for the recommendation of a freeze - stability is more important than 
numerical ceilings. For example, had there been a freeze before hardened silos 
and submarine-based forces had been developed, the result would have been 
that second-strike forces would today be more vulnerable, an outcome which 
I would not want to see. A mutual freeze leading to something valuable near- 
term could be useful, but a unilateral freeze by the West would be likely simply 
to increase overall Soviet advantage and weaken the stability that protects us. 
Similarly, had we had a Comprehensive Test Ban in 1963, our stockpile 
would be far less secure and far less safe than it is today. We will need a limited 
number of low yield tests in the future in order to validate the stockpile. That 
is why I talk about Test Limitation, not a Comprehensive Test Ban. 
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(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
A Soviet perception of our ability to strike deeply weakens Soviet confidence in the 
superiority of their conventional forces and, to that extent, reduces our reliance 
on nuclear weapons. This logic should induce critics of NATO nuclear policy to 
approve deep strike strategies. Certainly alternative strategies, in the form of 
stronger defences, can be explored. But they tend to come up against political diffi- 
culty in Germany, because they suggest the permanent division of the nation. 
Emerging Technologies have, of course, been proposed by the Reagan adminis- 
tration. I would not count my chickens before they are hatched. I would not want 
to become dependent urpn Emerging Technologies before they have emerged! 
(vi) Is it the presence ofAmerican front-line troops OR Is it domination by the two super powers that 
and the tying-in of theatre nuclear forces to the poses the greatest threat to European integrity? 
American strategic deterrent that guarantees Would Europe be safer decoupled from the 
W. European security? Should American super power nuclear confrontation? Should 
policies therefore be supported? Europe be made a nuclear weapon free zone? 
I am not sure that I am the most objective commentator on this matter. I 
spent some years fighting the Mansfield amendment for the withdrawal of 
American troops from Europe. ' and it was in my years as Secretary of Defense 
that I developed the concept of the NATO triad, in which the three legs of 
the triad mutually supported one another. American troops in Europe are an 
essential ingredient in European security, because these small and medium- 
sized states need the backing of the only available Western superpower if they 
are to withstand the pressures of the Soviet Union. That is fundamental. Any 
challenge to that is based upon a misunderstanding. 
Now, with regard to the issue of the two superpowers providing the greatest 
threat to European integrity, these critics apparently cannot distinguish 
between the superpower that threatens them, and the superpower that protects 
them. I pity them in their inability to make such an elementary distinction. I 
would remind them that the reason why American forces are here in Europe 
is the fear and desperation that came over Europe, particularly at the time of 
the Korean invasion, when it was felt that the Soviet Union, having unleashed 
forces in the Far East, would soon unleash forces here in the West. They 
begged at that time that the United States provide meat on the skeleton of the 
NATO Alliance. That judgement was and is essentially correct. 
There are, of course, understandably, irritations with the United States, 
and a fear that American global responsibilities will feed back in a way that is 
detrimental to detente in Europe itself. All of that is true. But one should not 
throw the baby out with the bathwater. The reason why Western Europe can 
feel secure enough even to raise these kinds of question today is because of 
i. A recurrent demand from the later t96os sponsored by the Senate Majority leader, Michael 
Mansfield. 
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American protection. That is why the competition between East and West has 
turned to the Third World, instead of Western Europe as it was in the 1940S 
and 1950s. That is why the critics have been provided with the intellectual 
playing-room, if I may call it that, to indulge in these fantasies. 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
From time to time there is the possibility that a unilateral initiative may have 
a useful effect in catalysing arms control discussion. But one can hardly regard 
unilateral initiatives as the centre-piece of Western strategy. That is simply a 
formula for serial disarmament by the West with inevitable consequences. 
Unilateral measures of this reckless kind will increase risks and must obviously 
be rejected out of a sense of prudence. 
C British Policy 
i. The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and 
independence and protects her from nuclear 
blackmail? 
OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
`deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
encourage proliferation? 
I should say at the outset that this is a subject upon which I speak with less 
authority, because I cannot speak as a Britisher. This is a matter that must 
be decided ultimately by the British themselves. In terms of overall alliance 
strategy, the view in the United States has historically been an ambivalent one 
about the British deterrent, save in this one respect: that the British must 
themselves decide, and we would support that decision. The view that the use 
of the British deterrent would very likely be suicidal is, of course, correct. But 
it is also irrelevant. The use of the great Western deterrent against Soviet cities 
would also very likely be suicidal. But the underlying fallacy of this objection 
is the notion of the use of the deterrent. The deterrent is there to deter - to 
avoid the use. This simple reality is what is ignored in the rhetoric of the critic. 
Having witnessed forty-one years of non-use through successful deterrents, 
one might think that they would be prepared to see at least the possibility that 
deterrence deters. Now the British deterrent has the advantage that, although 
in itself small, it receives reinforcement against the backdrop of the larger 
Western deterrent. This strengthens the argument for the effectiveness of the 
British deterrent - but may also, of course, be interpreted as meaning that 
there is less of a need for it. 
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(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
It is an exaggeration, at best, to talk about the British deterrent as part of a 
second, European, centre of decision-making, as if, given the very small force 
that the United Kingdom has, and the very large force that the Soviet Union 
has, the British force would be launched against Soviet cities in the event of 
a massive conventional attack against West Germany. That is an argument 
designed to'impress those who are impressed by that kind of argument! It is 
not really sound. The reason for the British force is that it gives comfort to 
Britain that her national interests will ultimately be protected - and that is a 
position that the United States has respected. 
I think that the broader idea of the British and French nuclear forces being coor- 
dinated, if not integrated, into a European force is a long road, though a desirable 
road to follow. It would take many years and a great deal of expenditure before an 
adequate force could be built up with second strike capabilities and the perceived 
capacity to respond to the invasion of another state in Western Europe, namely 
West Germany, that did not have its own nuclear force. Until such problems are 
solved, these forces have great national value, great symbolic value, but they are 
not central to the overall security of the North Atlantic Treaty. Until such time as 
Europe in its totality has put together a truly European force, it will be dependent 
upon the American strategic forces, and Europe will depend upon a single centre 
of nuclear decision-making. 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent British initiatives more likely 
to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
involvement? 
The long-term position of the United States has been that an independent 
deterrent for the United Kingdom is not an essential condition. The concern 
has been, however, that the abandonment of the deterrent would be part of 
a general weakening of determination and commitment to Western defence 
policy. 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? 
OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
afforded at the expense of conventional 
strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
This is a matter for the British to decide. But we have all recognized that a 
British nuclear force detracts from the resources that might otherwise be avail- 
able for conventional defence. 
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(v) Would unilateral British nuclear OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
disarmament have no effect on other proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
countries and only serve to weaken British British prestige? Would British 
influence and allow France unchallenged disarmament within the context outlined in 
ascendancy in Europe? B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
Britain's undoubted influence with the United States depends, not upon her 
independent nuclear forces, but upon an overall political relationship that has 
by now become traditional. Thus the stated policy of the British Labour 
Party to wind down the British independent deterrent, but increase Britain's 
contribution to conventional forces, is not, as such, damaging to relations with 
the United States. But the appropriate fear here is that those commitments 
that are made to strengthening expenditures on conventional forces, taken 
while one is getting rid of the nuclear deterrent, will suddenly, if not surpris- 
ingly, disappear after one has got rid of it. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
continue to ensure effective British strategic all the drawbacks listed above? 
defence into the 21st century? 
This goes to the heart of the question of whether or not the investment of 
British resources in a viable independent nuclear capability is desirable. This 
is a question for the British to decide. If the decision is to maintain a viable 
independent nuclear capability, it points towards Trident as being necessary 
for the modernization of Britain's forces. 
2 NATO forces and US bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
In the large, what is written in the left-hand column is correct. I myself have 
great confidence in the protection afforded by the strategic nuclear forces of 
the United States that are not European-based. To that extent this is a political, 
rather than an essential military issue. It is the European allies who have not 
been satisfied with the protection provided by American's overall strategic 
capability, and who have demanded, and are demanding, that there should be 
European-based nuclear forces as well. (In what follows, I treat the French 
nuclear capability as separate from NATO assets. ) Now, if there are to be 
European-based nuclear forces, then someone has to man them. It is true that 
some European countries have never participated in this, such as Norway, 
and that some governments have desired to opt out from time to time, such 
as the Danish and Dutch governments. But there is a difference between this, 
and what I will call the defection from the nuclear deterrent by a major 
Western European state, such as the United Kingdom. The result of the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom would be to leave the whole burden to be 
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borne by West Germany. The political cohesion of the Alliance is more import- 
ant that the building-blocks of military strategy. The defection of the UK 
from the nuclear deterrent must inevitably weaken the Alliance. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain make US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affairs 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
Military requirements change. In the age of the Poseidon, and particularly of 
the Trident, the requirement for Holy Loch, for example, is much less than 
it was in the period when we depended upon the short-range Polaris forces. 
So again the critical questions here are more political than military. A unilateral 
British decision to opt out will in this case also shift the burden to European 
allies, while exposing them to some of the distrust that at the moment is 
directed against the Americans West of the Atlantic. This will be a further 
erosion of the European concept. 
As to the repercussions in the United States of such a forced withdrawal of 
American nuclear bases from Britain, I have lived too long, and have seen too 
many prophesies of disaster proved groundless, to predict dramatic conse- 
quences. The outcome would depend upon circumstances. If this were read 
as an irresponsible and anti-American action by those who have long enjoyed 
American protection, the reaction might be disastrous. Inevitably it would be 
unfavourable. But it might be mitigated if the reduction were taken in the 
right spirit and spaced over time. I would hope that sensible people within the 
British Labour Party would be able to mitigate the political consequences of 
such an action. Let us just say that the special relationship between the United 
States and the United Kingdom would be placed in cold storage for an 
extended period. As for the idea that British sovereignty has been eroded, the 
very fact that these policies are being realistically proposed shows that it has 
not. No. British sovereignty is alive and well. 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
Britain will continue to be targeted by the Soviet Union, so long as she is part 
of NATO and part of a Europe protected by the United States. The Soviets 
will target British cities, British military bases, command-control centres, 
intelligence centres. Elimination of American bases and the independent 
British deterrent would reduce Soviet concern sharply, but her targets only 
slightly. 
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(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
2d3 .. 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
It may make sense politically within the context of the United Kingdom 
electoral process to say that Britain does not want to shelter under the Amer- 
ican umbrella. But it does not make any sense if it is remembered that the 
United States umbrella is providing protection for Norway, for the Federal 
Republic, for Italy, for Greece, for Turkey. If one is a beneficiary of the 
American nuclear umbrella, one can safely say that one rejects dependency 
upon the umbrella, as long as, happily, it is above ones head. 
Moral Considerations 
Let us take these questions together, as you suggest. 
In this world we must always deal with moral perplexities and moral ambi- 
guities. Many people, apparently, think that moral ambiguity can be elimin- 
ated simply by decree. I do not. 
Now, it is true that a strategy designed to attack civilians and urban areas 
is, as such, immoral. I have always felt such a strategy to be morally repugnant. 
It was embraced in the I 950s under the label `Massive Retaliation', which was 
directed against Soviet cities, and its only moral justification was that it worked 
and did not require execution: Actual execution would have been morally 
repugnant - and perhaps for this reason Secretary Dulles drew back some of 
the original outline of Massive Retaliation, and stated that our policy would 
be to respond at times and places of our own choosing. Similarly, I have always 
had reservations about `Mutual Assured Destruction' in its original form. It 
is for that reason that, when I was Secretary of Defense, we moved away from 
the threat against Soviet cities, to the threat of precise elimination of selected 
military targets in order to achieve city avoidance. In nuclear matters we 
should always make the punishment fit the crime. As the Catholic bishops and 
others have rightly said, massive retaliation is disproportionate and immoral. 
So, if the Soviets were to engage in a massive conventional attack on the West, 
the response would be small-scale selective nuclear targeting against the East. 
I share the moral doubts of the critics and have done something to deliver 
Western strategy from dependence upon what I regard as the unethical target- 
ing of civilians as an appropriate response. But those who argue that we must 
rid ourselves of nuclear weapons unilaterally on moral grounds, are taking 
what to me is a most immoral position. They are saying that we should surren- 
der the free societies of Western Europe to the goodwill of the Soviet Union, 
which, neither in its present form, nor in its prior form as Imperial Russia, 
ever demonstrated much respect for the Western notion of liberty. Are English 
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liberty, the spirit of the French revolution, the hard-won West German 
democracy, the freedom of the Scandinavians and the Low Countries, to be 
sacrificed simply because of correct doubts about the moral ambiguities of 
nuclear weapon deployment? I would say - no. To make that reckless decision 
would be an immoral act. 
We are left with the question of whether it is immoral to retain a capability 
of attacking Soviet cities in order to deter the Soviets from attacking or threat- 
ening to attack our cities. To this again I say `no'. That is clearly not the case. 
What is, indeed, an intriguing question is whether, if the Soviets nevertheless 
struck our cities, we would be morally entitled to strike at theirs. This has 
troubled those of us who have been analyzing nuclear weapons since the '1950s 
- long before the moral discoveries of some of the more recent critics. All that 
we can say is that in the entirely hypothetical conditions of a prior Soviet 
attack against our cities, the decision would be taken, as it were, existentially, 
in a way that we cannot now anticipate. We can do no more than ruminate 
about the moral aspects of such a decision taken under those circumstances. 
(v) Is there no relevant connection between the OR Is it a scandal that such huge resources are 
development and deployment of nuclear devoted to the development and deployment 
weapons and world poverty and disease? of nuclear weapons and not to the 
alleviation of suffering? 
Nuclear weapons represent only a small proportion of our total expenditure 
on military capabilities. So to say that this money should be spend on the relief 
of poverty (which, I may say, is an historically novel judgement) is to advocate 
pacifism. Pure pacifism must be respected, but to argue this only in terms of 
nuclear weapons seems to me to be illogical and unjustifiable. 
(vi) Does Christian teaching allow the OR Does Christian teaching condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? deployment of nuclear weapons? 
None of the churches has condemned what I have just outlined, and some 
have endorsed it contingently. They would, quite rightly in my judgement, 
like to move away from it. But once again, this requires the creation of those 
forces that will reduce or eliminate Western reliance upon nuclear weapons. 
There is a difference between captious criticism and responsible action. And 
the only responsible action, if this is what one desires, is to develop the alterna- 
tive that will face down Soviet non-nuclear forces, before one throws away the 
shield that for so long has protected the West. 
Recommendations 
i No (See B(iv)). 
2 No (Sec A2(A)v)). 
3 No (See B(iv)). 
4 No (See B(iii)). 
5 Deep, but not unconditional cuts (See Ai(iv)). 
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6 No. 
7 Yes (See A2(A)(vi)). 
8 No (See A2(B)). 
9 No (See Ai(iv)). 
io No. 
Ii No (See B(iii)). 
12 No (See B(iv) & B(vii)). 
13 This would be up to the British and the French (See Ci). 
14 No, for political rather than for military reasons (See C2(ii)). 
15 No. 
16 As for No. 13. 
17 If the decision is to give up the British deterrent, yes (See Ci(iv)). 
18 No (See C2(i)). 
19 No (See C2(i) & C2(ii)). 
20 Does not apply. 
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Star Wars (1985) and (with Dan Smith) Prospectus for a Habitable Planet 
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Editorial Comment 
These answers were given in an interview in E. P. Thompson's home near 
Worcester on December 15,1986. They represent the thinking of one of the 
most influential figures in the peace movement. Readers may find answers, 
such as those to questions A2(A)(vii), A2(B)(iv), B(vi), and B(vii), character- 
istic in the breadth of their ecumenicism. A champion of diversity and cultural 
variety, E. P. Thompson contrasts the cold war antagonisms associated with 
superpower confrontation and condominium, with the historic compromise 
between different traditions which is necessary if mankind is to survive the 
nuclear age. British policy is seen to be part of this wider process. 
E. P. THOMPSON 
A Global Policy 
r The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 1945 
This is what historians call a `counter-factual' proposition. It cannot be 
answered. It's like asking if the Industrial Revolution could have taken place 
without railways. You can play around with these games, but it's not real 
history. There are multiple factors at work, and in any case you can't remove 
one supposed factor and `replay' the thing in order to find out. Most historians 
don't believe in counter-factual history. 
In this case, there may have been one or two crises, such as the Berlin 
airlift, when war might have occurred if there had not been a threat of nuclear 
retaliation. On the other hand, this so-called `stabilizing factor' has also had 
the effect of freezing and perpetuating the post-Yalta confrontation of blocs 
and of deterring the resolution of underlying political 'differences, with a 
resulting steady and dangerous build-up of tension on both sides. What is the 
final account that we will be brought to for all this? 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
On the left-hand side here we have an example of anthropomorphic projection 
- the `pathetic fallacy' of attributing human intentions, in this case those of 
one or another ruling group, to things, in this case weapons. What we have is 
a weapon of inconceivable destructive power. To call it a `deterrent' is a state- 
ment of faith in human intentions, and not one that is usually accredited to 
the other side. For them it is not a `deterrent', but a possible. first-strike 
weapon. Similarly, it is nothing more than a statement of strategic intention 
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or motivation to distinguish between `first' and `second-strike' weapons. 
NATO, for example, pretends that all its weapons, nuclear and non-nuclear, 
are `second-strike' weapons, but claims that WTO weapons are `first-strike'. 
And yet NATO refuses to make a declaration of `no first use' of nuclear 
weapons. It's a very strange kind of double-talk. This is all part of what I 
regard as latter-day scholasticism. Deterrence theory is the scholasticism of 
contemporary times. Arbitrary and elaborate distinctions are made and quar- 
relled over, endless disquisitions are written, and proposals to reform the 
deterrent system in this or that way are put forward. And all this does is to 
distract us from tackling the central problem of the political confrontation of 
the blocs. I' 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war-fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
`Yes' to the proposition on the right-hand side. 
The arguing on the left-hand side is what I meant when I referred to scholas- 
ticism. `If this, then that' - these endless theoretical extrapolations and exten- 
sions lead to a ceaseless elaboration of menus and options and levels. 
Deterrence theory is an in-built accelerator to the nuclear arms race. One of 
the most common theoretical devices here is the `worst-case hypothesis', by 
which planners on both sides have to envisage and imagine the worst possible 
case and evolve answers to it. This constantly worsens the situation, and feeds 
and exaggerates the next phase of worst-case projection. I once called this 
`Deterrence as Addiction'. This just would not be allowed in other areas of 
social or political thinking, such as, for example, criminology. The result 
would be to fill the entire nation with prisons and police forces `in case' the 
crime rate increased to the maximum that could be conceived. On the other 
hand, any attempt to operate on the `better-case hypothesis' - to say `if such- 
and-such happened we would be in a better situation, so let's work for it to 
happen' - is dismissed as utopian, romantic, and moralistic, by the monks 
and hermits of the defence community. And yet, if you look at past human 
history, it is only where people did work for better-case hypotheses that real 
progress has been achieved - such as, for example, in the securing of civil 
liberties. In the 192os Ghandi would have seemed a romantic utopian, to be 
written off as `unrealistic'. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
I think that the superfluity of nuclear weapons systems is not only strategically 
pointless, but very dangerous. And this is not just because of their instability as 
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weapons, but because they are also symbols. As symbols, these weapons systems 
are a great blast of halitosis in the other side's face. They represent the foulest sort 
of human message that you can send. All the business about SS20's and Euro-miss- 
iles, for example, was simply symbolic political confrontation. It had very little to 
do with the actual use to which these weapons could be put. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
`Yes' to the proposition on the right-hand side. 
As I have explained, it is precisely the idea of `balance', as interpreted 
through worst-case analysis, which has been accelerating the nuclear arms race 
in recent decades. It can almost be called the characteristic obsession of the 
nuclear mentality. For example, Brezhnev and Andropov were ardent 
believers in balance and parity, and constantly tried to inject it into their end 
of what they called the `peace movement'. Contrary to what a number of those 
in the Western establishments claim, they used to be embarrassed at the fact 
that sections of the Western peace movement should be advocating unilateral 
measures. `The necessary thing is to establish balance and parity' was their 
refrain. We in END had terrible rows with the Russians at conferences about 
this. And the same, of course, is true of the monks and hermits on the other 
side. 
What is interesting now is that, with Gorbachev's more flexible approach, 
all of this seems to be falling away. Joan Ruddock' was in the Soviet Union a 
couple of weeks ago, and I understand that she found a far greater readiness 
to talk, instead of these blanket po-faced arguments about `parity'. 
(vi) Has force-planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
I think that there is considerable force in Solly Zuckerman's2 arguments. The 
right-hand side is nearer to the truth. I have recently looked into this in 
relation to Star Wars, and there is a clear correlation between the firms making 
Trident, MX, Bi bombers, Cruise, Pershing, and so on, whose order books 
are running out in the early 199os, and the industrial lobby pressing for SDI 
as prospective prime contractors. Then there are what Solly Zuckerman called 
`the alchemists of the laboratories', such as the scientists of the Lawrence 
Livermore laboratory. This is part of what some commentators call `techno- 
logical creep'. Finally, as I have already said, there is also an `ideological creep', 
which does not just come along behind and endorse what the tehnologists are 
doing, but actively spurs them on. 
i. Until recently Vice-Chair of CND. Now prospective parliamentary candidate for Deptford. 
2. Chief Scientific Adviser to the Secretary of State for Defence, tg6o-66. 
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2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
future? 
This is all a question of perception. In my own judgement, neither party at 
the present time has any serious strategy or policy of first-strike, but in the 
perception of the other, this can always be seen as a possibility. The SDI is 
inducing these fears in the Soviet Union at the moment, for example. In 
this context, everything which tends to computerize decision-making is very 
dangerous. It is undoubtedly a highly unstable situation, -, Where, as now, for 
military-technical reasons, at a certain point in an acute political crisis, a side 
which thinks that the other is planning a nuclear strike of some kind must as 
a result itself strike first. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
The right-hand side is correct. It must be so. Greater time-urgency increases 
dependence upon the computer, and pushes the whole system further towards 
launch-on-warning. There simply is no such thing as a bug-free programme at 
that level of sophistication. And everything to do with SDI and EDI (European 
Defence Initiative) will be computer-dependent. The time-lag between the 
first sensor information of an enemy launch, and the projected reply, will be 
so short that there cannot possibly be room for any kind of political consulta- 
tion. The response will be virtually automatic. It will be some computer ana- 
logue of Colonel North which will be taking the decision. 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
`Yes' to the proposition on the right-hand side. 
There seems to be quite widespread agreement that it is not feasible to 
envisage a limited nuclear war being fought with weapons dependent upon 
cruise or rocket technology. What some people appear to think is feasible is 
the use of nuclear land-mines and nuclear artillery. But, once these things go 
off, they will not have clear messages tied to them. The situation will be one 
of general panic, communications systems will be disrupted, and so on. The 
whole idea of a limited nuclear war is unrealistic and irresponsible. 
Perhaps the place where a nuclear war is becoming every year more possible 
is the Middle East. It is not hard to see a situation in which Israel used its 
nuclear arsenal against Iraq or Syria, because it felt its existence threatened. 
If this did happen, depending upon the political circumstances, it would prob- 
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ably be something that the two superpowers would stand back from. And over 
the grave of the Middle East the human species might perhaps learn a bit of 
sense. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
`Yes' to the proposition on the right-hand side. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the hope of an effective defence against the most recent and destabilizing example 
nuclear weapons? of the process outlined in r? 
The proposition on the right-hand side is undoubtedly correct. The American 
SDI certainly offers no hope of effective defence for the population at large 
(Star Wars I). And, to the extent that it may provide partial protection for 
land-based nuclear forces (Star Wars II), this can only further accelerate the 
nuclear arms race. The hawks in the Soviet Union are bound to want to 
multiply the numbers of their warheads so as to overcome this. To call it 
`enhancing deterrence' is just the usual kind of nuclear double-talk. In the 
meantime, of course, the SDI is clearly undermining arms talks. It may not 
succeed in shooting down missiles, but it is already shooting down disarma- 
ment. It has done this very effectively at Reykjavik. To call it `defence' is a 
complete misnomer. Apart from the fact that, in terms of nuclear confron- 
tation, to threaten to disarm the enemy is in itself highly aggressive, there is 
always the likelihood that' these technologies will be adapted for offensive 
purposes later on. We can envisage exotic new generations of weapons, such 
as lasers, being put on permanent station in space. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
`Yes' to the proposition on the right-hand side. 
This is obviously so. The possession of nuclear weapons by some powers 
puts pressure on others to follow suit. For example, in India, despite a long 
history of commitment by Congress Party to anti-nuclear non-aligned posi- 
tions, there is considerable national feeling that the attempt to prevent 
India from developing her own nuclear arsenal is a way of symbolically down- 
grading the country. This pressure seems to be becoming harder to resist. 
There is also the clear obligation laid on existing nuclear weapon powers 
which signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty to build down their own nuclear 
arsenals. The fact that they have not done this, but have, on the contrary, 
built them up, is in breach of the Treaty. 
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(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
offer the best prospect for future stability? attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
If the human species is to survive, then somewhere along the road there will 
have to be agreements of this kind. To that extent, we should not write off 
the possibility of them. If I am asked to confine myself to the question of arms 
reduction, then I believe that, in order to get the process going, we need, not 
negotiations, but actions. I favour independent initiatives, along the lines 
suggested by Charles Osgood in `An Alternative to War or Surrender'. ' There 
is plenty of fat that can be cut on both sides without danger, and these would 
be friendly signals, awaiting a response in kind. At some point, also, a phased 
reduction of conventional forces must no doubt i; e part of the settlement. But 
what I obejct to here is the way in which those who are in fact opposed to 
reductions of all kinds use this as a last resort in order to block any agreement 
on nuclear weapons. They use the `conventional' card, not in its own right, 
but simply as a way of preventing movement elsewhere. 
But in fact I find the whole of this line of argument much too restricted. It 
is too exclusively weapon-based. What is needed is a much broader political 
confidence, not necessarily anything to do with weapons. We want to work 
towards an historic compromise between the two blocs, which must be 
achieved at all levels and in all kinds of ways. The reduction of weapons is 
likely to be a consequence rather than a cause of this. Nuclear weapons are 
the most graphic symbol of what we are trying to get away from. They may, 
therefore, be the hardest point at which to begin to do so. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would 
war between the great powers again 
become a rational option and therefore 
more likely? 
OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
to initiate a third world war? 
The proposition on the left-hand side is taken completely out of context. The 
dismantling of nuclear arsenals is not going to happen without far-ranging 
political, cultural, and economic agreements at the same time. I really refuse 
to discuss one apart from the other. 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited preferable to nuclear war? 
nuclear war? 
The objective of the peace movement has always been to prevent both nuclear 
and conventional wars. I am not interested in trying to distinguish between 
them. Those who argue as on the left-hand side seem incapable of imagining 
an end to the confrontation between the blocs. But I can envisage the possi- 
bility that this might be transformed remarkably rapidly - as rapidly as the 
t. University of Illinois Press 1962. 
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old colonial empires disappeared and thawed like snow after World War II. 
Once the process begins, it will not be limited to negotiations about arms. It 
will be a total political process involving the healing of cultures. It is not a 
climate in which a conventional war will come about. 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented would they not be bound to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
there be no incentive to resort to 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
In a certain sense it is not possible to `disinvent' nuclear weapons. But it might 
be within reach of human culture to disinvent the capacity to use them. That 
is, to make them outlaws to human culture. 
There have been suggestions that each side might keep a handful of nuclear 
armed submarines during this process. It's very hypothetical. But I don't object. 
(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only 
feasible in a world where war itself is no 
longer a possibility? 
OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
hope of a rational world-order? 
I agree that those who refuse to contemplate even multilateral nuclear disarma- 
ment are giving up hope of a rational world order. What is important is not 
guessing what the end process might be, because that will happen beyond our 
time, but beginning to put the thing into reverse now. The repair of human 
culture will no doubt lead to all kinds of emergencies, hazards and political 
accidents along the way. A real thaw in the Eastern bloc would not proceed 
evenly or tidily. What is important is that neither side should try to take 
advantage of difficulties which the other might encounter on the passage back 
to normality. I do not see an abrupt transition to non-alignment, but a slippage 
in both blocs towards de-alignment. It is not synchronization that is needed, 
but some `give' on both sides. If you like, an increasing Finlandization of the 
countries in Eastern Europe, and a Swedenization or Austrianization of the 
countries in Western Europe. 
(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen 
to be prepared for war, as failure before 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under 
likely future conditions would global 
nuclear disarmament make war, including 
nuclear war, more likely? 
OR Do the years before 191¢ show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? 
Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
The proposition on the right-hand side is nearer to the truth, with the two 
heavily-armed camps, and war-fighting plans which could so easily dictate 
policy in a time of political crisis. Historians are always being asked `What 
lessons can we learn from the past? ' Well, one of the lessons that we can learn is 
that the immediate past is often a misleading paradigm for the present. Our 
memories are based on experiences from thirty, forty, or fifty years ago - and 
very often that is exactly what is not being repeated. The Soviet Union's 
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historical -memory is still overwhelmingly of Nazi aggression in World War 
II, and therefore their image of the future is of aggression from the West of 
the same kind. For the Americans it's more the fear of another Pearl Harbour 
-a sudden and unexpected first strike out of a blue sky. It is the trauma of 
the immediate past which often misleads the present, and immobilizes it. If 
you want to look at historical parallels you usually have to look further back. 
I think that 1914 is much more of a paradigm of our present predicament - 
the arms race, the inflexible alliances, the involuntary drift to some `Sarajevo'. 
B Nato Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically evenly matched? 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
The proposition on the right-hand side is nearer to the truth. There is gross 
and deliberate exaggeration of Soviet bloc force strength on the part of NATO 
apologists here. Large numbers of Soviet troops are there for police purposes 
in the East European countries. Many of the WTO forces are liable to be 
disloyal or ineffective. Numbers of Soviet tanks are always mentioned, but 
little reference is made to their battle-worthiness. And so it continues. This is 
all part of what Dan Smith" describes as a `con trick', which has been going 
on since the t 96os - the counting game with conventional forces. Assessments 
such as those made by the Institute of Strategic Studies, 2 for example, are 
more modest. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
which will take advantage of unilateral threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western concessions and is only restrained Western technology and likely to respond 
and forced to accept arms-control positively to unconditional offers of 
agreements by Western determination and Western restraint within a general context 
strength? of detente? 
I am much more in agreement with the proposition on the right-hand side 
here. It is true that the Soviet Union is still saddled with the legacy of Stalinism, 
is overripe for internal reform, and is encumbered by a periphery of increas- 
ingly restless client states. It is also true that there is as yet little evidence that 
Gorbachev and his associates are in any sense democrats. But they do represent 
the new generation of modernizers and technocrats, and the West should be 
prepared to encourage and support them as such. If Western governments do 
not reciprocate friendly gestures made by the Soviet Union or offer indepen- 
dent initiatives of their own, there is a great danger that Gorbachev will be 
discredited and the opportunity for further peaceful progress lost. The trouble 
is that there are a number of very dangerous people around the American 
President who are finding it hard to play against Gorbachev's hand at the 
z. A member of the Alternative Defence Commission, and Vice-Chair of CND. 
2. For example, the widely influential aniºual The Military Balance. 
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moment, and would far rather be dealing with someone like Brezhnev. They 
would like to discredit the present leadership for that reason. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional 
preponderance such that NATO must 
continue to be able to threaten early use of 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is NATO dependence on the early use of 
nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
strategically suicidal? 
The proposition on the right-hand side is correct. As the Welsh saying has it, 
`Granny was'never ill until she died'. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
`Yes' to the proposition on the right-hand side. Within this context I am very 
much in support of CND's general strategy for Britain. It is possible for a 
small nation to take an initiative of this kind. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
There is a Penguin Special coming out in February on this, called `Prospectus 
for a Habitable Planet'. The chapter on non-aggressive defence strategies is 
written by April Carter, who is on the Alternative Defence Commission. She 
comes down very much on the right-hand side here, and I agree with her. 
This is all part of the wider process of working towards measures which might 
provide common security to both blocs. 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
OR Is it domination by the two super-powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
`Yes' to the proposition on the right-hand side. This is a principal platform of 
END policy now. We want to see the withdrawal of all Soviet troops and bases 
from East Europe, and all American troops and bases from West Europe. In 
broad terms, this is bound to be the direction in which we move, so the 
question simply is - how can we do it with minimum risk of upheaval and 
instability? The great enigma in all of this is the pace of change in the Soviet 
Union. This is something which none of us can predict. The process will no 
doubt evolve at different speeds and in different ways in different parts of 
Europe. And the West will have to be part of it. 
If you travel in Eastern Europe, there can be no question at all but that this 
is the direction in which people want us to go. Youthful opinion in Hungary, 
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for example, wants Soviet forces withdrawn, but knows that this cannot 
happen if there is not comparable movement in the West. It is a highly sensitive 
subject. After a recent talk I gave in Hungary, an old man stood up and said 
that Soviet troops should leave, and the young people in the audience turned 
their backs on him. They thought he was an `agent provocateur'. Either that, 
or one of the `wounded' of 1956, who had never recovered from that trauma. 
But the same is also true in the West. Although, unlike Eastern Europe, 
Western Europe is in a sense occupied by consent, the results are still perni- 
cious. As in the East, there is the great danger of being caught up in the 
superpower nuclear confrontation, which does not relate to European inter- 
ests. And another development, which depresses me tremendously, is the 
creeping authoritarianism in a number of Western societies. Britain is a 
particularly bad case. This country is much less democratic and open in spirit 
than it was in 1945. Organs like the security services, the Association of Chief 
Police Officers, the Ministry of Defence, and so on, are removed from account- 
ability, and what is left of the democratic process is becoming increasingly 
ritualistic. American penetration into the establishment in this country is part 
of the whole process. 
So the main priority is to end the present exaggerated and unnatural bi- 
polarity of world politics. It is the global hegemony of the two superpowers 
which must be dismantled, because their political and military confrontation 
represents the greater danger to the survival of the human species at the 
moment. We must encourage the development of alternative centres of initiat- 
ive and influence, and work towards far more plural diplomacies. I see great 
hope and immense potential in the non-aligned world, which now easily out- 
numbers those still under the tutelage of the two power blocs. Particularly if 
China is added to its weight, this represents, not only a majority of the world's 
population, but huge potential markets, alternative areas of cultural exchange, 
and so on. The superpowers are going to have to take notice - particularly if 
more and more countries walk out of the theatre, because they are no longer 
prepared to be an audience for these Reykjaviks and Genevas. 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
The trap in the proposition on the left-hand side lies in the second word -'Wes- 
tern'. It is this continual insistence on seeing everything in terms of the two 
power blocs, and on identifying with one of them, which perpetuates the present 
system, prevents gradual and carefully managed change, and allows the water. 
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to build up behind the dam until eventually it breaks. As I have said, I do not want 
just to talk in terms of weapons-systems at all. We should be thinking much more 
broadly about all the interchange needed to bring about the historic compromise. 
But, if I was forced to confine myself to the question of disarmament, and argue in 
terms that would be understood by the defence community, I would suggest that 
the GRIT' strategy, worked out in Osgood's book, and recommended in the 
Church of England working party report `The Church and the Bomb', 2 is a very 
reasonable one. This is not `unilateral disarmament', but graduated independent 
initiatives aimed at reducing tension and creating the atmosphere for further meas- 
ures. Every upward movement in the arms race is one-sided. We don't ask the other 
side `Can we introduce Trident? '-we just introduce it. So the downward movement 
can be taken one-sidedly, also. And then the ratchet can be held at that point, and 
you can wait for a response. If there is no response, then it would evidently become 
increasingly difficult politically to hold it. But, unless such unconditional initiatives 
are offered, and responded to, on both sides, it is hard to see how there can be any 
hope for arms control. I know of two reasons for believing that this is the right 
moment for the West to offer signals and actions of this kind. First of all, there are 
the Soviet Union's manifest economic difficulties. And, second, there is the fact 
that their entire diplomatic strategy is now based upon their trying to present them- 
selves as the peace-loving pioneers. It would be almost impossible for them not 
to respond in some way. They have, after all, been making their own unilateral 
initiatives, especially their long-sustained Test Moratorium. The ball is now in the 
court of `the West'. 
C British Policy 
i The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and `deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
independence and protects her from nuclear encourage proliferation? 
blackmail? 
`Yes' to the proposition on the right-hand side. A `weapon of last resort' simply 
means a suicide weapon. And I just do not see a scenario in which the question 
of the nuclear blackmail of Britain would arise. Yugoslavia has not been black- 
mailed, nor even has Finland, a tiny country on the border of the Soviet 
Union. 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
European allies because they provide a illusion when the weapons are dependent 
specifically European second centre of upon the US and there is no independent 
decision making? strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
i. Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-Reduction. 
2. Hodder and Stoughton, 1982. 
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The statement on the left-hand side is just not in my mind-set at all. They are 
talking about the destruction of Europe. Why should one want to participate 
in that? 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent British initiatives more likely 
to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
involvement? 
I do not want 'US commitment to Europe' in the first place. In the second 
place, it is not to `Europe', but to NATO partners (or clients) only. 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in 
view of the vital defence role ix plays? Are 
alternatives likely to be more irxpensive? 
OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
afforded at the expense of conventional 
strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
We must include the question of disarmament with the questions of foreign 
policy, and of cultural and economic relations in general. We must pursue 
measures which will reduce the state of confrontation between the blocs, and 
allow both nuclear and conventional disarmament to proceed together. I'm 
not going to argue this like a shopkeeper. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament have no effect on other 
countries and only serve to weaken British 
influence and allow France unchallenged 
ascendancy in Europe? 
OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
British prestige? Would British 
disarmament within the context outlined in 
B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
Getting rid of British nuclear weapons, and the adoption of an independent 
foreign policy, would be the first steps towards increasing British influence in 
the world since the end of the Second World War. At the moment, Sweden 
probably has more influence than we do, because we are seen to be little more 
than the most dependent of all the client states of the USA. With our long histori- 
cal connections with Europe, Africa and Asia, our resumption of independence 
of movement, so far from weakening us, would make us a great deal stronger. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to 
continue to ensure effective. British strategic 
defence into the erst century? 
OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
all the drawbacks listed above? 
`Yes' to the proposition on the right-hand side. 
2 Nato Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear 
systems upon which her security depends? 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
alliance? 
OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
met by strengthening conventional forces 
where necessary within an overall non- 
nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
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I welcome the Labour Party's stand on nuclear weapons, but I wish they had 
also adopted a more independent foreign policy. I think that it is the Americans 
who should be expelled from NATO. Or, failing that, we should act as we 
want to act, and, if other members of NATO want to expel us, let them. 
Our policy should be one of non-alignment with either of the two blocs, and 
mediation between them in association with other non-aligned powers. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US 
nuclear bases from Britain make US 
defence of the West impossible? Is 
American interference in British affairs 
negligible? 
OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
yielded to the US erode British 
sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
more than restore a normal peacetime 
relationship? 
`Yes' to the proposition on the right-hand side. The existence of American bases 
in this country is, indeed, a major component in the serious erosion of British 
sovereignty. The American penetration of the British establishment, which I 
was mentioning earlier, has gone much further than many people realize. I do 
not mean the American people, I mean very nasty Americans. Some of the things 
that have been going on in the security services, and possibly inside the Ministry 
of Defence, are quite scandalous. There is direct nobbling of individuals within 
these organizations by the American CIA, American multi-nationals, and soon. 
If this were summarily removed, it might induce a measure of rationality into 
American thinking about their role in Europe. 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by the USSR 
accordingly? * Will Britain fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
In view of recent findings about the `nuclear winter', these questions are 
somewhat abstract. So I would not advocate a non-nuclear policy for Britain 
on the grounds of safety. The reason for declaring Bradford, for example, a 
`nuclear free zone' is not in the expectation that as a result Bradford would 
not be hit, but as a symbol. 
(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
`Yes' to the proposition on the right-hand side. We can't stop the Americans 
persisting with nuclear weapons. But we will be no more `sheltering' under a 
`nuclear umbrella' than is Austria, say, or Sweden. Or than Yugoslavia is 
`sheltering' under a Russian one. 
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(i) Is it morally right to pursue the policy least OR Are there actions which are in themselves 
likely to cause human suffering? May this wrong no matter what the situation? Is the 
sometimes involve doing things which in alternative to excuse almost any act of 
other circumstances would be wrong? barbarism? 
(ii) In formulating policy should we weigh up 
the probability of success and the relative 
costs in terms of human suffering of 
alternative nuclear and non-nuclear 
strategies? 
OR Is the only relevant point here that a 
nuclear exchange of almost any kind 
would in itself cause unimaginable 
suffering to largely civilian populations? 
(iii) So far as concerns intention, need we look 
no further than the fact that our sole aim in 
deploying nuclear weapons is to prevent 
their use? 
(iv) Are there possible uses of nuclear weapons 
which are allowed by just War theory, for 
example the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in order to prevent worse 
suffering? Can there be a theory of Just 
Deterrence? 
OR Is there no such thing as a fully deployed 
weapons system which is a bluff? Is to 
deploy nuclear weapons to intend to use 
them in certain circumstances? 
OR Is a conditional intention to cause 
indiscriminate and disproportionate 
suffering of this kind, whether admonitory, 
preemptive or retaliatory, ruled out by just 
War theory? Was it wrong to bomb 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? 
`Yes' to the second proposition in each case. The deployment of nuclear 
weapons corrupts culture at its source. The rocket-pad from which nuclear 
weapons are launched is the human mind. The very term `deterrence' is an 
evasion. It apparently sweetens what is a very foul thing. The deployment of 
nuclear weapons pollutes culture, it pollutes language, it pollutes children's 
minds. In that sense I do accept the argument about intention. 
More broadly, the deployment of nuclear weapons threatens the existence 
of the human species, and is immoral for that reason. What I have called `the 
ecological imperative of the species - survival' must involve the rejection of 
them. My sympathies lie with people like the Greenham women, who really 
act this out in their lives. But I do accept that there are thoughtful and rational 
people who actually think that nuclear deterrence has prevented war, and I 
do not want to call that immoral as an attitude. 
(v) Is there no relevant connection between the OR Is it a scandal that such huge resources are 
development and deployment of nuclear devoted to the development and deployment 
weapons and world poverty and disease? of nuclear weapons and not to the 
alleviation of suffering? 
`Yes' to the proposition on the right-hand side, although nuclear weapons are 
only part of this. In general, what is so pernicious is the whole cold war system, 
together with its armament industries and military infrastructures, through 
which both blocs try to infiltrate, pervert, and turn to their own advantage, 
every indigenous movement in the Third World. 
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(vi) Does Christian teaching allow the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? 
OR Does Christian teaching condemn the 
deployment of nuclear weapons? 
Christianity is such a contradictory historical phenomenon. The deployment 
of nuclear weapons is certainly un-Christian according to the sort of belief that 
William Blake had - and Blake is one of my heroes. But, on the other hand, one 
also comes across*some horrific apologists for war in the Christian tradition. So 
I think I'll leave this to the Christians. 
Recommendations 
I Yes. 
2 Yes (See A2(A)(v)). 
3 Yes. 
4 Yes. 
5 Yes (See A2(A)(vii)). 
6 Yes (See B(vi)). 
7 Yes (See A2(A)(vi)). 
8 Yes (See A2(B)). 
9 No comment. But see A2(B)(iii). 
to Yes. 
1t Yes (See B(iii)). 
12 Yes (See B(iv)). 
13 Yes. 
. 14 
Yes (See B(vi)). 
15 Yes. 
16 Yes (See Ci). 
17 No. The recommendations of the Alternative Defence Commission` as to 
strictly defensive armaments should be taken into account by the Ministry 
of Defence. 
i8 No. The best solution would be for NATO to expel the United States. 
Failing that, Britain should do as she pleases, and challenge NATO to 
expel her. 
19 Yes. All American military facilities should be removed (See C2(ii)). 
20 No. 
i. Established in i98o. Report `Defence Without the Bomb', published in 1983 by Taylor and 
Francis. 
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Biographical Note 
Born in 1917, Caspar Weinberger graduated at Harvard in 1938, and then 
served with the US Army in the Pacific between 1941 and 1945. He was a 
member of the California State Legislature, 1952-1958, and subsequently 
Vice-Chairman, then Chairman, of the California Republican Party Central 
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Committee, t96o-1964. From 1970 to 1975 he served successively as Chairman 
of the Federal Trade Commission, Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, Counsellor to the President, and Secretary for Health, Education and 
Welfare. He was with Bechtel Corporation between 1975 and t 980. Since 198 1 
he has been Secretary of Defense. 
Editorial Comment 
The Secretary of Defense prepared these answers in response to the questions 
sent to him, and has given permission for them to be published. They rep- 
resent the thinking of the person most immediately in charge of Western 
strategic defences, and therefore reflect constraints and pressures, which are, 
perhaps, not easily appreciated by those, particularly in Western Europe, who 
do not carry that responsibility. It is at once striking, for example, that the 
Secretary of Defense does not recognize a distinction between `Global' and 
`NATO' perspectives. The threat posed by the nature of the Soviet regime, 
and the disproportionate strength of Soviet forces, is the global setting for all 
defence considerations. It is the Soviet non-nuclear military advantage which 
necessitates a continuing nuclear component in Western defence strategy (see, 
for example, the answers to questions Ai(BXi), B(ii) and B(iii)); and it is the 
massive and sustained build-up of Soviet strategic and theatre nuclear forces, 
particularly during the 1970s, which necessitates the modernization of the 
Western nuclear deterrent (see, for example, the answers to questions Az(iv), 
Ai(v), AZ(A)(i), AZ(A)(iv), änd the charts accompanying the answer to ques- 
tion B(iv)). In general, the idea that the strengthening of the Western deterrent 
makes its use more likely is rejected, and it is maintained that, on the contrary, 
it is only Soviet perception of its manifest potency that can protect Western 
freedom and independence, assure future stability and prevent both nuclear 
and non-nuclear war. 
CASPAR WEINBERGER 
A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has kept the peace between the great powers since 
1945? - OR - Has it mainly been other factors? 
It would be difficult to argue that the existence of nuclear weaponry has not 
been essential both to continued peace and to the political freedom of our 
NATO allies - particularly if one considers continuing Soviet efforts to build 
overwhelming conventional forces. The Soviets' brutal suppression of demo- 
cratic movements within the Warsaw Pact and their adventurism elsewhere 
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around the world serve as stark reminders of what the Soviet leadership will 
do when it believes the risk to the USSR is low. Further, in any such dis- 
cussion, one must remember that, given Soviet determination to build nuclear 
weapons and refusal to forgo them when the US offered to do so through the 
Baruch plan, ' there has never been, in reality, a choice for Western nations as 
to possession of nuclear weapons. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable second strike strategic nuclear force pre- 
vent war? - OR - Does the threat of strategic nuclear retaliation, particularly 
against a similarly armed enemy, lack credibility and invite sub-deterrent encroach- 
ment? 
In our present world, our possession of a secure retaliatory force is critical to 
preventing Soviet attack. It is important that the Soviet leaders should not 
perceive that they could attack the United States or her Allies successfully. 
Our forces and plans must be adequate to respond appropriately to any level 
of Soviet aggression, and hence deter any attack. A mix of flexible options, 
each of which would provide a credible and effective response to a potential 
Soviet attack is necessary, therefore. This means that we must have adequate 
conventional forces to be able to pose a credible deterrent to Soviet non- 
nuclear attack as well as possessing flexible nuclear capabilities. In the future, 
we may be able to reduce the requirement for nuclear retaliatory forces if we 
are able to develop and deploy effective defenses against ballistic missiles. 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between peace and war? - OR - Have most 
military planners from the start been aiming for nuclear war-fighting superiority? 
Has `flexible response' dangerously lowered the threshold between conventional and 
nuclear war? 
Flexible response - the ability to respond appropriately to any level of Soviet 
aggression - has been the cornerstone of the free world's deterrent posture 
since the i96os. It clearly has worked. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? - OR - Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and worst-case analysis 
generated a dangerous and strategically pointless superfluity of weapons systems? 
We have designed a force posture, the Triad, ' to minimize the chance that an 
unforeseen technical breakthrough would destroy our deterrent, and in this 
i. The proposal presented by Bernard Baruch on behalf of the US Government at the first 
meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 to hand over all potential nuclear war-making 
activities to an international authority, and to destroy existing stocks of nuclear weapons. The 
USSR turned the proposal down, probably on the grounds that it would make US technological 
superiority in that area permanent. 
2. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, and munitions 
dropped or launched by Long-Range Bombers. 
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sense, a diverse force structure adds to stability. In any discussion of stability, 
however, it is important to distinguish between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The United States had unquestioned nuclear superiority for 
many years after World War II. We did not have any political desire to attack 
the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union could not attack us. That was stability 
in a very real sense. Today, the democracies of the West still have no reason 
to attack the Soviet Union. Further, we believe that there could be no winners 
in a nuclear war, and that such a war must never be fought. For stability, we 
must ensure that Soviet leaders also understand this-basic fact. Unfortunately, 
some of the Soviet weapons - such as the powerful SS- 18 missile - are designed 
explicitly to destroy United States forces and prevent a United States response, 
and they have been deployed in such numbers as to pose a clear first strike 
threat to America's land-based systems. Such Soviet forces clearly threaten 
stability. Thus it is both the type of systems deployed, and the number of 
those systems which affect strategic stability. As a result, our arms reductions 
proposals seek not only to reduce dramatically the size of the American and 
Soviet nuclear arsenals, but to place particular limits on the more destabilizing 
systems. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped to achieve it? - OR - Have ideas of 
`nuclear defense' and `parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral negotiation from 
strength' a contradiction in terms? Has `arms-control' been just another name for the 
arms race? 
Previously negotiated arms control agreements did not restrain effectively 
Soviet strategic programs. After a decade of relative neglect - in which the 
Soviet Union built new and more powerful strategic forces deliberately 
designed to upset the strategic balance - the United States has determined to 
modernize United States strategic forces precisely to redress a developing 
imbalance. Such an imbalance, if allowed to persist, could undermine stability. 
Contrary to critics' charges, the United States modernization program is not 
designed to produce strategic superiority, nor will it; it will however, restore 
a strategic balance. At the same time, the President has proposed deep, mutual 
and verifiable reductions in strategic forces. Such reductions, particularly in 
the more threatening systems, could lead to an increase in stability. 
(vi) Has force planning been controlled by strategic thinking? - OR - Has the self- 
reinforcing impetus of technology and vested interest dictated policies subsequently 
justified post hoc? 
Strategic weapons systems have very long lives - during which both technology 
and policy may change. Capabilities of systems developed several decades ago 
may, in fact, not meet current policy goals. For instance, the hardening of key 
Soviet installations requires modernized United States weapons to hold these 
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targets at. risk and to continue thereby to deter the Soviet leadership effec- 
tively. As a general rule, however, United States weapons development has 
been led by policy requirements and not the other way around (and, I believe, 
Soviet development of a first strike force posture resulted from Soviet military 
policy and doctrine). In the Reagan Administration we have made a particular 
point of ensuring that our force modernization decisions are tailored specifi- 
cally to achieving national policy objectives. We have also sought to make 
certain that our acquisition programs provide weapons systems that, over their 
expected lifetimes, will serve policy interests. 
ý The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike remain inconceivable for the foreseeable 
future? - OR - Is there an increasing threat from accurate and time-urgent first- 
strike weapons? 
As in questions of stability, one must distinguish between the West and the 
Soviet Union in considering the first strike issue. Even when it had a first 
strike capability, the U. S. did not attack the Soviet Union. Today, it is incon- 
ceivable that any Western leader could believe that he could attack the Soviet 
Union and avoid retaliation. Given their vastly different motives, Communist 
leaders must remain persuaded that they could not attack the United States 
and avoid retaliation. The SS-i8 and follow-on Soviet missiles are an obvious 
effort to pose precisely that type of threat - an attempt to destroy the United 
States systems which would be required for effective retaliation. The United 
States modernization program is intended to defeat such attempts by reducing 
the overall vulnerability of United States forces. The answer, then, is that the 
threat of a Soviet first strike will be low - provided that the West modernizes 
its strategic deterrent. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and intelligence facilities likely to remain 
secure? - OR - Does the amount of information to be processed, pressure of time 
and fear of preemption put command and control systems under intolerable strain 
and make inadvertent war more likely? 
It is fundamental to deterrence that we must be able confidently to detect and 
assess a Soviet attack and then respond effectively. While our capabilities 
today support effective use of our forces, programmed C3 (Command, Control 
and Communications) improvements are designed to both improve and 
extend reliable control of our strategic forces into the future. 
(iii) If, nevertheless, there were a limited nuclear exchange would it be likely to end 
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hostilities swiftly? - OR - Is the idea that nuclear war could be limited once it had 
broken out a dangerous illusion 
The course of a war, once begun, is uncertain. It is not possible to be certain 
that our efforts to limit escalation and terminate a conflict once begun would 
succeed. But it is imperative that we take every step possible both to deter war 
and to limit the destruction of any conflict, despite all our efforts to prevent 
it. Without credible limited options, our critics' view that any response to a 
Soviet attack would automatically lead to mutual suicide could become a tragic 
self-fulfilling prophecy. In short, while our policy cannot guarantee success, 
our critics' policy can only guarantee failure. Deterrence must not fail at any 
level. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and theater nuclear systems reinforce deterrence? 
- OR - Do new battlefield and theater weapons threaten a dangerous lowering of 
the nuclear threshold? 
Theater nuclear systems, like strategic systems, also require modernization to 
counter the many years of unconstrained Soviet deployments of such systems 
at the SS-2o. Again, there must not be a Soviet perception of Allied weakness 
to invite aggression at any level. Further to the question, however, modernized 
theater nuclear systems do not lower the nuclear threshold. To argue that they 
would implies that both the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons does not 
carry great risk, and that the use of modern nuclear weapons is easier to 
contemplate than was the case with the systems they replace. Neither is true. 
As the answer to question A2(A)(iii) indicates, the use of any nuclear weapons 
is fraught with profound uncertainties which can be balanced only by the 
extreme consequences which would befall the West if those weapons were not 
used to halt Soviet aggression. As a result, the key is to defer any such ques- 
tions by continuing to deter Soviet aggression at any level. As a final point, it 
is important to note that, by improving its conventional capabilities across the 
board, NATO is actually seeking to raise the nuclear threshold. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defense Initiative offer the hope of an effective defense against 
nuclear weapons? - OR - Is the Strategic Defense Initiative simply the most recent 
and destabilizing example of the process outlines in 1? 
The Strategic Defense Initiative is essential if we are ever to free the world of 
the threat of nuclear war. SDI is a research initiative whose goal is to destroy 
weapons after they are launched. Since such research, should it prove fruitful, 
would remove rather than increase an aggressor's incentive to attack it is 
clearly not `destabilizing'. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear proliferation best met by a continuation of past 
policies? - OR - Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence by the great powers 
Caspar Weinberger ?q 
bound to accelerate the process of proliferation and make nuclear war more likely? 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union discourage the proliferation of 
nuclear weaponry. Both nations encourage others to join them as signators to 
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and both support the oversight roles of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. These responsible actions by both 
the United States and the Soviet Union should continue. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations offer the best prospect for future stability? 
- OR - Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts attention from the only safe policy 
- nuclear disarmament? 
Multilateral arms control efforts may bear fruit in certain areas. Th'e central 
. 
dilemma of the nuclear balance can only be resolved by the United States and 
the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Leaders truly are prepared to agree to deep, 
mutual, verifiable reductions then we are ready to work with them to reduce 
dramatically nuclear weapons on both sides. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would war between the great powers again 
become a rational option and therefore more likely? - OR - Would nuclear disarma- 
ment remove the incentive for nuclear preemption while not affecting the reluctance 
of the great powers to initiate a third world war? 
Total nuclear disarmament - in the face of Soviet conventional force super- 
iority-would be a highly dangerous, destabilizing, policy for the West because 
we would not retain an adequate deterrent to Soviet conventional aggression. 
Nuclear weapons are only part of the overall problem faced by the West. 
The central feature of this problem is that the Soviet leadership considers 
democracy and freedom anathema, and that, in the absence of high risk to 
themselves, they are prepared to use military force against those who enjoy 
the fruits and blessings of liberty. 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely in itself to be as terrible as a limited 
nuclear war? - OR - Is conventional war, however terrible, preferable to nuclear 
war? 
This question attempts to set a level of `desirability' for either conventional or 
nuclear war. No war is `preferable'. Conventional war could be devastating 
on a scale not yet experienced by humanity. We must have the strength to 
deter all plausible aggression against our Alliance. 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented would they not be bound to be used 
sooner or later once war had broken out? - OR - As with nerve gases in the last 
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war,. would there be no incentive to resort to capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
Same as (ii). 
(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only feasible in a world where war itself is no longer 
a possibility? - OR - Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear disarmament is not 
desirable to give up all hope of a rational world-order? 
As long as the Soviet Union poses a military -threat to the West, we must 
maintain a deterrent which will assure, to the maximum degree possible, that 
the Soviet leaders must never decide to attack us. Global nuclear disarmament 
which did nothing to remove the Soviet non-nuclear threat to the Free' 1orld 
would be a dangerous, destabilizing step. 
B Nato Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? - OR - Are NATO and WTO forces 
relatively evenly matched? 
The Soviet Union maintains an extremely large standing army which provides 
a dangerous degree of military superiority in Europe. Soviet investment in all 
areas of military force continues, including such capabilities as chemical and 
biological warfare - which they deploy in violation of treaty. The Allies must 
therefore continue to modernize conventional capabilities to ensure that deter- 
rence of conventional attack does not fail. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power which will take advantage of unilateral 
Western concessions and is only restrained and forced to accept arms-control agree- 
ments by Western determination and strength? - OR - Is the Soviet Union an 
encircled and threatened power trying to keep up with Western technology and likely 
to respond positively to unconditional offers of Western restraint within a general 
context of detente? 
Clearly the former. Soviet actions after World War II and today in Asia, 
Africa, and Central America confirm Communist ideological intent to expand 
throughout the world. The Soviets have clearly demonstrated that they are 
restrained only by Western unity and strength. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional preponderance such that NATO must continue 
to be able to threaten early use of nuclear weapons? - OR - Is NATO dependence 
on the early use of nuclear weapons unnecessary and strategically suicidal? 
The whole goal of Flexible Response is to deter by maintaining a credible 
capability to respond appropriately to any level of Soviet attack. The West 
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will certainly attempt to meet aggression with conventional forces, but cannot 
forgo the possible use of nuclear weapons in the face of a major attack by Soviet 
forces. Given the massive nature of Soviet forces, the West must continue to 
rely on nuclear weapons as an essential element of deterrence. The Soviets 
must not see any possibility for success in initiating a war, conventional or 
nuclear. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal threaten the delicate theater and 
strategic balance? Would Western failure to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? 
- OR - Does the West initiate nearly all phases of the nuclear arms race and continue 
to enjoy a substantial lead in most areas? Is the nuclear `overkill' such that the West 
could offer a nuclear `fireeze' or unconditional cuts without risk? 
As the attached charts indicate, it is simply not true that the United States has 
initiated developments in what the question calls `the nuclear arms race'. The 
massive growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities, clearly designed to achieve a 
first strike capability, threatens the entire global balance, and can only be 
offset by Western modernization. A nuclear freeze would codify the current 
Soviet advantages, and could result, therefore, in a less stable world. Unilateral 
cuts by the West would have a similar effect, although their destabilizing 
nature would be felt far more quickly than would those of a nuclear freeze. 
Furthermore, either a freeze or unilateral cuts would remove any Soviet incen- 
tives to negotiate seriously for mutual arms reductions. 
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COMPARISON OF U. S. AND SOVIET LONGER-RANGE INF WEAPONS 
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This decision called for LRINF deployments at end of 1983 unless an arms 
control agreement were reached which made them unnecessary 
(v) Are NATO `forward defense' and `deep strike' strategies essential for effective 
deterrence? - OR - Should NATO exploit her lead in `emerging technology' to 
explore less provocative alternative strategies? 
The NATO forward defense strategy is designed to prevent the Soviet Union 
from perceiving that it can attack NATO successfully without major military 
risk. As such it is an essential element of NATO's deterrence of war. The US 
and other NATO nations are, in fact, exploring the possible benefits that 
might accrue from emerging technologies. Highly capable conventional 
weapons can, for instance, better deter the Soviets by increasing the prob- 
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ability that NATO could deny Soviet war aims - and lessen Western reliance 
upon nuclear weaponry at the same time. It is not justifiable to call weapons 
which would help blunt a Soviet attack which was already in progress `provoca- 
tive'. Nor can it reasonably be suggested that NATO, using forward defense 
and deep strike, poses a conventional military threat to the Soviet Union or 
the Warsaw Pact. 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line troops and the tying-in of theater nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be supported? - OR - Is it domination by the 
two super powers that poses the greatest threat to European integrity? Would Europe 
be safer decoupled from the super power nuclear confrontation? Should Europe be 
made a nuclear weapon free zone? 
The fundamental problem which lead to the creation of the NATO alliance 
was that the Soviet Union was taking over the countries of Eastern Europe, 
and free nations of Western Europe could not expect to defend themselves 
from a Soviet attack without American involvement. The forward deployment 
of American forces guarantees the Soviet Union that they will indeed face full 
American involvement in the defense of Europe. The physical presence of 
American troops has helped deter the Soviets for over forty years. It is difficult 
to see how Europe - or America - would be safer without the NATO Alliance. 
It is even more difficult to see how Europe would remain free from Soviet 
coercion. 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are sugges- 
tions that the West should take the lead in offering unilateral disarmament initiatives 
the thin end of this wedge? Do radical nuclear disarmers consciously or unconsciously 
serve Soviet interests and threaten to undermine Western defenses? - OR - Are 
unilateral initiatives as part of a general programme of nuclear disarmament the 
only way to reverse the arms race? Is talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere in 
the mouths of those who reject all suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
a Nuclear Freeze, a European Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, or a declaration of No 
First Use? 
Unilateral disarmament would not provide any incentive for the Soviets to 
reduce their forces. Responsible arms control policies leading to mutual veri- 
fiable reductions could well increase the security of the entire world. Calls for 
unilateral disarmament - which can only be voiced in the West - are simply 
not productive or helpful. Neither a No First Use declaration, nor a Nuclear 
Freeze, nor a European Nuclear Weapon Free Zone are in the security inter- 
ests of the West: all would serve to codify existing Soviet advantages. 
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c BRITISH POLICY 
i THE BRITISH DETERRENT 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last resort which guarantees her sovereignty and 
independence and protects her from nuclear blackmail? - OR - Would all possible 
uses of Britain's `deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to ensure Soviet targeting? 
First, one should have no illusion that if the Soviet Union uses nuclear weapons 
against the Alliance, some NATO countries would not be targeted - regardless 
of the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on their soil. Further, much of 
Britain's nuclear capability is at sea and cannot bi, - easily destroyed. That 
capability is a very powerful guarantor of British freedom - and contributes 
significantly to the overall security of the West. 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of decision making? - OR -Is the `second centre 
of decision making' an illusion when the weapons are dependent upon the US and 
there is no independent strategic role to be played? Are European allies unenthusiastic 
about a parochial British force likely to inhibit her commitment to European defense? 
British nuclear forces are valuable to the entire Alliance because they provide 
an important part of NATO's overall deterrent capability. Britain's nuclear 
forces do play both an Alliance role and a genuinely independent one - both 
of which deter Soviet aggression. This case for the UK deterrent - and its 
modernization - was made quite conclusively in the two UK Ministry of 
Defence white papers with which we fully agree: `The Future United Kingdom 
Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force' (July t 980) and `The United Kingdom Trident 
Programme' (March 1982). 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet recognition of it? - OR - Are US forces 
committed anyway and independent British initiatives more likely to trigger Soviet 
retaliation than US involvement? 
The NATO Alliance is based upon the shared capabilities of the members - 
each contributing to ensure the denial of Soviet war aims if required - to 
provide an overall deterrent to Soviet attack. The United States and Britian 
both contribute large forces - some of them nuclear, but all of them vital - to 
the Alliance. It is important that the Alliance as a whole remain strong and 
firmly committed for effective deterrence, and all Alliance capabilities, includ- 
ing nuclear, must be kept modern and effective. 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in view of the vital defense role it plays? 
Are alternatives likely to be more expensive? - OR - Can Britain's nuclear forces 
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only be afforded at the expense of conventional strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
The United States government fully supports the continued existence of the 
United Kingdom independent deterrent. The firm commitment of British 
forces - both conventional and nuclear - is vital to the Alliance. The exact 
allotment of British resources is, of course, a question on which I defer to the 
British Government. In that regard, however, I would note the points in both 
the July 1980 MoD White Paper ('No alternative use of British resources would 
provide a comparable strengthening of collaborative Alliance deterrence to aggres- 
sion. ') and the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1983 (`... no equivalent 
spending on conventional weapons could possibly have the same value [as the UK 
Trident] in preventing war or offer a better assurance for the long term'). So I 
would agree the cost of the British deterrent is small in view of the role it plays. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear disarmament have no effect on other countries and 
only serve to weaken British influence and allow France unchallenged ascendancy 
in Europe? - OR - Does the British deterrent encourage proliferation and do nothing 
to enhance British prestige? Would British disarmament within the context outlined 
in B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
First, unilateral British nuclear disarmament would not provide any incentive 
for any other government to reciprocate. Second, there is a need to deter the 
Soviet Union, not France. Nor does any UK/French contest for Western 
European nuclear ascendancy exist. Finally, unilateral nuclear disarmament 
by any of the Western allies would'undercut NATO's overall deterrent posture 
- it would greatly weaken the West's military capabilities without reducing 
the threat posed by Soviet nuclear and conventional forces. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to continue to ensure effective British strategic 
defense into the 21st century? - OR - Would commitment to Trident exacerbate all 
the drawbacks listed above? 
Yes, investment in Trident is the best way to ensure effective"British strategic 
defense into the 21St century. 
z NATO FORCES AND US BASES 
(i) Must Britain continue to share responsibility for manning NATO nuclear systems 
upon which her security depends? Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the 
Alliance? - OR - Should British obligations to NATO be met by strengthening 
conventional forces where necessary within an overall non-nuclear strategy as recom- 
mended in B? 
The British contributions to NATO - both conventional and nuclear - must 
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be considered from an Alliance viewpoint. They are essential. Regrettably, 
faced with Soviet conventional and nuclear capabilities, the Alliance does not 
have the option to resort to a full non-nuclear strategy. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US nuclear bases from Britain make US defense 
of the West impossible? Is American interference in British affairs negligible? - OR 
- Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities yielded to the US erode British sover- 
eignty? Would their removal do no more than restore a normal peacetime relation- 
ship? 
U. S. presence in Europe - at significant cost to this country - is intended both 
to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that America is firmly committed to NATO 
defense and to give us the advantages of forward deployment for our defending 
forces. Should any NATO nation request withdrawal of American support, it 
would send a signal to Moscow that NATO unity - absolutely essential to 
deterrence - could be fragmented. The United States does not - and has no 
desire or intention to - intrude in internal British affairs or impair British 
sovereignity in any way. This applies equally to US forces based in the UK as 
well as to US foreign policy. 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by Soviet warheads whether or not she unilater- 
ally disarms? - OR - Is Britain seen as an American aircraft carrier and targeted 
by the USSR accordingly? Will Britain fall an early victim in any super power 
confrontation unless bases are removed? 
Britain possesses military and industrial power. There is no reason to believe 
that, should the Soviet Union use nuclear weapons in attacking the West, 
Britain would be spared gratuitously. Rather, schemes such as unilateral dis- 
armament and foregoing Allied support could only fracture Alliance unity and 
heighten Soviet perceptions of military success - thereby weakening deter- 
rence. 
(iv) Can non-nuclear defenses only safely be afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? - OR - In a nuclear free Europe, de- 
coupled from the super-power nuclear confrontation, would Britain no more expect 
to depend upon the US `umbrella' than any other Western ally - or than Eastern 
Europe upon the USSR? 
One must state up front that NATO can in no way be compared to the Warsaw 
Pact. NATO nations freely agree to cooperate in common defense against 
possible Soviet aggression. The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations do not 
`depend' upon the Soviet Union for defense against a threat that the West does 
not pose. They are forced to submit to Soviet hegemony due solely to brute 
Soviet force. Not only can Britain, freely joined in the NATO Alliance, depend 
upon the US, but the US depends upon Britain. It is foolish to speak of a 
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`nuclear free Europe, decoupled from the super-power nuclear confrontation'; it is 
the political and military threat posed by the USSR to the free nations of 
Western Europe which is a major cause of super-power tensions, and not the 
other way around. 
Moral Considerations 
The policy of the Western nations is to jointly preserve their freedoms and 
cultural values while preventing aggression and war - all war. The security 
provided by a strong defense provides the environment in which education, 
business, religion and freedom can flourish. Even conventional war would be 
devastating to all our natioils, and all of these areas would suffer greatly if war 
erupted. It would be a cruel `economy' to jeopardize our national values by 
weakening our deterrence of the Soviet Union. In that our policy seeks to 
prevent war, and to ensure the continued existence of the Western political 
tradition which fosters and protects individual and human rights, democratic 
government and religious freedom and toleration, it is clearly and manifestly 
a most moral policy. 
Recommendations 
NOTE These recommendations have been deduced by the editor from the text 
(except for No. 3), and appropriate references have been given. They were 
not made by the Secretary of Defense himself. 
I No (See B(iv) & B(vii)). 
2 No (See A2(A)(v)). 
3 No, because the introduction of modern safety and security devices into 
the two-thirds of our stockpiled weapons that do not yet have them would 
be halted by a test ban (Quoted in the Times September i i, 1986). 
4 No (See B(iii) & B(vii)). 
5 Yes, if the cuts are mutual and verifiable (See A2(A)(vii)). 
6 No (See B(vi) and B(vii)). 
7 Yes (See A2(A)(vi)). 
8 No (See A2(B)(i)). 
9 Does not apply. 
Io No (See A2(A)(v)). 
II No (See B(iii)). 
12 No (See B(iv) & B(vii)). 
13 No (See B(i)). 
14 No (See A2(A)(iv) & C2(ii)). 
15 No (See B(vi) & B(vii)). 
16 No (See CI). 
17 Does not apply (See CI(iv)). 
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18 In present circumstances the Alliance does not have the option to resort to 
a full non-nuclear strategy (See C2(1)). 
t9 No (See C2(i) & C2(ii)). 
20 Does not apply. 
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Biographical Note 
Born in 193 1, George Younger read Modern History at New College, Oxford, 
and, from 1950, served with the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in the 
Regular and Territorial Army. He was elected Conservative MP for Ayr in 
1964. Following the general election of 1970 he was appointed Parliamentary 
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Under-Secretary of State, Scottish Office, later serving as Minister of State for 
Defence. In Opposition between 1974 and 1979 he was, among other things, 
Chief Opposition Spokesman on Defence (1975-1976). From 1979 to January 
1986 he was Secretary of State for Scotland, and has been Secretary of State 
for Defence since then. 
Editorial Comment 
These answers were communicated in an interview in the Ministry of Defence 
on December 16,1986. The reader is presented here with a complete rationale 
for current policy. In Section Ai the Secretary of State gives a reasoned expo- 
sition of what he calls `Mutual Assured Deterrence'. In Section A2(A) he 
refutes the suggestion that current policy is likely to lead to a greater risk of 
instability. In Section A2(B) he rejects global nuclear disarmament as a desir- 
able short-term option for reasons further explained in the answers to ques- 
tions B(i) and B(ii). Particularly important here is the justification for NATO's 
Flexible Response and Deep Strike strategies to be found in the answers to 
questions B(iii) and B(v). The modernization of Britain's independent nuclear 
forces is defended in Section CI, while the criticism in the answers to questions 
C2(i) and C2(ii) of Opposition proposals to move towards non-nuclear defence 
within NATO Alliance should be seen against the background of answers such 
as those to questions B(vi) and B(vii). 
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A Global Policy 
i The History of the Past Forty Years 
(i) Has it been nuclear deterrence that has OR Has it mainly been other factors? 
kept the peace between the great powers 
since 194S? 
No doubt many factors have contributed to the preservation of peace between 
the great powers during the past forty years. But, given the tensions that exist 
between East and West, and in particular the huge imbalance of conventional 
forces, it would be wrong to overlook the part that fear of nuclear retaliation 
has played in ensuring that tensions did not spill over into war. For the past 
forty years our security has depended on nuclear weapons. And it still does. 
(ii) Does mutual possession of an invulnerable 
second-strike strategic nuclear force prevent 
war? 
OR Does the threat of strategic nuclear 
retaliation, particularly against a similarly 
armed enemy, lack credibility and invite 
sub-deterrent encroachment? 
Mutual possession of an invulnerable second-strike strategic nuclear force is 
the ultimate underpinning of deterrence. But on its own it is not enough to 
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ensure the prevention of war. If all we had was the American strategic nuclear 
deterrent, the Soviet Union might be tempted to contemplate adventure at 
lower levels on the grounds that the leap to a full strategic nuclear exchange 
would be too disproportionate for the United States to risk. It might lack 
credibility. 
(iii) Have limited nuclear options at strategic 
and theatre levels enhanced deterrence by 
dramatically raising the threshold between 
peace and war? 
OR Have most military planners from the start 
been aiming for nuclear war fighting 
superiority? Has `flexible response' 
dangerously lowered the threshold between 
conventional and nuclear war? 
That is why, ever since the tripwire strategy ceased to be credible, the West 
has regarded a range of nuclear options within a strategy of flexible response 
as essential for effective deterrence. The importance of a graduated capability 
of this kind is that it denies the Soviet Union the perception that it might be 
possible to secure a swift advantage at one level without incurring unacceptable 
damage in reply. 
To attempt to infer from this that, by doing this, NATO is planning for 
nuclear war, is to try to make a false distinction. Deterrence is only effective 
when the enemy perceives that you have the capability and the will to carry 
out your threat if he ignores it. The purpose behind our dispositions is the 
prevention of war, and it can be done in no other way. Flexible response has 
added credibility to the deterrent. 
(iv) Has the size and variety of the nuclear 
arsenals held by the superpowers stabilized 
deterrence? 
OR Has the logic of nuclear confrontation and 
worst-case analysis generated a dangerous 
and strategically pointless superfluity of 
weapons systems? 
Within these terms, it is important that nuclear arsenals are diverse enough to offer 
these options. Extended deterrence demands more than a minimum strategic force. 
Looked at globally, the size of current arsenals is excessive, which is why, among 
other things, we favour fifty percent cut in strategic weapons on both sides. But that 
is not to say that it is dangerous. Deterrence is stable. 
(v) Has the idea of nuclear balance between 
the superpowers been essential to stability 
and have arms-control negotiations helped 
to achieve it? 
OR Have ideas of `nuclear defence' and 
`parity' proved illusory and is `multilateral 
negotiation from strength' a contradiction 
in terms? Has `arms-control' been just 
another name for the arms race? 
The idea of balance is an important one. The West is not aiming for nuclear 
superiority, but for balance. That does not mean exact parity, system by 
system, in any mechanical way; it means a balance of Mutual Assured Deter- 
rence. Arms control contributes by helping to orchestrate this. It facilitates 
mutual understanding of how the system works, and curbs escalation and 
proliferation. But we must not suppose that arms control is a substitute for 
proper defence, nor that it can achieve anything very significant unless carried 
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on within a wider context of military and political negotiation. We must not 
become so preoccupied with nuclear weapon number counting that we neglect 
the broader situation which gives nuclear weapons their significance. 
(vi) Has force planning been controlled by 
strategic thinking? 
OR Has the self-reinforcing impetus of 
technology and vested interest dictated 
policies subsequently justified post hoc? 
We must not let technology drive policy. Nor must we allow it to undermine 
stability. There is always a threat that this might happen, which is why it must 
be firmly controlled. But the idea of those represented on the right-hand side 
here that there is a runaway system is a gross exaggeration. In general, force- 
planning is controlled by strategic thinking. Despite what a number of the 
critics seem to siIiggest, it is, in fact, in the Soviet Union, rather than in the 
West, that political restraint on military spending is harder to achieve. 
2 The Prospect for the Future 
(A) WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) Does the threat of an enemy first strike 
remain inconceivable for the foreseeable 
future? 
OR Is there an increasing threat from accurate 
and time-urgent first-strike weapons? 
For our part, we have undertaken quite clearly that there are no circumstances 
in which we will use any weapons first. But fear of an enemy first strike is to 
do with perceptions, and it is true that at times there are expressions of alarm 
on this score on both sides. But the fact is that there is nothing in the pipeline 
which is remotely likely to threaten the present perceived mutual inhibition 
against a first strike. The prospects for Mutual Assured Deterrence are stable. 
(ii) Are command, control, communication and OR Does the amount of information to be 
intelligence facilities likely to remain processed, pressure of time and fear of 
secure? preemption put command and control 
systems under intolerable strain and make 
inadvertent war more likely? 
I am surprised by those represented on the right-hand side here, who suggest 
that the modernization of command and control systems will make inadvertent 
war more likely. It seems to me that the reverse is the case. Had there been 
nuclear weapons in the days when Admiral Nelson set off on a six-month 
mission with no more communication that some brief instructions in his 
pocket, we would be in trouble. But the instantaneous communications that 
we have today prevent that. 
(iii) If nevertheless there were a limited nuclear OR Is the idea that nuclear war could be 
exchange would it be likely to end limited once it had broken out a dangerous 
hostilities swiftly? illusion? 
None of us can know what would happen if deterrence broke down. Clearly 
we have to make plans to limit the damage should that happen, and it would 
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be irresponsible not to do so. But it is absurd to criticize this as `planning for 
limited nuclear war'. The purpose is to deter war, and the fear on both sides 
that, if deterrence failed, neither would be able to limit what the other did, is 
part of that deterrence. It is a potent component in ensuring that it does not 
fail. Our ability to make a flexible response is the best way of effecting this. 
(iv) Do new generations of battlefield and 
theatre nuclear systems reinforce 
deterrence? 
OR Do new battlefield and theatre weapons 
threaten a dangerous lowering of the 
nuclear threshold? 
Given the threatened Soviet preponderance in Long Range Intermediate 
Nuclear Forces, the Western deployment of land-based Cruise and Pershing 
II missiles has clearly helped to stabilize deterrence. Failure to have done so 
is what would have been destabilizing. As to the possibility of a `zero' option, 
in which all of these systems would be removed by both sides, if this could be 
achieved, we would of course, welcome it. Such an outcome would, of course, 
have implications for deterrence, and it would be essential to have adequate 
constraints on Soviet shorter-range intermediate forces. 
(v) Does the Strategic Defence Initiative offer 
the hope of an effective defence against 
nuclear weapons? 
OR Is the Strategic Defence Initiative simply 
the most recent and destabilizing example 
of the process outlined in i? 
It is hard to believe that Mr Gorbachev expected the proposals on SDI that 
he made at Reykjavik to be accepted. They would have placed severe new 
constraints on US research while comparable Soviet activities remained unac- 
knowledged. SDI is only a research programme. We cannot yet tell what 
options it may open up - or whether it is going to produce anything at all. But 
we must continue to explore the possibilities that technology offers, because, 
as has often been demonstrated in the past, these may turn out to enhance our 
security. The essential question is whether defensive systems have a role to 
play in maintaining deterrence and ensuring strategic stability, or whether 
we should continue to deter strategic nuclear attack solely by the threat of 
retaliation. 
But the programme should be conducted within the terms jointly endorsed 
by the President and the Prime Minister at Camp David" two years ago. It 
has been made clear that, in its research phase, it will not infringe existing 
agreements, such as the ABM treaty, and that, if and when it comes to deploy- 
ment, this will be subject to negotiation, both with Allies, and with the Soviet 
Union. The aim is to enhance deterrence. 
(vi) Is the threat of `horizontal' nuclear 
proliferation best met by a continuation of 
past policies? 
OR Is continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence 
by the great powers bound to accelerate the 
process of proliferation and make nuclear 
war more likely? 
We should go on containing the threat of nuclear weapon proliferation as we 
i. The Camp David Accord, December 1984. 
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have done, surprisingly successfully, up until now. But I do not accept the 
link implied in the question on the right-hand side, between the continued 
reliance on nuclear deterrence by the existing nuclear powers, and the likeli- 
hood of the spread of nuclear weapons to others. If nuclear weapons could be 
abolished entirely, then proliferation would evidently be ended as part of it. 
But this is not going to happen. Short of that, I do not think that current 
nuclear deterrent policies affect the issue of proliferation. 
(vii) Do multilateral arms-control negotiations 
offer the best prospect for future stability? 
OR Is `arms-control' an illusion which diverts 
attention from the only safe policy - 
nuclear disarmament? 
No real consensus has emerged on whether Reykjavik was a blind alley from 
which we must all now retreat, or a break-up in the ice-floes of arms control, 
or even a fundamental shift in the international security framework. I take a 
hopeful view. So far as concerns arms control, we would welcome fifty per cent 
reductions in strategic weapons, an INF agreement, and further constraints on 
weapon testing (the problem with a Comprehensive Test Ban, which we would 
otherwise favour, is verification). If Reykjavik proves to be a sign of a funda- 
mental shift, then, as the Prime Minister and the President agreed the other 
day, this must include a settlement to the whole range of issues that divide 
East and West. If there is such a shift, how marvellous. But we must wait and 
see. 
In the meantime, we can be confident that, if present policies are continued, 
deterrence will remain stable. 
(B) WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
(i) If nuclear arsenals were dismantled would 
war between the great powers again 
become a rational option and therefore 
more likely? 
OR Would nuclear disarmament remove the 
incentive for nuclear preemption while not 
affecting the reluctance of the great powers 
to initiate a third world war? 
If Mr Gorbachev's proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year Moo means 
leaving everything else as it is now, then clearly it is not desirable. The first worry 
would be that we would have no way of proving that Mr Gorbachev had in fact given 
up his nuclear weapons. And the second worry would be that in any case this would 
make the conventional imbalance very much more dangerous. It would be possible 
to concentrate troops for a conventional attack without having to fear a nuclear 
response. To replace the current situation of strategic stability with the unstable 
international environment that would result from a world made safe for conven- 
tional war is not an attractive proposition. 
(ii) Would a major conventional war be likely OR Is conventional war, however terrible, 
in itself to be as terrible as a limited preferable to nuclear war? 
nuclear war? 
A conventional war in Europe today, even in the unlikely event that it 
remained at the conventional level, would, indeed, be terrible. It is important 
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to remember that what properly maintained nuclear deterrence does. is to 
ensure the prevention of war of all kinds. It is a serious mistake to concentrate 
so much on nuclear weapons all the time that we overlook the appalling threat 
of modern conventional war. 
(iii) Because nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented would they not be bound to be 
used sooner or later once war had broken 
out? 
OR As with nerve gases in the last war, would 
there be no incentive to resort to 
capabilities which the other side has as 
well? 
But, since we cannot uninvent nuclear weapons, were a conventional war to 
break out in this way, then both sides would be hurrying to redevelop them. 
-tasty nuclear disarmament makes nuclear war more, not less, likely. 
(iv) Is global nuclear disarmament only 
feasible in a world where war itself is no 
longer a possibility? 
OR Is to argue that even multilateral nuclear 
disarmament is not desirable to give up all 
hope of a rational world-order? 
The vision of a non-nuclear world, to which we should all aspire as an ultimate 
goal for general disarmament, should not be allowed to obscure what we need 
for effective deterrence now, or the modest but real steps that we can take to 
secure reductions in weapon levels and improve East-West relations. It would 
be nice to wish away both the Soviet threat and the need for a nuclear deterrent. 
That would be the best of all possible worlds. But, until such dreams have 
more substance than they do at present, we shall continue to depend on nuclear 
weapons to ensure our security. We must work towards our goal painstakingly, 
realistically, and responsibly. To rush recklessly ahead towards some sup- 
posed Utopia is to put our security at risk. 
(v) Is peace only preserved when we are seen 
to be prepared for war, as failure before 
1939 and success since 1945 show? Under 
likely future conditions would global 
nuclear disarmament make war, including 
nuclear war, more likely? 
OR Do the years before 1914 show what 
happens when military planning and the 
arms race control political choices? Do 
present strategies make nuclear war almost 
inevitable under likely future conditions? 
Is global nuclear disarmament the only 
rational policy? 
I do not see our situation today as comparable to that in 1914. Nuclear deter- 
rence is stable. It is not a system which is running out of control. The key 
difference in the nuclear age is that nuclear war is totally unacceptable to all 
decision-makers in all countries, and for that reason they will do almost any- 
thing to avoid it. In 1914 there were a number of advisers recommending war. 
Today that is no longer the case. 
b NATO Policy 
(i) Does the Soviet Union, together with her OR Are NATO and WTO forces relatively 
Warsaw Pact allies, enjoy a strategically evenly matched? 
dangerous military superiority in Europe? 
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The Soviet threat is the starting point for all we do in defence. There can be 
no doubt that, at the moment, there is a serious non-nuclear military imbalance 
between the two sides, and those who deny this are, for whatever reason, 
simply ignoring the facts. Soviet spending on armed forces has risen by some 
sixty percent in real terms over the past fifteen years and is still rising. As the 
annual White Paper makes clear, and indeed other publications (for instance, 
the recently published IISS assessment), we are speaking of a wide imbalance 
in terms of numbers of men and divisions in favour of the Warsaw pact, a two- 
to-one advantage in numbers of main battle tanks and of fix-wing tactical 
aircraft, a three-to-one advantage in artillery, and so on. The Soviet navy is 
smaller, but more than enough to disrupt vital transatlantic supply routes. 
These are ready forces. We must also consider the Soviet ability to create even 
greater local superiority by a sudden massing of troops, and her longer-term 
advantage in reinforcement and supply. In addition, there is the near Soviet 
monopoly in chemical weapons. To say this is not to be alarmist. NATO has 
certainly made progress in strengthening her conventional forces. But the 
serious non-nuclear military imbalance is an undeniable fact. To ignore it, for 
example to try to claim that the two sides are evenly matched, is an irrespon- 
sible refusal to recognize the reality of the world we are living in. 
(ii) Is the Soviet Union an expansionist power OR Is the Soviet Union an encircled and 
which will take advantage of unilateral threatened power trying to keep up with 
Western concessions and is only restrained Western technology and likely to respond 
and forced'to accept arms-control positively to unconditional offers of 
agreements by Western determination and Western restraint within a general context 
strength? of detente? 
We must not, of course, confuse what we know of Soviet capabilities, with 
what we can only guess about Soviet intentions. I do not think, for example, 
that the Soviet Union has any direct desire to attack the West. But two points 
need to be made here. First, Soviet ideological hostility towards the West 
remains fundamentally unchanged. It is no more than stating the facts to say 
that, because the Soviet system depends upon repression, the free West is a 
standing threat to its continued existence. Secondly, there is the Soviet record. 
This shows that the way to handle the Soviet Union is to be strong and united, 
while at the same time exploring the possibilities for mutual accommodation 
and agreement. It is striking that in those areas in which the West has been 
relatively weaker, there has been no incentive for the Soviet Union to give 
anything away. It is disappointing that after thirteen years, agreement has not 
been reached at the MBFR` negotiations, nor have the negotiations for a global 
ban on chemical weapons so far produced concrete results. This contrasts with 
the situation where the introduction of Cruise and Pershing II has led to 
suggestions of a mutual giving up of INF weapons. The fundamental factor 
remains the underlying imbalance in non-nuclear forces. While that remains 
i. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks which have been going on since 1973 in 
Vienna between the WTO and NATO countries. 
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so, we do not want to depend for our security on Soviet good will - on some 
vague supposition that the Soviet Union does not intend to take advantage of 
her superiority. We do know that the forces exist. We do not know what 
Soviet intentions are. Prudent and responsible defence in the West has to 
make proper provision accordingly. 
(iii) Is Soviet chemical and conventional OR Is NATO dependence on the early Use of 
preponderance such that NATO must nuclear weapons unnecessary and 
continue to be able to threaten early use of strategically suicidal? 
nuclear weapons? 
Flexible response is the only credible strategy for the West in the face of the 
Soviet threat as it now stands. As the statement issued after the recent meeting 
between the President and the Prime Minister made clear, it. will continue to 
require effective nuclear deterrence based on a mix of options. But two popular 
misconceptions need to be corrected here. 
In the first place, flexible response includes conventional as well as nuclear 
options. NATO keeps open the option of using nuclear weapons in order to 
deter the Soviet Union - but that does not mean that this would have to be 
invoked at any particular stage of a conventional conflict were deterrence 
neverthless to fail. It could be that we would be able to hold a conventional 
attack with conventional forces. That would clearly be our aim. The nuclear 
option remains precisely that - an option. Secondly, the reason for keeping 
the option open is in order to deter. It is to demonstrate to the Soviet leaders 
that they cannot undertake aggression against NATO territory without put- 
ting their own homeland, their forces and those of their Warsaw Pact allies, 
at risk. A `declaration of no first use' of nuclear weapons would be counter- 
productive and meaningless. It would be counter-productive insofar as it 
weakened deterrence. And it would be meaningless for the same reason that 
the Soviet declaration is meaningless - no matter what Soviet official spokes- 
men may say, their nuclear forces are trained to preempt an anticipated attack. 
The fundamental fact is that NATO is a purely defensive alliance. We have 
made the only significant declaration - that we will on no account use any 
weapon first. 
(iv) Does the growing size of the Soviet nuclear OR Does the West initiate nearly all phases of 
arsenal threaten the delicate theatre and the nuclear arms race and continue to enjoy 
strategic balance? Would Western failure a substantial lead in most areas? Is the 
to match Soviet systems be destabilizing? nuclear `overkill' such that the West could 
offer a nuclear `freeze' or unconditional 
cuts without risk? 
The West does not have to match the Soviet Union system-by-system, but 
does need to make sure that the Soviet Union does not achieve a preponderance 
at any one level, which might invite a dangerous attempt to exploit it. That is 
why the West was right to respond to the Soviet build-up in LRINF forces. 
Within these terms, although there is room for unilateral adjustments, such 
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as the current reductions being made in NATO's battlefield weapons, more 
sweeping unilateral moves would clearly be destabilizing. 
(v) Are NATO `forward defence' and `deep OR Should NATO exploit her lead in 
strike' strategies essential for effective `emerging technology' to explore less 
deterrence? provocative alternative strategies? 
It is militarily meaningless to make the kind of distinction between `offensive' 
and `defensive' weapons and strategies proposed by the critics represented in 
the right-hand column. In view of -Soviet plans for concentrating massive 
successive waves of attack along a particular axis, NATO must be able to 
strike at the follow-on echelons, airfields, and lines of communication. But, 
once again, the crucial point is to do with deterrence. The enemy will only be, 
deterred from attacking when he knows that, if he does, he will not be vulner- 
able only in the territory that he is occupying. 
Emerging technologies are supplements to, not substitutes for, NATO's 
overall defence. They do, indeed, offer the hope of a significant strengthening 
of NATO non-nuclear forces, and therefore of a welcome deferral of the likeli- 
hood of having to invoke the nuclear option. That is why NATO is developing 
them. But they are no panacea. The gestation period for many of these systems 
is a long one, they are expensive, and, of course, the Soviet Union is also 
developing similar capabilities. 
(vi) Is it the presence of American front-line 
troops and the tying-in of theatre nuclear 
forces to the American strategic deterrent 
that guarantees W. European security? 
Should American policies therefore be 
supported? 
OR Is it domination by the two super-powers 
that poses the greatest threat to European 
integrity? Would Europe be safer 
decoupled from the super-power nuclear 
confrontation? Should Europe be made a 
nuclear weapon free zone? 
It is indeed the presence of American front-line troops, and the tying-in of 
those troops, by whatever stages, to the American strategic deterrent, that 
continues to underpin Western security. We nearly lost two world wars 
because the Americans were not in. Their commitment to the security of 
Western Europe is now made tangible by their presence. But that is not, of 
course, to say that European states are going to see eye-to-eye with their ally 
on every issue. For one thing, the United States is a global power, and has no 
land frontier with the Soviet Union. There are bound to be differences of 
perspective. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, which is a vehicle for the imposition of 
Soviet control, NATO is a free association of partners for mutual advantage. 
It is also important to remember that the United States is not opposed to a 
stronger and more united Europe. On the contrary, many Americans would 
welcome it. The essential point is that, at a time of change, when it is possible 
that old Cold War configurations may be beginning to shift, it is all the more 
important that Western cohesion and strength is maintained. NATO needs to 
adapt, but must not lose the unity and sense of common purpose that has so 
far preserved our freedom. It is fundamental to Western security that the 
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Transatlantic Alliance remains strong. To put this at risk is to my mind irres- 
ponsibility of the worst kind. 
(vii) Would Western unilateral nuclear 
disarmament invite Soviet blackmail? Are 
suggestions that the West should take the 
lead in offering unilateral disarmament 
initiatives the thin end of this wedge? Do 
radical nuclear disarmers consciously or 
unconsciously serve Soviet interests and 
threaten to undermine Western defences? 
OR Are unilateral initiatives as part of a 
general programme of nuclear disarmament 
the only way to reverse the arms race? Is 
talk of `multilateral disarmament' insincere 
in the mouths of those who reject all 
suggestion of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, a Nuclear Freeze, a European 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or a 
declaration of No First Use? 
One-sided measures of the kind proposed in the right-hand column have failed 
in the past. The way forward is a combination of continued nuclear deterrence, 
together with bilateral and multilateral negotiations. This is a long and difficult 
road, but one which we must go on travelling down. Our policies have brought 
us to this point and are beginning to bear fruit. To make the kind of rash 
unilateral gestures that have been suggested in some quarters, would be to 
throw all of this in jeopardy. It would just create instability. 
C British Policy 
i The British Deterrent 
(i) Is Britain's deterrent a weapon of last OR Would all possible uses of Britain's 
resort which guarantees her sovereignty and `deterrent' be suicidal? Is its only effect to 
independence and protects her from nuclear encourage proliferation? 
blackmail? 
Seen from a purely British point of view, the independent British nuclear 
deterrent is an ultimate safeguard against nuclear blackmail in a world of 
nuclear weapon powers. It is an ultimate option, but, for that reason, a remote 
one. Of more immediate significance, therefore, is the importance of the Brit- 
ish deterrent within the Western Alliance. British nuclear forces are commit- 
ted to NATO. 
(ii) Are British nuclear forces valuable to 
European allies because they provide a 
specifically European second centre of 
decision making? 
OR Is the `second centre of decision making' an 
illusion when the weapons are dependent 
upon the US and there is no independent 
strategic role to be played? Are European 
allies unenthusiastic about a parochial 
British force likely to inhibit her 
commitment to European defence? 
The fact that the British nuclear force is European, that is to say, non-Amer- 
ican, is significant, because of its effect on Soviet perceptions. It is important 
that the Soviet planner sees that there is a European component to the Western 
nuclear deterrent, in case he might otherwise be tempted to suppose that the 
United States might be inhibited from using her nuclear forces in defence of 
Europe. It is a further complication for the planner. His work is not done 
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when he has made a judgement about America - he must also assess the threat 
from Britain and France. A British nuclear force also helps European partners 
to see the deterrent as not only an American contribution. It means that there 
is a diversification of commitment, from a country like Norway which would 
only allow nuclear weapons on to her soil in wartime; through those countries 
which allow American nuclear weapons on their soil; to Britain which also has 
her own forces. But this is not to suggest that a European force is an alternative 
to an American force. There are those who suggest that we should somehow 
unilaterally switch nuclear partners from the United States to France - with 
little or no consultation with either, it seems. But this would produce no 
advantage over our present arrangements and would probably end up being 
more expensive. The British and American nuclear forces are complementary 
within the overall framework of the Western Alliance. 
(iii) Does the US favour shared responsibility 
and do British nuclear forces guarantee 
full US commitment to Europe and Soviet 
recognition of it? 
OR Are US forces committed anyway and 
independent British initiatives more likely 
to trigger Soviet retaliation than US 
involvement? 
The United States favours a British force because it favours shared responsi- 
bility. It also fears that British unilateral nuclear disarmament will be part of 
a general down-grading of the British defence effort. We have had these forces 
for so long now that there is scepticism about claims that we can give them up 
and compensate by being all the more vigorous elsewhere. It would make 
NATO look like one great big daddy and a lot of little hens running behind. 
At the moment it is not like that. America is the biggest partner, certainly, 
but Britain is also one of the major contributors. 
(iv) Is the cost of the British deterrent small in 
view of the vital defence role it plays? Are 
alternatives likely to be more expensive? 
OR Can Britain's nuclear forces only be 
afforded at the expense of conventional 
strength and of other more important 
economic priorities? 
Arguments about the cost of the British nuclear deterrent are a red herring. 
If it was not a nuclear weapon, nobody would be complaining that it was 
expensive. For example, Tornado is costing more, but there is no comparable 
`Ban the Tornado' campaign. This is just a useful handle for the anti-nuclear 
brigade to hang their argument on. 
(v) Would unilateral British nuclear 
disarmament have no effect on other 
countries and only serve to weaken British 
influence and allow France unchallenged 
ascendancy in Europe? 
OR Does the British deterrent encourage 
proliferation and do nothing to enhance 
British prestige? Would British 
disarmament within the context outlined in 
B help to break the nuclear log jam? 
If Britain gave up her independent deterrent, it would have no effect on the 
Soviet Union. The disparity in power is too great. The fact that at the time of 
Reykjavik Mr Gorbachev dropped the precondition that he had previously 
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been insisting on with regard to the British and French deterrents, shows that 
this had just been a ploy aimed at dividing the West. 
Although it is not enough in itself to constitute a major reason for Britain 
to keep her deterrent, it is certainly true that it serves to give her an important 
measure of influence with the United States as the Camp David Accords 
showed. 
(vi) Is investment in Trident the best way to OR Would commitment to Trident exacerbate 
continue to ensure effective British strategic all the drawbacks listed above? 
defence into the 21st century? 
There can be no doubt that, for the role it has to play, Trident is the best 
system. Alternatives such as Cruise missiles would be more expensive - for 
example, to acquire a deterrent force based on Cruise missiles that would be 
as effective as one based on Trident could cost up to twice as much. 
Nor will Trident represent an enormous escalation in firepower over Polaris. 
We have made it plain that we will not be using the full warhead-capacity. 
Our objective remains for it to be a minimum deterrent, although it has to be 
a rather larger minumum in order to get through what are now more sophisti- 
cated defences. 
2 NATO Forces and US Bases 
(i) Must Britain continue to share OR Should British obligations to NATO be 
responsibility for manning NATO nuclear met by strengthening conventional forces 
systems upon which her security depends? where necessary within an overall non- 
Would refusal to do so fatally weaken the' nuclear strategy as recommended in B? 
alliance? 
This is of great importance. To refuse to do this would undoubtedly divide 
and weaken the Alliance, throwing the burden in particular onto the West 
Germans. It is nonsense to suggest that Britain's obligations to NATO can be 
met by `strengthening conventional forces within an overall non-nuclear strategy'. 
There is no overall non-nuclear strategy, nor can there be while the situation 
is as it is. 
(ii) Would the forced withdrawal of US OR Do the large numbers of nuclear facilities 
nuclear bases from Britain make US yielded to the US erode British 
defence of the West impossible? Is sovereignty? Would their removal do no 
American interference in British affairs more than restore a normal peacetime 
negligible? relationship? 
First of all, our sovereignty is not eroded. We have control over how American 
bases are used. No operation is conducted from an American base in Britain 
without the Prime Minister's approval - as the Libyan raid showed. 
But, once again, the main thing to stress is that the Atlantic Alliance is the 
foundation on which European security is built. The transatlantic partnership 
is based on pragmatic mutual self-interest, underpinned by a common heri- 
tage, shared experience, and a joint commitment to the principles of freedom 
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and democracy. It is a unique bargain, and not one that we should take for 
granted. There are already signs of resurgent neo-isolationism in America, 
and a shift in US attention towards the Pacific basin, so that Europe is no 
longer the automatic first concern of many Americans today. If we put in 
doubt the value to America of its continued involvement in Europe - for 
example, by depriving their conventional forces of the nuclear umbrella they 
require to meet the Soviet threat - then we put in 'doubt also the foundations 
on which our security is based. It would be a profoundly misguided and 
irresponsible thing to do. 
(iii) Will Britain continue to be targeted by 
Soviet warheads whether or not she 
disarms unilaterally? 
OR Is Britain seen as an American aircraft 
carrier and targeted by he USSR 
accordingly? Will Britdin fall an early 
victim in any superpower confrontation 
unless bases are removed? 
It is unrealistic to think that Britain could be a nuclear-free sanctuary, no 
matter what she did, Her geographical position alone means that she will be 
targeted. 
(iv) Can non-nuclear defences only safely be 
afforded by powers prepared to shelter 
beneath the American strategic umbrella? 
OR In a nuclear free Europe, decoupled from 
the superpower nuclear confrontation, 
would Britain no more expect to depend 
upon the US `umbrella' than any other 
Western ally - or than Eastern Europe 
upon the USSR? 
It means nothing for the Labour Party to say `we are not going to shelter under 
theAmerican nuclear umbrella'. This is empty rhetoric. The American umbrella 
is there, and is recognized as such on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It is only 
because of it that the Labour Party can indulge in the luxury of such a policy 
at all. 
Moral Considerations 
Any moral discussion must be founded on the realities that we face; including 
the existence of nuclear weapons, and the realities of the measures nations 
have historically been prepared to take in pursuit of their objectives, including 
war. The moral repugnance at the thought of the effects of nuclear weapons 
is understandable, and, indeed, right. That must be the starting-point for 
serious discussion of defence and deterrence. I believe that the aim of prevent- 
ing war is a moral one; and that the Government's duty to ensure the security 
of the people is a moral one. As far as resources are concerned, of course we 
have to weigh up the consequences on other programmes of spending on 
defence; but, as one of my predecessors put it, `Peace is expensive - but it is 
never as expensive as war. ' 
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Recommendations 
i No, because this would freeze present imbalances, remove much of the 
incentive to achieve cuts, and be impossible to verify (SDE 1983, p8, para 
2). = 
2 No (see A2(A)(v)). 
3 No (see A2(A)(vii)). 
4 No (see B(iii)). 
5 No, we should concentrate efforts on reductions in United States and 
Soviet arsenals. 
6 No, not in Europe, because it would be militarily meaningless (SDE 1983, 
p8, para. 4). 
7 Yes. 
8 No, because the British Government believes that total nuclear disarma- 
ment could only contribute to security if it was accompanied by reductions 
in conventional arms as part of the process of general and complete dis- 
armament. It does not seem likely that this is achievable by the end of the 
century (see A2(B)). 
9I do believe that it will be necessary for the United States to retain a 
minimum strategic force unless or until more effective means can be 
devised for maintaining Western security. But it is of course difficult to 
comment on the specific weapon system that such a minimum strategic 
force might be based on (see Ai(iv)). 
to No (see A2(A)(v)). 
ii No (see B(iii)). 
12 No (see B(iv)). 
13 No (see Ci). 
14 No (see Ai(iii) etc). 
15 No. See No. 6. 
16 No (see Ci). 
17 Does not apply. 
18 No (see C2(1)). 
19 No (see C2(1) & C2(ii)). 
20 Does not apply. 
i. Statement on the Defence Estimates. 
